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I 
 
Abstract 
 
Since Deng Xiaoping‘s ―South Tour Speech‖ which he delivered during his 
inspection of special economic region in southern China in 1992, China‘s reforms and 
opening-up have entered a period of stable and rapid development. These undoubtedly 
are driving a comprehensive range of areas of social transition in Chinese society, 
including state affairs, social activities, mass culture, and globalization. All these 
factors may have a significant impact on the situation of Chinese film, but in the 
meantime, local cinema will inevitably present contemporary China and its social 
culture in a certain way. 
 
This thesis chooses a period of time from 1993 to 2008 and examines 
―nostalgia‖, a unique area of contemporary Chinese cinema, as its basis for discussion. 
In the light of Western and postmodern cultural theories, this study aims to explore the 
current state of nostalgia film and its postmodern elements in China and to extend the 
discussion to social areas and cultural studies. The conclusion reached by the 
discussion includes two major aspects. First, through historical reconstruction and 
superficial pastiche, China‘s past (or its nostalgia) has inevitably presented certain 
distortions when facing the global mass cult and Chinese communist leitmotiv 
ideology. Second, contemporary China has reached the stage of a visually featured, 
postmodern consumer society.  
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Chapter ONE 
Introduction – Nostalgia and Its Postmodernity 
 
In certain postmodern conditions, the concept of ―nostalgia‖ has become 
widely divergent from its original meaning in Western languages. The word, nostalgia 
originated in the early modern period. In 1688, Johannes Hofer (1669-1752), a Swiss 
doctor, first coined the term in his dissertation, in order to describe a frequent 
occurrence in Swiss mercenaries who in the plains of lowlands of France or Italy were 
longing for their native mountain landscapes. Such medical cases of mental illness are 
what we commonly described as homesickness today. To be more precise, the word 
―nostalgia‖ is a Greek compound, consisting of nóstos (homesick), and álgos (pain or 
ache). It was described as a medical condition at that time as nostomania and 
philopatridomania (qtd. in Natali, ―History and the Politics of Nostalgia‖). Soon after 
that, the Industrial Revolution of Europe rapidly led to a large-scale movement of 
population and colonial expansion in capitalism. The original idea of nostalgia as an 
emotional state of melancholy quickly spread through boom cities and colonists. In 
the early modern period, homesickness became the theme of nostalgia. 
 
In this way, one may realize that the initial idea of nostalgia in the early stage 
of modernity is quite different compared with today. The former, pining for a physical 
home, concerns the shifting from one geographical location to another; whereas the 
latter, yearning for the past, focuses more on the ellipses of time. Such a difference 
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consists in different relations of time and space. That of Western modernity can be 
embodied in an improvement in transportation (such as the invention of the train and 
steamships), and by the scattering of the modern urban industry (as Raymond 
Williams pointed in his The Country and the City, the urban prosperity and resulting 
population mobility brought by the industrial revolution). Then the root of the pain 
comes from the impassable distance between the country and the city. Because of the 
spatial distance people at that time could not return to their native land and even fell 
ill from nostalgia. However, as time went on, contemporary nostalgia gradually 
changed from a longing for space (homesickness) to a time of recall of the past.
 
According to Janelle Wilson, ―the definition of nostalgia as a disease prevailed until 
the late nineteenth century. Nostalgia during this time was de-medicalized.‖ (Wilson 
22)
1
 
 
This, to some extent, profits from a certain psychological disorder of people‘s 
spatial identification with their homeland in modern development. A typical example 
is from a recent Taiwan film, Cape No. 7 (by Wei Te-Sheng, 2008), about the end of 
the colonial era on the island. In the film a Japanese young man born in 1920s 
Taiwan
2
 is forced to leave the place by boat at the end of World War II. When the 
ship is heading for Japan, the young fellow writes down the words below for his lover 
                                                        
1  Also as Linda Hutcheon believes, ―by the nineteenth century, a considerable semantic slippage had occurred, 
and the word [nostalgia] began to lose its purely medical meaning […] and by the twentieth century, it had 
begun to attract the interest of psychiatrists. But curious things happened in that generalizing process: nostalgia 
became less a physical than a psychological condition‖. See Hutcheon, Linda. ―Irony, Nostalgia, and the 
Postmodern‖, Online data, 1998 at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/utel/criticism/hutchinp.html Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010 
2  From April 1894 to August 1945, Taiwan was a Japanese colony. 
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in Taiwan: 
 
The ocean in December is always with rage, 
The pressure of shame and regret is too great for me, 
Combined with the restless shake, 
I don‘t know if this is to return home, 
Or go away from home!
3
 
 
In this case, the spatial identity of the young man (with his homeland) has 
been at a loss in the inexplicability of a colonial history. However, as has happened in 
today‘s culture, the disorder of identification with our space is not always related to 
the colonial aftermath. As evanescent as snowflakes on a river, a world of the 
spectacle in the postmodern has been quickly changing our home scenes of childhood 
and altered many things beyond recognition. This is particularly in evidence in those 
booming metropolises. Alleyways and small shops have been fast disappearing, and 
replaced by high-rise buildings and busy streets. People are still there but the things 
are no longer the same. Those unvarying promises, like ―fifty years without change‖4 
for Ackbar Abbas, have thus been quietly ―belied by an urban landscape that mutates 
right under our noses‖, making our home ―subtly unrecognisable‖ (441-64).5 This 
raises the question of the disappearance of the difference between the past space and 
the spatial distance. ―Homeland‖ is never going to be any real-life realization by 
putting up with separate space. It is no longer simply a real physical space, but merely 
                                                        
3  “十二月的海总是带着愤怒，我承受着耻辱和悔恨的臭味，陪同不安静地晃荡，不明白我到底是归乡，
还是离乡！” If an English version cannot be found in direct quotations of this research, a translation from 
Chinese to English is usually translated by the author, except specified in reference. 
4  “五十年不变”。Chinese government has promised to let local people administer the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) with a ―high degree of autonomy‖ for fifty years (from the return of Hong Kong 
in 1997), which means to keep a ―way of life‖ that was supposed to remain unchanged for fifty years. 
5  When talking about Hong Kong, Abbas mentions ―a peculiar kind of city – it appears in the moment of 
disappearance (first sense) and it disappears in appearances/representations (second sense)‖ (446). 
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a disappeared past. The substitute is to rely on time. That is certain past recall in our 
thoughts. Such a memory has become hard to fix in any actual space, and just as has 
been said in a Chinese TV play, becomes ―our youth that has nowhere to set up‖ 6. 
 
Can the memories today pass through the handicap of distance and get to the 
other shore in our dreamland? Zhu Ziqing, a famous essayist of China, said, ―Our 
days leave us, never to return‖.7 We do not miss some place because of leaving it, but 
we experience a loss of identity because we cannot get back to a past of the place any 
more. Thus, the ―days‖ that make us feel lost are not a problem of space or distance at 
all. It has become a time barrier. Linda Hutcheon asserts, 
 
What made that transition possible was a shift in site from the spatial to 
the temporal. Nostalgia was no longer simply a yearning to return 
home. As early as 1798, Immanuel Kant had noted that people who did 
return home were usually disappointed because, in fact, they did not 
want to return to a place, but to a time, a time of youth. Time, unlike 
space, cannot be returned to – ever; time is irreversible. (Hutcheon, 
―Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern‖) 
 
Such a transition from ―place‖ to ―past‖ is also perceived by Janelle Wilson, who says 
―I believe there is a shift from longing for a particular place to longing for a particular 
time‖ (Wilson 22). Boym agrees with this and emphasises that, 
 
At first glance, nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is a 
yeaning for a different time – the time of our childhood, the slower 
rhythms of our dreams. In a broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion 
against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress. The 
nostalgic desire is to obliterate history and turn it into private or 
                                                        
6  《我们无处安放的青春》(directed by Shen Yan. 2005).  
7  “我们的日子„„ 一去不复返”。Zhu, Ziqing. 
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collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to 
the irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition. (xv) 
 
By this token, nostalgia in different stages of history may have a different 
dependence on the distance of space and time. As Fredric Jameson pointed out, the 
inference ―that modernism is temporal and postmodernism spatial has often been 
affirmed‖ (Geopolitical 153). This opinion has perhaps proved a changing process of 
the nostalgic concept. Properly speaking, the ―change‖ is closely interrelated with a 
pair of contrary concepts: linear ―order‖ and its ―loss of sequence‖ (out-of-sequence 
or disorder). Generally, time, to a large extent, is related to the linear order constructed 
in people‘s minds, like a linear loop of narrative with beginning, middle, climax, and 
ending. On the contrary, those spatial feelings are often in a state of chaos without any 
trace of sequence, just as what postmodernism is usually fond of, visual combinations, 
parody, appropriations, and bricolage. Accordingly, space is more related to a 
fragmentary state and its lack of order. This is why sometimes the postmodern 
receives a cold stare for its great passion for space, which easily leads to a prejudice 
that it contains subversive inclinations. If to look for certain time traces in space (like 
homesickness) means to rebuild order; then to hunt for (those imaginary) spatial 
traces in the past tense (like the postmodern nostalgia) will probably mean a disorder 
in time. Taken in this sense, the nostalgic shift – from pining for one‘s birthplace to 
longing for the past – perhaps purports to be a cultural transformation from a certain 
modernist (time) order to a postmodernist lack of sequence in space. 
 
It seems that contemporary Chinese nostalgia has completed such a shift 
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already. Today‘s nostalgia, even in some developing parts of China, has never been 
confused with a homesick sentiment, nor has it been used to describe the accumulated 
sorrows of peasant-workers in urban areas because of failure to go back home. 
Contemporary people in China, in their reference to nostalgia, may often think more 
about those representations of the revolutionary past with war-flame from films and 
TV plays; about all kinds of everyday reproductions printed with images of Chairman 
Mao, Guevara, red pentagrams, and other radical logos selling in Southern Gong and 
Drum Lane (Beijing) and Tian Zi Fang (Shanghai). Think of the revolutionary relics 
and slogans in Factory 798;
8
 about those old pictures, old music, old native cartoons, 
and old daily clothing; about friends in childhood and the old games; about the radical 
parades, various propaganda teams, and their red flags of the 1960s… 
 
Perhaps in the tradition of the Chinese language, the meaning of missing the 
past has always been separated from the concept of homesickness. There has always 
been a factor of ―longing for the old‖ in all periods of China as Ban Gu, a historian in 
the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) mentioned in his Poetic Essay for the West 
Capital (Xidu fu): 
 
The hope that one may express nostalgic sentiment through his 
reminiscence, and to recall with old emotions.
9
 
 
                                                        
8  Compared with those brand new modern buildings, people can find a unique architectural style of old Beijing, 
Shanghai and an old decommissioned military factory respectively in Southern Gong and Drum Lane, Tian Zi 
Fang, and the 798. Today, they are being developed into commercial shopping centres that house a thriving 
artist community with scores of galleries, lofts, publishing firms, design companies, tailor shops, and cafés and 
fancy restaurants set up. There are a lot of beautiful, special and unique goods (or handicrafts), some of them 
with nostalgic impressions. 
9  Ban, Gu. 班固, Xidu fu《西都赋》, Han Dynasty, “愿宾摅怀旧之蓄念，发思古之幽情。” 
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Yuan Zhen, a Chinese poet in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.), also wrote: 
 
The tear is for the separation and nostalgia, 
Call to mind our world again and begin a long march.
10
 
 
In addition, Liu Xun, a writer in the Yuan Dynasty, mentioned his personal 
experience in his work, and overcome with emotion wrote: 
 
I have lived on past 66 years of age, the older I am, the more I can feel 
a nostalgic dreariness.
11
 
 
It is thus clear that nostalgia in China is familiar from time immemorial. To 
meditate on the past has been common for a long time. 
 
Accidentally or fatefully, contemporary nostalgias from both China and the 
West meet at a point of intersection and become similar ideas in today‘s cultural 
concept. This in return is testing and verifying a referential feasibility between 
cultural studies of China and the West. If we recognize that what Jameson called (the 
Western) nostalgia is weighed with Western culture in postmodernity, it will naturally 
lead us to ask: Has China reached certain contexts of a postmodern culture yet? It thus 
inevitably becomes a crucial issue in the contemporary nostalgic culture of China. 
Although Simon Malpas emphasizes that the ―plurality of definitions has become 
crucial to the sense that the term ‗postmodern‘ now carries‖ (5), this research will only 
focus on those postmodern issues that cinematically relate to Chinese nostalgia. 
Chinese postmodernity on some economic levels does still remain the subject of much 
                                                        
10  Yuan, Zhen. 元稹，《赠吴渠州从姨兄士则》，“泪因生别兼怀旧，回首江山欲万行。” 
11  Liu, Xun. 刘埙,《隐居通议·礼乐》Yuan Dynasty, “余亦六十有六矣，老冉冉至，怀旧凄然。” 
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controversy
12
, but this is not the focal point of the thesis. Because, whatever the 
economy, a globalized cultural development has led to the germination of both a 
postmodernism in Chinese literature and art and a postmodernity in its socio-cultural 
aspects. In nostalgic debates, this research has attempted to reflect a postmodern 
condition of China from a particular angle. 
 
Undoubtedly, postmodern issues have attracted widespread interest and 
criticism in the film studies of China. Since 1988 when a local journal, Northwest 
Films
13
, started a serial discussion on postmodern films, the topic has never left the 
research field of vision. In the 1990s, two crucial scholars, Yin Hong and Dai Jinhua, 
provided impetus to postmodern studies in local films. In his article ―The Chinese 
Film in a Postmodern Context‖, Yin aims to break the local academia free from 
entanglement in the pure artistic strategies of Western postmodernism, and instead 
advocates changing and extending the academic concerns into a (postmodern) cultural 
context of contemporary China so that a postmodern issue can be involved in the local 
film studies and their cultural debates (Yin 60-7). Meanwhile, on the other hand, Dai 
Jinhua focuses her efforts on introducing Chinese postmodern culture to the West. In 
the late 1990s, quite a few of her essays, on Chinese postmodern presentations 
through local films, television soap operas, pop music and literature, were translated 
into English and released in Western academic circles. In ―Imagined Nostalgia‖, Dai 
                                                        
12  There is an undeniable fact that China has a long way to go to catch up with the developed world economy. 
13  Northwest Films《大西北电影》was the first to release serial essays discussing postmodernism and film in 
China. See Northwest Films, 1988-1,3,4-7,9,10. 
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explores how ―the giddy and aggressively rapid urbanization‖ in China has made 
nostalgia ―a strategic need, a necessary spiritual space for imagining and for 
consolation‖ in a postmodern context (147). This is the earliest known research on 
nostalgic culture in China today. Though there has been a great diversity of film 
studies in China combined with postmodern ideas since the new century, topics and 
papers are still rare on interdisciplinary studies between postmodern cinema and the 
cultural traits of local nostalgia. This thesis has attempted to focus on the latest 
developments in that field. 
 
However, as far as a literature review is concerned, the discussion on 
nostalgia in (even Western) academic circles seems still limited. As Svetlana Boym 
points out, ―nostalgia remains unsystematic and unsynthesizable; it seduces rather 
than convinces‖ (13). Janelle Wilson also says that on the topic of nostalgia it ―is 
difficult to reach conclusions which can be stated in definite, absolute, certain terms‖ 
(8). If one examines the basic concept of nostalgia from different scholars, it is not 
hard to find that their academic focuses usually include individual interests with little 
collision of views appearing. Generally speaking, essential ideas of nostalgia in 
today‘s academic domain can be reflected in the three following questions. 
 
First, is nostalgia a private experience or collectively discussible? Some 
scholars consider it as quite a personal affair. According to Elihu Howland,  
 
Nostalgia is […] unique. We have all encountered it, but not 
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necessarily in the same setting, and each of us feels grasped by it in a 
special way that he alone can know, so that the experiences of no two 
of us are probably quite the same. (―Nostalgia‖ 198)  
 
Also as Wilson states, in spite of today‘s popular cultural texts which provide a 
general landscape for describing and expressing a public experience of the past, ―the 
individual experiencing this emotion‖ is apt to find it difficult to truly capture in 
general affairs (24). However, in the meantime, Wilson also asserts the fact that most 
of the nostalgic resources may be provided by the dominant culture in the public 
sphere. So ―there is an interplay between what is available culturally and the 
individual‘s own bibliography, memory, and emotions‖ (30). Fred Davis has made 
still further progress to define the distinction between ―collective‖ and ―private‖ 
nostalgia.
14
 Generally, a collective and public domain can, to a great degree, 
influence the contemporary cultural wave. Davis then relates collective nostalgia to 
the purpose of forging national identities which suggests that, by representing past 
reference, collective nostalgia from the ―dominant culture‖ might both influence and 
reflect ―selective remembering and selective forgetting that occur at the collective 
level‖ (qtd. in Wilson 31). In the light of that point, this thesis is inclined to take 
advantage of the nostalgic double-movement of both remembrance and oblivion in 
exploring the way contemporary China has forged her public history (especially, the 
politically radical period between the 1950s to the 1970s) in the mass culture today, 
through its nostalgic cultural control such as film release and censorship. 
                                                        
14  As Davis terms, ―collective nostalgia‖ refers to ―that condition in which the symbolic objects are of a highly 
public, widely shared, and familiar character, i.e., those symbolic resources from the past which can under 
proper conditions trigger off wave upon wave of nostalgic feeling in millions of persons at the same time.‖ 
While ―private nostalgia‖ refers to ―those symbolic images and allusions from the past which by virtue of their 
resource in a particular person‘s biography tend to be more idiosyncratic, individuated, and particularistic in 
their reference.‖ (Fred Davis 222). 
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In the second place, is nostalgia a nice memory or disconsolately painful? To 
this question, most of the answers from Western academic circles are similar to what 
Wilson said: ―One‘s nostalgic memories may connote a pleasant or good time in the 
past, the fact that the individual is removed from that ideal situation can trigger 
sadness and a sense of loss‖ (22). Ralph Harper agreed with that and said ―nostalgia 
combines bitterness and sweetness, the lost and the found, the far and the near, the 
new and the familiar, absence and presence‖ (120). Lowenthal also asserts, ―nostalgia 
is memory with the pain removed, the pain is today‖ (8). Therefore it is almost 
common sense that the past is the good old days in nostalgia, which leaves regret 
today. Even as Wilson insists, ―my position is that […] there cannot be a so-called 
‗negative nostalgia‘‖. She then gives two examples for its impossibility. One is the 
Great Depression
15
 experienced by many individuals who may actually recall how 
difficult their lives were. But Wilson does not think there is longing for the 
Depression. In spite of their hard time, ―many individuals reflected nostalgically on 
families and communities pulling together […] which, compared to the present, may 
seem healthier and more intact‖ (27). The other example is about nostalgia for the 
Cultural Revolution in China, which as Wilson says, was objectively not ―the good 
old days‖ but seemed rather ―puzzling‖, since ―individuals‘ lives and careers were 
wrecked during this time of political struggle‖. As Wilson considers it, nowadays, 
―those feature images and slogans from the Cultural Revolution‖ have been ―aired‖ 
                                                        
15  A worldwide (economic) recession in the 1930s. 
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commercially. In this way, ―communist nostalgia has been turned into a capitalist 
marketing device‖. According to her it is ―a response to modernization in China, 
longing for a past that was more simple and certain, and less materialistic and 
commercially driven‖ (28). The Cultural Revolution is also what this thesis has 
attempted to bring widely into the discussion, and it does not much care whether the 
piece of the past is good or sad. After all, different individuals with different stands do 
have their own sentiment. What this research really cares about is the way by which  
today‘s culture represents its past in Chinese nostalgia films, and how its aftermath in 
return reflects on the contemporary (and the postmodern) society and culture. 
 
Thirdly, is nostalgia always a presentation of the realistic past? Andrew 
Wernick answers that nostalgia ―might never have been present at all‖ (219). Hence 
the past in nostalgia is turned into myths or utopias. Moreover, as George Mead 
argues, the past is never left as the past. Indeed, the past is as uncertain as the future 
(26). Wilson asks a similar question, ―Does the ‗nostalgic‘ truly long to go back in 
time? Instead, I think it is more a longing to recapture a mood or spirit of a previous 
time‖ (26). She uses the verb ―nostalagize‖, instead of ―nostalgia‖, to reveal that we 
actually yearn for (and recreate) a past that we wish for, rather than it really was. Thus 
one may realize a realistic significance of nostalgia for contemporary culture, which 
as Chilton suggests, could be quite ―valuable in helping us figure out what [today‘s] 
people want‖ (qtd. in Wilson 26) or what kind of historical opinion the dominant 
culture or market would like the masses to hold. In this case, nostalgia is not always a 
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realistic or rational speculation upon the real past. Just as Wilson comments, 
―nostalgia is between the head and the heart, […] the head knows that what is being 
fondly recalled wasn‘t really that way, but the heart finds comfort in the feeling‖ (23). 
Finally nostalgia is, indeed like Elihu Howland‘s observation, ―a confusing emotion, 
full of paradoxes‖ (198). 
 
However, I do not intend to explore the (purely academic) concept of nostalgia 
in writing this thesis. Instead, there is an attempt to examine the way the idea of 
nostalgia implemented in Chinese cinema (since the 1990s) has influenced and is 
reflected in the forging of postmodernity in contemporary China. This study brings 
together research I have carried out over the past several years on the postmodern.
16
 
To understand how nostalgia relates to the postmodern studies, Linda Hutcheon‘s 
research seems definitely enlightening. In her 1998 article, ―Irony, Nostalgia, and the 
Postmodern‖, Hutcheon attempts to find possibilities for the coexistence of irony and 
nostalgia in a postmodern context. As she said, ―[i]n general cultural commentary […] 
irony and nostalgia are both seen as key components of contemporary culture today‖. 
Even so, she does not deny that there is a connection between irony and nostalgia in 
today‘s postmodern culture. ―[H]ere was irony‘s end and nostalgia‘s proliferating 
types sharing […] the same popular culture‖, says Hutcheon, ―[i]n the 1980s, it was 
irony that captured our attention most; in the 1990s, it appears to be nostalgia that is 
holding sway‖. In this case, her argument, ―the end of irony seemed actually to 
                                                        
16  A necessary framework of postmodern theories and Chinese social background have been sorted through in 
Chapter 2. 
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necessitate this proliferation of nostalgia‖ (Hutcheon, ―Irony, Nostalgia, and the 
Postmodern‖), has become the academic basis of existence for my Chapter 3. That 
chapter, through a case study on a Chinese postmodern film (An Orphan Joins the 
Army), not only explains how postmodern irony can be presented in the cinema by 
parody, intertextuality, game spirit, fake documentary, and ahistorical discourse; but 
also elaborates a social context of the contemporary China (in the early 1990s) in both 
its literary and cultural domain, which seems prepared for the germination and 
proliferation of China‘s nostalgia. Thus it is reasonable to start the discussion from 
postmodern irony in this research. The following discussion in Chapter 4 begins to 
introduce the idea of nostalgia (in what Fredric Jameson called pastiche) through the 
comparison with Hutcheon‘s postmodern parody. Facing the contemporary cultural 
exhaustion and the exclusively stylistic nightmare in modernity, nostalgia (pastiche) 
becomes a passive acceptance, the only choice in the postmodern culture. As Jameson 
believes ―the moment at which pastiche appears parody has become impossible‖ 
(Jameson 1983, 114). It is then that Chinese nostalgic films remount the historical 
stage in the early 1990s. 
 
This research takes note of the numerous examples of nostalgia (and 
postmodern nostalgia
17
) that abound in the contemporary local cinema, in mass 
culture, and among people‘s memories of the past. The category of nostalgic cinema 
                                                        
17  This thesis does not mean to juxtapose the word ―nostalgia‖ with the idea ―postmodern nostalgia‖ as a pair of 
comparable concepts, nor does it admit that there is any essential distinction between them. Here it just 
emphasizes that this research is more inclined to study the contemporary nostalgia by a concept of the 
postmodern. 
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studied in this thesis is from the early 1990s to the near present around 2009. Within 
that two decades‘ duration, Chinese cinema has roughly experienced a nostalgic 
film-making climax twice. The first was around 1993, with Chinese fifth generation 
directors and their works, including the Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993), 
Farewell My Concubine (Chen Kaige, 1993), and To Live (Zhang Yimou, 1994). The 
other was started after 2005, by a group of post-fifth generation directors, such as Gu 
Changwei‘s Peacock (2005), Wang Xiaoshuai‘s Shanghai Dream (2005), Zhang 
Yang‘s Sunflower (2005), Li Yu‘s Dam Street (2005), Lou Ye‘s Summer Palace (2006) 
and so on. These are called the two nostalgic waves in this study. The first nostalgic 
wave will be mainly discussed in Chapters 5 and 6; the second in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
How are these nostalgic trends expressed in cinema? What purposes are being 
served through both selective remembering and selective forgetting? The crucial 
relationship between nostalgia and postmodernism that Fredric Jameson presented in 
―Nostalgia for the Present‖, in his 1991 book, Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism, finds support in the discussions I have conducted. Part of my 
research, especially Chapter 5, is based upon the basic idea of Jamesonian nostalgia 
which, through its postmodern characteristic of spatial superficiality in filmic pastiche, 
makes Chinese cinema gradually understood as a production process, a global 
marketing strategy, and international consumer participation. Similarly to Wilson‘s 
argument, ―[n]ostalgia is prepackaged and sold as a commodity‖ (30), nostalgia in 
Chinese cinema is casting away from its real history, distorting itself, and putting on 
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colourful adornment in the purpose of commercial temptation. This discussion is 
extended in Chapter 6, where such commercial supplies of overseas nostalgic 
consumption might be regarded as the seduction of Chinese cinema that profited 
greatly from a ―selective forgetting‖ by the dominant culture in the local film market 
through censorship. When a radical past memory combined with pent-up emotions 
cannot be released domestically, the local filmmakers then cast their sights abroad. 
Seen from the angle of the Chinese intellectuals, such a change hints at an 
intentionally fawning position towards the West and a psychological escape. 
Accordingly, the Chinese past has gradually become a part of global nostalgic 
illusions. 
 
Chapter 7 introduces a social transition from political retrospections to a rapid 
development in the economy and entertainment in the late 1990s. The local film 
industry slowed its nostalgic creation, and the reconstruction of the Chinese radical 
past was dramatically reduced for a while. That is called a short silence of nostalgia in 
this research. When the economic prosperity since the 1990s becomes a decisive force 
in the social culture, some Western arguments from Jean Baudrillard and David 
Lowenthal may eventually correspond with the Chinese process of nostalgic 
development. If consumer society becomes true, its culture, its space and its fashion 
must then be involved, says Baudrillard, into a ceaseless circle of accelerated 
replacement (Consumer 42-6). Thus as Lowenthal asserts, where there is accelerated 
obsolescence, there appears to be over-running nostalgia (399), not excepting 
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contemporary China. 
 
The last part of the thesis (Chapter 8) stresses a cinematic comparison between 
the 1990s‘ first nostalgic wave and the second launched since 2005. Owing to the 
lesson drawn from strict (nostalgic) film censorship in the 1990s, the second wave is 
drifting towards the edge from a political (radical) focus of history. If we see a 
nostalgic estrangement form radical trauma as a hint that the dominant culture (the 
local authorities) is selectively forgetting certain past history, one may come to realize 
a trivialized nostalgic ―everyday‖ as a selective remembering. That is likely to be an 
act of historical whitewashing, which is then apt to influence (and even form) our 
contemporary understanding of the past. Therefore nostalgia, in such a process of 
historical reconstruction, perhaps has limitations, which however can still be read as a 
profound reference to reflect the contemporary Chinese society. 
 
Before the discussion starts, it should be emphasized here, that what the thesis 
will talk about is not an entire nostalgic category of Chinese cinema. It never denies 
that there were perhaps some nostalgic inclinations in Chinese films before the two 
nostalgic waves, which are not involved in this topic. Moreover, there may have been 
some films that convey nostalgic feelings but which have been ignored by this study. 
As far as these imperfections of film selection are concerned, three points have been 
given below for explanation: 
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Many Chinese films before the 1990s – including some of the scar films (such 
as Xie Jin‘s Hibiscus Town, 1986; and Huang Shuqin‘s Woman Demon Human, 1987), 
the war movie (such as Wang Ping‘s The Story of Liu Bao, 1957; and Li Ang and Li 
Jun‘s Sparkling Red Star, 1974), the historical theme (such as Li Qiankuan and Xiao 
Yungui‘s The Birth of New China, 1989), and the homesick general (such as Wu 
Yigong‘s My Memories of Old Beijing, 1982) – are more or less related to the topic of 
nostalgia. However, they must be excluded from the main part of the discussion, 
either because they are outside the study phase focusing on 1993–2008, or distant 
from a postmodern or contemporary nostalgic issue. 
 
As far as the textual content is concerned, a historical category which can be 
generally recalled by contemporary nostalgia could probably extend back to a period 
from the 1920s to the 1990s. But the span that this thesis will mainly focus on is not 
as long as that. What the first nostalgic wave mainly concerns is a stretch of history 
from the 1940s to the 1960s; and the second wave is generally about a past social 
scene in the 1970s and 1980s. In a sense the study interest of this thesis will mainly 
include a radical and political reinterpretation since Socialist China was founded (the 
first wave) and a self-examination and representation of the new social reform in 
China during the late 1970s and early 1980s (the second wave). While beyond this 
interest, there are perhaps many other nostalgic factors that this study has not dabbled 
in, and their existence is not denied. 
 
Chapter One 
 19 
Finally, one‘s general outlook of nostalgia is perhaps a dynamic or flexible 
field of view, which to a large extent depends on a dynamic age-state of the 
mainstream audience of the day. A person who was born in the 1930s may find it hard 
to share a similar piece of nostalgia with a junior born in the 1980s. When the junior 
reaches his later years in life, his grandparents‘ early experiences around the 1930s 
would not be called nostalgia any longer, instead they could be termed ―a memorable 
personal history‖. 
 
Thus, any topic about nostalgia cannot claim a comprehensive (rounded) 
analysis. As time goes by, all nostalgic feelings will degenerate and all this research 
can really do is to grasp the most recent feelings of nostalgia. The two nostalgic 
waves are matched with two generations of directors in China respectively, the fifth 
generation and the post-fifth generation. The past periods referred to in their films 
may be generally in accord with the early backgrounds (childhood or youth) of 
themselves. However, this situation seems a bit different from a broad sense of 
nostalgia, in which one‘s nostalgia is for a period much earlier than their own age. For 
instance, a person who was born in the 1960s may have a nostalgic interest in the 
1930s and 1940s, because they relate to their parents and elders‘ experiences, which 
can easily excite nostalgic feelings since the young never stop imitating and being 
infatuated with their elders‘ world in their early years. 
 
Nevertheless, in most of the films selected in this research, their nostalgic 
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content does not extend beyond the childhood of their directors. This is because 
Chinese history has turned over a new leaf since 1949. The fifth generation directors 
were born in the early 1950s, and their nostalgic films are mainly about the radical 
period of the new socialist country (the 1950s to 1960s). At that time, a communist 
revolution itself had the ability to wipe out all the heritage and consciousness of the 
traditional timeline. Such a thorough abolition may have considerable implications for 
certain deconstruction in a radical past (like the Cultural Revolution). In this case, the 
mental growth of the fifth generation directors in their childhood may have become 
immersed in a radical practice of spurning history and traditions. Their parents‘ early 
experiences may have become their targets for rebellion or at least made them despair. 
It is a spiritually independent period, a real age that forsakes the past. People of those 
days may retain independent thinking and memories. Comparatively speaking, the 
post-fifth generation directors (generally born around the latter half of 1960s) could 
have had more opportunity to overstep their childhood and imitate their elders in the 
second nostalgic wave. However, for a variety of reasons, most of their nostalgic 
focus has been delayed to the second half of the 1970s. Beyond doubt, Deng 
Xiaoping‘s reform and opening-up combined with dramatic social changes have 
brought them more intensified heart-quake. 
 
It was the sixtieth anniversary of the People‘s Republic of China (1st October 
1949-2009) when the first draft of this research was finished. Through the guidance of 
governmental investments in filmmaking, the Chinese film authority prepared and 
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dominated as many as forty film productions that are called ―celebration films‖ for the 
national anniversary, including The Founding of a Republic (Jianguo daye, Han 
Sanping and Huang Jianxin), The Message (Fengsheng, Chen Guofu and Gao 
Qunshu), and Tiananmen (Ye Daying). From August to October, 2009, the domestic 
cinema chains have been peppered with such greeting films. Among them, most of 
those films can be brought into a film category of nostalgia. However, these films are 
too close to the time the thesis was written to allow a settling time for academic 
review. It is difficult to tell whether these films were a flash in the pan, or a new wave 
of nostalgic culture in China. Thus, this thesis will just leave it at that. The nostalgic 
film-case study of this research will mainly focus on a filmmaking period from 1993 
to the first half of 2009. All the films involved in the discussion have been listed in the 
film appendix at the end of the thesis.  
 
As for the name spelling style of this thesis, all Chinese names (including 
political leaders, film directors, and academic scholars) are spelt in Chinese style, 
which is to print Chinese surname followed by given name. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework and Social Background 
 
2.1. Significance and Methodology 
 
Each piece of research in universities has its own social meaning and the 
discussions contained in this thesis are no exception. Although the whole thesis is 
based on filmic examples, which generally emphasize the discussion in the domain of 
film studies, the pivot is on a broad discussion of postmodern issues (especially 
postmodern nostalgia), and it tries to seek a balance between films and contemporary 
culture. Thus a combination of film studies and cultural studies, and their interaction 
and infiltration, seem significant as well. Both sides may have influence on and 
significance for each other. Concerning culture, as Peter Koslowski (1999) argues, 
certain points of view in postmodern study should be diverted to cultural study 
(108-52). This actually includes the cross combination of postmodern films and 
culture. Films, as a cultural communication platform and impetus, are gradually 
showing their value in cultural studies (e.g. globalization, consumer society and 
post-industrial life). Since film studies, whether about film making, distribution, 
internal narrative, flat appearance, or audience reception, all have close relations with 
mass cultural activities that should be emphasized and applied as a crucial basis for a 
discussion of contemporary culture. Therefore, through this research, the 
methodology and experience of a cross-disciplinary study may also be further 
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accumulated. 
 
As far as postmodernist study is concerned, this thesis is of great value for 
reference as well. Postmodernism and postmodernity are multifunctional. They are 
not only a kind of subversion of modern rational enlightenment, but a very creative 
and innovative impetus to shape a new cultural prospect. On the one hand, 
postmodernism may be regarded as a cultural weapon of the masses to erase the 
social-estate boundary between the high arts and the popular tastes; on the other, it 
may be exploited by the mainstream power to trivialize/fragment social contradictions 
and to reduce/weaken the rebellious voice. Meanwhile, of course the absolute status 
of the mainstream discourse is inevitably impacted on as well. All the social power — 
from its accumulation, taking effects, to having results — has possibly been reflected 
by the contemporary cinema, which provides explanations for the flexible cultural 
trend. Hence the postmodern study in this paper will not only be a theoretical fulcrum 
for films and culture, but more importantly, it will give profound reasons for cultural 
phenomena and offer evidence and comments for cultural debates and orientation in 
the future. 
 
To study Chinese issues in a framework of postmodernist theory seems not as 
easy as studying those of the West. The social reality of China is not just an 
‗industrial-modern‘ issue and a ‗post-industrial, postmodern‘ issue, but a mixed reality 
that consists of national, traditional, post-traditional (modern), post-colonial, 
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postmodern and post-Marxist issues. This means that Chinese ideology, the historical 
track and the development of the economy are not consistent with the Western world. 
Furthermore, with the impact of globalization, Chinese society is facing more and 
more infiltrations of cultural imperialism, which fragment the local traditional life. 
Meanwhile postmodern culture in China is also showing subversive trends towards 
the bureaucratic government. All these social environments tend to shape a new 
dominant influence on mass culture, which differs from that of the West. It is not easy 
to know whether to regard Chinese cinema as a process of learning from and imitating 
the West, or a course of nostalgia and fragmentation as the country (post) modernizes. 
Whether a film reflects a realistic response, a distorted image or a creative drive, they 
all have special reference to the research. 
 
Chinese nostalgia has its special importance as well. In the light of discussions 
on ―pastiche‖ and ―cultural exhaustion‖, Fredric Jameson tries to bring the 
postmodern round to a topic of nostalgia. Based on the imitation of the past, he 
introduces a way to understand a historical superficiality and its incredulous gaze on 
the past. For China however, its local nostalgia seems different from Western feelings 
of pure bright sunshine, and memories of the past may be clouded with historical or 
political pain. Much of the contemporary nostalgia in China focuses on the political 
and radical themes from the 1950s to 1970s. Therefore, the special, historical case of 
the Chinese past experience has given literary (cultural) criticism from the Western 
―new left‖ a realistic meaning, which prompts a historical review of the Chinese 
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socialist practice and its reflections of the time. In this case, the local nostalgic studies 
may make an independent contribution to the global academia. 
 
It is beyond dispute that film has provided an immense stage for nostalgic 
presentations. Film studies, in this sense, may naturally become a junction of the 
postmodern discussion, cultural studies, and an ideological past of China. So this 
research will still mainly depend on methodologies of film study. Generally speaking, 
there are two dominant methods for the field, narrative analysis and genre analysis.  
 
In terms of the former, it seems obvious that the narrative style of those films 
related to postmodernism has its own stance and characteristics, by which, as Peter 
Wollen (1985) suggested, we may compare and analyse the narrative difference  
between a counter/alternative cinema and the mainstream cinema. Cited in the table 
below are several differences identified by Wollen (500-8). Although there is some 
difference between the so-called counter cinema and the postmodern film in their 
narratives, we may still receive some inspiration and accumulate analysing 
experiences from their comparison with the mainstream. 
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Mainstream Cinema Counter Cinema 
Linear Narrative Nonlinear Narrative 
One episode follows another in the course 
of narrative construction 
Gaps, interruption, episodic construction, 
digression, and narrative break up 
Identification Defamiliarization 
Empathy and emotional involvement Forcing the audience to see common 
things in an unfamiliar or strange way; 
Direct address, multiple central 
characters, mass as hero, Overt 
commentary on people and events 
Transparency Foregrounding 
Neutral window on the world, 
Seamlessness 
Making overt and explicit the technical 
and constructed nature 
Single diegesis Multiple Diegesis 
Homogenous world Heterogeneous world 
Closure Open 
Self-contained, beginning/middle/end Open-ended narratives, over-spill and 
Intertextuality 
Fiction Reality 
Actors wearing costume and make-up 
telling a story 
Real life, non-professional actors, 
Breaking-up representation 
 
Rowe and Wells also emphasize that, by comparing the different ways the 
stories are told, it will become clear ―how far each text uses [mainstream] narrative, 
and how far, and in what ways, it rejects it‖ (89). Not only may this comparative 
method be applied to narrative analysis, but it can also be extended to other parts of 
textual analysis. For example, some actors‘ lines (in juxtaposition) may be compared 
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in the mainstream context and the postmodern context to explain how different these 
lines are in their sense making; some nostalgic elements may also be compared with 
the features of documentary films or historical films to show what and how different 
connotations (about their attitudes towards the historical ‗reality‘) have been 
conveyed.  
 
For the latter (genre analysis), few people regard postmodernism or 
postmodernity as a film genre, because its components are too complex and obscure 
to classify. As Chris Newbold concludes, postmodernism in films would have a 
pastiche base, drawing on the categories of experimental, classical, parody 
(self-reflexive), and deconstruction, and ―creating a kind of product which is based on 
nostalgia, fragmentation of content, relativism of values, erosion of time/space and 
symbols, hyper-signification or the over use of intertextual and symbolic message, 
and recycled themes‖ (177-8). Therefore, horizontally, in terms of a film, 
postmodernism reflects a bricolage of various genres; vertically, it reviews the 
historical tracks (e.g. nostalgia) where different genres have developed. To a certain 
extent, genre seemingly fits more to be an evidence, object or symbol in the field of 
postmodernism rather than a method. 
 
2.2. The Postmodern, Theory and Society 
 
But ‗film‘ is not the only object in this research. It is just one of the media 
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through which postmodernism/postmodernity is reflected and which influences the 
culture. Thus, to discuss its relations with contemporary society, the postmodern 
thought itself and its social phenomenon should be emphasized as well. Then it 
naturally leads to the question as follows: What is postmodernism? 
 
Before answering the question, a point should be clearly stressed at first. That 
is, many scholars concerned with postmodernism have rejected giving a definitive 
definition of ―the postmodern‖. As Best and Kellner argue, ―[p]ostmodern critiques 
are directed against the notion of ‗theory‘ itself [...] a systematically developed 
conceptual structure anchored in the real‖ (x). Furthermore as Malpas said, 
―unfortunately, finding such a simple, uncontroversial meaning for the term 
‗postmodern‘ is all but impossible [...] But things are even more difficult than this. 
Few critics even agree about what exactly it is that they are dealing with‖ (Malpas 
4).
18
 Three reasons can be given to explain such a dilemma: first, a ―clear and concise 
process of identification and definition is one of the key elements of rationality that 
the postmodern sets out to challenge‖ (Malpas 4); second, there is the fear that simple 
definitions miss the complexities of the postmodern, for the ―plurality of definitions 
has become crucial to the sense that the term ‗postmodern‘ now carries, and it is 
important to grasp both its multifaceted nature and its propensity to open up debate‖ 
between the various values within its definition (Malpas 5); third, from the very 
                                                        
18  As Malpas concludes, ―the postmodern has been defined in a huge variety of different ways: as a new aesthetic 
formation (Hassan, 1982, 1987), a condition (Lyotard, 1979; Harvey, 1990), a culture (Connor, 1997), a 
cultural dominant (Jameson, 1991), a set of artistic movements employing a parodic mode of self-conscious 
representation (Hutcheon, 1988), an ethical or political imperative (Bauman, 1993, 1995), a period in which we 
have reached the end of history (Baudrillard, 1994; Fukuyama, 1992; Vattimo, 1988)…‖ (Malpas 6-7). 
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beginning, the postmodern is an typical interdisciplinary theory, which has interacted, 
and continues to interact, with various thoughts and domains, such as post-colonialism, 
feminism, queer theory and the politics of globalisation, as well as with literature, 
music, architecture, history, philosophy and so on. Therefore, different critics, who 
began to understand it and developed it from different fields, are bound to have 
divergent views more or less. To make matters worse, according to George Ritzer, ―it 
is impossible to adjudicate conflicts between interpretations‖ (3). 
 
However, although the concept of the postmodern looks quite loose, 
fragmented, and even mutually exclusive, a basic theoretic framework is still 
necessary. ―While postmodernists may reject theory, what most of them in fact do is 
to theorize‖ (Ritzer 3). Because a ―theory‖ is not only a pre-decided systematization, 
but it can reflect internal relations of a group of conceptual aggregation. 
 
As far as academic practice is concerned, most scholars have adopted or 
borrowed a structuralist approach to explain the ―postmodern‖, a word that is clearly 
of post-structuralist sense. Like its own pluralism, the postmodern framework has 
been diversified as well, by all kinds of theorists.  
 
Not all of the frameworks are appropriate for this research, because this thesis 
has a special relationship with film studies. Not only should it have a comprehensive 
consideration for postmodern films, but it should also develop a profound 
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understanding about its theoretical principle (source of philosophy) and its close links 
with politics, economy, and social culture. 
 
Therefore, in this section a theoretical framework by John Hill to structure and 
review postmodern concepts and their social influences will be chosen. Hill, in The 
Oxford Guide to Films Studies and Film Studies: Critical Approaches, established a 
framework by dividing the discussions on the term ―postmodernism‖ into three types 
of debate: philosophical debates, social-cultural debates and aesthetic debates 
(94-103). At first, he explained the suspicious, negative and uncertain attitudes of 
postmodernism in philosophy. Then he introduced the new economic order, consumer 
culture and the development of new media in the field of postmodern society, as well 
as the consequent results, including the disorder of space-time relation, globalization, 
and Baudrillard‘s so called hyperreality. Finally, in the aesthetic field, Hill argued the 
exhaustion of modernism, the fall of high arts, and intertextuality and its strategies. 
 
2.2.1. Philosophical Debates 
 
In philosophical debates (related to ―the groundings of knowledge‖), 
postmodernism is mainly demonstrated as a growing ―incredulity/suspicion‖ (Lyotard 
Knowledge xxiv) towards the logical concept of integration and the ―universal or 
all-embracing systems of thought and explanation‖ (Hill 97). There are many features 
of postmodernism in this respect and as Hill concludes, these may include 
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 a suspicion of totalization that tends to ―offer comprehensive and 
all-embracing accounts of social and cultural phenomena‖; 
 
 an ―anti-foundationalism‖ which ―rejects claims to ‗absolute‘ or 
‗universal‘ foundations for knowledge‖; 
 
 a rejection of ―ethnocentric‖ systems of thought; 
 
 a rejection of ―‗depth‘ epistemologies‖ or ―‗essential‘ realities‖. 
 
From these features, it is clear that postmodernism advocates ideas of multiplicity and 
uncertain identity, and emphasizes the ―heterogeneity and fragmented character of 
social and cultural realities…as well as the impossibility of any unified, or 
comprehensive, account of them‖ (Hill 97). 
 
2.2.2. Social-cultural Debates 
 
In the context of socio-cultural debates (concerned with the social, economic, 
and cultural transformations in contemporary life), postmodernism may be understood 
as a term used to describe and identify a new order that has emerged in social and 
economic fields. Moreover postmodernism is usually related to the concept of 
postmodern society, which, according to Hill, can be also identified as a shift ―from an 
old industrial order to a new ‗post-industrial‘ one‖ (Daniel Bell, qtd. in Hill 98). This 
transition, associated with postmodernism, has been characterized by some features in 
social and economic life. As Hill concludes, these features are 
 
 a transition from manufacturing to service industries: the surplus value of 
economics does not mainly come from factories but from some service 
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industries, such as business, banking, and tourism. 
 
 a change of the producing model from Fordist production to 
‗post-Fordist‘ production: the standardized (mass) production is being 
replaced by a new pattern of production that is based on the flexible and 
individual consumer requirement. 
 
 a great increase in the population scale of the middle class, white-collar 
class, and service class: people from these classes have gradually 
dominated the mainstream attitude and taste of the social and cultural life, 
and they have an inclination to accept the existence of postmodernist 
culture. 
 
 diversity of the social identity: the fading and the ambiguity of the social 
class differentiation make the individual identity (related for example, to 
gender, sexual orientation, and religion) become more significant and 
dominant.
19
 
 
On the other hand, Hill also points out that the improvement in new technologies 
(especially those computing and communications technologies) has played an 
important role in the social and economic transitions as well. He mentions that the 
new media is ―significantly reshaping social experience and subjectivity‖ in two 
ways:  
 
One is that a superabundance of the circulation of information and images 
through the advanced communication platforms (such as the Internet and satellites) 
may probably result in ―an increasing compression of time and space, a 
deterritorialization of culture, and the construction of forms of identity which are no 
longer strongly identified with place‖ (Harvey and Meyrowitz, qtd. in Hill 98). This 
can easily be linked with the context of ―globalization‖, and then be associated with 
                                                        
19  Also refer to Stuart Hall. ―The Question of Cultural Identity‖, in Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (ed.) Modernity 
and Its Futures. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 
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the accelerated flow/communication of goods, services, ideas and so on. That forms a 
cultural perspective, in which some mixed, depthless space has been compressed in a 
single temporal conception. 
 
The other way in which the new media and new technologies have influenced 
the social shift may be described as a changing opinion on the social/cultural ‗reality‘. 
According to Baudrillard, we are living in a world where a new ―social reproductive 
order based upon communication and the circulation of signs‖ is gradually replacing 
―the old industrial order based upon labour and the production of goods‖. Thus in this 
transition, images and signs are becoming our ―primary reality‖. As Baudrillard 
summarized, it is a world of ―simulations‖, or ―hyper reality‖, which has no reality 
beyond itself, and it is impossible to prove the real, because all we have are just ―signs 
and simulations‖.20 
 
2.2.3. Aesthetic Debates 
 
In the aesthetic debates, the characteristics of postmodernism are often argued 
to respond and resolve the problems left by modernism. According to Hill, there are 
two main difficulties in the development of modernism: one is that it is confronted 
with ‗failure‘ or ‗exhaustion‘ (refer to Huyssen, ―Mapping the Postmodern‖); the other 
is that modernism is losing its mass market due to its ―institutionalization as ‗high 
                                                        
20  Jean Baudrillard. The Mirror of Production, St Louis: Telos Press, 1975; and Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. P. 
Foss, P. Patton, and P. Beitchman, New York: Semiotext, 1983. 
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art‘‖ and its lack of communications with ―a public beyond a small elite‖ (Berman, 
―Modern Art and Desublimation‖). Therefore with the decline of modernism, for Hill, 
three features of postmodernism should be identified: firstly, postmodernism 
demonstrates a cordial attitude to suit popular tastes, and it has fused with some 
elements from popular culture; secondly, postmodernism in this respect may also be 
characterized as ‗eclecticism‘ which means mixing different ―styles, genres, and 
artistic conventions‖ to form ―a stylistic promiscuity‖ or to emphasize the strategies of 
―appropriation and hybridization‖; thirdly, as a result of the ‗cultural exhaustion‘, the 
feature of postmodernism may be linked with a ―declining emphasis upon originality‖ 
(Hill 99). For Dick Hebdige, this can be reflected by a series of postmodernist 
elements (such as parody, pastiche, and bricolage…), and then the innovative spirit 
becomes indifferent (191). 
 
2.3. Background  
 
2.3.1. The Social Situation of China 
 
Since the late 1970s, the socialistic politics of China have gradually cast off 
the left-leaning perspective of the Cultural Revolution, and the emphases of the 
government have shifted to economic development. Contradictions inevitably 
happened between the socialist bureaucracy and a growing economy. In order to 
reduce the adverse effects of these contradictions, as well as a historical emphasis, the 
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communist government has always put propaganda into the media, including the film 
industry, which has been encouraged and has developed rapidly. In the meantime, the 
voice from the opposition is still being censored and suppressed.  
 
With the innovation of modern technologies and the promotion of productivity, 
a great amount of labour surplus has emerged throughout the country. Many rural 
labourers swarm to urban areas to be engaged in manufacturing and service industries, 
which has led to a huge inflation in the urban population. In addition, the 
implementation of the ‗one-child‘ policy depopulates the Chinese family, which has 
perhaps eased the financial worries of the parents and accelerated families‘ 
accumulation of wealth. Then private wealth has triggered greater demand for 
consumer goods, yet the ‗one-child‘ policy has also changed the old cultural model 
that centred on large extended families into nuclear families that rely much more on 
social communication and popular entertainments. Moreover, with an extension of the 
‗opening up‘ policy, Western culture, such as McDonald‘s, Hollywood cinema, and 
French fashions, have been infiltrating the daily life of Chinese people. The 
impressions of history and tradition are fading from people‘s memories. All in all, 
China is increasingly becoming a part of globalization and a typical example of global 
cultural colonialism.
21
 
 
                                                        
21  For further readings, please see William H.Overholt, ―China and Globalization, Testimony Presented to the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission‖. 19 May 2005. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT244.pdf Last access: 4 Oct. 2010; and David Rothkopf, 
―In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol.107, Summer 1997. 38-53. 
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New technologies also shape a new life for the Chinese masses. They not only 
promote productivity but also generate a surplus that may be used for more cultural 
activities. The new media provide more sources and platforms for the communication 
of information. The Internet and mobile technologies are providing people with much 
wider views than those of traditional media. Meanwhile they shorten the ‗distance‘ of 
time and space, which challenges traditions. Additionally a consumer society 
inevitably results in an overflow of advertisements, brand names and trade marks. All 
of these tend to make people more devoted to materialism, which seems to 
dramatically conflict with those spiritual traditions of the masses who lived in a 
Marxist society for several decades.
 22
 
 
2.3.2. The Postmodernity of Chinese Society 
 
Postmodernity in China does not seem to originate from its ‗cultural 
exhaustion‘ of modernism, nor as Jameson23 analysed, to be a result of late capitalism 
(1991). Its origin is far more complicated than it is in the West.  
                                                        
22  Arthur Rosenfeld, an American scholar in Chinese studies, in his recent essay ―China: Spirituality Or 
Materialism‖, argues that ―While the recent recession has many Americans rethinking the wisdom of chasing 
money and things all our life even at the cost of our health and happiness, the Chinese have no such 
reservations. Theirs is an all out frenzy of industry, a rampant desire to assume economic primacy in the world. 
[…] as I‘m also sure that at some point they will come to the same realization we are reaching, which is that 
the American Dream, replete with a new car every few years, an ever bigger house, an ever shinier refrigerator, 
is not the road to happiness, and it‘s certainly not the road to health. The Chinese people are remarkable for 
their capacity for suffering, for tenacity, for focus, and for industry.‖ This seems to be a proof from Western 
eyes that Chinese spiritual belief are been eroded by today‘s materialism. See Rosenfeld, Arthur. ―China: 
Spirituality or Materialism?‖ 2009. online article: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arthur-rosenfeld/china-spirituality-or-mat_b_349963.html Last access: 4 Oct. 
2010 
23  As Willie Thompson said ―postmodernism has been designated by Fredric Jameson as ‗the cultural logic of late 
capitalism‘ and there is a lot of sense in this‖ in Postmodernism and History, New York: Palgrave, 2004. 127-8. 
Also see Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, London: Verso, 1991. 
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As far as social economy is concerned, though the Chinese economy is 
booming, China is still far from being a well-developed modern state. The per capita 
GDP of the country was only US$ 1700 in 2004, unimaginable poverty in the 
countryside remains very high and China is experiencing a transformation from 
traditional to modern civilizations. However, these realities should not counteract the 
influence and the development of cultural postmodernity in China. On one hand, the 
great amount of labour surplus from rural areas saves a great deal of the urban 
production costs that accelerate social and individual accumulation of wealth and is of 
benefit for the promotion of consumer and citizen culture. On the other hand, an 
ample labour force may benefit the service industry, which combined with 
globalization and the new media, is gradually making the world‘s popular culture and 
fashion life flood into every corner of the country. Furthermore, the dramatic growth 
of materialistic desires in the Chinese masses has changed their notion of identity into 
a decentred, fragmented and superficial one
24
. In addition, traditional ethical and 
rational thought also faces challenges from a pluralistic culture and individualism. 
 
In the field of politics, owing to the establishment of the market economy and 
the opening up since the early 1980s, the political notions of Chinese citizens 
                                                        
24  As Douglas Kellner argued, in premodern societies ―one‘s identity was fixed, solid, and stable‖ (p231); while 
in postmodern society, identity becomes ―a freely chosen game, a theatrical presentation of the self, in which 
one is able to present oneself in a variety of roles, images, and activities.‖ (p246-7) He also pointed out that 
―once upon a time, it was who you were, what you did, what kind of person you were – your moral, political, 
and existential choices and commitments, which constituted individual identity. But today it is how you look, 
your image, your style, and how you appear that constitutes identity. And it is media culture that more and 
more provides the materials and resources to constitute identities.‖ In Kellner, Douglas. Media Culture: 
Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern, London: Routledge, 1995. 
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(especially the educated elite) have gradually produced a liberal tendency, which has 
led to a growing suspicion of communism. This may reflect a contradiction between 
the market economy and bureaucratic politics, which eventually resulted in a social 
ferment (protesting against the unfair distribution and corruption) in 1989. Though it 
does not seem necessary to discuss the whole movement, the result and the means the 
government adopted to appease it provided Chinese postmodernity with three hints. 
Firstly, suppressing the storm with military force showed the government‘s resolution 
to pursue economic growth and private ownership, which greatly encouraged both 
national and international investors and made the Chinese economy soar rapidly in the 
1990s. These also gave China more postmodern social characteristics (such as 
consumer culture) that were similar to those in the West. In addition, a military 
solution showed an uncompromising and arbitrary attitude on the part of the 
government over its political control. More importantly, it tended to have results 
limiting freedom, becoming a unipolar, bureaucratic and meta-discourse system. 
Secondly, the left-leaning liberalism was repressed in the ferment, even any rational 
protest based on binary opposition was intimidated by the authorities. Thereupon, 
some of the citizens gradually lost themselves in communist ideals, and irrationalism 
was inclined to be accepted. (Some scholars consider this to be a phenomenon of the 
global new conservatism.
25
) Subsequently, binary opposition in China has gradually 
been replaced by a pluralistic/fringe culture and a diversity of ideas that provide a 
mass basis for the spread of postmodern thought in the country. Thirdly, through 
                                                        
25  For example, Zhao, Yiheng. ―Postmodernism, New Conservatism & Literary Criticism‖, in 21 Century (HK), 
1995-2. And, Zhang, Xuchun. ―The Postmodernist Roles in China‖, in Journal of Foreign Language College, 
Sichuan, 2002-1. 
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dealing with the movement, the Chinese authorities have been aware of a menace 
from the class-consciousness and the solidarity of the masses. To distract mass 
attention from protests, two policies have been adopted: one is to increase people‘s 
income, encourage consumption and the growth of a ―middle class‖; the other is to 
develop a pluralistic culture to spread mass interest around, such as to support social 
entertainment, soap opera, fashion journals, to import Hollywood culture and so on. 
All of these have brought China close to a global postmodernity. Therefore, as far as 
the government is concerned, postmodernity in China does not always subvert it, 
contrarily it is helpful. From 1990 to the present, Chinese social policies continue 
without radical changes.  
 
2.3.3. Postmodernism in the Local Academia 
 
Postmodernism, as an important part of the contemporary Western 
literary/cultural theories, has absorbed broad attention in China since 1985 when 
Fredric Jameson gave a series of lectures on postmodernism and its cultural theory at 
Beijing University. Subsequently, a significant number of postmodern-related works 
have been introduced in China, which included the works of F. Jameson, F. Lyotard, 
J.Habermas, Jean Baudrillard, D. R. Griffin, T. Eagleton and J. Derrida. Besides, 
Chinese academics have discussed in depth the ‗possibility and particularity‘ of the 
existence of postmodernity in China, and it seems that these debates have been 
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extended to many related fields,
26
 such as post-colonialism, feminism, psychoanalysis 
and the ‗third road‘. Furthermore, postmodern studies in China have been related to 
their own literary practice all along. From literature and drama to cinema and the ‗Net 
media‘, many new works have been enlightened by the theory. They either reflected 
postmodernity from the real world or imitated/simulated postmodernist elements from 
the West. No matter what they did, they all contributed to the local society and social 
culture. In this concern, the development of postmodern theories in China seemed 
earlier than its social germination of postmodernity. When postmodernism comes into 
a developing country, people define it, imitate it, accept it, digest it, and then put it 
into the local cultural practice to form a particular/unique cultural landscape. Thus, 
the theory and its practice may be regarded as an accelerant for the postmodernity of 
Chinese society. 
 
2.3.4. Feasibility Study on Postmodern Issues in China 
 
The reason to introduce a feasibility study on Chinese postmodernism is that 
until recently there were still some scholars from both the West and Asia who thought 
postmodernism was a Western phenomenon, which is irrelevant to the third world and 
Asian societiesn (Wang Ning in Dirlik and Zhang, Chinese Postmodernity 21). 
Additionally, in the light of Jameson‘s construction of postmodernism, especially his 
periodization of capitalism, China was automatically excluded (Wang 22), for it is still 
                                                        
26  For more introduction to the early propagation of postmodernism in China, please refer to Chen, Xiaoming. 
(ed.) Postmodernism, Henan University Press, 2003. 2-7. 
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a developing country in the Third World and is far from attaining the standards of a 
post-industrial society. Therefore, it seems necessary to provide some evidence to 
prove that a postmodern study on China is feasible.  
 
The first evidence is from the relationship between modernism and 
postmodernism. Although modernism is ―the logical starting point of postmodernism‖, 
as Lyotard has observed, the postmodern is essentially ―part of the modern‖ and is an 
inevitable product of the development of modernism (Wang 22). This means their 
relation is quite unlike the past and the present. The modern and the postmodern are 
not as simple as two successive periods. The existence of postmodernism does not 
need to wait for the accomplishment of modernism. Both the two social formations 
may coexist in a contemporary society connected by globalization. Therefore, it seems 
irrational to neglect postmodern issues in the third world where modernization is 
being promoted and extended. 
 
The second point is that some Western scholars in recent years have gradually 
been thinking of postmodernity as a globalized/universal phenomenon which may be 
related to further discussion on economic globalization and cultural imperialism in 
developing countries, even if ―postmodernity germinated in the cultural soil of 
Western postindustrial society‖ (Wang 21). For instance, Lyotard in his famous work 
The Postmodern Conditions suggested that postmodern questions should be discussed 
and reconsidered in a worldwide context, which probably includes the globalization of 
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the third world. That makes it necessary to reconsider the possibility of studying 
postmodern issues in China in a global context. Furthermore, when debates about 
postmodernism overlap with questions of post-colonialism in the Third World, the 
relevance of postmodernism to critics and scholars in the East is enhanced even 
further. 
 
Also, the ―uneven development‖ of China should be emphasized. Wang Ning, 
Professor in Beijing Language and Culture University, argues that although China is 
still a developing country and is still far from being a post-industrial society, yet 
―uneven development in its politics, economy, and culture undoubtedly manifests 
post-industrial symptoms in the economy and postmodern elements in political life 
and culture‖ (22). Then, agreeing with Jameson‘s and Fokkema‘s descriptions of 
postmodern culture, Wang re-described the actual situation of postmodernism 
developed in the Third World within the scope of literature/culture alone as the 
following eight forms: 
 
a) It is a fundamental cultural phenomenon in highly developed 
capitalist countries or post-industrial societies that occasionally 
appears in unevenly developed regions within developing 
countries; 
b) Postmodernism is a kind of worldview, in which the world is no 
longer a world of totality but rather one of plurality, 
fragmentation, and decentralization; 
c) It may also be seen as a main current of literature and art that is 
erasing, weakening, eliminating the gap and boundary between 
modern high arts and popular culture, and facing the fall of 
modernism; 
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d) Perhaps postmodernism is a narrative style or kind of discourse 
that is relevant to the suspicion of ―master narratives‖ or 
―metanarratives‖; 
e) In the fifth place, postmodernism gradually becomes an 
interpretive code or a reading strategy with which non-Western 
texts (including certain film texts) can be analyzed from the 
perspective of postmodernity (e.g. consumer culture and 
hyper-reality); 
f) Postmodernism can also be a cultural/philosophical trend that is 
contrary to the elite preoccupation with the enlightenment, and it 
is characterized by the crisis of legitimation and representation; 
g) Then next, it is a cultural strategy adopted by the Third World 
critics during their economic modernization and struggle against 
cultural colonialism and linguistic hegemonism; 
h) Finally, postmodernism is a critical mode related to 
post-structural and deconstructed approaches to literary texts.
 
(23) 
 
Therefore, all of the points mentioned above manifest that postmodern elements have 
been infiltrated into the Third World‘s literature and culture, and it is becoming a 
dominant part of cultural criticism in developing countries. 
 
The last proof is from the frequent academic and cultural exchanges since the 
1980s, which have made postmodern studies in China come true. One of the most 
memorable academic exchanges was Jameson‘s series of lectures at Beijing 
University in 1985, which lasted for four months and set off a rush of postmodern 
studies on China. Soon after his visit, many Western works in relation to 
postmodernism were translated and published in China in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, 
a few young Chinese students followed Jameson back to America for PhD research, 
and some of them, such as Tang Xiaobing and Zhang Xudong, have become famous 
in the academic field of postmodern studies on China, and their writings will be of 
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great value for this research. On the other hand, cultural exchanges (through 
Hollywood, the Internet, foreign advertisements and popular fashions and so on) also 
provide China with broad opportunities and references to borrow postmodernist 
elements for its own literature and arts.  
 
2.3.5. The Local Film Industry 
 
Since the 1990s, China has taken further steps to intensify reform and open 
more widely to the outside world. With the explosion of the market economy, the 
local film industry has paid more attention to capital operations, commercial markets, 
and extraction of profit. Meanwhile, the viewing tastes of the local audience have 
shifted from the political and spiritual appeals to commercial and entertaining 
interests. These changes in filmmaking and its reception unconsciously led to an 
unlimited inflation of material desires, making faith, morality, and spirituality become 
lost in the process. This has been reflected by people‘s blind chase of Western screen 
productions that have been pouring into China. Those old filmic stereotype and 
socialist viewing experiences (full of revolutionary romanticism) in people‘s minds 
have been strongly replaced by Hollywood‘s commercial films, European cinema 
trends, and celebrity appeals from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus the Chinese film 
industry has had to make great changes in the new conditions. But it must at first face 
certain limitations brought by the local bureaucracy, such as film censorship. 
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On the other hand, Chinese filmmaking has encountered a variety of 
difficulties in its macro environment of technology and a cinematic globalization. The 
popularity of television since the 1990s is making more and more audiences stay at 
home rather than go to a cinema. An oversight in the protection of intellectual 
property has also created opportunities for film pirates. Then the loss of audiences and 
profits is indirectly resulting in a decline in the domestic box office on national films 
and a decrease in interest from film investors; meanwhile the big movies from 
Hollywood and Hong Kong have been changing the viewing habits of Chinese 
audiences as well. These have compelled the Chinese film industry to expand its 
overseas markets. Looking for overseas investors, narrating international stories, 
chasing international film festivals and awards, promoting overseas box office are all 
becoming the prime purposes of Chinese producers and directors. Pessimistically 
speaking, it leads to a distance between the national film environment and society in 
reality; while optimistically, it may be seen as a powerful drive for the shape of a new, 
global culture of China. 
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Chapter Three 
Postmodern Elements in Contemporary Chinese Cinema 
– A Case Study on An Orphan Joins the Army 
 
3.1. Background and Arguments 
 
As the most flourishing and international city in China, Shanghai has been 
influenced by Western culture through history for a century or more
27
. Thus it seems 
logical to commence discussion on an early combination of the Chinese cinema and 
the postmodern with the city. An Orphan Joins the Army (Sanmao congjun ji, directed 
by Zhang Jianya
28
, 1993) was produced by the Shanghai Film Studio in 1993. The 
film was probably inspired by a certain cultural atmosphere and Western thinking 
besides some accidental factors of literature and the arts. Nevertheless no one can 
dictate which film was the first postmodern text in China. The reason is simple, for 
even though it is common in the West, few people study the postmodern as a cinema 
genre. The postmodern itself is a pioneer against genre and definitions, which makes 
it hard to trace back and tell that which one was the earliest postmodern film. 
However, three points should be confirmed as follows: first, before An Orphan Joins 
                                                        
27  Since the First Opium War (1840), Shanghai has gradually grown in importance, from a fishing town to a 
metropolitan area, due to its favourable port location and as one of the cities opened to foreign trade by the 
1842 Treaty of Nanking. The city flourished as a center of commerce between east and west, and became a 
multinational hub of finance and business by the 1930s. Therefore it is also a typical representation of 
semi-colonial culture before 1949. However, Shanghai's internationalization was suspended between 1949 to 
the late 1970s when the communist China developed a planned economy and a de-Westernization. However a 
new market economy brought it back to prosperity by the 1980s. From then on Shanghai has again become in 
the forefront of being influenced by the West. 
28  Please distinguish Zhang Jianya from the other film director Zhang Yimou, both of them are fifth generation 
directors of China. 
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the Army, few Chinese films had ever been discussed or compared in a postmodern 
debate in academia
29
; secondly, after its premiere, it is clear that quite a few scholars 
or film critics related some sections of the film to certain postmodern elements and 
provided various positive feedbacks and reviews
30
; thirdly, some tertiary institutions 
specializing in film studies have already taken this film as a typical instance of 
postmodernist work in teaching
31
. There are reasons for An Orphan Joins the Army to 
be discussed as the beginning of the main body in the thesis. The film laid the 
foundations of and presents a few postmodern keynotes (features) in contemporary 
Chinese literature and culture, such as ―conservative strategies‖32, parody, bricolage, 
absurdity, and an infatuation with history. These elements were integral to the cultural 
development of the postmodern in China through the last two decades. The reason I 
                                                        
29  Adam Lam had launched a postmodern discussion focusing on the international attention on the fifth 
generation directors of China, such as Zhang Yimou and his world-famous Red Sorghum (1987), but Lam‘s 
intention was to talk about the Western cultural acceptance of the Chinese films in a global context, see his 
Post-Cultural Revolution Chinese National Cinema and Global Culture (2005, 67-75, 123-9); Wang Yichuan, 
in his ―Zhang‘s Myth and Its ending‖ (1997-5, 68-79), also combined Zhang Yimou‘s films (before early 1990s) 
as a cultural symbol to discuss its postmodern transformation from elite enlightenment to a popular mass 
culture. Though the films mentioned by both Lam and Wang were made earlier than An Orphan Joins the Army, 
those film texts seem difficult to discuss in detail as postmodernist instances. Other postmodern related reviews 
were mostly based on Western films, while it is seldom that a scholar discusses postmodern cinema with 
typical examples of Chinese films before An Orphan Joins the Army. 
30  Such as Yin Hong, ―The Chinese Films in A Postmodern Context‖, Contemporary Film (60-7); and Zeng 
Yaonong, The Postmodern Criticism on the Latest Chinese films (53-6, 100). Zhou Huan, in his ―Authors‘ 
Films‖, mentioned that ―Zhang Jianya‘s two films, An Orphan Joins the Army and Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desire, 
were not absolutely the first Chinese films combined with postmodern consciousness, but they were indeed the 
earliest films that stopped talking about it but showed it on the screen and exploited postmodernism through 
the film texts themselves.‖ (55-61) 
31  The film has been listed as one of the compulsory teaching films in the college of Communications, Tsinghua 
University since 2002, refer to http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsn/cbx/cft/kaifang/ys.htm; and selected by 
Beijing University in its teaching plan of the course ―History of Chinese Film‖ in the period of 2007-08, see 
http://203.208.37.104/ attach/boards/CFH/M.1211814209.A/2007-2008.htm; the director Zhang himself also 
mentioned in an interview that ―now these films [An Orphan Joins the Army and Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desire] 
have been cited in many film research institutions as a postmodern teaching example‖, New Beijing Daily, 
cultural edition, 3 Feb.2007. 
32  A conservative strategy here means to take evasive actions in films to avoid political repressions, like film 
censorship. Conservative strategies (such as marginalization) are directly related to the neo-conservatism of 
China under the social background of the 1990s, which will be explained later in this chapter. In this context, 
the word ‗conservative‘ does not prefer the traditional situation, but resists the radical position (on politics) or 
sudden social change in the case that subversion or irony may coexist with mainstream discourse without 
repression. 
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have chosen the film as the first text for analysis is not because it is exceptional, but 
because it contains a comprehensive demonstration of a variety of practices of 
postmodern thought. 
 
There are two arguments in this section. One is that, textually speaking, An 
Orphan Joins the Army presents many postmodern elements, which seems a round-up 
of representation of the postmodern features in the contemporary Chinese film. It 
enlightens people‘s minds and points out a way for the postmodern culture in China to 
turn into an artistic practice. Actually, other sections in this chapter are all discussions 
developed or extended from here in this part of the analysis, including imitations, 
fusions between the high (elite) and the masses and incredulity towards meta-narrative. 
The other argument is that the film seems to be a kind of self-conscious experience for 
contemporary China. Its connotation lies not so much in personal or individual 
inspiration as in the inevitable social cultural context as a whole. That makes it 
possible for the film to be seen as a showcase, through which the postmodern 
evolution of contemporary Chinese culture, rather than just the text itself, can be 
understood in a better way. 
 
3.2. Postmodernism and the Film Text 
3.2.1. The Theme 
3.2.1.1. The Film Adaptation 
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An Orphan Joins the Army is not developed from an original film script but 
adapted from a manhua
33
 comic series called ‗Sanmao‘ – the name of the orphan – 
drawn by Zhang Leping
34
, a quite famous comic artist in China, since 1935. The 
duration of its publication lasted until the 1980s.  
 
 
Figure 1. An Orphan Joins the Army (Manhua) 
 
Sanmao is probably one of the world‘s longest running cartoon characters and 
remains one of the most famous and beloved fictional characters in China today. 
However, as time goes on, the character has undergone quite a few transitions; 
Sanmao – as a protagonist in various comic stories – has been planted in a number of 
                                                        
33  ―Manhua‖ means Chinese comics originally produced in China, and distinguished from other national comics, 
such as Japanese comics (manga) or Korean comics (manhwa). 
34  Zhang Leping (1910-1992), a comic artist in Shanghai, China. He played a key role in the development of 
modern manhua in China, and is mostly remembered for his work in Sanmao. 
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the most important periods in Chinese history
35
. The original part of the story, which 
has been adapted by the film, was firstly serialized in the Shanghai Times
36
 from 12
th
 
May to 4
th
 October 1946 under the same name as the film. It is an early work of 
Zhang Leping. Sanmao‘s general identity is an orphan wandering on the streets in 
Shanghai, and because of malnutrition as the result of poverty he has always been 
drawn with three strands of hair that became his trademark later. In his early works, 
such as An Orphan Joins the Army (comic series, 1946) and Wanderings of Sanmao 
(comic series, 1947-9), Zhang Leping‘s original intention was to refract the ordeal of 
China in the Anti-Japanese War
37
 through the destiny of the orphan. As a household 
character, it was not the first time that Sanmao had been adapted for film. Before An 
Orphan Joins the Army was shot in 1993, the Sanmao series had been adapted as 
motion pictures four times already: Wanderings of Sanmao (1949, drama), Sanmao 
and the Business (1958, puppet), Wanderings of Sanmao (1958, drama), Wanderings 
of Sanmao (1984, animation), and after 1993, the stories of Sanmao were continually 
revised as TV drama (1996), movie (2004), animation (2006), and even an Internet 
game (2006). From a diachronic view, it raises the question why most of the 
adaptations in recent decades have been based on Wanderings of Sanmao (1947-9), 
while the Chinese film ignored the great changes made in the socialist new China, and 
                                                        
35  For instance, An Orphan Joins the Army (1946) reflects the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945); Wanderings of 
Sanmao (1947-49) shows the social poverty in Shanghai in the second Chinese Civil War (1946-49); Sanmao‟s 
liberation (1951) reflects the renewed vigor of the new socialist China; Sanmao‟s Past and Present (1959) was 
published in the Great Leap Forward (1958-60, which leads to a huge economic disaster); Sanmao Learns Lei 
Feng (1977-1984) shows the new period of China after the Cultural Revolution. 
36  Also called Shen Bao (申报), published since 1882 to 1949, it was one of the most influential newspapers in 
Shanghai and throughout China. 
37  Also known as War of Resistance against Japan, or the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. 
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used a comic strip, An Orphan Johns the Army (1946), which seems not very famous 
today. Perhaps the reasons are complicated, while within those chances, contingency, 
or uncertainty, is there any inevitable relationship implied? 
 
3.2.1.2. Disharmonies in the Film Industry (1990s), Repressions, and Marginalization 
 
 This possibly reflects a conservative, compromised, and marginalized 
strategy on postmodern theme selections in the contemporary reality of China. In the 
1990s, China was experiencing a transitional period of reform when the market 
economy had been developing at top speed. A prosperous economy
38
 has made China 
– an old communist country even before the 1980s – largely expand its materialized 
desires. Accordingly, there emerge three disharmonies between the domestic market 
and the Chinese film industry: first, unlimited materialization and inflation gradually 
made the masses lose their way or become confused about their belief in the spiritual 
world; second, a contradictory coming out between the old watching (appreciation) 
experience left from a planned economy and the shock of filmic thoughts suddenly 
breaking in from the West; third, a disjunction between those new, advanced, and 
rapidly changing thoughts in the reform of film arts and the sluggish transformation in 
the film system and its censorship. These disharmonies made the Chinese audience of 
the 1990s steeped in a certain, perplexity, or loss of orientation, gradually develop 
some sceptical attitudes towards a tradition of revolutionary romanticism or realism 
                                                        
38  The economic growth has played a crucial role in the development of the postmodern culture in China since 
1980s. It will be discussed later in this part. 
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that had typically predominated in the seventeen-year cinema
39
 of China. 
Additionally, the huge numbers of Western films pouring into the country since the 
1980s considerably changed people‘s tastes in watching contemporary culture. 
Chinese people, at least some of them, do not chase lofty ideals in certain dogmatism 
or spiritual instillations any more, but turn to its entertaining elements. On the other 
hand, filmmakers in China have to try to offset (or counteract) and comply with those 
side effects brought by a lag or delay in the system or censorship, in order that their 
works will not be seen as a sensitive taboo in politics or realities, which probably 
leads to a prohibition. Therefore, objectively speaking, those avant-garde or counter 
cinemas in the 1990s chose neither to get back to the old way of romanticism nor to 
have more entanglement with a realistic context today. Instead, there was a preference 
towards playing a ridiculous farce in a fictional context, such as historical, parodic, or 
nostalgic themes, rather than realism. In this respect, certain avant-garde tendencies in 
1990s China did correspond with some postmodern contexts in the West in their 
spiritual realities, which inspired some kind of conservative sentiment among 
intellectuals.  
 
For Zhao Yiheng, the postmodernity of contemporary Chinese literature 
directly boils down to a germination of a new conservatism (Zhao 201-8)
40
. This kind 
                                                        
39  A period of film history in China, 1950-1966. Chinese cinema has had a long tradition of presenting 
revolutionary romanticism and realism since 1930s. In particular, they were prosperous in the seventeen-year 
cinema of China. 
40  For Zhao, conservatism means to give up a radical position and the elitism, and to combine with a trend of the 
mass culture. For further argument about relations between the postmodern and neo-conservatism, see J. 
Habermas (1989) The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate. ed. and trans by 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen, introduction by Richard Wolin, Cambridge: Mass MIT Press. 
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of compromise, presented in filmic themes, shows a marginalized tendency, which 
simultaneously creates various ‗margins‘. These include the marginalized genre or 
theme (to avoid the mainstream discourse and the leitmotif), marginalized space (the 
margin of cities
41
), marginalized characters or identities (the hero has been superseded 
by a mere nobody), marginalized time (nostalgia or other fictional background), and 
marginalized narrative (deconstruct metanarrative). Being on the margin is not the 
only choice, while some of the Chinese films in 1990s were inclined to be so. Many 
films discussed in this research embody various strategies based on the inclination of 
marginalization, such as In the Heat of the Sun (Jiang Wen, 1995) that shows a 
nostalgic story through a boy‘s memory in which his heroic dream is shattered (a 
marginalized character tells a marginalized story with a marginalized narrative setting 
in the Cultural Revolution); and as some ‗sixth generation‘ directors did in their films 
like Beijing Bastards (Zhang Yuan, 1993) and Xiao Wu (Jia Zhangke, 1998), a 
marginalized space and voices from the minority cultures or sub-cultures are 
increasingly more valued than they used to be.  
 
On one hand marginalization shows a reluctance to cooperate with the 
dominant position and a compromised position (rather than radical opposition) for 
self-protection; on the other hand it may help filmmakers to avoid political censorship. 
It may be considered as a crucial feature of the postmodern cinema in China, 
especially in the later 1990s. However, this kind of ‗conservative‘ attitude (or 
                                                        
41  Or as Susan Hayward (2006) said, ―voices from the margins, minority cultures, are finding spaces within 
contemporary cultures‖, in talking about ―postmodernism‖. (309) 
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compromise) does not mean that those filmmakers are cowards
42
. In fact, what 
conservative thought and a deconstructed discourse did was just give up a face to face 
conflict with the mainstream in form. However it was not really the case. The 
postmodern must have alternatively given birth to other meanings or ―signified‖ from 
critics. In the last two decades, a concealed struggle like this has been adopted broadly 
in Chinese literature and arts. Postmodern culture must be associated with certain 
politics, which is a vital clue throughout the discussion on the postmodernity of China. 
We may read what Zhao Yiheng cited from Liu Kang: 
 
…for good or ill, [Chairman] Mao‘s conception of the relationship 
between politics and aesthetics might in fact have inspired Foucault‘s 
radical critique of western liberal humanism. The fact that Mao 
considered these matters from the angle of political strategy and the 
power struggle certainly makes his views prone to repressive cultural 
policies. But this does not alter the fact that politics always permeates, 
in various forms, every cultural formation and institution. The People‘s 
Republic of China‘s avant-garde writers and critics of the late 1980s 
tried to counter the Maoist political dominance in literature by a 
cultivation of the aesthetic object of language or artistic form. But this 
very act of aestheticization is in itself political. It attests to Mao‘s view 
of the political nature of cultural and literary activity, rather than 
undermining that view. (Liu 14; or qtd. in Zhao 2003, 137) 
 
Here, a so-called ―repressive cultural policies‖ from Liu, may be clearly 
realized as a period of China before 1977, when politics dominated the everyday and 
clouded every corner of the social culture. At that time, everyone believed in politics, 
and saw culture as an instrument of revolution, but it neglected a key role played by a 
market and a consumer culture. Liu‘s point not only focuses on those specific issues 
                                                        
42  Because of a long term influence by the left-leaning ideology since the 1950s, the word ―conservative‖ has a 
slight negative or derogatory suggestion in modern Mandarin. 
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on the piece of history of China, but also consists in emphasizing the effect that 
politics works towards every cultural formation, including commercial economy, the 
market economy and late capitalism itself
43
. However, in the 1990s, after the market 
economy had been dramatically developed in China for more than a decade, what 
Chinese contemporary culture needed to face, on its political permeation, seems much 
more complicated than what the West met. In addition to reacting to the changes of 
those powers and discourses brought by the market, consumption, globalization and 
the new medium, China also needed to deal with a variety of disturbances left from 
the old planned system and its repressions. So if a literary reality is considered here, it 
must include a sensitivity of censorship towards political discourse. The word 
‗sensitivity‘ can be elaborated in films through various evidences. For example, 
directors from those fifth generation like Zhang Yimou and Tian Zhuangzhuang to 
sixth generation like Lou Ye, have all had their works prohibited from the domestic 
box office. But without participation of the domestic audience, how can we read their 
films as a Chinese national cinema? Thus, in this sense one may understand that 
politics is always crucial in its relations with every culture it has penetrated. As a 
conservative, outwardly tamed and concealed trick, postmodernism inevitably 
becomes a way to gamble with the culture permeated. 
 
3.2.1.3. Questioning the Marginalized Theme 
 
                                                        
43  This is why Linda Hutcheon, a Canadian literary critic, wrote a book on political self-examination in Western 
literature. See Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, Routledge: London, 1989.  
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 On this basis, we may reconsider the theme of the film, An Orphan Joins the 
Army. The characteristic of being marginalised seems obvious. The film is set in 1938 
before the new socialist China (1949) has been founded. The country was still under 
the military regime of the Kuomintang and invaded by Japan. Politically speaking, 
that social background apparently has no part in the new (communist) China nor its 
honour or disgrace; nor does it touch a sensitive nerve of contemporary censorship. 
This temporal marginalization leads to the alienation of the film‘s theme from a 
realistic context of the 1990s, so that it can trade time for a space of criticism or satire. 
Of course, the contemporary authority cannot become a legitimate target of satire (or 
it will be prohibited by censorship); it is naturally replaced by the Kuomintang 
government a few decades ago in the film, which can be seen as a marginalized object. 
Then the plot develops as follows: as a result of poverty, Sanmao was forced to join 
the army. Though his friends in arms saw him as a child and used to tease him, he was 
still obstinately in the forefront of the fighting and dreaming of becoming a hero. 
According to its director – Zhang Jianya in a later interview – the battle scenes of the 
film were faithfully copied from the real Songhu campaign
44
, which means that the 
film plot is in accord with the real historical background. Here, two points need to be 
emphasized. On the one hand, what Sanmao joined was the Kuomintang army rather 
than the troop led by the Communist Party; on the other, the Songhu campaign in 
history ended in the failure of Kuomintang China. When the two points are combined, 
                                                        
44  Refer to the interview with Zhang Jianya, 12 Oct.2005, in People Net. 
http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/40473/40476/3761931.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010. The Songhu Campaign 
is also called ―the Battle of Shanghai‖ (Aug - Nov. 1937) in the West. It is one of the battles in The 
Anti-Japanese War. The result of battle was that Chinese army retreated from Shanghai with the strategy of 
trading space for time. 
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it naturally leads to a question: why did the Kuomintang fail? There are reflections on 
the corruption of the Kuomintang army in the film. As a reward for his bravery in 
battles, Sanmao was allocated to be an orderly for a division commander. Besides 
dealing with the trivial round, he needs to take care of the whole family of the 
commander, such as washing underwear for the family, entertaining the child, and 
concealing the infidelities of the commander and his wife. Through Sanmao‘s busy 
life, the film reflects the Kuomintang‘s corruptions bit by bit with a strong irony. This 
naturally leads to the question: when Chinese film develops in 1990s, why did it not 
choose a revolutionary romanticism to sing a song of Chinese bravery? Why can‘t it 
adopt a realism to reflect the contemporary issues of China? But it must adapt a comic 
series published forty years ago to show the corruptions of the Kuomintang that 
retreated to Taiwan in 1949. In addition, the relationship between the mainland of 
China and Kuomintang Taiwan has greatly improved since 1992. From then on the 
Chinese government has not advocated giving the Kuomintang a negative role in 
films any more, but why is An Orphan Joins the Army separated from the mainstream 
tendency? If this were only a particular case, it would not be necessary to get to the 
bottom of it at all. But here what I am questioning is not just this film and its specific 
theme, but the postmodern themes in contemporary China as a whole. The 
understanding of this question will run through the main body of the research.  
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3.2.2. Incredulity towards History 
3.2.2.1. A Cartoon Character in a Documentary 
 
There seems adequate evidence to say that An Orphan Johns the Army is a 
film about history. A statement that it is ―not fictional at all‖ appears at the very 
beginning of the film. Many patterns from the early silent films, like adding film 
captions before each section, have been imitated in it. Actually, quite a few parts of 
the film are directly shot and presented in black and white film with an old 
documentary style. The director Zhang apparently intends to let the audience trace 
back to a piece of history in the late 1930s. At the beginning, the film sounds an 
air-raid warning; a documentary sequence about Japanese bombers raiding Shanghai 
appears on the screen. With a frame rate of 16 per second, the old film makes vehicles 
and pedestrians on the streets of the city seem as if they were moving in great haste, 
which sets off a big panic around old Shanghai in wartime. Indeed Chinese audiences 
have been used to looking at those days of humiliation with a heavy heart. However, 
the oppressive feelings of that history may be challenged or deflated by a fictional 
protagonist in the film, Sanmao, a widely known cartoon character in modern China. 
Everyone knows that he is just a myth that has been widely adapted in literature and 
arts in the recent fifty years. So in people‘s minds, there is always a clear boundary 
between him and reality. But to plant a famous cartoon character in a documentary – a 
kind of precise, historical, and realistic context – was a completely fresh attempt, at 
least in China at the time. Accordingly, it became a selling point to see how Sanmao 
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was drafted into war and perhaps to be a part of history. That was just one of the 
director‘s intentions. Zhang Jianya said in his later comments:  
 
At that time, I would like to make a film between the mainstream and 
the counter-cinema
45, so I needed a brand new train of thought… 
Sanmao, in my mind, should be an existence in the historical reality 
rather than a fiction. So we made quite a few fake documentaries 
which seem quite real. We let Sanmao emerge in them and even in a 
same scene with those big shots in history, like Chiang Kai-shek, head 
of Kuomintang…46  
 
This leads to two additional points: What attitude does the film emphasize on history? 
Can Sanmao eventually become a historical hero? 
 
The film apparently shows scepticism towards the past and its reality. That is 
reflected through two sections in the film, imitating old, black and white film style. 
The first is at the beginning, when Sanmao is being chased by a policeman. The black 
and white style conveys a sensation of silent film. From the sound track and mise en 
scene to the comic performance of the actors, all of these seem like a (postmodern) 
parody
47
 of Chaplin‘s early comedies, which brings 1930s Shanghai into a light and 
humorous context, namely, to narrate the past with a game-like or ridiculous attitude. 
This corresponds with Sanmao‘s fictional identity as he was in any comic series; so 
that the parody may simultaneously copy a comedy style of the 1920s and subverts its 
                                                        
45  Postmodern film can be seen as a counter-cinema to mainstream cinema. To define ―counter-cinema‖, please 
refer to what Peter Wollen (79-91) identifies: a number of oppositions between mainstream cinema and 
counter-cinema, which are mentioned in the part of postmodernist narrative in the literature review of this 
paper. 
46  See the interview with Zhang Jianya on People Net. 
47  This section may also be considered – in the other way – as ‗pastiche‘ resulting from the crisis of stylistic 
exhaustion. See another part of this chapter, ‗Cultural Exhaustion and Desublimation‘. For the difference 
between parody and pastiche, please refer to the next chapter about nostalgia. 
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historical context by using a fictional character ‗Sanmao‘ in the process of 
representation. Its purpose as I see it is to challenge the metaphysical attitudes on 
historicity that have been held by the audience for a long time. In addition, this is in 
sharp contrast to the previously mentioned documentary sequence in which people on 
the street seemed scared under the Japanese bombers. War indeed causes universal 
misery, while the humor brought by Chaplin cannot be ignored in our memories as 
well. How can we always generalize a piece of the past with only cruelty and 
solemnity? It is clearly a dangerous preference. The originator of the prejudice is not 
history itself, but in our way of presentation. As Linda Hutcheon said, postmodern 
parody is just a historical and dialectical revision and rethinking; in this process it 
simultaneously constructs and subverts the power of the historical representation (95): 
―[p]ostmodern parody is both deconstructively critical and constructively creative, 
paradoxically making us aware of both the limits and the powers of representation – 
in any medium.‖ (98) 
 
The significance of this parody consists in scepticism and adjustment on our 
cognitive style towards a past. I do not mean to compare the sublime with humour, 
nor see them as a pair of binary oppositions. There is no quantitative measure to tell 
which one is better. What parody does is to break through in the monotony and 
dignity of a historical discourse and its representation, and meanwhile advocate a 
pluralism and a variety of attitudes. 
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The second section with black and white style emerges towards the middle. 
The sequence tells a story about a commendation meeting. After a victory in a 
campaign where Sanmao successfully raided the enemy‘s artillery unit, the film 
suddenly changes from colorful scenes of disarmed Japanese soldiers into a silent film 
caption ―A Triumphant Return‖, then turns into a black and white sequence of 
Chinese troops matching forward on streets, and the citizens standing on both sides of 
roads giving them a warm welcome, while children with flowers enthusiastically fly 
to their heroes. A visual impression of the section is that it was shot crudely and lacks 
change in camera positions, suggesting a propaganda documentary style. It is unclear 
if this is real or false, but what follows is definitely a mockumentary rather than a 
documentary. The big shot (Chiang Kai-shek) makes an inspection of the front line. 
When he is observing the enemy‘s situation through a periscope, he unintentionally 
sees the film camera shooting him from the side. Then his face falls, and he winks at 
his staff officer who immediately walks towards the camera and covers it with his 
hand. The sequence is then cut into another scene in which Chiang is expressing 
sympathies with the wounded. A commendation meeting follows: soldiers are lined up 
for inspection in a yard. The film camera is facing the platform but behind the soldiers; 
for them the attraction from the camera is obviously much more than that from the 
leader. They turn to look at the machine continually; some of them even point to the 
camera and whisper to each other. Meanwhile, Sanmao turns for a glance as well. 
After a speech, Chiang poses for a group photograph. Then Sanmao caught his 
attention and was taken to his side. Chiang raised Sanmao‘s hat and laughs at his three 
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stands of hair. At that time, Chiang is presented with a flag that symbolizes a victory. 
He then lets Sanmao hold the flag and be photographed with him. But Sanmao is too 
short to make the whole flag rise up from the ground, so the photographer lets him 
raise it higher over and over again. Eventually Sanmao lifts it over his head, and the 
flag completely covers his body and face. The next day this picture is published on 
newspapers, but there is only the big shot and a flag in it. 
 
 a.   b. 
 c.   d. 
Figure 2. The “Documentary” in An Orphan Joins the Army 
  
The purpose of elaborating this sequence is to represent clearly those 
postmodern elements. Generally speaking, the sequence appropriates a documentary 
style, combines a counter narrative, and eventually illustrates certain film forms 
existing between parody and mockumentary, in order that it may achieve an ironic 
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effect on history and insist on an incredulity towards the historical reality.  
 
3.2.2.2. Historical Context and Big Shots 
 
First of all, the appropriation and imitation of a documentary style is quite 
apparent in the film. In addition to the use of black and white style and silent film 
form, the director Zhang Jianya also invited a typecast actor, Sun Feihu who is famous 
for acting Chiang in a series of ―leitmotif‖ films48 in early 1990s, in his film so that 
the historical feelings can be conveyed accurately. A similar example may be found in 
Forrest Gump (1994, R. Zemeckis), where Forrest was received by Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson. The difference is that Chiang is played by the typecast actor, 
while the two presidents are digitally made by computers. But no matter how different, 
they share one intention, to make the historical discourse and its context prominent 
through the big shots.  
 
3.2.2.3. Counter-cinema Narratives 
 
Secondly, the sequence is not just an imitation of documentary. It also merges 
with some counter-cinema narratives. For example, the soldiers look into the 
audiences‘ eyes through the lens of the camera, which can be understood in different 
ways. On one hand, a direct vision between actors and the lens may help to promote a 
                                                        
48  The ―leitmotif‖ is usually used in the mainland of China as 主旋律, which generally refers to politically 
mainstream cinema in revolutionary discourse advocated by the government. 
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sense of random shot. An unconsidered mise-en-scene that is lack of plan may set off 
the realities of a documentary style. On the other hand, people in the past or in a 
historical context continually communicate with audiences by eye contact in the 
present tense. That may arouse audiences‘ self-awareness of their own peering 
behaviors towards the past; thus it separates them from the historical context, and 
eventually breaks a film narrative closure and influences the totalization of history. 
Two points may support this argument, one is what Wollen (1982) mentions, the 
counter cinema narratives, which include an opposition between counter-cinema and 
the mainstream. He argues that audiences are distanced from the characters in a 
―counter‖ film rather than empathizing with particular characters as in the mainstream, 
so they see the stories as fictional constructs rather than adopting and enjoying them 
as real events (79-91). The other point is about the ―fourth wall‖49 and its breaking, 
which makes the boundary between the audience and the fiction obvious and forces an 
audience to see the fiction less passively but think more critically about what they are 
watching rather than dreaming. When Chiang in the sequence had the camera covered, 
the film demonstrates a barrier that interferes with a historical reading behavior 
through lens. This restriction seems not friendly, but it emphasizes the existence of a 
camera in a history. When a history realizes a camera, as far as the audience is 
concerned how can they get a completely authentic and objective history? A historical 
                                                        
49  The fourth wall is the imaginary ―wall‖ at the front of the stage in a traditional three-walled box set in a 
proscenium theatre, through which the audience sees the action in the world of the play. The idea of the fourth 
wall spread in nineteenth-century theatre with the advent of theatrical realism, which extended the idea to the 
imaginary boundary between any fictional work and its audience. The presence of the fourth wall is an 
established convention of modern realistic theatre, which has led some artists to draw direct attention to it for 
dramatic or comedic effect when this boundary is ―broken‖, for example by an actor onstage speaking to the 
audience directly. See Elizabeth S. Bell, Theories of Performance (203). 
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reality then becomes impossible. It simultaneously exploits the documentary style and 
betrays its original intention. This postmodern appropriation can be explained as what 
Linda Hutcheon mentioned, in her chapter on ―re-presenting the past‖. In describing a 
process of ―total history, detotalized‖ (or as similar as meta-fictions50), she said,  
 
[T]he postmodern questioning of this totalizing impulse…there are 
equally powerful examples of the postmodern paradox of 
anti-totalizing totalization in [postmodern works] which structurally 
both install and subvert the teleology, closure, and causality of 
narrative, both historical and fictive.
 51
 
 
3.2.2.4. Parody, Fake Documentary, and an Absent Past 
 
Thirdly, by this token, an appropriation of documentary style is inevitable. The 
strategy, in counter cinema, leads to the germination of two literary forms, parody
52
 
and mockumentary. The former creates an absurd historical situation, which in my 
view provides a seedbed for the latter in questioning a historical-cognitive framework. 
The intentions of both parody and mockumentary do not consist in the reappearance 
of history, but in reconsideration of its reality
53
 and our totalizing impulse. In this 
                                                        
50  Meta-fiction is a type of fiction that self-consciously addresses the devices of fiction and self-consciously 
draws attention to its status as an artifact in posing questions about the relations between fiction and reality, 
such as irony and self-reflection. See L. Hutcheon (Narcissistic 139). 
51  For Hutcheon, totalized narrative can be seen as follows: ―we have seen that narrative has come to be 
acknowledged as, above all, a human-made structure – never as ‗natural‘ or given. Whether it be in historical 
or fictional representation, the familiar narrative form of beginning, middle, and end implies a structuring 
process that imparts meaning as well as order. The notion of its ‗end‘ suggests both teleology and closure… it 
is considered a mode of ‗totalizing‘ representation‖. (Hutcheon Politics 62). 
52  For Hutcheon, parody and appropriation are equal and similar. See Hutcheon (Politics 93). But some other 
scholars see them as two tied strategies. 
53  Alisa Lebow believes the term ‗mockumentary‘ more effectively works to signal a skepticism toward 
documentary realism, rather than to reauthorize documentary‘s ‗truth‘ against the fake doc‘s ‗false‘.‖ In 
―Faking What? Making a Mockery of Documentary‖ edited by Alexandra Juhasz and Jesse Lerner, Fake 
Documentary and Truth‟s Undoing, (223). 
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regard, they arrive at the same end. As a typical fiction, the joint photo of Sanmao and 
Chiang becomes a living example to explain that how a parody and the fake 
documentary construct a fictional narrative in an empty shell of history, which seems 
enough to subvert, or at least waver in, our firmness on any source of information 
about the past. Actually, through the ages, our historical cognitions do not depend on 
the authentic or direct-viewing reflections, as Hutcheon pointed out, ―the past really 
did exist, but we can only know it today through its textual traces‖ such as documents, 
archives, photographs, films and so on that are often indirect presentations in the 
present (Politics 73). Like the joint picture of Chiang and the flag, its reality or 
existence cannot be denied, for it is published in a real newspaper, but no one knows 
what exactly it was behind the flag. So the point is not discussing whether a past tense 
has happened before, but to realize that what existed in a history and what we can 
recognize in the present from history are totally different questions. Therefore, an 
absent past can only be inferred from those unimportant and circumstantial evidences. 
If so, to let Sanmao stand behind the flag is just an exaggerated assumption rather 
than a subjective imagination, while this assumption seems so easy to be looked 
through so that people may be clearly aware of the limitations of historical perception. 
 
3.2.3. The Downfall of Heroes 
 
The discussion above may be read as a fragment of epic heroics or a 
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suggestion of meta-narrative
54
. Since the Homeric hymns, heroism, as one part of 
grand narrative, has dominated the historical narrative in the West. This inclination 
has a long history in China as well, since Sima Qian wrote his Records of the Grand 
Historian in a biographical style two thousand years ago. 
 
3.2.3.1. To Be a Hero? 
 
However, according to Lyotard, to question the legitimacy of a meta-narrative 
is exactly a primary mission of the postmodern. In his The Postmodern Condition, he 
points out that a subversion of meta-narrative depends on the invalidation of two 
legitimate narratives. Both of them were developed in the Enlightenment, one is the 
Freedom narrative based on the French Revolution; the other is the rational tradition 
inherited from Hegel. On behalf of a radical independence, the former leads to a ―hero 
of liberty‖; the latter defends rational science and works hard in pursuit of the validity, 
totality, ultimate principle, and sublime authority, which leads to a ―hero of 
knowledge‖55. For Lyotard, a postmodern attitude is delegitimation. The legitimate 
                                                        
54  Also known as master or grand-narrative. Meta-narrative is ―a term that is used in critical theory, and 
particularly postmodernism. In this context it refers to a grand or all-encompassing story, which attempts to 
give order to the historical record, and to justify the existence of social institutions and authorities. The term is 
most well-known for its use by Jean-François Lyotard in the following quotation: ‗ I define postmodern as 
incredulity toward metanarratives‘ (1984). By this, Lyotard meant that the condition of postmodernity is 
characterized by an increasingly widespread skepticism toward metanarratives, such as reason, truth, and 
justice, that were accepted without question in modernity‖. (see ―Metanarratives: Lyotard Postmodern Human 
Existence‖, online definitions on http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Metanarratives.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 
2010) ―meta‖ refers to beyond, and ―narrative‖ means story. So a meta-narrative is a story about a story beyond. 
The primary emphasis of a meta-narrative refers to a set of beliefs applied universally that is unquestioned by 
the individual and group holding those beliefs. For more definitions on meta-narrative, please see the part of 
literature review in this paper. 
55  See J. F. Lyotard (Condition 31-6). The hero of knowledge is similar to what Frankfurt School (T. W. Adorno 
and M. Horkheimer) argued an ―elite culture‖ germinated from the authoritarian personality. Lyotard noticed 
that the integration between knowledge and authority are inclined to an opposition between the masses and the 
elites. This leads the high art to a profound collapse in popular culture. 
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device of meta-narrative has had its day in the postmodern condition. The grand 
narrative and its social context – including hero and oracle, rescue and liberty, the 
great victory, and the splendid landscape – are going to be obscured as time goes by. 
People do not believe in political or historical discourses any more, nor in those great 
themes. A petit récit has replaced them. A hero narrative – a process from calamity 
and rescue to a nice ending – is no longer fashionable. The postmodern world is a 
realm of mortal existence without oracles, and an era which emphasizes a process 
rather than the end (Wang Yuechuan 188). Here ―the mortal‖ means ordinary people 
or the masses, which consists of the marginalized characters in postmodern films of 
China, such as Sanmao. 
 
3.2.3.2. Chiang‘s Temptation 
 
Though Sanmao did not eventually become a historical hero, he had no 
intention to give up. The film creates a context of historical meta-narrative for him. 
Whenever a piece of history is mentioned in the film, there always comes out a black 
and white sequence to set off the past, which must include Chiang. As if there was no 
history without a big shot. This perhaps makes the audiences aware that the big shots 
are not only the representatives or dominators of history, but controlling history they 
identify with it. Under the circumstances of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang apparently 
played a role, which Lyotard mentioned, the hero of liberty. Therefore, in a historical 
context, Sanmao has to count on (or relate to) Chiang in order that he may join into a 
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history and show the impossibility of his existence and how tiny the ordinary people 
are in master narrative. Chiang emerges in the film three times (three sequences with 
fake-documentary style) and made a great impression on Sanmao. The first is in the 
beginning, after the documentary sequence of Japanese bombers. Chiang is standing 
on a platform for a speech and he said, ―The national crisis warrants special measures, 
every Chinese should try their best against the invasion. We should bring up a famous 
hero among uncounted unsung heroes…‖ his speech spread throughout the country 
and reached Sanmao‘s ears as well. Then when was asked why he joined the army, 
Sanmao answers that he wants to be the ―famous hero‖ advocated by Chiang. Thus it 
is Chiang that tempts him to join the army. Ironically, Chiang is the only one who 
becomes famous in the film and his second appearance is in an army parade before a 
campaign. Sanmao marches in the formation with a rifle in his hands and his head 
turning right. That was his first chance to see the ―big shot‖. It may be argued that 
most people have a similar dream, a subconscious motive, to become a hero emerging 
in the same space time with those big shots and to leave an eternal memory on 
history
56
. The third time, Chiang emerges in the commendation meeting mentioned 
above, where Sanmao got a chance to go near the ―big shot‖ and even had a joint 
picture taken with him. However in the end, he was still covered by a flag and 
disappeared in history without trace. While the fake-documentary sequences bring the 
―traces‖ back for us, everyone realizes it is meta-fiction.  
 
                                                        
56  For example, Ma Xiaojun, in In the Heat of the Sun (Jiang Wen, 1995), looks at himself through a mirror and 
imitates Wang Cheng, another hero in the other film Shang Gan Ling (1956), saying the famous lines ―fire 
towards me!‖ a self-irony on those who had dreams to be a hero. 
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3.2.3.3. Incredulity towards Metanarratives 
 
This is an extreme satire on meta-narrative that seems lack trace or process but 
just focuses on a result or outcome. It may also remind the audiences that only public 
figures (those ―big shots‖) can become a history, a hero, or a permanent legend. 
Conversely, who did create a history? Most audiences may have this belief: the people 
are the makers of history. Chiang also emphasizes in the film that all of the honors 
should go to Chinese soldiers like Sanmao. He cannot deny the influence of the 
ordinary people on history either. But most of them finally faded out behind the flag. 
If we see the flag as a result of history (or at least a historical appearance), all the 
processes have already been covered behind it. It is not a fault of history, but of 
representation, which again leads to distrust of narratives. According to Lyotard: 
 
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives. […] The narrative function is losing its functors, its 
great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, and its great goal. It is 
being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements – narrative, 
but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. (xxiv-xxv) 
 
As a meta-narrative, a typical documentary is used to celebrating heroes and 
their great outcomes but ignoring the masses and their traces. If an imitation of 
documentary style brings some new meanings, it may be considered as a parody, 
which simultaneously constructs a process of how our historical consciousness creates 
and arouses scepticism of narratives by which a hero is portrayed or molded and 
ordinary people are hidden. Its intention seems in accordance with Lyotard‘s point – 
heroism is past now, the postmodern is an ordinary world, an era where we only focus 
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on process rather than consequence
57
. 
 
3.2.3.4. Trivialization, Desire and Their Repression 
 
 In addition, the film provides another way of dealing with ―hero‖, a 
trivialization. Since Sanmao cannot flourish in historical narratives, why not fashion 
him as an ordinary person? Through such trivialization, the film reconstructs a pattern 
of trivialized discourse. Its core consists in Sanmao‘s illusions and desires. Before 
going to the frontline, the troop invites some dancing girls for a performance, looking 
very sexy in their dress. The film provides quite a few close-ups of their chests and 
thighs and soldiers are sexually excited by the pornography. Here the director 
apparently excited the audience‘s subconsciousness to show how a libidinous feeling 
works on people‘s minds. It reminds me of certain aesthetic intentions related to the 
postmodern, I call it a resurrection of irrational desires, such as sexual fantasies. This 
may be explained by Daniel Bell who argues that the core of the postmodern cultural 
industry consists in resisting a rational restriction. The postmodern advocates an 
individual liberty, instinctive catharsis, a freedom of impulsion, and a return of some 
pre-rational spontaneity (Bell Exhaustion 370-8; Bell Contradiction 79-125; Wang 
Yuechuan 135-7). Generally speaking, these inclinations in postmodern films are 
mostly presented as a pornographic temptation
58
, a violent impulse
59
, or indulging in 
                                                        
57  In talking about An Orphan Joins the Army, Zhou Huan said that, when the myth of history is demonstrated as 
a performance of the historical process in front of the audiences, the historical result then becomes a fictional 
illusion that will collapse and fade out from audiences‘ awareness. See Zhou Huan (57). 
58  Like Blue Velvet (David Lynch, 1986) that is full of temptations of curiosity and nudity. 
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certain drug fantasies
60
.  
 
The other film directed by Zhang Jianya, Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires 
(Wangxiansheng zhi yuhuo fenshen, 1994), also discusses the relations between high 
arts and lust/lechery, when the two male protagonists quarrel with each other about a 
nude picture. One asks the other, ―Why when you look the picture, you have a keen 
eye for aesthetic appreciation; but when I do the same, you see me as a satyr?‖ This is 
a typical example that demonstrates how the postmodern questions the high arts, 
which is maybe a metaphysical excuse for people to legitimately release their desires 
in a rational context. Sanmao here is tempted by porn as well, first from the dancing 
girls, then from the underwear of his commander‘s wife, and eventually dreaming of a 
series of love fantasies with a young female partisan after a combat. In this section, 
the film shows the typical happy life of traditional China – men till the land and 
women weave cloth with children playing around. This illusion forms a sharp contrast 
with his early dream, in which Sanmao had dreamed of being a hero on the stage of 
traditional Peking opera. It manifests that Sanmao subconsciously transfers his desire 
to a longing for an ordinary life. This may be seen as a transition from the grand 
narratives to a petit récit. However, the dream is immediately broken by another 
discourse. A voice over, with a self-reflexive strain, says ―Sanmao knows, as a soldier 
he should not have affections or desires…‖ then he bewilderedly walks up a stage of 
                                                                                                                                                               
59  For instance a film, Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), demonstrates an irrational violence. 
60  Like Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996) which tells a story of a group of young people in Edinburgh. Drugs 
helped them breakthrough the rational standards of conduct. 
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modern Peking opera
61
, surrounded by a group of communist soldiers. One of them 
holds Sanmao‘s hands enthusiastically and says, ―Little comrade, welcome to take 
part in the revolution!‖ 62  After that, Sanmao returns to the battlefield. This 
arrangement, on one hand, proves – with the meta-narrative strain – that human 
history is a narrative history with its desire suppressed; but on the other, it is also a 
metaphor for the influences brought by the ideological revolution on public life, and 
meanwhile shows how much petit récit (in this particular case, subversively) exists in 
a left-wing political discourse (or mainstream censorship), which in return asserts the 
necessity of the existence of postmodern conservatism in contemporary China and its 
social context. 
 
3.2.4. War, Game, and Their Intertextuality 
 
 Parody in the film is widely used to present the battle scenes. The application 
of parody leads to a dramatic change in attitudes on wars, namely a change from a 
cruel and solemn impression into an absurd game. It lacks linear association between 
scenes, so that it forms a bricolage including: Sanmao playing Yue Fei, a famous 
ancient hero, fighting with Japanese soldiers on the stage of classic Peking opera
63
; 
the parodies of the Tunnel Warfare (Didao zhan 1966, film) and Shajia Creek (Shajia 
                                                        
61  The modern Peking opera refers to the ―Eight model plays‖, which were the most famous operas and ballets 
that were permitted during the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976). They all have communist or 
revolutionary themes. 
62  Exactly speaking, this is a scene imitated from the revolutionary Peking opera Sha Jia Bang, in which 
revolutionary masses were joining with the New Fourth Army led by the communist party of China. 
63  This is a sequence of parody of the traditional Peking opera: such as Tiao Hua Che, Man Jiang Hong, and Ba 
Da Chui, both of them adapted from the Story of Yue Fei (1103-1142). 
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bang, modern Peking opera); even an imitation of an early Chinese film Laborer‟s 
Love (Zhi guo yuan, 1922); and in the end, the film appropriates a children‘s game, 
―Hawks Catching Chickens‖, to show the battle scenes. These sequences not only 
practise a language game on film, but also fill the film with intertextuality
64
. As far as 
the postmodernity is concerned in the film, both of the elements present a denial of 
the primacy of subjectivity. What is different consists in that the former denies the 
subjectivity of a war; the latter illustrates a subjective crisis in literary acceptance. 
 
3.2.4.1. War or Game? 
 
 ―Game‖ does not simply mean to demonstrate certain entertainment with a 
film language. For L. Wittgenstein, all of human activities can be seen as games. He 
argues that there is no intrinsic quality in any of the words. Their meanings are all 
reflected in certain contexts, in other words, in their applications of concrete games
65
. 
Therefore in his late considerations
66
, Wittgenstein refused to define ―language game‖, 
and even denied that a language has any essential logic or idea
67
. Hence, when we 
make language concrete into a specific word such as ―war‖, it cannot become an 
essential concept any more. Here what I am referring to is neither to see a war as a 
                                                        
64  Intertextuality is the shaping of texts' meanings by other texts. It can refer to an author‘s borrowing and 
transformation of a prior text or to a reader‘s referencing of one text in reading another. Please refer to Julia 
Kristeva and Linda Hutcheon‘s works. 
65  Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford : 
Blackwell, parts related with ―language game‖. 
66  Compared to his early works (Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus, 1922), the late consideration refers to 
Wittgenstein‘s Philosophical investigations (1953). 
67  Jiang Yi (2002) ―Wittgenstein‘s Language Game‖ a speech in Beijing Normal University, 22 Oct. 2002. 
http://www.zisi.net/htm/ztlw2/xfzx/2005-05-10-19562.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010. 
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game nor to present a war with any entertaining form; but mean that, to read a war as 
a sign in language and to comprehend it in a concrete context. This process itself is a 
game. Then whether it is a Peking opera, an old movie, or a children‘s game, the 
parodies of those texts actually provide diverse contexts for the understandings of a 
war. This kind of fragmentation or bricolage towards various games of the war leads 
immediately to a plurality and uncertainty of the meanings of the war. While they 
have a common ground that all the original texts of these parodies contain dramatic 
conflicts, such as Yue Fei versus invaders, hawks versus chickens and so on, the 
contexts of those conflicts exist on stages, movie screens, or games in kindergartens 
rather than a real battlefield. So it does not describe a war with language any longer, 
but a war that has been brought into games by language
68
. These parodies, based on 
the mimicking of wars, have erased the basic intentions, the cruelty, and the feeling of 
justice of a war, which indirectly shake the audience‘s inherent sense of mind on wars. 
Once the cognitive essentiality has collapsed, the binary subject consciousness on 
wars – such as win or lose, contradictions or hostility – begins to lose its existent 
necessity. Then people (or any party against each other) in wars gradually lose their 
dominant position to control the game and its rules, and they are reduced to 
insignificant participants or by-standers. Parody and bricolage, from this perspective, 
construct a filmic language game, undermine the position of human as a subjective 
cognition in wars, and shake people‘s stereotyped images of warfare. 
 
                                                        
68  To be extreme, people‘s cognitions on wars are gradually controlled by language and media. This concept is as 
similar as J. Baudrillard‘s views on the Gulf War and the hyper-realities. See Baudrillard (Gulf, qtd. in Malpas 
63-74). 
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3.2.4.2. The Authors, The Works, and The Readers 
 
 Intertextuality is usually characterized by the lack of individual styles and the 
appropriation of many original texts. Therefore, it is almost impossible to avoid, when 
the participation of Sanmao in the war has been presented as the parodies of other 
texts. An appropriation means a disappearance of the differences between texts, or at 
least an indistinction among styles. The lack of textual styles then naturally leads the 
question to a subjective concept of literary reception. The ―subject‖ emphasized here 
means a discussion on what the core is between the authors, the works, and the 
readers. It was generally thought that a literary work was created through its author‘s 
inspiration and conveys the author‘s intent, and the distinctions between works 
embody the styles of authors. However, through the application of parody and 
appropriation, the film demonstrates a fragmented bricolage on various styles that 
seems quite confusing. It is not only the author‘s motive that has been called into 
question, but it shakes its principal position through the process of the reception. For J. 
Kristeva, ―the notion of intertextuality replaces the notion of ‗intersubjectivity‘‖ when 
we realize that meaning is not transferred directly from writer to reader but instead is 
mediated through, or filtered by, ―codes‖ imparted to the writer and reader by other 
texts (69). Hutcheon also argues that excessive interest in intertextuality obscures the 
role of the author, because intertextuality can be found ―in the eye of the beholder‖ 
and does not necessarily entail a communicator‘s intentions (87). In addition to the 
author, the lack of distinct textual styles also makes it nearly impossible to have a text 
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become the core subject of literature. Thus as Roland Barthes pointed out, this 
intertextual view implies such kind of significance that the meaning of an artistic 
work does not reside in that work, but in the viewers
69
. Ultimately we have to rely on 
readers to achieve a creation of meanings from works. This is in accord with H. 
Gadamer‘s view. In his Truth and Method, he believes that a truth is reflected from 
not only the work but also a reality participated in and influenced by the readers and 
their viewing behaviors (262-71). In this respect, it implies a concept of postmodern 
hermeneutics
70
, and its substance does not make readers become a subject or the 
centre of literature
71
, but just emphasizes the significance of the participation of 
readers and their subjective contexts, thus breaking the centricity, totality, objectivity, 
and certainty of modern philosophy. This is what a filmic intertextuality conveys, as a 
postmodern aesthetic inclination. 
 
3.3. The Film Reflected As a Culture 
 
 Based on the discussion above, it is more than convincing that An Orphan 
Joins the Army has close ties with the postmodern in many aspects. The argument 
below is that the postmodernity of film texts is not only based on any occasional, 
accidental, or personal attempts by certain individual directors or artists; it can also be 
                                                        
69  Roland Barthes (S/Z 21). He also announced ‗the death of the author‘ and ‗the birth of the reader‘, declaring 
that ‗a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination‘. See Roland Barthes ―the Death of the Author‖, 
(142-148). 
70  Here refers to those hermeneutics after Martin Heidegger, including Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics, 
Habermas‘s critical hermeneutics, and Hans R. Jauss‘s reception theory. 
71  Actually, for postmodernism, there is not any intrinsic core in its nature. See Jiang Yi. 
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read as postmodern in cultural debates, in other words, its germination was affected or 
catalyzed by certain social factors so that the film becomes a self-conscious cultural 
practice and presentation, rather than an innovation or avant-garde artistic practice 
created purely from personal awareness. 
 
3.3.1. Cultural Exhaustion and Desublimation 
3.3.1.1. The Embarrassing Situation 
 
 As one of the fifth generation directors of China, Zhang Jianya, in an 
interview ten years later, does not admit that he personally had any postmodernist 
motive when shooting the film, but emphasizes the embarrassing situation he met in 
the early 1990s. 
 
―After graduation in 1982, I got back to the Shanghai Film Studio, 
busy in some peddling details. At that time I really wanted to shoot a 
film of my own, but when my turn really came to me [in the 1990s], I 
found that my classmates had already gone beyond me by a long way
72
. 
Then I jokingly said that all the colors have been already used by 
others, such as Yellow Earth (Chen Kaige, 1985), Red Sorghum (Zhang 
Yimou, 1987), Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993), and The Black 
Cannon Incident (Huang Jianxin, 1985) etc… all kinds of styles of the 
fifth generation have stood in great numbers, the front road has been 
closed and there is no leeway for me to create something unique. What 
I may do is just enjoy the old cartoon that makes people 
comfortable.‖73  
 
Zhang‘s words presented a crisis of innovation in the Chinese film style at the 
                                                        
72  ―Classmates‖ refers to those fifth generation directors who at the same time as Zhang Jianya graduated from 
the Beijing Film Academy in 1982, such as Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, Huang Jianxin and Tian 
Zhuangzhuang. 
73  See Zhang Jianya‘s interviews in People Net. 
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beginning of the 1990s. There may have been various interpretations of the crisis, but 
here I will only mention two points related to culture: one is Fredric Jameson‘s 
so-called cultural exhaustion; the other is Russell Berman‘s so called high art and its 
desublimation. The former leads the creative arts to an imitation, and the latter points 
out the direction for the imitation. 
 
3.3.1.2. Postmodernism and Cultural Exhaustion 
 
 So far as the former is concerned, Jameson believes that there exists an 
absence of original innovation or a crisis of originality in late capitalist culture, where 
people increasingly infiltrate a culture in which everything has already been said and 
done, and into a world in which it is impossible to accommodate an innovative style 
any more (1983, 111-25). In such a culture and world, what is left are only those 
repeats and imitation of the dead styles
74
. Our discourses covered with stylistic masks 
are all roaming in the old image archives. This situation is quite similar to what Zhang 
Jianya met. In the early 90s, the whole Chinese film had been enveloped by Zhang 
Yimou‘s success around those international film festivals, and most of the fifth 
generation directors had already established their styles and won awards frequently in 
the world (Wang Yichuan 68-79). However in this period Zhang Jianya had just begun 
getting his opportunity and making his first film independently. It was hard to 
overtake others from a backward position. He later recalled, ―I do not like to follow 
                                                        
74  Imitating and mixing up dead styles may be considered as pastiche or empty parody. They are discussed in the 
―nostalgia‖ part of this paper. 
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others, I cannot duplicate them, those are their success.‖75 He had obviously given up 
on the efforts of innovative style, for to follow others means being always left behind. 
This is a dilemma when facing cultural exhaustions, which is obviously not only a 
personal frame of mind, but a realistic situation reflected from the contemporary 
Chinese culture as a whole. This gave Zhang Jianya no choice. He can only, as 
Jameson pointed out, wear dead masks and pick up those old styles and clichés again 
to make a reconstruction and redeploy them. However, compared with Jameson‘s 
pessimism, Zhang found an alternative style from parody, an absurd and humorous 
satire and self-derision. The reason I call it a substituted style rather than an 
occasional imitation is because after An Orphan Joins the Army, Zhang‘s second film, 
Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires (1995) also continued the same pattern of style. It is 
adapted from another comic series as well, and is full of parody, bricolage, and 
intertextuality
76
. These elements were rare in Chinese films before. 
 
3.3.1.3. Mass Culture and Desublimation 
 
 The other initiator of the crisis is cultural desublimation (Berman, ―Modern 
Art and Desublimation‖). It manifests a clear direction of getting back to the mass 
culture. For Russell A. Berman, the word ―sublimation‖ means a posture, like high art, 
that overtops a mass-level culture and seems too highbrow to be popular in recent 
                                                        
75  See the interviews with Zhang Jianya on People Net and New Beijing Daily. 
76  For instance, the parodies of and the bricolage between the films such as Red Sorghum (1987), Raise the Red 
Lantern (1991), Taking Tiger Mountain by Stategy (1970), Battleship Potemkin (Броненосец Потёмкин, 
1925). 
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years. The word was then borrowed by John Hill to set off the gradually subverted 
high art in the postmodern culture. He said, it has lost its capacity to challenge and 
provoke as well as its capacity to communicate to a public beyond a small elite (97). 
Thereupon in a postmodern culture, high art is gradually giving up sublimation of 
upward and in return condensing into a mass taste. I call this as a process of 
―desublimation‖. Except for Zhang Jianya, other fifth generation directors and their 
works, especially their early films before the mid 1990s, generally have a sublime 
quality saluting modern literature and art. On the one hand, this derives from the blind 
worship of modern Western culture; on the other hand, it results from the return of 
humanism after China‘s Cultural Revolution and the inherent cultural ambition of the 
intellectuals in China. But the most important influence perhaps comes from the 
change of film audiences. The works of the fifth generation gradually lost their 
creative focus fully serving the revolutionary masses, and turning their range of vision 
overseas
77
. Or to put it extremely, they were catering for the foreign artistic tastes and 
developing their Chinese illusions from international film festivals. Though no 
detailed evidence can be provided to argue that most of the fifth generation films in 
early 90s had ever had absolute sublimation effects, it is indisputable that those works 
had become partially detached from the local audience and its commercial markets 
already
78
. Facing this situation, Zhang had to refocus his attention on the local market 
                                                        
77  Adam Lam mentioned that the Chinese cinema had experienced a crucial transformation since the mid 1980s. 
Chinese films have not only focused on the domestic market, but have started trying to get attention of the 
overseas audiences with various cultural backgrounds (2005, 61). Then he takes Red Sorghum (1987) as an 
example to argue that most of the successes of the Chinese cinema in overseas partially come from their 
catering for the Western tastes and its cultural identity (67-8). 
78  For example, when talking about Chen Kaige‘s early films like Yellow Earth (1985), Adam Lam has pointed 
out that this kind of film, although it received some good feedback from both overseas and domestically on the 
artistic achievements, yet it is only effective for a narrow audience and lacks the support of the masses (2005, 
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in addition to giving up an individual style. ―To the early 1990s, the fifth generation 
directors had already grabbed their styles in great numbers‖, Zhang said, ―every way 
had been gone through by others, so what should I make? I put myself as an audience 
[rather than a judge], and asked myself what would I like to watch?‖79 His words 
convey a passive choice. It is better to say that Zhang has passively accepted the 
realistic situation of the contemporary culture in China
80
, rather than actively giving 
up his own style and going back to the masses. Actually he has realized a disharmony 
between the modern arts and the masses, and consequently put the fusion of the high 
art and popular culture as his breakthrough. At that time, no matter whether Zhang 
himself had realized the process of transition or not, he had already plunged into a 
cultural state of desublimation, and consciously practised various postmodern 
elements for public awareness. When referring to his original intentions for An 
Orphan Joins the Army and Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires, Zhang said that he just 
wanted to make a joke on films, arts, and the directors themselves. When he was 
shooting the two films, there was not any [postmodern] ism in his mind at all, and his 
aim was just to make his works popular
81
. His words provide a clear direction for the 
imitation. That is to tease literature and arts with the vision of the masses. In this 
respect, no matter whether Sanmao is standing on the stage of a revolutionary drama 
                                                                                                                                                               
77); then he argued that after Red Sorghum (1987) Zhang Yimou‘s other films in the early 90s did not get high 
box offices in the domestic market (2005, 150). Additionally for Wang Yichuan, the reason Chinese audiences 
paid more attention to Y. Zhang‘s Red trilogy was not because of its intrinsic attractions, but because the films 
got awards from foreign film festivals, in ―Zhang‘s Myth and Its ending‖ (68-79). 
79  See the interviews with Zhang Jianya on People Net and New Beijing Daily. 
80  The popular culture of mainland of China was experiencing a high-speed development in 1990s. Its social 
background will be discussed later on. 
81  Refer to the interview with Zhang Jianya on People Net. 
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or Mr. Wang is lying in the field of red sorghum and instead of ―my grandpa‖82 with 
his weak chest in a context of sexual behavior, a parody is no longer a pure or empty 
imitation, but shows an attitude of giving up the idolization of lofty ideals and turning 
into certain satire over public consciousness.  
 
3. 3. 2. Conservative Refutation 
 
 The great changes in the Chinese social and cultural background since the 
late 1970s also provide a fertile soil for the germination of the postmodern. A cultural 
reality is inevitably playing a role of a catalyst. So its result is not just demonstrated 
by the intellectuals‘ auto criticism on their separations from the masses. Actually since 
the very beginning of this period, the postmodernity of China was not limited to the 
category of literature and arts, and this was related in its films. This section shifts 
from the view of seeing film as a literary art and focuses on a wider field, the 
influence from social-cultural respects. 
 
3.3.2.1. Social and Political Background, China 1990s 
 
 In the period of the early 1990s, China had been reformed for more than ten 
years. The market economy was being developed rapidly all over the country, and its 
economic achievements were obvious to all. The local capital market was facing a 
                                                        
82  The protagonist of Zhang Yimou‘s famous maiden (directoring) film Red Sorghum (1987). 
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great innovation, which led to a reshuffle of the income distribution system. The 
unbalanced distribution and the problem of corruption gradually resulted in a 
polarization of rich and poor
83
. Without their markets and protection from the old 
planned economy, some of the nation-owned enterprises began to go bankrupt one 
after another. Unemployment levels rocketed to new heights, which became social 
factors of instability. As for politics, the student movement of 1989 had just ended. 
The government showed a tough attitude towards the radical leftist intellectuals
84
; 
from the point of view of international politics, socialist China was enduring 
tremendous pressures from the decline of international communism
85
. Such a situation 
on the one hand forced the government to ease the tension of the domestic social 
conflicts; on the other hand it awakened intellectuals to the negative consequences of 
radical protests, and they then instead began to seek other means of discourse. So 
during this period, conservatism and eclecticism began to receive acceptance by both 
the mainstream discourse and the public, and since then a right-wing conservative 
attitude has started to play a relatively leading role in its social culture.  
 
3.3.2.2. Neo-conservatism of China 
 
Zhao Yiheng clearly pointed out that, based on the Western ―postism‖86 the 
                                                        
83  See, The Basic Issues on Deng Xiaoping Theory (1). 
84  Please refer to relevant information about ―Tiananmen Massacre‖. The three main purposes of the movement 
were to advocate the freedom of speech, to punish corruption, and to improve the treatment of intellectuals. 
85  The decline here is for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the socialist camp in Eastern 
Europe. 
86  Postism (后学), created by Yiheng Zhao, generally refers to those ―post‖ related to Western thoughts 
developed in the late 20th century, such as post-structuralism, postmodernism, and post-colonialism (Zhao 
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Chinese academia started a new tide of discussion on neo-conservatism around the 
early 1990s. He argues that ―conservative‖ is not a derogatory term, and it is at least 
much better than radical. Its basic meaning is to maintain the status quo and to 
emphasize a rationality of the existing contemporary culture. In ―The New Ten 
Symposium‖ attended by Chen Xiaoming, Zhang Yiwu, Zhu Wei, and Dai Jinhua, a 
status quo of the contemporary culture has been made clear, that is, the mainstream 
discourse or the elite culture has no longer had complete control of the production and 
dissemination of cultures. Zhu thinks, to blindly defend the elite culture is already 
ridiculous; Chen points that now that the elite and the mass are growing towards 
integration in the post-modernized West, the Chinese mainstreams should also move 
closer to the public, then he borrowed Lyotard‘s point, that in contemporary culture 
we should improve our sensitivity to the differences in order to promote the capability 
of tolerance on ―incommensurability‖; additionally, Zhang directly concludes the 
conservative mentality as a postmodern-culture compliance: postism means a 
participation in the contemporary culture, it neither stands on the opposition of culture, 
nor attempts to go beyond it (in Chen Xiaoming 138-9). Those discussions had 
obviously led the Chinese society of the 1990s into a conservative relationship to the 
postmodern. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
201-2). 
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3.3.2.3 Mutual Tolerance 
 
Maintaining a status quo then becomes a provisional contract between the elite 
and the mass. Maintaining does not mean doing nothing, but having a little more 
tolerance and patience. Ordinary people, who do not come from a privileged 
background, need a way to release their pressures, which need not touch the sensitive 
nerves of the government; there is also an urgent need for the government to shift 
people‘s attention away from politics. Therefore, in addition to improving the 
economy, the government has had a relaxed attitude and loose management on the 
cultural industry and entertainments
87
. For instance, with the popularity of TV sets in 
Chinese families, the number of entertainment programs and foreign soap operas had 
sharply increased by the beginning of the 1990s
88
. Corresponding to this, the film 
industry of China was in a rapid decline over the same period
89
. The huge reduction of 
the film audience made the film industry gradually lose its significance as the main 
ideological propaganda media. In this sense, there should have been reasons for 
censorship holding certain tolerance towards a postmodern film practice. As far as the 
filmmakers are concerned, they need a kind of text with something tame, humorous, 
absurd, and naïve like the postmodern literature so that they may live in harmony with 
                                                        
87  Feng Xuan (2005) ―An Entertaining News, from Market, Audience, and Ideology‖, People Net, 
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/51231/51271/3576668.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
88  See ―The Political & Economic Analysis on the Contemporary Chinese TV Drama‖, Xinhua Net, 15. July. 
2003. The article clearly pointed out that the large-scale import of foreign TV programs started from the late 
1980s in China. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-07/15/content_974317.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 
2010 
89  The Chinese box office sharply declined from US$ 500 million in 1989 to US$ 380 million in 1992 and then to 
no more than US$ 170 million in 1999. However the average single ticket fare increased from 0.25 Yuan (1989) 
to 20 Yuan (around US$ 3) in 1999. ―Is a film ticket price high or low?‖ World Entertainments Reports. 3. Dec. 
2004. 
Chapter Three 
 87 
the mainstream at least on the surface. As for the audience receptions, the masses are 
more inclined to resonate with those realistic and practical senses of humor, and tend 
to conservatively release their pressures through self-irony and self-fragmentation. 
Postmodern elements like parody are in line with such a demand. No matter its 
absurdity in form, its vague intentions under cover of intertextuality, or its 
fragmentation of high art, all of these met a conservative context needed. Thus, it 
should be argued that the birth of An Orphan Joins the Army reflected a self-conscious 
choice by history and culture. The germination of its postmodern elements was an 
absolute necessity. 
 
3.3.2.4. Criticism and Subversion 
 
 However postmodern culture is a double-edged sword. It can be used for 
suppression of radical potential, but at the same time it may also provide the 
possibility of subversion. When this chapter talked about marginalization before, it 
argued that conservative does not mean blindly retreating. The contemporary Chinese 
intellectuals are not cowards either. The postmodern for them is only a tool of cultural 
expression. Fragmentation, self-irony, and conservatism only abandon a head-on 
collision or positive conflict with the main discourse in form, but turn to convey other 
significations and criticism. Though An Orphan Joins the Army is set in a historical 
period before communist China was founded, this temporal retreat can only be seen as 
a compromise on the surface. In fact it cannot prevent Sanmao from being attached 
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(as a bricolage) on the stage of revolutionary opera, nor can it restrain the old 
memories from audiences to reflect a reality. The director here just borrows certain 
postmodernist elements (like intertextuality) to cover up his own traces. When 
Sanmao, who was still indulging in his better life illusions, is suddenly pulled back on 
to the ideological stage and warmly invited by communist soldiers (dancers) to join 
the revolution, the audience may naturally associate the left-leaning awareness in the 
Cultural Revolution with its negative impact on the public in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. This absurdity then contains a reflection and criticism towards today‘s 
mainstream (communist) politics as well. Additionally, when the film makes Chiang 
its target to question the heroic narratives and the meta history, it also conveys an idea 
that the people are the real makers and heroes of history. This symbolic meaning may 
perhaps be associated with the Tian An Men Massacre which happened not long ago 
(in which the voice of the people was suppressed), and meanwhile it may transfer its 
suspicions of Chiang to criticism of the mainstream ideology and discourses in a 
realistic context. This awareness of conversion seems not hard for those who had 
experienced the movement of 1989. 
 
3.3.2.5. Successful Distribution and Marginalized Genre 
 
The most important factor is that, the new conservatism reflected from the 
postmodernist elements in the film successfully circumvented the political censorship 
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and came into the commercial distributions
90
. The education department of China also 
organized primary and secondary school students to go to the cinema for the film
91
. 
Even in Shanghai, the local government launched a film review contest in its middle 
schools. One review comes from a senior middle school student (around seventeen 
years old)
92
. That is a completely negative comment. It argues that the appropriation 
of various styles does not have any new ideas; the absurd humor is sheer nonsense; 
and using the silent film style in a high-tech society is a complete degeneracy. 
Apparently, not all ages can understand the postmodern intentions. So it is not 
surprising that the film bureau sees it as a film for children, and it won the award of 
the best children‘s film in 13th Jinji film festival of China. The film today is still 
considered as one of the best children‘s films of China (Huang Jun 103). This leads 
me to suspect that the film may be using the marginalized genre as a shelter to pass 
the censorship. While no matter how, the fact is undeniable that both An Orphan Joins 
the Army and Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires had been smoothly distributed and released 
in China and had adequate feedback from the audiences. The films seem very lucky 
when compared with other movies in the same period that were prohibited from 
domestic cinemas, like Blue Kite or To Live
93
. 
                                                        
90  Zhang Jianya himself mentioned that he was satisfied with the box office result. Please refer to the interview 
with Zhang Jianya, New Beijing Daily, 3. Feb. 2007. 
91  At that time I was a junior middle school student, and forced to watch the film before summer holiday in 1993. 
92  Yang Jingxin, ―Humor Needs More Inovation, A Review on An Orphan Johns the Army‖, (33). 
93  Blue Kite (1993) and To Live (1994) are directed by Tian Zhuangzhuang and Zhang Yimou respectively.  
Similarly to Zhang Jianya, they are all of fifth generation directors. What is different with An Orphan Joins the 
Army is that it consists of four points: first, though both Blue Kite and To Live are famous overseas, they have 
never been distributed in the Chinese film market; second, the investors of the both films were not from 
mainland China; third, both of the films present Jameson so-called pastiche or nostalgia rather than Hutcheon‘s 
parody; fourth, both of the two films directly illustrate a nostalgic social life under the left-leaning ideology 
(1950s and 60s) and refuse a temporal marginalization. The comparison between pastiche and parody will be 
mentioned in the next chapter. 
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3.3.3. A Reflection on Mass Culture 
 
 It seems that today, An Orphan Joins the Army came out on the right 
occasion, or in other words, its birth was inevitable. But the audiences of the day did 
not identify its post-modernity at the very start, when the film was probably seen as a 
movie for children. It usually takes a little more time to recognize and to accept the 
postmodern. I remain to such a view that people within the situation of their own 
cultural awareness generally lie behind the self-conscious development of culture. It is 
similar to what capitalism experienced. When capitalism had germinated and 
developed for a long time in Europe, scholars like K. Marx only started providing a 
systematic summary of it. A consumer society and its existence cannot be denied or 
ignored before J. Baudrillard published his The Consumer Society: Myths and 
Structures in 1970. The postmodern arts had germinated in Chinese poetry and other 
literature as early as the 1980s (Dai, in Lau 151-66). So comparatively speaking, the 
postmodern participation in Chinese films was not very early. Only after one or two 
years after the premiere of the film (1994) did some scholars start exclaiming that An 
Orphan Joins the Army has a strong inclination for the postmodern (Yin 60-7; Zhou 
55-61). Even today its director Zhang Jianya still denies that he had ever been inspired 
by any postmodern thought from the West when shooting the film. All of these show 
that the birth of the postmodern in Chinese films did not depend on any individual 
interest or occasional idea, but derived from an automatic cultural practice influenced 
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through the social transition. The postmodern is no longer like that which its 
predecessors (such as realism or modernism) did to enlighten its readers by rational 
thinking or to highlight its personalities with distinctive styles, but is trying hard to 
take itself out of the ideological obsession or high arts and back to the mass culture, to 
let nature take its course. When a film gets rid of the control from authors and is 
exposed under a contemporary cultural awareness, film studies and its significance 
then gradually turns to a field of cultural studies rather than literature and arts. 
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Chapter Four 
Parody, Pastiche and Nostalgia – Definitions and Contexts 
 
Life back then seems brighter not because things were better but 
because we lived more vividly when young; even the adult world of 
yesteryear reflects the perspective of childhood. Now unable to 
experience so intensely, we mourn a lost immediacy that makes the 
past unmatchable. Such nostalgia can also shore up self-esteem, 
reminding us that however sad our present lot we were once happy and 
worthwhile.  
                                         (Lowenthal 8) 
 
The reason for including nostalgia films as a crucial part of postmodern 
discussion is not only Fredric Jameson‘s personal interest in nostalgia, but in fact, its 
attraction also lies in the long-term debate between Linda Hutcheon‘s concentration 
on parody and Jameson‘s on pastiche. For Jameson, nostalgia94 is apparently not as 
fascinating nor is he as sentimental as Lowenthal (above). Jameson, instead, directly 
associates nostalgia with film as an example to highlight a vital postmodern artistic 
strategy – pastiche95. This seems so important that it is regarded, by Jameson, as ―one 
of the most significant features or practices in postmodernism today‖ (Consumer 113). 
To explain what pastiche is, he makes a comparison with parody on the one hand, and 
uses nostalgia (film) for example, to explore how pastiche represents postmodern 
culture on the other. Although Jameson has not systematically elaborated the relation 
between pastiche and nostalgia in his works, it seems apparent that (at least for him) 
                                                        
94  Please note that the word ―nostalgia‖ here – as elsewhere in this study – is generally based on what Jameson 
called postmodern nostalgia, rather than sentimental longing for personal things that are past (in the common 
sense). (Fredric Jameson, Chapter 9: ―Nostalgia for the present‖. In Postmodernism 279-96) Their difference in 
detail will be discussed hereafter. 
95  For instance, as Hutcheon cited from Foster, ―pastiche has been offered as the ‗official sign‘ of neoconservative 
postmodernism‖. See Hal Foster (127); or Linda Hutcheon (Politics 94). 
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the two concepts are similar or as he said, nostalgia film is a ―particular practice of 
pastiche‖ and is ―very much within mass culture‖ (Jameson Consumer 116). 
Therefore, this section of the discussion attempts to identify some controversial 
differences between parody and pastiche in film, and to give some cinematic 
examples in contemporary Chinese cinema of parody and pastiche. Through the 
comparative study, the significance of imitation in postmodern culture can be better 
understood. 
 
4. 1. Parody 
 
In the last chapter, I briefly mentioned the parody and intertextuality reflected 
in An Orphan Joins the Army, but did not see parody as a main concern. This section 
will define the controversial term (based on the views of Hutcheon and Jameson, the 
two important postmodern critics) and analyze the respective effects of both parody 
and pastiche in the postmodern context (especially Chinese postmodernity), so that a 
(postmodern) concept of imitation will be gradually drawn out through their 
comparison, and reflected in the Chinese cinema context. 
 
4.1.1. Definition 
 
What is parody? In the Oxford English Dictionary, parody is defined as a 
―(piece of) speech, writing or music that imitates the style of an author, composer, etc 
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in an amusing and often exaggerated way; comic imitation.‖ For Hutcheon, this kind 
of definition seems ―still tainted with eighteenth-century notions of wit and ridicule‖. 
She does not think people should be limited to such period-restricted definitions of 
parody. Hutcheon argues that the twentieth century has brought us into a brand new 
era, where ―parody has a wide range of forms and intents – from that witty ridicule to 
the playfully ludic to the seriously respectful‖ (Politics 94).96  In A Poetics of 
Postmodernism, Hutcheon completely breaks with the concept of the age-old 
ridiculing imitation. What she means by ―parody‖ – as elsewhere in postmodernism 
studies – is not rooted in ―eighteenth-century theories of wit‖ any more. Instead – as 
the Greek prefix ―para‖ originally means both ―counter‖ and ―near‖ or ―beside‖ 
(Hutcheon Poetics 26) – she redefines parody with a postmodern representation. 
―Parody – often called ironic quotation, pastiche, appropriation, or intertextuality – is 
usually considered central to postmodernism, both by its detractors and its defenders‖ 
(Politics 93). With this double code irony, Hutcheon believes postmodern parody can 
both provide and undermine context paradoxically (Poetics 127). 
 
4.1.2. ―Styles‖ and the ―Norm‖ 
 
However, when Jameson talks about imitation, instead of parody that ―finds 
itself without a vocation‖ (Postmodernism 1984, 65) in the postmodern, he prefers 
―pastiche‖ – neutral or blank parody – to express its intent. But before discussing 
                                                        
96  ―Ludic‖ derives from Latin ludus, ―play‖. It means literally ―playful‖, and refers to any philosophy where play 
is the prime purpose of life. Ludic connotes anything that is ―fun‖. 
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pastiche, two questions should be answered. How does Jameson think of the concept 
of parody, and why does he bear a grudge against it? Jameson‘s understanding of 
parody derives from its two essential elements, the uniqueness of styles and a 
linguistic norm: 
 
[P]arody capitalizes on the uniqueness of these styles and seizes on 
their idiosyncrasies and eccentricities to produce an imitation which 
mocks the original. […] Still, the general effect of parody is – whether 
in sympathy or with malice – to cast ridicule on the private nature of 
these stylistic mannerisms and their excessiveness and eccentricity 
with respect to the way people normally speak or write. So there 
remains somewhere behind all parody the feeling that there is a 
linguistic norm in contrast to which the styles of the great modernists 
can be mocked. (Consumer 113-4) 
 
Apparently for Jameson, ―styles‖ and the ―norm‖ play a vital role in parody. It seems 
necessary to lay more stress on the two elements.  
 
Firstly, what does a ―style‖ mean? It certainly has some special qualities or 
something different from others (other authors) of the same type, which can make it 
stand out and become unique. Jameson argues that all styles, no matter how different 
they are, have one thing in common: ―each is quite unmistakable; once one is learned, 
it is not likely to be confused with something else‖ (Turn 4). To be brief, parody 
capitalizes on styles as certain personalized identification signals, through which some 
stylistic stereotype can be aroused or realized consciously in its readers‘ minds. Only 
on this basis could the existence of imitation be realized, and a comparative process 
between the original and the mocked make sense and (perhaps) create an element of 
humour.  
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In the 1990s, Zhang Jianya‘s early films usually contained certain legible 
parodic sequences. For example, his Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires shows a scene in 
which Shanghai is invaded by Japan, which is obviously an imitation of ―The Odessa 
Steps Sequence‖ in Sergei Eisenstein‘s The Battleship Potemkin (1925). Japanese 
soldiers in Zhang‘s film are substituted for Tsarist soldiers marching down the steps 
with their rifles, and what they are suppressing is no longer the Odessans but the 
underworld gangs of Shanghai. A close-up of soldiers‘ boots, a baby in a carriage 
falling down the steps, and a wide shot of the massacre are completely imitated and 
edited in the same way as Eisenstein applied his montage, so that a filmic narrative 
style can be recognized at once. Here the personal style apparently becomes a main 
principle that underlies a successful parody. The other parody in the same film is a 
copy of Zhang Yimou‘s maiden work as director Red Sorghum (1987), where the 
imitations of red filter and the field full of vigorous sorghum reconstruct the original 
style and intensively drop a hint of Mr. Wang‘s sexual desires. Based on the original 
style, this parody tries to evoke a comparison between the stereotype of My Grandpa 
(Wo Yeye, by Jiang Wen in Red Sorghum) and Mr. Wang (by Lin Dongfu in Mr. 
Wang‟s Burning Desires), and through their differentiation a sense of humour can 
probably be generated. Similar parodic strategies can be found everywhere in An 
Orphan Joins the Army as well. In general, the application of parody in contemporary 
Chinese films was not a flash in the pan
97
. After Zhang Jianya, Feng Xiaogang‘s The 
                                                        
97  For more detailed examples of applications of parody in contemporary Chinese cinema, please refer to Wen 
Dezhao (12-3); and Wang Xianping (69-73). 
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Dream Factory (Jia fang yi fang, 1997), for example, introduces a parody of the 
image of General George Smith Patton (especially in the film Patton, Franklin J. 
Schaffner, 1970); Jia Zhangke in his Unknown Pleasures (Ren xiao yao, 2002) uses a 
number of sequences to refer Quentin Tarantino‘s Pulp Fiction (1994) 98.  If You Are 
the One (Fei cheng wu rao, 2008), Feng Xiaogang‘s recent film, even directly 
―quotes‖ (transplants) a scene of ―the variance terminator‖ from Hong Kong director 
Pang Ho-Cheung‘s A.V. (2005) and has in its end title ―Thanks to Pang Ho-Cheung – 
the inventor of the variance terminator‖, so that the director‘s (Feng Xiaogang) 
parodic strategy can be realized without a doubt. All these instances do emphasize the 
point that intentional imitations of ―styles‖ have been present in contemporary 
Chinese cinema for quite a long time.  
 
Secondly, in addition to style, Jameson stresses another meaning behind 
parody when he said it was ―a linguistic norm in contrast to which the styles of the 
great modernists can be mocked‖. Then what is a ―normal language‖, ―ordinary 
speech‖, or a ―linguistic norm‖? It is likely there are some hints in these words. If 
there is a norm or anything normal – which the postmodernist takes leave to doubt – it 
may be associated with a wide range of stereotypes, such as meta-narratives, 
narratives following linear logic, the blind worship of high art, certain modes of 
totalizing representation in rationalism or didacticism and so on… Everything 
transcendental or going beyond the limits of human knowledge, experience or reason; 
                                                        
98  Including the scenes of John Travolta‘s dancing and the restaurant robbery by Pumpkin and Honey Bunny. 
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and everything which becomes fixed or standardized in a conventional form without 
individuality, may be included in the understanding of the word ―norm‖. Jameson 
believes this is why parody seems unreliable. A reconstruction of any style is very 
likely to rebuild (or re-emphasize) a linguistic norm of authority (or power of 
discourse), and lead to blind faith. 
 
When talking about parody in his early films, Zhang Jianya makes no secret of 
his respect for those original authors of the styles he reconstructed, and he explains his 
meaning of parody as being a mark of honour to them.99 His words prove the possible 
existence of belief and worship through the ―norm‖ being reconfirmed. To take The 
Odessa Steps Sequence as an example, many films made in different countries in 
different periods have paid homage to the scene through various means of imitation
100
. 
Consequently, the process of the sequence being constantly repeated by others has 
probably changed the original scene of Eisenstein into a classic fragment, through 
which his montage gradually becomes a paradigm of film language; and countless 
filmmakers regard it as a model of film narrative, or even a dogma. However, this 
transcendental stereotype is just what the postmodernist is suspicious of and tries to 
break away from. That is probably the reason that Jameson feels anxious about 
parodic behaviour – paying a tribute to a classic norm again and again. 
                                                        
99  Refer to the interview with Zhang Jianya, in People Net.  
http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/40473/40476/3761931.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
100  In addition to Zhang Jianya‘s imitation, The Odessa Steps Sequence has been mentioned, copied and mocked 
by many other films world wide: Terry Gilliam‘s Brazil (1985), Francis Ford Coppola‘s The Godfather (1972), 
Brian De Palma‘s The Untouchables (1987), Tibor Takacs‘ Deathline (1997), George Lucas‘s Star Wars 
Episode III: Revenge of the Sith (2005), and Chandrashekhar Narvekar‘s Hindi film Tezaab (1988)… 
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4.1.3. The Double-coding Strategies 
 
However Jameson‘s anxiety about parody seems unpalatable to Linda 
Hutcheon. Compared with the effect of blind worship, she thinks of a parody more in 
its ironic and subversive sense. She believes that in any case, (postmodern) parody 
always plays a role of contrast through the rebuilding and imitation of styles, namely 
letting readers be conscious of the ―norm‖ and its fetter. Hutcheon provides a 
double-coding strategy – two parallel trains of thought by which a unique style or an 
individual characteristic can be reconstructed and subverted simultaneously in parody 
– to provide a further explanation of the role of self-reflection (and its postmodern 
irony and sense of humour). In the beginning of The Politics of Postmodernism she 
says ―the postmodern‘s initial concern is to de-naturalize some of the dominant 
features of our way of life‖, and points out that ―those entities that we unthinkingly 
experience as ‗natural‘ are in fact ‗cultural‘, made by us, not given to us.‖ (Politics 2) 
Those entities are not concerned with or produced by nature but subjectively 
transcendental. In A Poetics of Postmodernism she says: 
 
Postmodernism questions centralized, totalized, hierarchized, closed 
systems: questions, but does not destroy. It acknowledges the human 
urge to make order, while pointing out that the orders we create are just 
that: human constructs, not natural or given entities…. (Poetics 41) 
 
What [postmodernism] does say is that there are all kinds of orders and 
systems in our world – and that we create them all. That is their 
justification and their limitation…. (Poetics 43) 
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[Therefore] postmodernism is a fundamentally contradictory enterprise: 
its art forms (and its theory) at once use and abuse, install and then 
destabilize convention in parodic ways, self-consciously pointing both 
to their own inherent paradoxes and provisionality and, of course, to 
their critical or ironic re-reading of the art of the past. (Poetics 23) 
 
Here, we may realize that Hutcheon‘s perspective on the working principle of 
parody – at least on the level of construction (rather than subversion) – tends to accord 
with Jameson‘s. What he called ‗parodic exploitation of styles‘ is perhaps what she 
referred to as a kind of reconstruction of a priori order and what we thought it should 
‗naturally‘ be. What is different is that Jameson‘s view of the redeployment (of parody) 
seems more negative, cautious, anxious, suspicious and distrustful; while Hutcheon is 
more optimistic about its further effect – an inclination of deconstruction, 
destabilization, and subversion.  
 
There is a parody scene in Unknown Pleasures. When Xiao Ji, sitting with 
Qiao Qiao in a restaurant, tells her the story of a film he has watched – Pulp Fiction101, 
he imitates its sequence where Pumpkin and Honey Bunny rob a cafe in improvisation. 
Though the scene is quite short, it seems adequate to rebuild a sense of Tarantino‘s 
style, especially when Xiao Ji suddenly turns back to the crowd and yells, ―Everybody 
be cool this is a robbery!‖ with his right hand imitating Pumpkin‘s pistol. However, 
compared with the original, one can realize that the parody replaces the mock robbery 
with a completely different context. The original story in which an improvised 
robbery with a real gun happens in North America, perhaps suggests a feeling of 
                                                        
101  Please note that, Pulp Fiction (both in novel and film) also contains its own parody. 
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individual liberalism used to relieve tension from repression or to subvert the 
authority of the social order; while by contrast, Xiao Ji‘s mock robbery at a small 
restaurant in Shanxi Province, China, apparently seems ironic. He tells Qiao Qiao, ―If 
I were born in the States where money is everywhere, I would have robbed banks‖. 
His words remind the audience to recognise the different contexts. Then at the end of 
the film, Xiao Ji drives Bin to a bank for a robbery with a fake exploder, but then they 
fail. Bin is left at a local police station where he is forced to sing by a policeman. 
Nevertheless Bin chooses to sing Ren Xiao Yao
102
, a pop song about being spiritually 
free. If one understands the police station to be a sign of mainstream discourse, then 
the spiritual connotation of the song clearly reflects the ambivalent reality of young 
Chinese marginalized groups and their repressed feelings. Here I would argue that the 
purpose of a parody in which a contemporary Chinese film imitates an American 
original is not only just to reconstruct a classic (or re-enjoy its aftertaste) but also to 
express certain postmodern irony through its abuse in pluralistic situations. As a result, 
a parodic tease makes people realize certain constraints of order and the difference in 
pluralistic effects in diverse contexts, so that order, ideology and those other norms 
covered by totality and universality can be sufficiently exposed. 
 
Hutcheon‘s process of ―de-naturalization‖ is similar to Jameson‘s process of 
―being compared with the great linguistic norm‖. This (process) is a postmodern 
                                                        
102  ―Ren Xiao Yao‖, 任逍遥, is also the Chinese name of the film Unknown Pleasures. Here it refers to a popular 
song by Ren Xianqi, a famous singer from Taiwan from the mid 1990s. It expresses a spirit of unfettered 
freedom. However, when Bin is forced to sing the song under the pressure of a national apparatus, the artistic 
conception of the song then becomes a sharp-cut irony as a result of his situation. 
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parody of what An Orphan Joins the Army has shown. It reuses a documentary (black 
and white) style to rebuild a historical belief, and at the same time places a fictional 
protagonist (Sanmao) in it to bring a paradoxical contrast (between history and fiction) 
to audiences, who then are aware of transcendental orders (and their limits) in history, 
wars, grand narratives, and heroism.
103
 
 
4.1.4. Criticism of Parody in China 
 
In spite of the positive explanation by Hutcheon, there is no lack of negative 
criticism of, or anxiety about parody in critical circles in China. Wang Xianping, in 
his recent article ―Token and Significance of Contemporary Chinese Parody‖, points 
out that an immediate cultural consequence resulting from parody in related Chinese 
films leads merely to ―a construction of a pro forma pleasant sensation‖ (happiness as 
a matter of form or on the surface) and certain mass entertainment trends 
accommodating Chinese cultural consumption (72). The unspoken words of his point 
are that (following the rules of a market-oriented economy) parody in China 
(especially in its films) has been excessively exploited for consumers‘ advantage, for 
their (external) desire for humour and ―pleasant sensation‖, rather than for certain 
postmodern (internal) intentions of deconstruction. Because according to Wang, 
parody in films, in the same way as other factors in mass culture, is at root a part of 
the market economy. In order to promote its own economic interests, ―parody is apt to 
                                                        
103  See the related discussion in the last Chapter. 
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lose its artistic merit (profound value) of self-discipline and merely welter in 
happiness and absurdity on the surface‖. Accordingly in recent years, most of the 
parody in China has become ―pure consumables of mass culture‖, ―rarely reflecting 
on humanistic spirits‖, ―lacking innovative values of art‖, and has eventually lost its 
way in slapstick comedy or practical jokes. (72-3) 
 
Moreover, Li Xijian‘s attitude is further proof that anxiety about parody exists 
widely in Chinese circles of literature and art. He pointed out that nowadays the 
freedom of humanity has been affected by material desires. ―Instinctive satisfaction, 
superficial happiness, and all the luxury, coziness, torpidity of human beings have 
largely superseded their real freedom; however this particular state of existence is not 
human liberty, and it can only lead individuals to new alienations.‖ (64) As far as the 
two criticisms (mentioned above) are concerned, the entertainment elements of parody 
have been considered to be a byproduct or a side effect, which blocks the expression 
of postmodern connotations, for it makes the audiences fail to understand its central 
meaning. 
 
From the standpoint of mass culture of China, personally, I would not go as far 
as to argue that parody in China has gone astray from extremes of consumer culture, 
and I do not entirely agree with the criticism mentioned above for three reasons. The 
first is that, if some critics consider the ―pleasant sensation‖ as something similar to a 
byproduct or side effect, I would say they obviously do not fully understand what 
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postmodern parody means. For Hutcheon, the double code strategy of parody is 
simultaneously to construct and subvert the stereotypes of the ―norm‖ in people‘s 
minds to create absurd humour and irony through the comparison. In this process, 
postmodern parody will dissolve the fixed, magnific norm in its own absurdity, so that 
the incredulity of universality, totality, and grand narratives can be realized. Thus the 
germination of a pleasant sensation and the process itself prove that the stylistic 
discourse and its hegemony have been detected. Perhaps the humour from the 
sensation manifests (or displaces) the challenge to and the subversion of the stylistic 
originality. For that reason, humour, happiness, and pleasant sensations are not side 
effects, but indispensable for postmodern strategies. It seems too one-sided to simply 
understand parody as pure consumer desires in films. 
 
The second reason is that a part has obviously been taken for the whole when 
criticism blindly attributes the motive of parody to the market economy or material 
desires, but ignores other factors that stimulate and catalyze the cultural environment 
in the germination of parody, such as technical innovations and the ideological 
background of China. So far as technology is concerned, the spread of the internet, the 
personal computer, digital video cameras, and home editing equipment in China have 
probably promoted the attraction of parody for the masses. Zhang Jianya recently 
pointed out that there is no essential difference between the parodies in his early films 
(An Orphan Joins the Army or Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desire) and the prevalent (internet) 
Chapter Four 
 105 
spoof
104
 in recent years.
105
 As I see it, ten years after Zhang made his parodies (in the 
early 1990s), The Bloody Case Caused by a Steamed Bun (Hu Ge, 2006)
106
, a 
re-edited parody cut of Chen Kaige‘s The Promise (WuJi, 2005), can be seen as one of 
the typical amateur parody works spread on the net. The advent of the internet and 
home editing technologies have dramatically fired the crowd with enthusiasm for 
active participation in comic imitations of film ―norms‖. Furthermore, the internet has 
changed some individual parodic behaviours into a part of universal entertainment. I 
have no intention of making a judgement about the influence on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the spoof. But I am inclined to lay stress on the part that 
technologies play in the democratic art forms of China. As a new media platform, the 
internet, in the above-mentioned example, has obviously inspired the Chinese 
audience with an interest in parody. The Bloody Case Caused by a Steamed Bun, a 
free download of an internet video, was at first not created for the purpose of 
marketing benefits or consumer desires. This at least proves that, beyond the market 
economy, the spread of parody in China is perhaps stimulated by the promotion of 
technique. The attraction of parody for the crowd is probably not limited to an 
economic category. If technical innovation has promoted consumer interest in artistic 
                                                        
104  Internet spoof is the name of a Chinese video parody from the Internet. It is also called ―e gao‖ in Chinese (网
络恶搞), a kind of funny imitation of current popular films and TV programs, usually made and edited as short 
movies by personal computers and widespread in network communications. 
105  Refer to the interview of Zhang Jianya, The Beijing News, 3rd Feb. 2007, 
http://discovery.cctv.com/20070203/100831.shtml Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
106  Also known as Parody of Promise or Steamed Bun Spoof《一个馒头引发的血案》, a short parody video of 
director Chen Kaige‘s film Wu Ji (2005). After Wu Ji was released, Hu, an ordinary young man, spent $15 to 
see the movie and thought it was a mediocre piece of work – as did Chinese film critics. He then crafted a 
20-minute video satirizing Chen‘s creation and blogged it to a few friends as something of a lark. Hu‘s spoof 
basically takes Chen‘s mythic storyline and ridicules it by refashioning the drama into a mock 
legal-investigative TV program. The video ricocheted quickly around the blog sphere and networks in the early 
2006, becoming one of the most downloaded video clips on the Chinese Net. Hu‘s efforts also led to concerns 
by newspapers and magazines, and eventually became a national story on Chinese TV networks. 
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imitation, and criticism of consumer desires seems unlikely to reverse the progress of 
social history to a no technique era, then apparently the criticism will be caught in a 
negative dilemma without facing up to the real condition of contemporary Chinese 
culture. 
 
As for the ideological background of China, I have borrowed the discussion of 
Chen Xiaoming et al
107
 in the last chapter and argued that one of the current cultural 
situations is that Chinese elitism (and its literature and art) have gradually lost their 
entire capability of controlling the creation and broadcast of social culture (Chen 
Postmodernism 138-9). The phenomenon of internet spoof is an example, for it is 
already out of the control of the mainstream discourse
108
. Consequently, there emerges 
a fusion of eclecticism between elitist art (such as Chinese ―leitmotiv‖ films and some 
of the mainstream commercial films, which usually contain ―high‖ art or ideological 
themes and seem too highbrow to be popular) and mass/pop culture. Postmodern 
parody is in tune with the signs of the times. Based on its double-code strategy, 
parody on the one hand conforms to the elite discourse on the surface and takes a 
self-constructed attitude with its mood of lofty sentiment imitated. On the other hand 
it leads the imitation to absurd jokes and facetious deconstructions, in order to relieve 
the monotony of everyday life and the blank minds of the crowd that result from a 
disharmony between the reality of the capitalized market economy (in China) and an 
                                                        
107  Please refer to the related discussions in the last chapter. Detailed Chapter numbers to be advised later. 
108  The term ―mainstream‖ is mainly used in this thesis to describe what has been encouraged and promoted by the 
Chinese government. 
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ideological discourse of ―postsocialism‖109. The disharmony precisely reflects the 
distance of the mass culture from the elite perspective of the mainstream (dominated 
by the government‘s cultural control, such as the Chinese National Film Bureau and 
its censorship). So there is reason to believe that the masses and their popular culture 
have confronted pent-up emotions which seem hard to release. At the precise situation 
of such restriction, perhaps, parody (and its apparent pleasant sentiment) may become 
a remedy for their repressed grief. Taken in this sense, it is better to consider the 
absurd humour (of parody) as a sad sneer in the face of lofty elitism (and its grand 
narrative) than to regard it as the superficial pursuit of pleasure in contemporary 
Chinese cinema. The absurd motive is probably not limited to the surface. Perhaps, it 
has deeply worked on the spirit of the crowd and been potentially helpful in relieving 
their repressions. If this imitation of ―restaurant robbery‖ in Unknown Pleasures 
brings the audience some pleasant sensation, it may convey a feeling of occasional 
release from a restraint caused by conflicts between the general substantial desire of 
human beings and the reality of the social order. I do not agree, in this connection, that 
the audiences have consumed the delight so that they can simply get vicarious 
pleasure by going to watch films about crime. I prefer to understand it in this way, that 
the audiences watch an indulged behaviour breaking through order (in films), and 
simultaneously (through an absurd humor) they may consume their own repressions 
                                                        
109  As Sheldon H. Lu argued, contemporary China – ―as a socialist/communist country in name‖ but with ―a 
fledgling quasi-capitalist economy – ―confronts a series of social, institutional, and psychological problems‖. I 
would argue that a vacuum in the spiritual life of the Chinese crowd is probably one of the problems which 
results from the development of a capitalist economy where the masses care more about the substantial life but 
gradually lose their communist faith in spirit. ―Postsocialism‖ in China, by Lu, means ―a society that was a 
Soviet-style socialist country before the end of the Cold War around 1990, and still maintains a 
socialist/communist political structure today but pursues capitalist economic practices in the era of 
globalization.‖ (Lu 130, 224) 
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which seem hard to release in reality. Thus some of the pleasant sentiments (especially 
in the parody of Chinese cinema) may become a path leading the masses to escape 
from certain restrictions in real life. 
 
Thirdly, returning to the point of a detailed market, if the pleasant sentiment or 
absurd humour (as a consumer product) can attract attention from contemporary 
culture (as a market) and become a selling point, its own market value must prove the 
mass demand for it. Public interest determines the direction of mass culture, and it is 
not easily swayed by any criticism. If cultural studies remain outside (or opposed to) 
mass culture with more indiscriminate criticism of, and restriction on what the masses 
need, they will lose our cultural diversity and integration, and become a spokesperson 
for a certain polarised discourse. 
 
Postmodernism has a monopoly of neither parody nor imitation, which have 
existed for centuries. However the question is why, since the 1990s, comic imitations 
have flooded the contemporary Chinese cinema. It seems obviously too simple to 
merely impute the rise in imitation to a consumer culture. As far as a spiritual state of 
the contemporary Chinese masses is concerned, the socialist mental realm that was 
constructed during the 1950s to the 1970s, including revolutionary idealism, 
egalitarianism, self-sacrifice, and innocence, has gradually faded out since the 1980s; 
or as Sheldon H. Lu argued it is ―putatively absent today‖ (131). What appears to be 
most difficult is that many of the crowd have no alternative but to confront the 
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temptation of substantial desires brought by the economic reform. The dialectic of its 
result consists in that, on the one hand, not all of the Chinese can become rich and 
realize their desires quickly; on the other hand, however, there is no longer any mental 
realm to be relied on as a spiritual shelter in a China becoming capitalized. Thus there 
must have been some material repressions in dire need of spiritual reparation. Perhaps, 
contemporary Chinese cinema is just a good place for that. Accordingly, no matter 
whether it is the ―robbery‖ in Unknown Pressures, the ―burglar‖ in Crazy Stone (Ning 
Hao, 2006), ―realizing dreams‖ in Dream Factory (Feng Xiaogang, 1997), or the 
―sexual desires‖ of Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires, they all tend to represent certain 
depressions of public desire or lust. Parody and its absurd humour just provide a 
temporary exile
110
 at their spiritual level. The mass consumption of the pleasant 
sentiment has deeply reflected their mental blankness and release. 
 
4.2. Pastiche 
 
If parody is considered to be a postmodernist (artistic) strategy rather than a 
reflection of culture, then pastiche embodies certain features of postmodern culture 
from an entirely different perspective. When referring to pastiche, Jameson is equally 
concerned about the roles of both style and linguistic norm in it. However, this time 
he totally changes his viewpoint on the two terms (the style and the norm). In the 
                                                        
110  The word was exploited and re-termed by Sophia A. McClennen with the ―ludic‖ postmodern use of ―exile‖ as 
a metaphor for a ―new phase of social alienation‖ which, as she argues, is at the core of the many strains of 
cultural studies and border studies. She found that ―in many scholarly works the term ‗exile‘ having lost its 
reference to a painful state of being, was empty of history and an association with material reality.‖ 
Consequently, her point is dedicated to ―reconcile the exile of the theoretical discourse with concrete cases of 
exile from repressive authoritarian regimes‖. See Sophia A. McClennen (304). 
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distinction between parody and pastiche, or the dispute between Hutcheon and 
Jameson it does not matter at all who is correct. It depends entirely on the various 
ways in which the style and the norm are read.  
 
4.2.1. Pastiche – Exhausted Styles 
 
In term of style, if parody takes advantage of the unique feature of style, then 
pastiche presents a situation of having no alternative to the limiting of styles which 
have been swallowed up by modern literature and art. This can be considered together 
with Jameson‘s idea of cultural exhaustion. In the discussion on An Orphan Joins the 
Army, the awkward situation that the fifth generation directors met in the early 1990s 
has been mentioned – the ―yellow earth‖, ―red sorghum‖, ―black cannon‖, and ―blue 
kite‖…111 Everything (every colour) has been used, all the styles have been tried by 
others before. The situation illustrates the distressing difficulty in contemporary 
Chinese cinema. Jameson considers the exhaustion to be an aesthetic dilemma:  
 
If the experience and the ideology of the unique self, an experience and 
ideology which informed the stylistic practice of classical modernism, 
are over and done with, then it is no longer clear what the artists and 
writers of the present period are supposed to be doing. What is clear is 
merely that the older models - Picasso, Proust, T. S. Eliot - do not work 
any more (or are positively harmful), since nobody has that kind of 
unique private world and style to express any longer. And this is 
perhaps not merely a ―psychological‖ matter: we also have to take into 
account the immense weight of seventy or eighty years of classical 
modernism itself. This is yet another sense in which the writers and 
artists of the present day will no longer be able to invent new styles 
                                                        
111  See the ―cultural exhaustion‖ related part of the discussion in the last chapter. 
Chapter Four 
 111 
and worlds - they've already been invented. Only a limited number of 
combinations are possible; the unique ones have been thought of 
already. So the weight of the whole modernist aesthetic tradition - now 
dead - also ―weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living‖, as 
Marx said in another context…  
 
Hence, once again, pastiche: in a world in which stylistic innovation is 
no longer possible, all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak 
through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary 
museum. (Jameson Consumer 115) 
 
For parody, artistic originality/uniqueness means (or probably leads to) 
possible humour, irony or postmodern satire through imitation; but for pastiche, a 
distinctive style has long become a psychological burden that creators have to bypass. 
Innovations of individual colour can no longer continue, because they have been 
created, or the most inimitable have been already considered. It seems completely 
impossible for postmodern culture to have similar experiences in styles as modernism 
had. In other words, Jameson has sentenced (those individual) styles to death. As he 
mentioned in Postmodernism and Consumer Society, ―postmodernism [is] not as a 
style but rather as a cultural dominant‖. (4) He further elaborates, 
 
In postmodern society narratives break down when the great modernist 
expressions of style evaporate and the subject splinters away from its 
unique individuality. As a result, postmodern culture becomes pastiche. 
(113) 
 
What a postmodern artist may practise can only be established on the basis of 
those (dead) styles already existing, such as combining, mixing, synthesizing and 
recycling familiar genres, styles or narratives. That is what it called bricolage.
112
 
                                                        
112  In art, bricolage is a technique where works are constructed from various materials available or on hand, and is 
seen as a characteristic of postmodern works. In cultural studies bricolage is used to mean the processes by 
which people acquire objects from across social divisions to create new cultural identities. See online 
definition at http://www.jahsonic.com/Bricolage.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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Whichever you practise, you are bound to experience pastiche.  
 
4.2.2. The Exhausted Condition in Contemporary Chinese Cinema 
 
I do not agree with those biases that contemporary culture and its 
artistic/literary development have had no innovation in the postmodern context at all. 
Actually, at least in my view, innovation is still an important ingredient in 
social/cultural development. However, what seems irrefutable is that innovations can 
no longer completely free themselves from those authorized originals and their 
stylistic uniqueness. Considering contemporary China though, it seems quite hard to 
roughly prove or decide whether it has been transformed into a postmodern society (in 
fact there are no common standards in academia at all). There is no lack of detailed 
examples in Chinese cinema reflecting what the postmodernist has to face –in fact 
there is a ―nightmare‖ of styles. The ―colour‖ exhaustions that Zhang Jianya has met 
have already been mentioned; other instances come from In the Heat of the Sun 
(Yangguang canlan de rizi, Jiang Wen, 1995), The Forest Ranger (Tian gou, Qi Jian, 
2006), and Crazy Stone (Fengkuang de shitou, Ning Hao, 2006). 
 
In the Heat of the Sun was originally adapted from Wang Shuo‘s novel, Wild 
Beasts (Dongwu xiongmeng). After its premiere the film was a great success (in its 
domestic box-office). However, as time has gone by, it has been criticized by some 
critics – although I personally dissent from what they said – for its appropriation of 
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Edward Yang‘s A Brighter Summer Day (1991) in its whole narrative and stylistic 
outline
113
. The argument consists in stating that, despite their difference in plot details 
and colour tones, both of the films contain similar themes, such as a rebellious 
childhood, juvenile violence, and sex consciousness during puberty; in addition, both 
films try to indirectly reflect a society and its ideological background through the 
exploration of friendship, gang-banging, love, loss, greed, the passage of time, broken 
relationships and so on. The contents of the films are so close that they can be read as 
the same story with a similar narrative style in different contexts: one is set in 1960s 
Taipei, the other in early 1970s Beijing. Jiang Wen (the director) never responds to the 
criticism. However, his silence does not stop some of the audience associating his film 
with Edward‘s. Furthermore, the style of Edward in his A Brighter Summer Day may 
not seem the most original. When Zhang Xiaodan published his review in the South 
Metropolis Daily, the recognition of styles developed to such an extent that it made 
any originality too hard to recognize:  
 
The great admiration for the director‘s talent of In the Heat of the Sun 
faded out soon after A Brighter Summer Day was introduced. I mean, 
people were all shocked by In the Heat of the Sun around 1994 at its 
heated nostalgia; while they had not realized how Jiang Wen‘s creative 
ability through his lens was inspired until Once Upon a Time in 
America (Sergio Leone, 1984) was shown in China; and then it was not 
until 1996, when Edward Yang‘s A Brighter Summer Day came into the 
Mainland with pirate VHS being popular, that people started to 
understand that what really deserves to be called ―Once Upon a Time 
in China‖ is not In the Heat of the Sun, but A Brighter Summer Day. 
However what the latter imitated was not Once Upon a Time in 
                                                        
113  Tian Huiqun (387-405). Or see Mtime.com, an audience blog for film review, ―相比牯岭街，处女姜文无论如
何都显得稚嫩无比，尽管他模仿了大量镜头，制造了不少笑料，但是最终却没有超越。不过学来一些也
就足够了，阳光也依然经典。‖ http://www.mtime.com/my/1401261/blog/1595846/ Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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America, but a grim German New Wave.114 
 
This example proves that – at least for some of the audience – some 
contemporary Chinese cinema (in its domestic market) can be considered to be a 
process of pastiche, which has gradually sunk into a postmodern cultural condition 
where artistic originality, uniqueness, and its ownership become indistinct and 
increasingly difficult to distinguish. That could be speculated to be the result of two 
factors. One is that stylistic combination and its abuse have already made the original 
individuality become hard to perceive or detect. Consequently, if an imitation fails to 
indicate its original, or the original style cannot be recognized clearly, the imitation 
will lack a process of reconstructing any unique style to maintain a ―double-code‖ 
function. As Hutcheon argued, parody needs to rebuild an original consciousness first, 
and compare it with the mock in order to create deconstructions or a subversive 
position. Therefore the imitation cannot be called parody any more, and perhaps it 
does not generate humour any longer. It then can be considered as an empty parody or 
pastiche. However pastiche or stylistic abuse is not the only reason leading to a 
disappearance of originality. The other factor is that people in the postmodern context 
are holding more and more diverse perspectives of the originality of style. In the Heat 
of the Sun is just a good example. No matter whether the director recognizes his 
indiscriminate plagiarism, audiences with different watching experiences who fail to 
reach an agreement about where on earth a stylistic archetype comes from. Does the 
film‘s narrative style originally derive from Jiang Wen/Wang shuo, or as Tian thought, 
                                                        
114  Zhang Xiaodan (2007) ―Edward Yang – The Cavalier in Dark‖, in South Metropolis Daily, 4th July, 2007. 
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from Edward Yang, or even as Zhang presumed from the States or Germany? There is 
short of an agreeable answer for everyone in the exhausted cultural context. 
 
The Forest Ranger (Tian gou, Qi Jian, 2006), an influential film in the 
domestic film festivals
115
, encounters similar difficulties as well and produced a 
sudden reaction from the press. Many newspapers and websites found fault with the 
film for its plagiarism of a classic French film, Jean de Florette (Claude Berri, 1985) 
through its identical narrative style
116
. The protagonists in the two films are all 
disabled and settle down in a new countryside where they are framed and persecuted 
by local officials and civilians, with even their water supply being cut off. 
Nevertheless, in the face of such accusations, both the producer and the actor of The 
Forrest Ranger repeated their denials of the suspected imitation. They kept insisting 
that the film was adapted from Zhang Ping‘s novel Murderer, which derives from 
actual persons and events in Shanxi Province, and Zhang himself had not watched the 
French film before (Wang Yang). Another typical example of imitation is Crazy Stone 
directed by Ning Hao. This is a well-known film in China with the ninth position in 
the annual domestic box-office table in 2006. It is considered as a comprehensive 
imitation of Guy Ritchie‘s style from his Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels (1998) 
and Snatch (2000). But on this occasion, one of the Chinese film directors, Ning 
                                                        
115  The film won two awards in the 16th China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival (Best Director 
and Best Actor) and received many awards and nominations in the Shanghai International Film Festival and 
China College Students Film Festival. 
116  For instance, Wang Yang (2006) ―The Forrest Ranger‖ is Indicated as a Plagiarism‖, in Chongqing Business 
Daily, 22nd June 2006; and Zong Shan (2006) ―Is The Forrest Ranger a plagiarism? Fu Dalong Denies‖, in 
Beijing Daily Messenger, 24th June 2006.  
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Hao‘s response to the imitation was immediate and positive. At a press conference in 
July 2006 Shanghai he explained: 
 
Indeed I have watched Guy Ritchie‘s films before, and his style 
appeals to me so much. But the script of Crazy Stone was written by 
myself much earlier, before I watched Snatch. It is my first screenplay, 
and I really enjoy showing some absurd and accidental happenings. 
When making the film, we certainly borrowed some tricks from 
Ritchie. You should understand that after all Crazy Stone is of a similar 
genre to Ritchie‘s. A genre does have its inherent technique of 
expression. To avoid being accused of plagiarism, the scriptwriter and I 
had drawn quite a few possible plans; however, the best one is always 
that what had been used, so we had to try our best to make a film in 
that way.
117
 
 
The above words prove that certain imitations – for some Chinese films – are 
perhaps no longer a director‘s subjective and active (artistic) strategy. Even though 
contemporary Chinese filmmakers have been working hard to produce individual 
innovations of their own, it has become hard to escape from an embarrassing reality of 
stylistic exhaustion. 
 
4.2.3. A Comparison of Parody and Pastiche 
 
Therefore as a pastiche, imitation becomes a passive acceptance, with a neutral 
or even negative sentiment, as it does not have any motive, impulse and conviction. 
According to Jameson, there is a significant difference between pastiche and parody. 
 
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the 
wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a 
                                                        
117 See Yifan Wu and Ya Huang (2006) ―Crazy Stone: Ning Hao Dismisses Plagiarism with Scorn‖, in News Times, 
5th July 2006. 
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neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior motive, 
without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent 
feeling that there exists something normal compared with which what 
is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, parody that 
has lost its sense of humour… (Consumer 114)118 
 
I supplement this with some of my opinions on the distinction between parody 
and pastiche. As has been mentioned above, both of them are involved in imitation. 
However I would emphasize that their mimicking mind-sets are completely different. 
As far as parody is concerned, imitation is an active and energetic strategy of art, 
which means artists/authors have their choice of various ways to present their feelings 
and ambitions. Directors may achieve their purpose or at least convey certain of their 
motives through their dominant roles of choosing strategies. While in a postmodern 
culture, styles are going to dry up, imitation is no longer a kind of dispensable art 
strategy, but a passive cultural reality that people are forced to accept. No matter to 
what extent China has been involved in a postmodern context, or whatever happens 
there, the unavoidable imitation (a passive reality) has already appeared in the 
contemporary Chinese cinema. Even though many Chinese filmmakers, like the above 
examples, were unwilling to subjectively acknowledge the fact of appropriation and 
their intention, it seems impossible to prevent their works from being considered as an 
example of mimicry by others. In this way, partially speaking, some Chinese cinema 
has (consciously or unconsciously) co-existed with all kinds of styles and continually 
practised a variety of bricolage, appropriation and combination. Jameson calls these 
                                                        
118  Or Jameson presents a similar explanation: ―Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in 
a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody‘s ulterior motives, without 
the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have 
momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists.‖ (Postmodernism 17) 
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―cultural dominants‖ by which art and aesthetics can be conveyed in the 
contemporary culture. That is Jamesonian pastiche. According to Jameson, the 
appearance of pastiche means that  
 
contemporary or postmodernist art is going to be about art itself in a 
new kind of way; even more, it means that one of its essential 
messages will involve the necessary failure of art and the aesthetic, the 
failure of the new, the imprisonment in the past. (Consumer 115-6) 
 
Pastiche then becomes a cultural dominant with imitating features. In contrast, 
it is impossible for parody to develop a characteristic of its own, and it will never 
become a style. Parody is at best an imitation of style, for it has to reconstruct the 
original style, an extension (or a transformation) of the original, rather than an 
innovation such as pastiche. Thus there remains a sense of legitimacy, norm, or order 
in parody. For example, like those parodies in An Orphan Joins the Army and Mr. 
Wang‟s Burning Desire, where all kinds of styles and their combinations can be 
obviously recognised at once from the originals: such as Chaplin‘s early comedy, 
documentary styles, Eisenstein‘s Odessa Steps, Zhang Yimou‘s Red Sorghum, and 
Zheng Zhengqiu‘s Labourer's Love (1922). However, it seems hardly possible for all 
of these imitations and the combinations to be integrated and regarded as a new 
―parodic style‖ as a whole. Because each parody that mixes in the combination clearly 
refers to a uniqueness of the originals and an incompatibility of their stylistic 
originality. Consequently, one could hardly think of parody as a brand new style 
which has been undermined by the incompatible. When audiences enjoy a parody, 
they will say it should not be like this, the original was like that… It is such a strong 
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sense of error correction that leads to humour, or a funny sense of irony.  
 
But pastiche does not have such sense or any ulterior motive, because it not 
only refuses to carry the original style but also establishes a new type of norm. The 
new order has only one particularity, which is to confuse and cleanse the relationship 
between styles and the linguistic norm behind them. Can parody successfully imitate a 
pastiche? The answer is negative, and that tells why pastiche seems not humorous. 
Just because of this uniqueness, Jameson considers it as empty parody. Therefore, in 
pastiche (a new style of imitation) which is flat, superficial, covered with bricolage 
and separated from the signified(s), such as postmodern nostalgia, people find it 
difficult to have a sense of error correction any more. When you face a pastiche or 
nostalgia, you may prefer to give a positive answer to what is floating on the surface – 
the simulation of light and shadow in the past – yes ah, that is what the past may look 
like!  
 
In the early moments of Blue Velvet (David Lynch, 1986) there are idealized 
small town images in around the 1950s or 60s, accompanied by the 1963 Bobby 
Vinton song ―Blue Velvet‖, blooming red roses and immaculate white picket fences 
show up to advantage with the blue sky
119
, a fireman is smiling and waving his hand 
towards the lens, and a few kids at a crosswalk. Altogether, this presents a safe, quiet 
                                                        
119  As John Powers wrote: ―a red-white-and-blue vision whose saturated 50s hues announce, in a sense, Lynch‘s 
whole approach: Everything is slightly off — don‘t trust it.‖ In his ―Blue Velvet: Last Tango in Lumberton‖, in 
LA Weekly, 12 September, 1986. 
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and peaceful American life. The past tense takes you back to a good old time. Those 
depthless appearances relating to the past become the impressive stuff of nostalgia, 
which means that you probably have no way (at least on the surface) to detect any 
individual style from pastiche. Actually postmodern nostalgia does not emphasize any 
personal original, but a simulation of the whole atmosphere and cultural peculiarities 
of a public era in the past. If there were any original style, it should be their own past 
of each audience or the stereotypes they have of the past. However the nice illusion in 
Blue Velvet soon cracks apart. In a white house, two women watch a TV programme 
where a man is holding a gun; outside, a man watering his lawn suddenly falls to the 
ground, his hose shoots into the air, a little boy watches the toppled figure, and the 
camera tracks down deep into the grass where some ugly beetles climb all over the 
ground to the highly amplified sound of their grinding roar. Then not until a young 
college student comes across a rotting ear in an open field, do viewers realize how 
different the illusion looks from the lifelike reality. It not only implies the dirty 
undercurrents hidden behind the conventional, bourgeois lives in America but also 
impressively reminds the audience of the effect of superficial nostalgia serving as a 
foil to a conventional real life. Perhaps postmodern nostalgia hints at a feeling of 
uncertainty or disbelief about a past memory and the present reality. Just as what has 
been shown in some Chinese nostalgia films set in the 1960s, behind a past social 
atmosphere that is full of revolutionary passion and romantic stories, an ideological 
storm may be hidden from the surface. It hints at the painfulness of the age. The 
wound, the past, and the tradition seem too distant to be reached by the present. 
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However, pastiche, similarly to postmodern nostalgia, does not like parody 
that contains any tendency to literary deconstruction; instead it is a reflection of 
postmodern cultural realities. Parody, no matter whether it exists in modernism or 
postmodernism, is always a literary and artistic strategy; but pastiche belongs to the 
public, the mass, the culture…, it has neither strategy nor motive. They are not in a 
same area, but both have crucial links to the postmodern. 
 
4.2.4. Jameson‘s Misgivings and the Linguistic Norm 
 
On the other hand, as far as the linguistic norm is concerned, Jameson does not 
believe that, once parody momentarily borrows an abnormal (or stylized) tongue, it 
will find and rebuild a consummate or healthy linguistic normality. The fatal 
weakness of parody is that, it is only temporarily teasing or showing-off in the face of 
styles; the conventional criterion – that which the postmodern is questioning – will 
still exist or be resurrected after the quantitative change; even with teasing those 
―willful eccentricities‖, the original norm that parody ―ostentatiously deviates‖ from 
probably ―reasserts itself‖120 and reconfirms a legitimate style and model. If parody 
seems still infatuated with or unwilling to leave the legitimate norm, then the 
deconstructing attitude of pastiche is quite determined. It is in this way that pastiche 
surpasses parody.  More importantly, Jameson believes parody, in a future tense, will 
                                                        
120  Jameson (Postmodernism 16-7). 
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be completely replaced by pastiche: 
 
[…] if one no longer believed in the existence of normal language, of 
ordinary speech, of the linguistic norm (the kind of clarity and 
communicative power celebrated by Orwell in his famous essay 
‗Politics and the English Language‘, say) One could think of it in this 
way: perhaps the immense fragmentation and privatization of modern 
literature - its explosion into a host of distinct private styles and 
mannerisms - foreshadows deeper and more general tendencies in 
social life as a whole. Supposing that modern art and modernism – far 
from being a kind of specialized aesthetic curiosity – actually 
anticipated social developments along these lines; supposing that in the 
decades since the emergence of the great modern styles society had 
itself begun to fragment in this way, each group coming to speak a 
curious private language of its own, each profession developing its 
private code or idiolect, and finally each individual coming to be a kind 
of linguistic island, separated from everyone else? But then in that case, 
the very possibility of any linguistic norm in terms of which one could 
ridicule private languages and idiosyncratic styles would vanish, and 
we would have nothing but stylistic diversity and heterogeneity. 
 
That is the moment at which pastiche appears and parody has become 
impossible. (Jameson Consumer 114) 
 
The reason I draw these assumptions mentioned above into a future tense is 
because it seems hard for Jameson to discover a typical instance of individual styles 
being isolated and fragmented in a realistic context – the present time. In fact, though 
contemporary language has a growing trend to be ―flat‖, ―superficial‖ or 
―depthless‖121, master narratives and grand discourses (and any other legitimate orders 
and norms) – as a leading role – are still dominating the mainstream consciousness of  
contemporary social life. For Jameson, only when individual language has been 
                                                        
121  As Jameson argued, the first and most evident of postmodernist moments is the emergence of a new kind of 
flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense (Postmodernism 9). Jameson 
imagined that, in a utopian late capitalism, a linguistic fragmentation of social life as similar as a host of 
distinct private styles is going to change into the point where ―the norm itself is eclipsed: reduced to a neutral 
and reified media speech… Modernist styles thereby become postmodernist codes.‖ This, relatively, testifies 
its departing from the signified depth. (Postmodernism 17). 
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totally isolated and become a private taboo making communication impossible, will 
parodic humour and irony gradually fade out from our life. That reflects Jameson‘s 
deep concerns about the isolated condition of high-modernist styles. His anxiety is 
based on the assumption that the future tense is not enough to form a binary 
opposition to Hutcheon‘s opinion122. Jameson has to lead his prediction in a past tense, 
and try to explain pastiche through some historical memories. That is what Jameson 
called nostalgia
123
. 
 
4.3. Nostalgia 
4.3.1. Nostalgia in the Postmodern 
 
The reason Jameson considers pastiche as ―blank parody‖ (that has ―lost its 
sense of humor‖ (Postmodernism 17) and does not carry any meaning new to compare 
with the original), is as I see it, because intrinsic connections between original styles 
and their pastiche – namely the fixed conjunction between signifier and signified or 
between code and its linguistic norm – have been blurred or have even faded away. 
Accordingly, the appearance of traditional art gradually separates its essence, and 
presents a process of transformation from literature and art dominated by semiotics 
and structural linguistics to a superficial culture based on an unprecedented sense of 
visual experience, like those tremendous spectacles in nostalgia films. When culture 
                                                        
122  Linda Hutcheon maintains that parody is a vital part of postmodernism. See Hutcheon (1989) Chapter 4: ―The 
Politics of Parody‖ (Politics 93-117). 
123  What should be explained is that, Jameson‘s so-called ―nostalgia‖ here is not the traditional one for the past, 
but a nostalgic genre existing in a timeless reality – what Sheldon H. Lu concludes, a ―Jameson nostalgia for 
the present‖, which will be discussed later. See Sheldon H. Lu (132).  
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makes a quantum leap from quantity to quality, separation and isolation caused by 
individual styles will gradually result in an overshadowed language community. The 
so-called linguistic model will only be reduced to neutral and stereotyped ―media 
speech‖. The old modernist styles then become more like a rigid language code 
(Jameson Postmodernism 17). All of these provide evidence to prove the rupture. 
Actually, pastiche is just an empty and numb reflection of those ―codes‖ or ―dead 
language‖ floating on the surface, instead of the standard linguistic norm. What kind 
of imitation cannot only be far away from the original styles of elite/high culture but 
also represent a type of new language with imitating features? Nostalgia films are a 
good example. Nostalgia is neither a strategy for literature and art nor a private style. 
It is cultural experience based on public/mass awareness. It comes from certain image 
memories of the past; hence it is not subject to the old language trap
124
. The essence 
of nostalgia film may be considered as the imitation of past images, that is images 
stacked with appearances of the old days. What nostalgia imitates is our past-life, a 
kind of visual action reanimating a collective sense of the past; a process (and 
production) from text to video, spectacle, and mass culture. 
 
4.3.2. Nostalgic Waves of Chinese Cinema, a Brief Introduction 
 
In last two decades Chinese cinema has experienced two main bursts of 
nostalgic themes. I sum them up as two nostalgic waves of China. The first one took 
                                                        
124  Think of what Jameson called, the ―prison-house of language‖. 
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place in the early 1990s, and is typically represented by some fifth generation 
directors‘ works, such as the Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993), Farewell My 
Concubine (Chen Kaige, 1993), and To Live (Zhang Yimou, 1994)
125
. The second 
wave began in the early twenty-first Century and involved quite a few sixth 
generation directors such as Wang Xiaoshuai‘s Shanghai Dreams (2005), Zhang 
Yang‘s Sunflower (2005), Zhang Jiarui‘s The Road (2006), and Gu Changwei‘s 
Peacock (2004)
126
. Comparatively speaking, the first wave is much more inclined to 
convey certain ideological (or political) suffering in the 1950s or 1960s, which caters 
for the Western audiences‘ taste for novelty-hunting and happens to build a global 
illusion of nostalgia. The second wave, however tends to overcome those ideological 
traumas and recollects a social style of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it is 
increasingly becoming a nostalgic consumer commodity in China‘s domestic market. 
                                                        
125  It should also include a crucial film In the Heat of the Sun (1994) directed by Jiang Wen in this wave. However 
Jiang is not commonly known as a fifth generation director. He is much younger (the same age as the so-called 
sixth generation) and was not trained as a filmmaker, but an actor. This film is his maiden work as a director. 
126 While the term ―sixth generation‖ is already problematic, Gu Changwei was in the same (cinematography) 
class with Zhang Yimou and should definitely be seen as a fifth generation filmmaker, despite the fact that his 
directorial debut came rather late in 2004. 
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Chapter Five 
Postmodern Essentials of Nostalgia 
 
Nostalgia is not a peculiarity of recent decades. People all over the world 
always create their own classic memories of the past, such as the Victorian era of the 
United Kingdom, the 1950s golden era of the United States, and the Student 
Movement of Western Europe in the late 1960s. These eras often appear in 
contemporary literary and artistic works, or some of them, such as the Victorian era, 
have even become an independent branch of the best-selling novels in 
English-speaking countries (Thomas and James 164-7). However, now that the social 
culture has entered the post-industrial era, technological advances have given 
nostalgia some new media, such as ―film‖ (the subject of this study), one form of the 
mechanical reproduction industries critiqued by Walter Benjamin. As part of the 
postmodern culture, nostalgic film has some characteristics: its dependence on 
technologies, its bricolage from superficial images, and its special objects of imitation. 
These essentials are to be discussed in this section. 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, three Chinese fifth generation master filmmakers 
each directed their own classic pieces: the Blue Kite (1993), Farewell My Concubine 
(1993), and To Live (1994). These three films made at the same time have realistic 
colour and trace back to a certain nostalgic context (the Blue Kite is set in the1950s to 
1960s; Farewell My Concubine is set in the 1930s to 1970s; and To Live is set in the 
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1940s to 1960s). All three plots have similar historical backgrounds and all three films 
were completed within two years. In this case, it naturally leads me to associate them 
together and to think of them (as a whole) as a nostalgic film wave of contemporary 
China. In this section, these three films will be briefly discussed in terms of their 
nostalgic elements, and at the same time serve as an introduction to further analysis in 
the next chapter. 
 
Additionally, I would argue that it is not only the above-mentioned films that 
contain old memories of the past. Many Chinese films shot before the 1990s had  
historical backgrounds as well. Leitmotif films such as Da Jue Zhan trilogy (Wei Lian 
etc. 1990) and The Birth of New China (Li Qiankuan and Xiao Guiyun, 1989) can also 
be considered as stories rebuilding the past. However they are more concerned about 
events in the history of grand narratives, and about the representation of public affairs 
(stories) in history rather than imitations of any past superficiality of personal 
memories. So for me they can only be described as historical themes rather than 
(postmodern) nostalgia. Some other films, such as Sparkling Red Star (Li Jun, 1974) 
and Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Xie Tieli, 1970) are more concerned with 
heroism in a fictional past of master discourse, thus they seem far from trivialized 
nostalgia and lack concern about the past itself. My Memories of Old Beijing (Wu 
Yigong, 1982) adapted from Lin Haiyin‘s novel of the same name is a particular case. 
It is a homesickness story about late 1920s Beijing, and can be seen as the beginning 
of (contemporary) Chinese nostalgia. In addition, Xie Jin‘s Hibiscus Town (1986) 
Chapter Five 
 128 
traces the protagonist‘s life back to the period from 1963 to 1979 (around the Cultural 
Revolution and its end). Though I prefer to think of it as a typical reflection of ―scar 
literature‖ on Chinese films of the time, it still contains certain nostalgic ingredients. 
However, as both of the films mentioned above are outside the limit of the research 
domain (Chinese films since the 1990s) and lack an echo from other films of the time, 
it does not seem possible to make them typical examples of a contemporary cultural 
discussion in this research. 
 
5.1. Glossy Technology – History or Image? 
 
A fundamental element of (postmodern) nostalgia film derives from glossy 
technology. The word ―glossy‖ was originally used by Jameson in his Postmodernism, 
or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism: ―the formal apparatus of nostalgia films has 
trained us to consume the past in the form of glossy images‖ (287; ch. 9). Nostalgia 
films make us focus on a certain form of the past with rapt attention. It remains to be 
discussed whether the form (of the past) is the real reality in the real past; but before 
answering the question, the basis of the form and its carrier – glossy images – require 
some investigation. Where does the image that seems full of glossy colours and 
relationships with the past come from?  
 
Actually, it is largely due to technological advances in recent decades that 
films can acquire the capability to exceed historical texts and relics to represent an 
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overall landscape realistically associated with the past. An interest in glossy colours is 
clearly not just a personal preference of Jameson; the popularity of colourful films 
since the 1960s reflects a tendency in the mass culture as well. Only when the film 
industry has developed a large-scale application of colours, could films through 
glossy objects/superficiality convey a ―live‖ past. The fifty years or so since the rise 
of colour films have been roughly in line with the development stage of nostalgia 
films in Hollywood
127
.  
 
However, compared with North America, the growth of nostalgia films in 
Mainland China did not occur till the 1990s, thirty years after colour films became 
popular in 1960s China. The reasons for the delay are complicated and I would like to 
emphasize two points. On the one hand, ideologically speaking, one could not expect 
national films in the new socialist China (the 1950s to the 1970s), in which all its 
culture, literature, and art were dominated by and served politics, to freely bring the 
1920s or 30s – a period generally called the ―old society‖ in China and considered to 
be humiliating times full of exploitation by imperialism, capitalism, colonialism and 
so on – back into the colourful minds of the masses. Therefore it would have been 
quite hard for a Chinese film of the 1970s (controlled by the Communist Party) to – 
similarly to what China Town shows, the 1920s of the States – recall happy memories 
of its past. On the other hand, as far as filmmaking is concerned, a nationalized studio 
(and film distribution) system dominated by the government (and its planned economy, 
                                                        
127 According to Jameson, in his ―Postmodernism and Consumer Society‖, nostalgia films rose from the early 
1970s in North American, such as Bertolucci‘s The Conformist (1969, but set in 1930s Italy), Lucas‘s 
American Graffiti (1973, set in the 1950s), and Polanski‘s great film Chinatown (1974, set in the 1930s). (118) 
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from the 1950s to the 1980s
128
) presumably failed to provide suitable space for a 
mass-dominated culture, like nostalgia. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that colours 
and technologies have brought vital attractions for Chinese nostalgia in overseas 
markets. When China started its reform of filmmaking cooperation with foreign 
investments (and distributions) in the early 1990s
129
, fifth generation directors then 
positively introduced some Chinese nostalgic themes to the West. From then on, their 
glossy images and colourful appearances of the past have become an important factor 
that influences the global constructions of Chinese phantasms.
130
 
 
Glossy colours in nostalgic images – a reconstruction of those flat, past 
appearances in films – are beyond the reach of historical writing or black and white 
documentaries. According to D. Lowenthal, new media supported by technical 
progress apparently promotes filmic/visual culture to represent and participate in past 
memories, and forms an absorbed attraction. Compared with books and pictures, 
movies are clearly more influential. The former are ―more taxing and less convincing‖ 
because ―books have been contrived by later minds, artifacts have suffered subsequent 
erosion‖; while the latter ―plunge[s] us into a vivid past – or bring that past directly 
into the present – seemingly without mediation‖. People may suppose ―the camera 
                                                        
128 Rao Shuguang in his ―The Historical Turning Point of Chinese Cinema‖ argued that before the 1990s the 
Chinese film industry had been completely controlled by a planned economy and a planned distribution system 
(16). Therefore, it probably lacked the influence of a mass film market and mass-oriented productions. 
129 The cooperation reform started from 1988 when the government enacted ―The Rule of International 
Filmmaking Cooperation‖ and allowed all the national studios to independently communicate with foreign 
investors and producers; and in 1993 a new rule permitted and pushed the local studios to compete for their 
own distribution benefits from cooperation markets. Refer to Zhang Yan (61). With that situation, Chinese 
filmmaking and its market have been gradually internationalized. 
130 This argument will be further discussed later in chapter 6. 
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cannot lie, because it cannot think… Forgetting that camera angles are selected, tapes 
and films edited and distorted, we attend to them as raw glimpses of what actually 
happened.‖(Lowenthal 367) That is what glossy technology brings to us, an 
unprecedented experience of the past. Its difference from ―historical newsreels‖ is 
obvious. Documentary films are those shot contents left from a past time – at least the 
objects on the screen were ―quite real‖ when they were shot131 – and are a product of 
time; relatively speaking, nostalgia films are shot in a present time, but set in or 
related to certain past contexts. They belong to technology rather than time, although, 
sometimes, they may challenge a linear time-span of narratives.  
 
We seem less bothered by the over-realistic images
 132
 created by mimicking 
technology, and to fear that they confuse the ―truth‖ of history. Because, as John Frow 
said, ―history is always a textual construct; the question cannot at all be about the gap 
between representations of history and history ‗itself‘, but only about the relative 
effectiveness, the relative political force of different representations‖ (78). 
Furthermore, if we are thinking of images based on the technology as fakes of lost 
origins of the past, we should remember the adage, cited by Lowenthal, that ―a 
forgery can be distinguished from an original because it looks more genuine‖ (291). It 
then naturally leads one to shift the focus to skepticism. One may realize that 
technologies not only promote the over-developed instrumental rationality, but also 
                                                        
131  There is nothing completely ―real‖ in films, for any filming involves choosing of angle and framing, which are 
both very subjective. It can only be read as the cinematographer‘s interpretation of the real. 
132  Or maybe associated with what J. Baudrillard called, the hyper-real. 
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provide opportunities for postmodern scepticism and pluralism through those 
mechanical reproduction industries, such as colour film developing. The suspicion, in 
my view, comes from a dilemma of judgment between the original and its 
hyper-representation. Here glossy technology forms an attraction across time and 
space, in which nostalgia films constitute a paradox of the past – the glossy images. It 
is this that reminds me of diversity between a hyper-reality and its real past when 
considering Chinese nostalgia and films. ―Distortion‖ will become a fatal argument 
(in the next chapter) when examining how nostalgia builds a hyper-real past of China 
to cater for the Western audience and to simultaneously deviate from an earlier 
position of local reality. But it seems too early to organize a separate discussion on 
audience receptions between the domestic and overseas film markets. Because, apart 
from its readership, whether a nostalgic film itself has the ability to reflect an 
objective, authentic past is still unanswered. The last section of this chapter (5.6) will 
put stress on the doubt and argue that postmodern nostalgia – as a kind of popular 
realism – is leading its hyper-real appearances into certain temptation and seduction in 
order to remind people of the unreachable truth. 
 
5.2. The Appearance 
5.2.1. Flatness – The Fate of History 
 
The superficiality and bricolage of appearances are the most significant 
elements in postmodern nostalgia. In traditional philosophy, it is perhaps to be taken 
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for granted that people should see through the appearance to perceive the essence. 
However such common sense has already been considered by those postmodernists as 
a dogma that we cannot rely on any more. As Jameson argues, the most simple and 
apparent stuff is the most basic of the things; the fact is not as Descartes affirmed, that 
the simplest is just the foundation of a pyramid, that then leads the system to a higher 
grade
133
. When a society strides forward to a postmodern culture, the current era 
becomes similar to that described by Ludwig Feuerbach, ―the present age is one 
which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, presentation to 
reality, the appearance to the essence‖ (qtd. in Frow 5). Nostalgia film derives from 
images collaged with appearances of the old days. Here we may interpret the meaning 
of ―appearance‖ in nostalgia through the concept of ―superficiality‖. 
 
Superficiality (or flatness, depthlessness) manifests the fate of history in 
contemporary culture. Jameson directly linked the postmodern culture with a 
historical consciousness. He mentioned that historical consciousness has faded out 
from the universal flatness and superficiality of postmodern culture. Those old, 
modernist feelings about history were related to linear time, painful memories of 
feeling, or a sadness for loss of the past… That deep, traditionally nostalgic, and 
personal emotion has already changed into a jaunty, schizophrenic, and brand new life 
of the eternal present in the postmodern
134
. In other words, people in contemporary 
                                                        
133  F. Jameson (1997) The Postmodernism and Cultural Theories, 《后现代主义文化理论》Tang Xiaobing (ed.), 
(7). The book derives from a series of speeches by Jameson at Beijing University, 1985. To date, there has not 
been any English version published. 
134  Jameson ―Realism, Modernism, and Postmodernism‖, originally published in Collected Speech of 
Comparative Literature, (275-300). This article has not been published in English. It originally came from one 
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culture have long isolated the present from the past tense in their mind, and 
self-consciously realized the irreversible fracture of time. This rupture results in two 
situations occurring, and both results have been achieved.  
 
5.2.2. The Signifier without Signified 
 
The first situation is the disappearance of a sense of history. Then a past exists 
only in the pure image/mirage. As the ―history‖ of the United States has been 
converted into a number of pictures of the past; in a similar way, the ―history‖ of 
China – through the mimicking of nostalgic movies – may also be changed into film 
that relates to the past. For a postmodern culture, the past has completely changed into 
a dead warehouse which is full of out-of-date hardware you can freely borrow. 
Eventually in film, it presents a heap of historical appearances, or a medley of patchy 
collage.
135
 This kind of (postmodern) nostalgia – based on pure appearances, or 
signifiers without signified – seems obviously not on the same level as the 
personal-homesickness nostalgia shown in Wu Yigong‘s My Memories of Old Beijing 
(Chengnan jiushi, 1982). The historical melancholy of the latter has been dissolved in 
a bricolage of the former. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
of Jameson‘s speeches in Beijing University 1985. Jameson‘s English version cannot be found, its Chinese 
version (translated by Liu Xiangyu) is the only one published: “历史的意识在后现代文化普遍的平淡和浅
薄中已经消失了。老的现代主义对历史的感觉是一种对时间性、或者说对往昔的一种怅然若失、痛苦回
忆的感觉„„那种深深的怀旧的个人情绪在后现代主义中完全转变成一种新的永远是现在时的异常欣
快和精神分裂的生活。” 
135  Ibid, p291. ―东拼西凑的大杂烩‖ 
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Secondly, the rupture of time reflects the issue of schizophrenia. That is a 
popular theme in postmodern theory. Jameson tried to explain the feature of time in 
postmodernity through the perspective of patients with schizophrenia, and he termed 
it (following Lacan) a ―fracture of the symbolic chain‖136. In the mind of the patients, 
syntactic and temporal organizations have disappeared without trace, leaving only 
pure symbols/signs
137
 (namely, the postmodern appearance) that mean nothing to 
them. This is what Gao Xiaosong did in his film, Where Have All the Flowers Gone 
(Nashi huakai, 2002), when he populated a currently popular love story with a collage 
of performers wearing old/historical costumes and living in traditional folk houses 
which seem quite singular today, such as the old-fashioned gowns of the early 
twentieth century and the courtyard of quadrangles in Beijing (Siheyuan). Or like the 
other film, Set Off (Jiri qicheng, Liu Jiang, 2008) where Lao Cui (by Fan Wei), 
wearing a theatrical costume of the police uniform of the Qing dynasty
138
, walks 
along a modern avenue in Beijing, and is then surprised by two present-day policemen 
in the act and misnamed ―fellow comrade‖ by them. Both of the examples, for no 
reason, combine some old type appearances (that had been discarded for years) with 
the uncorrelated, current environment, which tends to result in an isolated signifier 
separated completely from a time-related signified, in order to form a spatial 
hotchpotch of film appearances without linear-time trace. Many postmodern films 
have become typical examples of the betrayed concept of linear time. However the 
                                                        
136  Quoted in Jameson (1988) ―符号链条的断裂‖; and Xudong Zhang (Capitalism 291). 
137  Ibid, ―句法和时间性的组织完全消失了，只剩下纯粹的指符‖。 
138  Qing dynasty, 1644 – 1911. 
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flat, isolated appearances do not merely react to time disorder. Broadly speaking, 
appearances in postmodern culture may be read as free-floating signifiers that lead to 
uncertain meanings of anything signified
139
. Thus, this is what Jamesonian 
postmodernism argues is a disassociation between signifiers and signifieds. Using 
Eisenstein‘s ―montage‖ as an example of modernism, Jameson distinguishes the 
aesthetic significance of postmodern films by their ―patchy collage‖: 
 
The aesthetic forms in modernist works may still be explained by the 
logic of filmic montage. As S. Eisenstein theoretically argued, it is still 
necessary to seek certain ideal models in modernism to juxtapose all 
unrelated signifiers/images together. However, such a unified ideal is 
not accepted by (or the purpose of) the postmodernist clutter on the 
heaps of superficiality, consequently it seems impossible to obtain any 
new form/meaning (signified). We then may conclude that the 
transformation from modernism to postmodernism is in fact a 
transition from montage to patchy collage. (Jameson 1988; ed. in 
Zhang Xudong Late Capitalism 292)
140
 
 
5.2.3. ―Dusty Spectacles‖ – A New Spatial Logic Instead of Time 
 
Therefore, based on depthlessness and superficiality, the sense of the past in 
nostalgia films is often conveyed by a number of daily appearances of the past, 
through which the memories of the old era, old life, and old style can be aroused at 
once. Postmodern nostalgia is considered by Jameson as certain ―museum‖ culture. 
―The producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead 
style, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a 
                                                        
139  As such a ―floating signifier‖ may ―mean different things to different people: it may stand for many or even 
any signifieds; it may mean whatever the interpreter wants it to mean.‖ See Jeffrey Mehlman (10-37). 
140  Translated from the Chinese edition: “把毫无关系的意象并列仍然是寻求某种理想形式所必需的，后现
代主义那种杂乱的意象堆积却不要这种统一，因此不可能获得任何新的形式[所指意象]。我们可以归纳
说，从现代主义到后现代主义的这种转变，就是从蒙太奇到“东拼西凑的大杂烩”（collage）的过渡。” 
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now global culture‖ (Postmodernism 17-8). Nostalgia has to absorb various nutrients 
from the museum and make the bricolage become today‘s cultural product. On the 
other hand, a cultural ―product‖ implies certain types of consumption values. 
Nostalgia is apparently of no practical use, but a kind of spectacle, which is made up 
of a variety of appearances of previous styles (or crusted properties for filmmaking) 
(such as old hair styles, old houses, old furniture, old music, old dress, and even 
streetscapes of the past…) Those props, whether true or false, are not important any 
more. Their images are the real substance of nostalgia. In Guy Debord‘s words, ―the 
image has become the final form of commodity reification‖ (qtd. in Jameson 
Postmodernism 18)
141
. For Jameson, the commercialization of the image, spectacle, 
and appearance directly subverts the historical sense of nostalgia. We are indeed 
getting more incapability of reaching a feeling of time. With this sense, an example 
can be found from the Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993) on which Zhang Xudong 
writes in his review about the nostalgic reconstruction of Dry Well Lane, a bustling 
residential quarter of Beijing in the film, that 
 
Visually, one cannot tell to which time period it belongs. Even though 
the subject matter is highly time specific, there is simply no traits of 
temporality in terms of the way people dress, means of transportation, 
architectural style, etc. Rather, everything seen in this setting – from 
the traditional-styled residential courtyard, chimneys and smoke in the 
coal-burning winter of Beijing, a cart pulled by a donkey, to children 
playing on the street – gives rise to a sense of timelessness. (Trauma 
34) 
 
Though I do not quite agree with Zhang‘s extreme criticism of ―timelessness‖ 
                                                        
141  Guy Debord (1970) The Society of The Spectacle (English Ed. Translated by Fredy Perlman and Jon Supak), 
quoted by Jameson (1991) p18. (However this quotation cannot be found in the third edition of The Society of 
The Spectacle, published in 1994 by a different English translator, Donald N Smith). 
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with the film (because as he later argued the film is still ―an ‗anthropological‘ 
documentation of ordinary life in Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s‖ (Trauma 40), which 
proves a time indicator is still there in the nostalgia), it is just a good example here 
showing the postmodern tendency that nostalgic space/appearance is gradually 
encroaching on a concept of time. Perhaps as Jameson mentioned, the feeling of time 
has gradually been substituted by a new spatial logic in postmodernism: 
 
The new spatial logic of the simulacrum can now be expected to have a 
momentous effect on what used to be historical time. The past is 
thereby itself modified [… It] has meanwhile itself become a vast 
collection of images, a multitudinous photographic simulacrum. Guy 
Debord‘s powerful slogan is now even more apt for the ―prehistory‖ of 
a society bereft of all historicity, one whose own putative past is little 
more than a set of dusty spectacles. In faithful conformity to 
poststructuralist linguistic theory, the past as ―referent‖ finds itself 
gradually bracketed, and then effaced altogether, leaving us with 
nothing but texts. (Postmodernism 18) 
 
This approach [nostalgia film, beyond real historical time] to the 
present by way of the art language of the simulacrum, or of the 
pastiche of the stereotypical past, endows present reality and the 
openness of present history with the spell and distance of a glossy 
mirage. Yet this mesmerizing new aesthetic mode itself emerged as an 
elaborated symptom of the waning of our historicity, of our lived 
possibility of experiencing history in some active way. It cannot 
therefore be said to produce this strange occultation of the present by 
its own formal power, but rather merely to demonstrate, through these 
inner contradictions, the enormity of a situation in which we seem 
increasingly incapable of fashioning representations of our own current 
experience. (Postmodernism 21) 
 
5.3. The Rupture of Time 
 
An obvious example that embodies the disappearance of historical 
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consciousness is the (floating/slippery) uncertainty
142
 between texts and their 
(historical) background (or the appearance of time). Postmodern films and their plots 
are no longer limited to modernism on linear time experience. Texts are not necessary 
to keep a fixed association with matched background/linear logic, which is likely to 
lead to a nonlinear time-span in film narratives. The Back to The Future trilogy 
(1985/1989/1990), for instance, was shot in the late 1980s, but its story shuttles 
between 1955, 1985, 2015, and 1885 through Doc Brown‘s time machine. This 
ruptures temporal connections of the narrative. The text then changes into a 
―bricolage‖ combined with the past, the present, and the future. Marty, the protagonist, 
travels back to the 1950s and participates in his parents‘ love, but accidentally attracts 
his young mother‘s romantic interest; lotto files taken back from the future (by Biff) 
make the condition of the present change dramatically. Through these plots, the 
audience‘s historical consciousness becomes misted over. The original fixed and 
dignified historical feelings have changed into an erratic game without any fixed 
result.  
 
5.3.1. The Slippery Appearance 
 
However, the most important point of the film is not the ―medley‖ based on 
the combination of textual cues, but the appearance‘s bricolage constructed on 
space-time disorder. It is necessary to think of the way the audience reads the story 
                                                        
142  Here, the understanding of ―uncertainty‖ may be linked with the ―floating signifier‖ and the ―slippery 
signified‖ from Lacan, by which the subsequent deconstructions were deeply influenced. J. Lacan (1998) ―The 
Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud‖. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (190-205). 
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backgrounds from the silver screen, such as the 50s, the 70s, the present, or the future. 
On film of motion pictures, this kind of recognition process mostly depends on the 
stacked appearances of various times, which is what Jameson called a ―list of 
stereotypes, of ideas of facts and historical realities‖ (Postmodernism 279), such as 
hair style, music, clothing, language, street views and anything else that relates to a 
historical sense. Therefore, a rupture (or disorder) of time in a postmodern 
pastiche/nostalgia tends to be revealed as those exterior appearances of a diverse past. 
The audience‘s consciousness of historical time (in nostalgia films) then completely 
relies on (and is transformed into) expressions of spatial qualities, such as scene, 
props, and costumes for a particular period. This point proves Jameson‘s early 
prediction that the postmodern culture is gradually changing its attention from a 
modernist historical consciousness on ―time‖ to purely spatial issues, and focusing on 
―space‖ itself (Jameson Realism; republished in Zhang Xudong Capitalism 299-300). 
 
5.3.2. Farewell My Concubine 
 
Farewell My Concubine (Chen Kaige, 1993) deliberately takes advantage of 
various appearances to substitute a sense of time and to form a collage of an historical 
outer shell, which provides ―sliding‖ opportunities (or intertextuality) between 
signifiers and signified in texts of history, of drama, and of fictional nostalgia. The 
film borrows a famous text/plot that is set in the historical era of 2200 years ago and 
shows a traditional Peking opera adapted from it on the stage. Eventually it tries to 
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present the life experience of the two protagonists of the opera in a long nostalgic 
context, from the 1920s to the 70s. 
 
5.3.2.1. A Historical Legend 
 
The name of the film, Farewell My Concubine, can perhaps be associated with 
a historical event in 202 B.C. According to Sima Qian, in his the Records of the 
Grand Historian
143
, the great hero Chu Bawang (Xiang Yu, the Great Conqueror from 
the State of Chu, 232-202 B.C.) was defeated in his war with Liu Bang (the first 
emperor of the Han dynasty, 256-195 B.C.) and finally trapped by him at Gaixia. 
Bawang, on the night before his last sally, felt so sad that he drank for the last time 
with his favorite concubine, Lady Yu, and was reluctant to part from her. Then on the 
next day he committed suicide with his sword beside the Wu river (Sima, Ch. 7 
―Xiangyu Benji‖ 333). 
 
As Adam Lam argues, ―Lady Yu was not significant enough to deserve any 
further words about her fate in the formal historical record‖ (2000, 196). Indeed, there 
are very few words (only two sentences) in the Records of the Grand Historian that 
refer to Lady Yu: 
 
There was a beauty, named Yu, who often followed and played with 
Bawang.… Then Bawang sadly composed his song/poem: 
                                                        
143  The Records of the Grand Historian (史記), written from 109 B.C. to 91 B.C., was the magnum opus of Sima 
Qian, in which he recounted Chinese history from the time of the Yellow Emperor (2600 B.C.) until his own 
time. 
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My strength plucked up the hills, my might shadowed the world; 
But the times were against me, and Dapple runs no more; 
When Dapple runs no more, what then can I do? 
Ah, Yu, my Yu, what will your fate be? (Sima 333)
144
 
 
It is obvious that Yu had just a negligible role in the formal history.
145
 The purpose of 
her existence in the record is only to serve as a foil to the sadness of Bawang‘s failure 
and the heroic tragedy. 
 
However, in the two thousand years that have passed since the tragedy, many 
novel writers and playwrights have taken the role of Lady Yu and ―her story more 
seriously and expanded it into romance‖, in which she ―becomes the tragic heroine 
who kills herself in front of Chu Bawang to prove her loyalty and preserve her 
chastity. This suicide is not mentioned in the official historical record.‖146 Nowadays 
Yu‘s suicide has been romantically adapted and widely passed down from one 
generation to another through all kinds of related Chinese poems, novels, dramas, 
historical criticism, and so on
147
. Therefore I have reasons to presume that most 
contemporary Chinese readers have a stereotyped image of Yu as a model of loyal 
                                                        
144  “有美人名虞，常幸从„„ 于是项王乃悲歌慨，自为诗曰：‘力拔山兮气盖世，时不利兮骓不逝，骓不
逝兮可奈何，虞兮虞兮奈若何’歌数闋，美人和之。”Translated by Burton Watson (45). 
145  In the official history, there are even no records of Lady Yu‘s last name, nor was the name ―Concubine Yu‖ (Yu 
Ji). ―Yu ji‖ begun to be used in any record until the book Kuo Di Zhi《括地志》in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 
A.D.)  
146  For instance, Chinese folklore records that ―Lady Yu speaks to Bawang: ‗the soldiers of Han have invaded, we 
have been trapped without leeway; your future has come to an end, how can I survive.‘ Then she cut her 
throat, ‖ in order to eliminate the burden for him and enhance his faith to breakthrough. “霸王歌罢，虞姬应
和道：汉兵已略地，四方楚歌声；大王意气尽，贱妾何聊生。歌罢自刎。”(Lam 2000, 196). 
147  For example, Lu Jia‘s Chu Han Chun Qiu《楚汉春秋》(陆贾, Western Han Dynasty), Zhang Shoujie‘s Shi Ji 
Zheng Yi《史记正义》(张守节, Tang Dynasty), Shi Naian‘s Shui Hu Zhuan《水浒传》(施耐庵, Yuan/Ming 
Dynasty), Feng Menglong Qing Shi《情史》(冯梦龙, Ming Dynasty), Zhen Wei‘s XiHan Tongsu Yanyi《西汉
通俗演绎》(甄伟, Ming Dynasty), Shen Cai‘s Qian Jin Ji《千金记》(沈采, Ming Dynasty), and Yuan Mei‘s
《过虞沟游虞姬庙》(袁枚, Qing Dynasty) all mentioned about Lady Yu‘s suicide. 
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women today. Ironically, it is Lady Yu who bids farewell to Bawang in literary 
common sense, rather than Bawang saying goodbye to her in the untouchable history. 
So the process itself – in which a real history was passed down and eventually 
changed into a totally different literary expression through the two thousand-year 
adaptations – can be considered as a reminder of the textual prejudice of the way a 
historical reality evolved to the grand narrative of such a popular love story. Taken in 
this sense, the traditional legend of ―Farewell My Concubine‖ can be seen as a typical 
example of postmodern incredulity about grand history. However it is not the point 
that the film would breakthrough. Instead, the film not only reconfirms Yu‘s suicide, 
but also put it in a different context – nostalgia. 
 
5.3.2.2. The Film Text and Intertextuality 
 
What the film title actually refers to is a romantic Peking opera piece
148
 (with 
the same name as the film) that tells the historical event mentioned above combined 
with the plot of Yu‘s suicide. Then the film text slides between the historical text, the 
opera stage, and the nostalgic life story (the 1920s to the 1970s) of the two 
protagonists of the opera.  
 
It is well known that female characters in traditional Peking opera are always 
                                                        
148  The Peking opera ―Farewell My Concubine‖ was originally adapted from Qian Jin Ji 《千金记》and premiered 
in 1918. Since then it has become one of the masterpieces of traditional Peking opera. 
Chapter Five 
 144 
played by male actors
149
, who usually learn performance from a very young age. The 
film, Farewell My Concubine, tells of a pair of actors who played in the opera (and 
their lives, loves, and relationships) from when they were young in the 1920s until, 
they lived to a great age, the 1970s. Strictly speaking, the film is a story about two 
men. What is different is that one (called Stone, or Duan Xiaolou) plays Bawang, the 
other (called Bean, or Cheng Dieyi) plays Lady Yu on the stage. The nostalgic story 
spans a very long period, from the beginning of the Republic of China
150
, the period 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the new socialist China, to the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
       
Figure 3. Bawang and Lady Yu on Stage in Film 
 
Presumably, as the result of a long unbearable trial in historical movements 
and his failed homo-relationship (with Stone), Bean eventually kills himself when 
playing the role of Lady Yu on stage in a rehearsal in the late 1970s, which makes the 
                                                        
149  At that time females acting on the stage were not accepted by social morality in China. 
150  The Republic of China, 1912-1949, which then retreats to Taiwan. 
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nostalgic narrative form a reference with the other two texts – the traditional legend 
and the opera plot of ―Farewell My Concubine‖. However, if comparing the nostalgic 
story with the legend or the opera, one may find that the reasons for ―farewell‖ in 
literary history or traditional opera of China are largely different from the reason for 
Bean saying goodbye on the stage of nostalgia. The contemporary nostalgic text 
endows the suicide of ―Lady Yu‖ with some new agents, such as the Cultural 
Revolution and unsuccessful homosexuality. The film, over a great deal of time, 
shows Bean‘s love for Stone offstage, but Stone seems to find it hard to extricate 
himself from heterosexuality and to accept his feelings. Moreover, the film also 
represents the way the cultural reforms and movements encroach on traditional opera 
after the liberation of China (in the 1950s and 1960s), which even deprive Bean of his 
opportunity onstage and his performing life that he has placed all his love on. These 
clues appear to have a direct link with the suicide. Nevertheless, those new factors 
seem quite far away from the spiritual content of ―Farewell My Concubine‖ by Sima 
Qian, in his Records of the Grand Historian, two thousand years ago. In the historical 
narrative, it was Bawang rather than Lady Yu who really got into trouble. It was 
because of being defeated that Bawang was compelled to take his leave of Yu; while 
this is obviously not the same reason that results in Bean‘s suicide in the identity of Yu. 
It is not hard to realize that a contemporary nostalgia has become adrift (disjointed) 
from history and its past tradition of narratives. Its result could lead to two different 
views of postmodernity. 
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On the one hand, if we borrow Linda Hutcheon‘s words that what 
―postmodern intertextuality challenges [is] both closure and single, centralized 
meaning‖ (Poetics 127), the film, Farewell My Concubine, just forms an 
intertextuality intertwined between history, opera stage, and nostalgic text. Originality 
from past texts in postmodern literature and films can no longer exist in a stable form; 
―if it were‖, according to Hutcheon cited from Barthes and Riffaterre, ―it could have 
no meaning for its reader. It is only as part of prior discourses that any text derives 
meaning and significance‖ (Barthes Image 160; Riffaterre 142; cited in Hutcheon 
Poetics 126). Just like the nostalgic story of Bean and Stone – though they play 
―Farewell My Concubine‖ (opera) on the stage and it forms a reference to their real 
life, they are not limited to following a textual destiny from a historical context. 
Nostalgia provides a wider understanding of Bean‘s suicide because, it relates to the 
film reader‘s personal memories, feelings, and experiences in the present, such as 
their sufferings in the Cultural Revolution and perspectives on homosexuality today. 
All of these (situations) help readers develop their own comprehension of the film and 
the suicide, beyond a historical text or fixed opera plot. As Barthes argued, 
―intertextuality replaces the challenged author-text relationship with one between 
reader and text‖ (Image 160). Thus I would argue that nostalgia combined with 
intertextuality may probably embody a postmodern value of release in the film. 
Because for one thing, it can be considered as a liberation of text from the shadow of 
the author (no matter whether it is the author of the history or of the film); for another, 
it awakens people to the limitation of authorship in originality.  
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On the other hand, the above-mentioned ―disjointing‖ just manifests the 
postmodern relationship between past and present in contemporary culture. The 
understanding of the past at present and our historical experiences today have greatly 
surpassed what it was in original texts of the past. Just as Farewell My Concubine did 
in its film narrative, nostalgia rebuilds a traditional opera stage for the current 
generation of visual consumers, but the culture today already lacks an ability to return 
to the original condition. Nowadays what a postmodern culture can accomplish is no 
more than to treat issues (such as the Cultural Revolution and homosexuality) from 
current perspectives and to fill up a textual frame of the past with today‘s brand new 
life experiences. As quoted from Jameson above (see the end of part 5.2.3.), nostalgia 
as a present way of ―the pastiche of the stereotypical past‖ has provided us with not 
only a ―new aesthetic mode‖ but also ―the spell and distance of a glossy mirage‖. That 
is just the most important symptom of our historicity being faded out in the current era. 
Instead, we are ―experiencing history in some active way‖. We seem not to be able to 
observe historical relations between past and present any more, nor could we 
experience the past concretely. Our powers to grasp a historical experience are not 
what they were. The reason for this does not consist in any ―strange occultation of the 
present‖. The fact is that the new aesthetic mode is verifying our ―increasingly 
incapable [situation] of fashioning representations of our own current experience‖ 
with its ―inner contradictions‖ of time and space. (Jameson Postmodernism 21) 
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5.3.2.3. The Floating Appearance and the Confused Time Span 
 
Apparently, the intertextuality which is blended with the history, the opera, 
and the actors‘ lives has been refracted into the audience‘s mind through certain 
nostalgic illusions. In this process, the pure appearance, the spatial flatness, and their 
bricolage make the textual feeling of ―time‖ become increasingly complex, fuzzy and 
chaotic. It blurs the audience‘s impression of time. The collaged images give nostalgia 
more and more of a sense of flatness in ―space‖. The text becomes a superficial game 
(a dead frame) in which you may freely jump to and fro in your mind. Just as in an 
other film, Curse of the Golden Flower (Zhang Yimou, 2006), its original text 
(Thunderstorm by Cao Yu) was written and set in the 1930s, but was adapted for the 
contemporary film market and reset in the royal family of the Tang Dynasty (more 
than a thousand years ago). So the text is totally separated from any unique concept of 
time. Thus, what is most important in postmodern culture is not a ―deep‖ text any 
more, but a redeployment of those visual symbols freely floating on the surface and 
projected on the screen.  
 
The most prominent feature of the filmic appearance consists of taking 
advantage of costumes and facial makeup in the opera – certain apparent material that 
lacks specific signifiers of time and connections with real life – to blur the experience 
of time. At the beginning of the film, there is no caption or title showing when the 
story happens. The first scene is a long take slowly moving back in a gloomy corridor 
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with sundries; two persons (a man and a woman), wearing opera costume and with 
their faces made up so that their age cannot be told, are walking towards the camera 
shoulder to shoulder. The camera keeps a regular distance from them and slowly 
retreats into an empty sports hall with seats. The sharp comparison between the strong 
light coming through the entrance of the hall and the dark inside constitutes the back 
scene behind the two protagonists, as if they were just shuttled in with bizarre dress 
from another space-time. Through their conversation with an off-screen voice (a 
conservator of the hall) viewers may generally know that the scene takes place in 
Beijing not long after the fall of the Gang of Four
151
 in the late 1970s. The identities 
of the two persons are Peking opera actors who have come for a rehearsal. Then there 
follows a full shot. A stage spotlight is suddenly turned on in the dark, and its focus 
slowly moves to the two actors standing in the centre of the hall. 
 
  
Figure 4. The Opening Sequence in Farewell My Concubine 
 
The sequence suddenly stops here. Consequently, we see a traditional Chinese 
                                                        
151  The fall signalled the end of the Cultural Revolution. The Gang of Four was the name given to a leftist political 
faction composed of four Chinese Communist party officials. They came to prominence during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) and were subsequently charged with a series of treasonous crimes. 
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painting – in which Lady Yu is holding a sword to her neck but Bawang beside her 
can do nothing to help – accompanied by the sounds of the traditional Peking opera 
tune that gives the film its title, Farewell My Concubine. Then the story starts and it 
cuts to 1924. 
 
 
Figure 5. The Film Title and the Traditional Painting, Farewell My Concubine 
 
With these two beginning scenes, the film transplants the two opera characters, 
who confuse the precise time, into a dim hall of the late 70s; while the audience‘s 
thoughts are returned with the name of the movie to two thousand years ago, puzzling 
them in terms of the period of history and its text. Here the dressing up of the opera – 
as a sort of crucial appearance – has been completely separated from the 
context/situation of the stage, and collaged together with a nostalgic story lasting fifty 
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years. That foretells the subversion and collapse of a linear time experience that will 
be caused by the whole film. 
 
5.3.2.3. The Makeup and the Confusing Identity 
 
A similar situation (the collage of the reality and the stage) is repeated in the 
film several times. Bean who plays Lady Yu on stage hopes all along that the love 
story between Bawang and Yu will continue in his real life; but Stone, with his opera 
costumes taken off, always treats Bean as his brother rather than lover. Consequently 
in their offstage life, Bean, Stone, and his lover Ju Xian form a love triangle. When 
the film describes the dramatic conflict, it frequently presents Bean wearing operatic 
makeup appearing in the same scene (narrative space-time) with Stone wearing no 
makeup, to create a confusion of identity of characters between the stage and reality. 
A historical character referred to in an opera text is associated with an opera actor in 
his real life; while the relationship itself is represented in a postmodern nostalgia. This 
obviously implies a concept of nonlinear time and space. 
 
  
Figure 6. The Confusion of Identity between the Stage and Reality 
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Actually, a subversion of the linear text by the collaged appearances in 
Farewell My Concubine looks more complex than the pure skip over the time-span in 
the Back to The Future trilogy. The latter simply breaks the rational linear time of the 
film narrative by introducing a time machine; while the former – through the 
appearances (visual signs) of costumes and makeup and their bricolage – makes the 
audience‘s mind dissociate history, opera and nostalgia, which results in a slippery 
move between signifiers and signified from various texts
152
, and leads to a vague 
textual time. 
 
5.3.2.4. The Bricolage from Diverse Appearances of Time 
 
As far as Jamesonian nostalgia is concerned, a fundamental factor that leads to 
the disorder of time in the film narrative consists of an empty pastiche/simulation of 
the purely collaged appearance of the past. The reason that I consider those opera 
costumes and facial makeup in the traditional culture of the past to be visual signs in a 
pastiche of its culture rather than a parody of a Peking opera style, is because the 
original styles of Peking opera (that kind of legitimate and formal staging language 
norm behind the costume, the makeup, and the mask) are not constituted any longer, 
nor have they led to any humour or irony. In fact, these appearances have totally 
broken-away from the opera stage, and changed into some dead visual symbols 
                                                        
152  For instance, in Farewell My Concubine, its director Chen Kaige is interested in relating the actors‘ destinies in 
the nostalgic Cultural Revolution to Bawang and Yu‘s story end in the historical text, so that the intertextuality 
may convey certain political criticism. That will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
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appropriated with other stereotyped images of nostalgia. All of them, in other words, 
seem more like that which Jameson called the culture of museum: the medley of 
historical collage. 
 
A typical example of that bricolage in Farewell My Concubine is in the later 
part of it, when Bean and Stone are violently criticized by Red Guards
153
, where the 
traditional costumes and the identities of Yu and Bawang are combined with the 
radical guards and their appearances in the Cultural Revolution. In this scene, the 
significance and feelings of history (and the concept of time) are fading out through 
the flatness of the visual collage consisting of those pluralistic appearances.  
 
However, from the position of Jameson on postmodern nostalgia, this 
argument may very much depend on who are the audience. The understanding of the 
collaged appearances may also vary from person to person. As far as those who have 
experienced the Cultural Revolution are concerned, the scene containing political 
struggles is likely to cause some negative memories. For them, traditional costumes 
appearing at the critical assembly may not be a ―spectacle‖, but a lingering nightmare. 
In such a political setting where everything traditional has been fought against, 
Chinese people (no matter whether they are the critics or the targets of criticism) have 
already had their mentalities extremely distorted in that period. When being criticized 
                                                        
153  Red Guards were mostly students and other young people in the mainland of China, who were mobilized by 
Mao Zedong between 1966 and 1969, to attack the "Four Olds" of society ( believed to be old ideas, cultures, 
habits, and customs of traditional China), and to make posters and speeches, criticizing other Party leaders, and 
some committed violent acts in the name of the Cultural Revolution. 
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together with Stone (who is forced to dress up as Bawang by Red Guards), Bean 
hysterically says to the public ―I‘m despicable, and I have been so for a long time. But 
now even the King of Chu (Bawang) is on his knees begging for mercy! Can Peking 
opera survive? It‘s doomed [...] that is retribution!‖ This part of the film obviously 
shows a past social context of the late 1960s, which is inclined to criticize traditions 
and to break with history. However when the scene was reconstructed thirty years 
later by Chinese nostalgia of the 1990s, the process of the criticism (of the political 
disaster) itself, as a part of historical representation, appears to be pale and ironic. 
Because, from an understanding of how the historical, political and ideological 
feelings and stands have changed after a mere 30 years, how can a reader today 
authentically reach a history of 2000 years ago to examine the original fact of 
―Farewell My Concubine‖? Perhaps no one will have a definite answer. As a result, 
(postmodern) nostalgia and its aesthetic mode bring the present an expression of 
shock and utter incredulity as well as an unreachable and fashionable historicity. With 
this sense, nostalgic experience for those old, domestic audiences of China is no more 
than watching a pile of flat, unattractive, and old pictures. While on the other hand, 
those who, for various reasons, were mostly absent from the past of China, such as an 
overseas audience, or young Chinese viewers who were born after the Chinese reform 
and opening-up of the late 1970s and seem increasingly to be forming the mainstream 
audience taste of contemporary Chinese cinema in the near future, are more likely to 
accept (rely on) superficial, visual appearances to constitute their historical 
perceptions that they have never experienced. Then gradually, as Jameson pointed out, 
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nostalgic films are forming a society losing all of its historicity, the past has thereby 
had ―itself modified‖ and become ―a vast collection of images, a multitudinous 
photographic simulacrum… one whose own putative past is little more than a set of 
dusty spectacles.‖ (Postmodernism 18) 
 
 
Figure 7. “Lady Yu” at a Struggle Meeting 
 
In this situation, where the appearance departs from its texts and the 
relationship between signifiers and signified is no longer stable, the historical reality 
of Farewell My Concubine will then be transformed into a totally different form of 
representation – farewell my concubine – nothing more than the three common 
words
154
. Thus the destinies of Bawang and Yu are not limited to any historical 
                                                        
154  Just as Jameson said about the ―fifties‖ in his ―Nostalgia for the Present‖: ―to shift from the realities of the 
1950s to the representation of that rather different thing, the ‗fifties‘.‖ (Postmodernism 281). 
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discourse, but freely exist in a representation of visual depthlessness. 
 
5.4. What Does Nostalgia Imitate? 
 
5.4.1. The Mass Consciousness 
 
Beyond the flat appearance, a further question is, what does a nostalgia film 
imitate? What does it represent? Will postmodern nostalgia be similar to parody 
which, carries out a double-code strategy by which elitist styles in high art are both 
constructed and subverted simultaneously? In this section, the point is that nostalgia 
film (in China, in the 1990s) has broken away from a peak of heroism as well as a 
centre of master narrative, and changed into a representation of certain mass/group 
consciousness. Based on that trend of mass culture, nostalgia has constructed a 
trivialized context in a realistic narration and shaped a new film fashion. Through the 
imitation of a specific past, nostalgia tries to convey the impossibility of historical 
―authenticity‖ in the face of the subjective and pluralistic consciousness of the past. 
 
As Hutcheon argued, ―postmodernism clearly attempts to combat what has 
come to be seen as modernism‘s potential for hermetic, elitist isolationism that 
separated art from the world, literature from history‖ (Poetics 140). What is called the 
―mass/group consciousness‖ is just a cultural position relative to elitism or the ―elite 
consciousness‖. Featherstone, in his Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, points 
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out that what the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkhermor, and Marcuse) were 
interested in – ―an elitist critique of mass culture‖ – has already gone out of date. 
―They are generally regarded as looking down on the debased mass culture and as 
having little sympathy for the integrity of the popular classes‘ pleasures. The latter 
position has been strongly endorsed by the swing to postmodernism‖ (Featherstone 
vii). Going back to the point of this part, I would argue that a de-stylized imitation, 
such as nostalgia in contemporary cinema, has probably proved ―the swing‖ to a mass 
culture of postmodernism. In this process, modernist styles combined with its ―high‖, 
artistic uniqueness/originality may be considered as a bottleneck that blocks the 
freely-opened popular culture by its dated potential for the ―hermetic, elitist 
isolationism‖. Taken in this sense, isolated styles though do not seem to be completely 
equal as a result of elitist modernity, they have already played roles in defending our 
humanist assumptions about high artistic notions of originality and scarcity
155
. 
However imitations from postmodern parody and nostalgia have been contesting this 
gradually. It is the de-stylized imitation and its self-absorption in constructing a 
mass/group consciousness that proves an active example of the mass culture today. 
 
5.4.2. Different Targets of Parody and Pastiche 
 
Relatively speaking, as far as parody is concerned, its works tend to emphasize 
imitations of certain literary/artistic styles. Then the impact of parody and its sense of 
                                                        
155  As the saying goes, ―less is more‖. That proves the distance of mass culture from elitism and ―high‖ art. 
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humour often depend on the extent to which its original style can be well-known by 
the (popular) readers. A style generally has something distinguished and out of the 
ordinary; it may have more or fewer differences from the ordinary life of the masses, 
and even place itself above the common way of life and its common sense. This is one 
of the differences between elite art (high art) and mass culture (Kellner Dialectics 4). 
Postmodern parody is then good at mimicry of those unique styles, genres and 
narratives of elitism, for example, the imitation of a black and white documentary 
style in An Orphan Joins the Army. The genre of the old documentary film has a wide 
advantage (so that it can be easily recognized or identified); for another, its unique 
style has considerable charm in showing some of the grand historical scenes and 
historical figures. That makes it impressive for the audience with stereotypes of grand 
narratives in history and separate from the masses that are popularly conscious. 
However when the film imitates its documentary style with a parodic way and adds a 
fictional (cartoon) character (Sanmao) to its historical context, parody on the one hand 
is equipped with some implications of deconstruction, subversion, or irony; and on the 
other hand it presents certain signs of fusion between the elite and the mass (high art 
and popular culture). 
 
But postmodern nostalgia, based on pastiche, cannot be considered as an 
imitation or a reconstruction of elite art and its styles at all. Instead of that, it is the 
direct retrospect, the original simulacrum, the superficial appearance, and the empty 
representation of the mass consciousness that become the target of nostalgic imitation. 
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Within this process, there is no ulterior motive, nor any subversion or satire; then what 
has been left is only the construction of the old, collective, and stereotyped memories 
of the past, rather than any personal genre. By this token, perhaps it can be also seen 
as a de-stylized process. For example, Chinatown (1973) rebuilds a historical 
background of Los Angles, 1937, when Jack (a private investigator) helps his 
customers to investigate adulteries; The Godfather: Part II (1974) represents the rise 
to power of the young Vito Corleone in his early life and career in 1920s New York; 
Back to the Future (1985) makes Marty look back on the school life of 1950s‘ North 
America. All the sense of the times restored by the films does not belong to any 
individual, artistic style, but a past experience of ordinary people and their everyday 
life. This version of imitation of the past is not completely in accord with what parody 
did in its stylistic satire: 
 
 Postmodern Parody Filmic Nostalgia 
the object/target of 
imitation 
familiar styles, narratives & 
genres 
images of lost originals 
construction stylistic consciousness memories of ordinary life 
deconstruction redeploy the dominant 
discourse 
- 
depth profound self-reflections superficiality 
humor postmodern irony - 
culture high/elite, but simultaneously 
exploited and subverted by 
parody 
the mass 
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Thus, what nostalgia imitates is different from the target of parody. Nostalgia 
is no longer limited to an (double-coded) intertextuality or an imitation of 
literary/artistic styles, but directly involves itself in a simulacrum of an overall 
cultural style of a past age. Eventually, it embodies three transformation trends: a 
transformation from textual strategies to superficial appearances (visual images); a 
change from elite arts into mass culture; a conversion/extension from a literary theory 
based on text to a macro cultural theory (cultural studies) based on visual appeals – 
namely a cultural turn. 
 
5.4.3. Trivialized Experiences – To Live and the Blue Kite 
 
Chinese nostalgia films of the 1990s may be considered within a context of 
cultural studies; the audience‘s consciousness is not necessarily subjected to the 
authors‘ artistic intentions or restricted to a textual frame. But it may freely roam in its 
own memories/illusions of the past. This illusion (or what Baudrillard called 
―simulation‖156) is not created by an author (or a filmmaker) for his/her originality – 
nor does it come purely from any personal expression of the author‘s own sentiment, 
but it may (independently of the plot/text) arouse universal resonance in the general 
audience through their own experiences of the past. When talking about the 
contemporary nostalgic movies in China, Sheldon H. Lu argues that elitist heroism is 
no longer accorded great significance: 
                                                        
156  As Jean Baudrillard argues, we live in ―the age of simulation‖. See his Simulations (1983), New York: 
Semiotext, p4. Thus nostalgia of the past can probably be seen as a case in point of contemporary culture of 
simulations. 
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What should be noted here is that such [nostalgic] films and TV 
dramas take on the everyday in the representation of the past. That is, 
they do not linger on the sublime historical moments in national 
history and narrate the stories of great heroes, but rather focus on the 
personal and private dimensions of individuals. (133) 
 
This is the charm of nostalgia. To Live (Zhang Yimou, 1994) represents a piece 
of the past from the 1940s to the 60s. The story is not converted from real historical 
material, but adapted from a novel by Yu Hua. As far as the story is concerned, the 
film bears mainly imaginary/fictional colours. On the other hand, the historical 
context beyond the plot seems so appealing that the audience may easily soak 
themselves in past memories. The historical background that the film restores is not a 
positive performance from a great discourse of grand history. Instead, it is an ordinary 
person (a small shot), Fugui (the protagonist), who strings together quite a few 
fragments of history through his life. Fugui experiences many landmark events of the 
public history in China, such as the Civil War
157
 (1946-1949), the Great Leap 
Forward
158
 (1958-1960), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  
 
The historical retrospect in To Live (1994) is quite similar to an American film, 
Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, 1994), shot in the same year. Forrest, in his epic 
journey through life, influences the era of Elvis Presley, and experiences a sequence 
of American history, such as the Vietnam War, the Ping-pong Diplomacy, the Anti-war 
                                                        
157  It refers to the Second Nationalist-Communist Civil War, between the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) 
and the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, the newly founded the People's Republic of China controlled 
mainland China and the Republic of China was restricted to their remaining territories of Taiwan. 
158  It was an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which aimed to use China's vast population to 
rapidly transform mainland China from a primarily agrarian economy dominated by peasant farmers into a 
modern, agriculturalized and industrialized communist society. However it led to a great famine in 1960-62. 
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Movement of the 1970s, and the Watergate Scandal.  
 
But it is uesful to compare the different ways in which the two films portray 
their protagonists. Although Fugui and Forrest are the main characters in their films, 
their historical status is entirely different. Hollywood moulds Forrest into a leading 
role or an accidental hero (rather than an ordinary person) in many public events in 
history. From the beginning of the film, Forrest inspires Elvis Presley to his best 
performance as the ―Hillbilly Cat‖; later he becomes an All-American (a great football 
player) and hero from Vietnam; then he is received twice by U.S. Presidents; and after 
that he contributes to improving Sino-US relations as a table tennis player. Forrest is 
always placed in a central position when he emerges in a grand history, and he 
promotes the smooth development of history. This kind of role model seems quite 
similar to the parody in An Orphan Joins the Army. This is to mix a fictional character 
into a grand narrative historical discourse, such as a documentary or newsreel, and let 
the character combine with those events and big shots. Then it (as a foil) shows the 
absurdity of history in great narratives. 
 
However, beyond the absurd/deconstructed strategy of parody, nostalgia brings 
a new wave in the representations of history. Just as Pam Cook argues, in her 
Screening the Past: Memory and Nostalgia in Cinema, the ―master narratives of major 
events focused on the activities of public figures have shifted to include the 
experience and perspective of the ‗ordinary person‘‖ (1). This transformation has been 
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implemented in what To Live represented. Its historical context does not rely on those 
documentary styles or grand themes of history, but is mostly constructed on the basis 
of the mass consciousness and memories of past appearances. Fugui, the protagonist 
of the film, goes through the twenty-year changes and shifts encountered in his life 
(from the Civil War in the 40s to the Cultural Revolution in the 60s); he never stands 
in a central position of any historical event. In the war, he is at first forced to be 
conscripted as a soldier in the Kuomintang army, soon to become a captive of the 
People‘s Liberation Army without fighting, and plays ―shadow puppet show‖159 for 
communist soldiers. After the war, he returns home and becomes a water-deliverer in 
the street. Whether it be the war, the Great Leap, or the Cultural Revolution, Fugui 
cannot change/save/dominate a single historical event as a hero throughout his life. He 
is only one of the many ordinary people that silently suffered and dumbly experienced 
those memorable years. 
 
Similarly to Fugui, the protagonists of The Blue Kite (1993) are also common 
residents of Beijing. Tietou‘s Mom is a grade teacher and his father is a librarian. The 
family leads an ordinary life in a small alley in western Beijing of the 1950s. With 
Tietou‘s memory of his childhood, the film tries to bring the audience back to their 
own nostalgic illusions (which can be seen to be the ―everyday‖ of representations of 
the past): a series of common memories of the 1950s and 1960s, such as (in the Spring 
Festival) burning Chinese lanterns, setting off firecrackers, making dumplings, and 
                                                        
159  It is called ―皮影戏‖, a typical national culture of the traditional China. Here the director Zhang Yimou takes 
the advantage of its unique appearance as a cultural spectacle to cater for the interest of modern audiences, 
especially those from overseas.  
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paying a New Year call from door to door. Tietou‘s story is just in accord with the 
group memories of the mainstream audience thirty years later (when the film was shot 
in 1993). Some scenes in To Live and Farewell My Concubine represent similar 
impressions. The posters about the Great Leap, scenes of the collective dining-hall, 
the sight of the Red Guards, propaganda on state radio broadcast, political slogans and 
banners, mass parade, drums and red flags, and portraits of Chairman Mao all over the 
streets – as the crucial stereotypes that have been used in presenting the period of the 
late 1950s and 1960s – all arouse the audience‘s own nostalgic feelings.  
For those who have experienced the ―Mao era‖160, all of these past illusions 
are not of any author‘s brand of personal attitude and style, nor an individual mirage 
from any directors. As precise cultural symbols in mass consciousness, they construct 
a model of the ―past everyday‖ into a contemporary mass culture, though sometimes it 
seems politically idealized. As Xu Bi points out, any yearning for, or recollections of 
the Mao era and its related (political) movements should be viewed as a kind of 
―collective memory‖161. Because even the most individual memory is sure to happen 
in certain social frameworks that constitute a fundamental condition of a memory to 
be understood by others.
162
 Xu then borrows Lev Vygotsky‘s point and argues that the 
                                                        
160  The history of the People‘s Republic of China is often divided distinctly into the ―Mao era‖ and the ―post-Mao 
era‖. The Mao era lasted from the founding of the People‘s Republic on October 1, 1949 to Deng Xiaoping‘s 
grip on power and policy reversal at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December, 1978. The first 
wave of nostalgia in contemporary Chinese cinema usually focuses on Mao's social movements from the early 
1950s onwards, including Land Reform, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, and evaluates 
Mao‘s ideological/cultural legacy as a whole. 
161  ―Collective memory‖ is a term coined by Maurice Halbwachs, separating the notion from the individual 
memory. The collective memory is shared, passed on and also constructed by the group, or modern society. 
Recently, the concept has extended to include the human body as a site for the collective processes of retention 
and propagation of memory in mass media, like film and television news broadcasting. For more information, 
please refer to Maurice Halbwachs (1992) On collective memory, translated and re-edited by Lewis A. Coser, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
162 Xu Bi (徐賁 2006) ―Cultural Relic Collections and Nostalgia in Mass Culture‖, Chinese Art Criticism, 2006-10. 
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reason every human being has a grand memory is not because they have inherent 
power to remember, but must recall their memory through the use of cultural symbols. 
Without an exogenous process, symbols can directly touch/enlighten thoughts and 
ideas in people‘s minds. That is memory/recollection.163 We understand the nostalgia 
of Mao‘s era today exactly by means of various social, cultural symbols and relics of 
that period. Nowadays, those symbols have already lost the ability to control the 
current ideology, but still constantly strike deep into the memories of the people.
164
  
 
From all appearances, (nostalgia) films have become an excellent 
carrier/media of cultural symbols to recall the group/public memories. They 
simultaneously, may throw off those private, isolated, textualized, and sometimes 
elitist styles, by projecting the (mass) visual symbols on to the screens for 
depthlessness. They then, to a large extent, do arouse a nostalgic consciousness of the 
masses towards their ―felt‖ past. Regarding Chinese nostalgia in the early 1990s as a 
whole, no matter whether it is Farewell My Concubine, Blue Kite, or To Live, they all 
happen to coincide in their time background, focusing on the Mao era and its 
ideological situation. Regardless of the length of their time span in the films or how 
their stories differ in narrative, they all have a similar intersection on the narrative 
background – China, the 1950s and 60s. The question is why the intersection is 
formed in a cinematic nostalgia of China in the special period (of the early 1990s). 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.zgyspp.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=3084 
163  Lev Vygotsky (1978) Mind in Society, edited by Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner, and Ellen 
Souberman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cited in Bi Xu (2006) ibid. 
164  Xu (2006) ibid. 
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There must have been some cause for the coincidence. 
 
Perhaps on the one hand, it is closely bound up with the social environments 
of the fifth generation directors‘ early growth. Chen Kaige and Tian Zhuangzhuang 
were both born in 1952, and have similar family backgrounds, so that they befriended 
each other at an early age. Their parents were famous filmmakers (or actors) in China 
and all heavily criticized political movements subsequently.
165
 This has probably 
resulted in their keen interest in representing that specific period in their later 
professional career. Those representations of the 1950s/60s – reflected in the 
contemporary Chinese cinema of the 1990s when the economic and political reform 
had been implemented for more than a decade – must have contained intense 
emotions/senses of scar literature or ideological criticism. Another director, Zhang 
Yimou, was born in Xian 1951. Though Chen and Tian were his contemporaries 
(1978-1982) at the Beijing Film Academy, yet comparatively speaking, Zhang‘s early 
experience seems quite different. He had not suffered from the many changes in the 
political wind.
166
 Perhaps, this point partially leads to his To Live containing more 
                                                        
165  Chen‘s father, Chen Huaikai was once a famous film director in the early period of the Beijing Film Studio. 
When Chen Kaige was in junior high school, he had participated in criticizing his father on a public gathering 
as a Red Guard, but was expelled subsequently from the organization for his ―counter-revolutionary‖ family 
blood. Tian‘s father was the first head manager of the Beijing Film Studio, but he was then criticized and died 
despite the Cultural Revolution. In 1966, Tian Zhuangzhuang had witnessed his parents being violently 
criticized by Red Guards. For more information about their sufferings in early life, please refer to Adam Lam 
(2000, 162, 251); and Sha Hui ―Passing Melody of the Sad Youth – the Chinese Fifth Generation and What 
Succeeds‖ (4-13). 
166  Zhang‘s father and his father‘s two brothers all graduated from The Whampoa Military Academy of 
Kuomintang before 1949, but not like Chen and Tian‘s parents who first became communist cadres in socialist 
China and then were persecuted in the political movements. So since the founding of the People‘s Republic of 
China in 1949, the generation of Zhang‘s father had already gone down the wind and not been a main target of 
political struggle. That led to a negative but peaceful family background for Zhang, who developed a great 
inferiority complex over his childhood. It seems quite distinct from Chen and Tian‘s early experiences where 
their parents‘ radical ups and downs in their political life possibly led to their accumulated rancor in early age. 
For Zhang‘s early life, please refer to Wang Zheng (184). 
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humorous and comic material than the other two films directed by Chen and Tian 
which tend to be more inexorable, solemn and frank as a result of an exposure to 
left-leaning ideology in their early days. Sha Hui, in her recent article ―Passing 
Melody of the Sad Youth – the Chinese Fifth Generation and What Succeeds‖, wrote 
 
The Cultural Revolution, as a course of growth in their early life, has 
become a perennial dream lingering in the minds of Chen Kaige and 
other fifth generation directors. Just because of this, there have come 
the three comparable films that together appeared in international film 
festivals
167
, Farewell My Concubine (1993), The Blue Kite (1993), and 
To Live (1994). Even though it [the burst of nostalgia movies in China 
in the early 1990s] was not cooperation in concert with the directors‘ 
efforts, it at least happened to coincide with a chorus of a battle-cry. It 
is obvious that these directors, who had experienced national and 
domestic calamity in the Cultural Revolution when they were young, 
still suffered considerable discomfort from feelings of deep hurt. That 
led to their works being loaded with omnipresent emotions of 
complaint and anger. (Sha 7)
168
 
 
It must be clear that the above-quoted ―emotions‖ do not only derive from 
personal anger or release by individual ―fifth‖ directors. Their attitudes in the films, to 
a great extent, conform to a general ideological orientation of contemporary China, 
such as what Sha mentions, to associate their family experiences with the whole 
―national calamity‖ of China. 
 
On the other hand, the reason China in the period of the 1950s and 60s became 
                                                        
167  The international awards for the three films and their situation of overseas distribution will be introduced in the 
next chapter. 
168  “少年时代所经历的‘文革’，是陈凯歌和他所代表的“第五代”挥之不去的旧梦。正因为如此，才有
先后在国际上获奖并经常被人相提并论的三部影片，陈凯歌的《霸王别姬》、田壮壮的《蓝风筝》和张
艺谋的《活着》。这即使不是一次齐心协力的合作，至少也是不约而同的大合唱，可以看出，这些在‘文
革’中经历了国与家的巨大变故的少年，至今仍对他们受到的伤害耿耿于怀，这使得他们的作品中弥漫
着一种无处不在的控诉感和愤怒的情绪。” 
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a target of the filmic interest of the 1990s, has a close bearing on the political 
discourse and ideological context of that period. From the founding of socialist China 
(1949) till the 1970s, before the economic reform and opening-up, China had 
experienced a period of relatively pure socialist movements, where most of the 
crowds were forced to break away from capitalist, colonialist, and feudalist 
domination and their life styles. The whole country had to lose its individual colours 
of personal life and live under the rule of a highly-centralized socialist ideology. The 
economy, education, social culture, and everyday life were all dominated by the 
single-polar political system at that time, which provided the ordinary Chinese citizen 
with a relatively unified cultural context and an orthodox political discourse. People 
all over the country read The Little Red Book
169
, wore a green/blue uniform or Mao 
suit, actively applied for party membership, watched revolutionary films, and sang 
revolutionary songs similarly. In brief, that period left the people with quite 
stereotyped impressions that supply vivid symbols of culture, of the past, and of 
nostalgia today. Thus, no matter whether it is Tietou in Blue Kite or Fugui in To Live, 
the life stories of the two families can resonate with the audience, and be close to the 
past daily life of the Chinese masses. It is the unknown living experience of the 
never-was that becomes the basis of a trivialized nostalgia and creates a common 
narrative context. 
                                                        
169  Also called Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, it was published by the Chinese Government from April 
1964 until approximately 1976. As its title implies, it is a collection of quotations excerpted from Mao 
Zedong‘s past speeches and publications. As one of the most printed books in history, it had an estimated 5 to 
6.5 billion copies printed during Mao‘s attempt to transform Chinese society. The book‘s phenomenal 
popularity may be due to the fact that it was essentially an unofficial requirement for every Chinese citizen to 
own, to read, and to carry it at all times during the Cultural Revolution. During the 1960s, the book was one of 
the single most visible icons in mainland China. The importance of the book waned considerably after the rise 
of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. 
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5.4.4. Postmodern Nostalgia, as Distinct from Personal Homesickness 
 
Postmodern nostalgia is demonstrably distinct from any personal 
homesickness in the general sense of nostalgia. Postmodern culture in contemporary 
Chinese cinema is probably inclined to introduce a nostalgic sense into certain public, 
socialized, and ideological contexts of the everyday in a past tense rather than some 
individual recollections. This point is to a large extent based on the understanding of 
the three films mentioned above. No matter how differently, the stories have been 
viewed from the directors‘ standpoints; the films all represent pieces of history – 
whether they are the destinies of Peking opera in various periods of the twentieth 
century or the hard chapter of the political movements reflected in Blue Kite and To 
Live. However, compared with another film, My Memories of Old Beijing (Wu Yigong, 
1982), what is reflected from the three films are extreme social and ideological 
landscapes rather than pure personal experiences or memories; because the stories of 
postmodern nostalgia (in China) are provided with the general typicality of a whole 
time spirit but not with any form of escapism for individuals.  
 
This point can be partially proved by the fates of the protagonists at the end of 
those films. Bean in Farewell My Concubine loses his love, his stage, his dignity of 
art, one after the other, and is humiliated by Red Guards; but eventually he is still 
unaccustomed to a life of stress, which leads to his suicide. Such a conclusion of the 
Chapter Five 
 170 
film makes Bean, the protagonist, place an individual identity in real life on one side 
and separate from an escape and the numbness of grief; he then looks back and faces 
straight/bravely the social pressures of the past reality. In this sense, his death is not 
merely an individual story, but it strongly suggests an impression of its time and 
marks the passing of an old epoch that was morally and spiritually distorted. In Blue 
Kite, Tietou firstly loses his father in the Anti-rightist Movement around 1957, and 
then loses his stepfather (in succession) in the period of the Great Chinese Famine 
(1959-61). Finally when his second stepfather is caught away from home by Red 
Guards at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Tietou, a boy aged about fourteen 
years, chooses to face the reality with courage and to grapple with the Red Guards. As 
a result, he is laid out in front of his house, but he comes round after a time. While 
lying on the ground, Tietou looks up into the sky and sees his broken blue kite being 
wound round the branches of a tree. It is swaying in midair, but cannot freely ride on 
the wind. If we consider this as a metaphorical expression of the ideological stresses 
at that time, the image of the stuck kite has not been of any specific sort of personal 
memory. Perhaps, instead it has become part of the collective consciousness of the 
Chinese masses that had experienced the past. To Live is interrelated with a social 
reality as well. Fugui (the protagonist) successively loses his son and daughter, but he 
still encourages his grandson that ―our life is getting better and better‖. This shows 
that Fugui has an optimistic vision of the future he wants for later ages. However it 
also contains a subtext that in the past of China there was too much distress and 
sadness for the crowd to avoid, so that they can but place reliance optimistically on 
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the future. Thus the conclusion of the film does not avoid narrating any social context. 
 
Comparatively speaking, the ending of My Memories of Old Beijing seems not 
to be combined with much public/group images of a social reality. The movie script 
was adapted from a personal homesickness story by Lin Haiyin (林海音 a writer in 
Taiwan) who spent her childhood in 1920s‘ Beijing. The film pieces out some of her 
nostalgic recollections and changes them into three dim memories of the protagonist, 
Yingzi (a young girl from the age of six to twelve). At the end of the film, Yingzi sits 
in a carriage with her family and leaves the city. She takes leave of her own childhood 
with a sense of uncertainty locked in her little mind. There is little relationship 
between the personal leave-taking and the historical/social reality. Therefore one may 
consider it as a nostalgic romance that offers an escape from a public reality of the 
past. Thus the memories of childhood are only a blur that seem like a fairy tale full of 
personal nostalgia, but it only exists in and shelters under private emotions; rather 
than any socialized context that would make a mass/postmodern consciousness stand 
out as a narrative subject being prominently displayed through the cultural symbols of 
the time.  
 
The film does not completely lack contemporary visual signs of the 1920s; but 
those old costumes, buildings and street scenes in My Memories of Old Beijing are not 
highlighted or expressed as the crucial stuff of postmodern nostalgia. Perhaps, it is 
partially because that those visual signs of the 1920s seem to be not sufficient to 
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arouse more socialized memories of the mainstream audiences sixty years later when 
the film was premiered in the 1980s. As time has gone by, it seems unavoidable that 
the nostalgic feelings from the film will gradually fade away from the minds of the 
new generation of contemporary readers and their life experiences. Especially in the 
sense of this research, which focuses on Chinese society since the 1990s, My 
Memories of Old Beijing seems like a recollection of ―history‖ or a personal feeling of 
a past, but no longer a social/mass nostalgia. This is not because nostalgia loses its 
function, but that probably the generation today has already lost its capability of 
reaching that trace through their experiences. It could be considered as a spectacle in 
the future, but it is a spectacle of a strange history rather than the nostalgia 
accumulated by the readable symbols. If there were any reconstruction of collective 
consciousness or ideological context left in the film, it would be better considered as a 
delicate hint of the spatial absence – a homesickness – of (some of the) Taiwanese 
who had left their native place (the mainland of China) for several decades (since 
1949), than as nostalgia for Beijing. 
 
Fundamentally, a nostalgic transition in the 1990s – from My Memories of Old 
Beijing to Farewell My Concubine, Blue Kite, and To Live – indicates that 
contemporary Chinese culture is moving towards a social recollection beyond stylized 
individual or personal feelings. Thus what (postmodern) nostalgia represents in the 
period of the 1990s, to a great degree, reflects the past of society, of the ideology, and 
of the collective memories as a whole through their cultural symbols. An essential 
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difference consists in those personal memories (in their sense of modernist aesthetics) 
that can often trace back to one‘s own past through imitations of their unique styles – 
just as Lowenthal pointed out, ―we mourn a lost immediacy‖ to remind ourselves 
―however sad our present lot we were once happy and worthwhile‖ (8). So a personal 
memory-sickness does usually dwell in a past tense, in reflection of the past that is not 
an easy parting. But postmodern nostalgia is largely based on a comparison with the 
present time. It combines all the socialized symbols from the past and spreads them 
out on the surface today without the signified. It then forms a collage of past images 
floating on the present to hold a memorial ceremony for sacrifice. Similarly to a 
photograph of the deceased at a funeral, nostalgia of the postmodern is not directly 
related to a past any more. Instead, it has changed into stereotyped impressions resting 
on the present forever, but leaving a past itself untouchable. 
 
5.5. The Suspecting Effect 
 
In addition, it seems that nostalgic context (in the postmodern sense) 
constructs a past related realism presenting the everyday. But the (above-mentioned) 
―untouchable stereotypes‖ of the past are purely imaginary reality. Realization, 
writing or painting realistically, means going closer to not only the history but also a 
sense of reality from the audience. As far as ordinary experiences are concerned, 
compared with the irrelevant grand historical discourse (such as those 
monumentalizing events in Forrest Gump, or the dream to be a hero in An Orphan 
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Joins the Army), people probably have more interest in nostalgia through which their 
own facts and experiences of the past can be traced or aroused. However, realism does 
not promise an authentic reality or history. Here, two opinions (one from Baudrillard, 
and the other from Jameson) elaborate how nostalgia facilitates certain suspicions 
through trivialized reality in postmodern culture. 
 
5.5.1. Excessive Simulation 
 
In the light of Baudrillard‘s thinking, a realization strategy in nostalgia of 
postmodern film can be probably reduced to a reproduction of the appearance 
(duplication of superficial images). In other words, nostalgia can be considered as the 
―flooded symbols of the postmodern‖170 that isolates from any signified image (or 
truth). In the meantime, postmodern culture itself is becoming even more a world 
surrounded by hyperreality, and a world of ―superficial images seemingly ‗invented 
with the screen in mind‘, where ‗life is cinema‘‖; however, when nostalgia films 
move ―the perfect simulacrum‖ (Baudrillard America 28 55 and 101; or qtd. in Rizter 
106) of the past into such a vivid cinema, its consequence may probably be reversed – 
deviating from a sense of reality. As Lam argues: 
 
                                                        
170 “后现代泛滥的符码”Adam Lam (2005) Baudrillard‘s ―The Fatal Strategies‖, in Post-Cultural Revolution 
Chinese National Cinema and Global Culture, Beijing: Cultural and Art Publishing House, p74. When talking 
about the cultural simulation and the fatal strategies, Lam points that ―The cultural simulation seems inevitable. 
To resist cultural simulation effectively, Baudrillard, a postmodernist theoretician in the West, calls for some 
fatal strategies... [Which means] by playing on the dual meanings of fatal as both predestined or inevitable and 
disastrous or deadly.‖ See Lam (2000), p156. For more information on fatal strategies and their application in 
Chinese culture, please refer to Baudrillard (1988) Selected Writings, Mark Poster (ed.) Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, p183-99; or Baudrillard (1999) Fatal Strategies, translated by Philip Beitchman and W.G.J. 
Niesluchowski ; edited by Jim Fleming. London: Pluto Press; and Lam (2005) p74 or Lam (2000) p155-60. 
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In a postmodern culture full of hyperreal symbols and a world where 
the reality and the truth have already disappeared, it seems impossible 
to resist the seductions of commodities, powerful cultures, and 
symbols… Now that the truth has faded out from the symbols without 
trace, it looks unpractical to pick it up again in the collaged visual 
symbols [or appearances]; on the contrary it, to prominently present 
their essential character of simulation through the accelerated 
duplication of those symbols, is perhaps practical to help people realize 
the fact that the real truth has ceased to exist.
171
 
 
For Baudrillard, nostalgia films can be also read as the ―ecstasy and inertia‖ of 
suspicions of (or confrontation with) the reality: 
 
We will not seek changes, nor oppose the fixed and immobile; we will 
seek what is more mobile than mobile: metamorphosis [...] We will not 
distinguish the true from the false; we will seek what is more false than 
the false: illusion and appearance. (Selected 183) 
 
Nostalgic images provide an opportunity for this kind of illusion and appearance. 
Whether it was the purpose of providing consumer product, aesthetic value, political 
criticism, or a target of novelty-hunting, as Zhang Xudong argues, ―the professional 
visual quality‖ of these cinematic nostalgia and ―the riot of colors, images and 
unheard-of stories‖ of the past, at first in essence, present a sense of ―postmodern 
authenticity‖ (Trauma 31). But how can one read the word ―authenticity‖ here in a 
postmodern sense? It may be argued that when it has been unavoidable for an 
authenticity to sink into a monetary system and then have a certain consumption value, 
or to suit a transformation of the political environment by developing some 
ideological criticism, or even to follow the steps of cultural globalization and 
                                                        
171 “在一个真实与真理已经消失在后现代‘超仿真’符码里的时代，抵御商品、强势文化、符码的诱惑并
不可能„„ 真理既然已经消失在符码中，在符码堆里去重拾也是不现实的，反而加快这些符码的复制，
特显他们的仿真本质，或许可以帮助人们意识到真理已不复存这一事实。” (Lam 2005, 74) 
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changing completely into a visual spectacle for a cosmopolitan spectator, a fact seems 
undeniable: that this kind of (postmodern) authenticity and its appearances (those riots 
of signifiers) – in contemporary culture, including China – have been gradually 
divorced from the essence that they relied on (namely the past of the original) and 
have evolved into senseless (visual) signs
172
 that break away from fixed signified(s). 
Signs, for Baudrillard, are not simply an ―object‖; rather they are a seductive object. 
No matter whether it (such as the nostalgic appearance) is a temptation for the 
box-office in the market economy, of elites in political criticism, or of the global 
audience in novelty hunting, Baudrillard always emphasizes the object of seduction, 
rather than the so-called desire of the subject from Freud. In fact, seduction is power. 
―Only the object is seductive… all initiative and power are on the other side, the side 
of the object‖ (Baudrillard Fatal 119). 
 
However seduction is merely a factor of what Baudrillard termed ―fatal 
strategies‖. He pointed out that objects possess various fatal strategies; and in 
describing what he means by a fatal strategy, Baudrillard says ―something responds of 
its own accord, something from which it is impossible to escape‖ (qtd. in Gane 
Interviews 50). The fatal strategy of nostalgic signs does not only consist in its 
mysterious narrative to rewrite a past, but also in the distance from the ―authenticity‖ 
embodied by nostalgia to the real reality of the original past. It is the fate that this gap 
                                                        
172  Here as George Ritzer argued, it is better to think of the postmodern authenticity as what Kellner called ―games 
with signs‖. ―We tend to think of seduction and illusion as false and therefore to be rejected in our search for 
the ‗truth‘. However, for Baudrillard illusion is not false and does not involve false signs; rather it is senseless, 
involving senseless signs.‖ (Ritzer 110) 
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can never be filled. Fatal strategies lay great stress on the power of the object. 
Nostalgic appearance/representation as an object, just embodies its power, its being 
and meaning. What if one were to return to a past, to find out what its true colours 
look like, and if there were no difference between nostalgia and history, what could 
nostalgia do? Would it have the (false) allure of history any more? Would it be 
necessary for it to exist any longer? Perhaps as postmodern culture is concerned, 
―there is no real, there never was a real. Seduction knows this, and preserves its 
enigma‖ (Baudrillard Fatal 108). Postmodern nostalgia is such a seduction, which as 
Baudrillard argues, shows ―our fundamental destiny‖ that is ―not to exist and survive, 
as we think: it is to appear and disappear. That alone seduces and fascinates us. That 
alone is scene and ceremony‖ (Fatal 175). This is exactly a hyperreal world full of 
illusions that originally result from seduction rather than desire. Therefore, the 
existence of nostalgia (as the object) not only proves that Chinese culture today could 
not resist the temptation to visit the past, but also tends to hint at the fatal distance 
between the nostalgic authenticity and a reality of the original. As a power of ―ecstasy 
and inertia‖ (Baudrillard Selected 185), the distance preserves its enigma of historicity 
through the constant reproduction of nostalgia. 
 
5.5.2. The ―Past‖ in Our Mind 
 
On the other hand, for Jameson, the trivialized realism of nostalgia is aimed at 
bringing that universal and objective consciousness of the masses back to their 
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subjective/internal souls and their sensory impressions; and verifying their own 
experiences of history by the time span, so that those transcendental, fated, fixed, 
unitary, and impersonal realities of history are immersed in certain scepticism. 
According to him, nostalgia films 
 
… do not represent our historical past so much as they represent our 
ideas or cultural stereotypes [prejudice] about that past…. Cultural 
production has been driven back inside the mind, within the monadic 
subject: it can no longer look directly out of its eyes at the real world 
for the referent but must, as in Plato‘s cave, trace its mental images of 
the world on its confining walls. If there is any realism left here, it is a 
‗realism‘ which springs from the shock of grasping that confinement 
and of realizing that, for whatever peculiar reasons, we seem 
condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop images and 
stereotypes about the past, which itself remains forever out of reach. 
(Jameson Consumer 118) 
 
This is a definition of nostalgia film according to Jameson: it is a product of mass 
culture in post-industrial society, a kind of visible description based on superficial 
images, instead of any textual or language prison
173
; and it is a visual cultural 
expression that can directly communicate with the heart. This kind of direct-viewing 
narrative seems quite different from heroic and epic narratives. Its difference is not 
only embodied in the distance between old memories and great legends, but also 
presented in the capability of arousing audience interests. Those nostalgic contexts 
(build into the 1930s of Chinatown, the 1950s of Back to the Future, or the 1950s and 
1960s of Chinese nostalgias) look more tangible than those stiff, grand, and august 
film discourses, such as Gladiator (Ridley Scott, 2000), Troy (Wolfgang Petersen, 
                                                        
173  Refer to Jameson‘s idea in The Prison-House of Language (Jameson, 1972). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
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2004), and the Indiana Jones series (Steven Spielberg, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1992, and 
2008).  
 
5.6. An Idealizing Nostalgia 
 
Nevertheless, the nostalgic sense of the past does not derive from any ―real‖ 
history, but from the fusion of nostalgic appearances (of films) and subjective 
illusions (of the viewer). Jameson sees this as ―our ideas or cultural stereotypes 
[prejudice] about [the] past‖, in other words, it is certain ideological or utopian 
memories in our minds. It is important to emphasize the difference between 
―idealizing nostalgia‖ (or ―the ordinary traces of old everyday life‖) and an official 
history in postmodernity. John Frow argues: 
 
The past is reworked through different economies of value, and 
acquires a correspondingly differential force. The concept of the 
everyday may in its own way be as much an idealizing and a unifying 
category as that of the national, but it is perhaps more workable, more 
flexible, more open to multiple appropriations than the modes of 
official history. At the same time, however, it remains crucial to guard 
a deep suspicion of the auratic object, whatever the uses to which it 
may seem to lend itself. Nostalgia for a lost authenticity is a paralyzing 
structure of historical reflection. (79) 
 
As a result, postmodern nostalgia, with all kinds of periods opening up for ―aesthetic 
colonization‖, tries to ―witness the stylistic recuperation‖ (Jameson Postmodernism 19) 
of revolutionary China; and it is looking to the old period-related superficiality (the 
appearance and stereotypes) to result in a startling proliferation of individual 
perspectives on history, that is an unfixed and pluralistic concept of history. 
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By this token, it can lead to such a premonition that those simulations deriving 
from flatness and visual appearance may probably ferment a profound turbulence 
related to historical consciousness (in China). Properly speaking, that will directly 
relate to the subjective ideology, and lead to a suspicion about the absolute (fixed) 
objectivity of the past. As a result people‘s previous ideologies may differ as time 
goes on. Nostalgia just reminds us of temporal variability around time. I agree with 
Susan Stewart that nostalgia is ―the repetition that mourns the inauthenticity of all 
repetition‖. According to her, nostalgia is sadness without object. Nostalgia, 
 
is always ideological: the past it seeks has never existed except as 
narrative, and hence, always absent, that past continually threatens to 
reproduce itself as a felt lack. Hostile to history and its invisible origins, 
and yet longing for an impossibly pure context of lived experience at a 
place of origin, nostalgia wears a distinctly utopian face, a face that 
turns toward a future-past, a past which has only ideological reality. 
(23) 
 
This opinion answers my previous doubt: nostalgia film attracts us with rapt 
attention to a certain form of the past; however, is the form a real reality in the real 
past? It seems not. If nostalgia constructs a certain past, then it proves the absence of 
that past – at least the lack on the objective level – the inability to represent a 
historical authenticity. Consequently, all discussion around nostalgia will rest on 
ideological grounds, and talk about cultural illusions and representations of a utopian 
past, such as those political issues in ideologies and consumer desires in economies. 
They will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Chapter Six 
 181 
Chapter Six 
To Be Nostalgic Overseas 
 
This chapter will focus on the ideological illusions of nostalgia and its cultural 
consequences. Discussions in the last two chapters have mentioned that, from a 
historical standpoint, the Chinese cinema of the early 1990s had really experienced a 
series of nostalgic narratives. The fifth generation directors gained a widespread 
reputation in the world at that time. The three major figures, Chen Kaige, Zhang 
Yimou, and Tian Zhuangzhuang, had offered their most famous works, respectively 
Farewell My Concubine, To Live, and the Blue Kite, which  intellectually and 
artistically led to such extensive influence that they had largely consolidated their 
positions as the best known fifth generation filmmakers internationally. (Wang Myth 
67-79) 
 
However, the domestic distribution and box-office of the three films were not 
encouraging, when compared with their success abroad. Even to this day, the Blue 
Kite and To Live still lack permission for a public premiere by the local film bureau, 
nor can any box-office statistics be reliable in the domestic market. Presumably it is 
the cinematic content in relation to certain ideological taboos that have produced such 
tender and sensitive results. In fact the nostalgic films of the early 1990s contain an 
especial period of history, the thirty years of Chinese history from the founding of the 
People‘s Republic of China (1949) to the end of the Cultural Revolution (the late 
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1970s). The nostalgic narratives in that period generally reflect some political 
movements. Such social unrest, through its political appearances and description in 
postmodern nostalgia, obviously involves the films in trouble with censorship.  
 
While certain political nostalgia was not allowed any release in the domestic 
market, the Chinese cinema shifted its stress to overseas interests in the 1990s. From 
then on, nostalgic films from China began to consciously construct some globalized 
illusions that to some extent distort historical authenticity, separate from Chinese 
social realities. They attempted certain representational distortion in order to cater for 
exotic novelty hunting from overseas. This was likely to make the cultural 
connotation of the Chinese cinema temporarily isolated from its local reality and 
ideological trauma, and become a common subject-matter of today‘s global market. 
 
All of these issues result in a series of further considerations: What is it that 
blocks Chinese nostalgia in its domestic film distribution and public showing? What 
are the relations between Chinese nostalgia fettered by political ideology and a 
Western nostalgic sense for the counter-culture movements of the 1960s? What 
functions does orientalism perform in the ‗exotic‘ nostalgia? 
 
To answer the above questions, the main points and arguments of this chapter 
are as follows. Though the films are greatly successful overseas, they are 
simultaneously limited, censored, banned in, or excluded from the domestic market. 
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―Banned in China‖ has become an international trade mark to attract foreign attention, 
whereas political retrospection is one of the main reasons preventing them passing the 
domestic censorship. A sudden change in the political climate of the late 1980s and an 
international background of the films‘ investment proved that, from the very 
beginning, those films were largely shot for and focused on an overseas audience. The 
Chinese ―nostalgia‖ (or, as it can be called, the first nostalgic wave of the Chinese 
cinema) in this sense could probably be extended to an international longing for the 
past radical movements of the Sixties in the Western world. Thus the first wave of 
nostalgia takes up a fawning position towards the West and simultaneously distorts its 
own historical reality. 
 
6.1. Going Abroad, Distribution and Censorship 
6.1.1. International Reputation and Distribution 
 
The three films, the Blue Kite, Farewell My Concubine, and To Live, yielded 
unusually brilliant results at overseas film festivals in the early 1990s. The Blue Kite 
first won the Grand Prix (the highest award), the Best Actress Award, and three 
Special Mention Awards at the Tokyo International Film Festival in 1993. Then in the 
same year it won the Best Feature Film at the Hawaii International Film Festival. 
After that it was nominated for the Independent Spirit Award in California in 1995. 
Farewell My Concubine began its splendid success in Cannes, France, 1993. It is the 
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first and the only Golden Palm
174
 that Chinese speaking movies have ever won. Later 
the film also won another twelve awards in the British Academy of Film and 
Television Arts (BAFTA), Boston Film Festival, the Japanese National Society of 
Film Critics, Poland‘s Film Festival, LA Golden Globes and the New York Film 
Festival in succession. Farewell My Concubine was nominated for two Oscars (Best 
Foreign Film and Best Photography)
175
 as well in 1994. That same year, To Live won 
three awards and a nomination at Cannes, a Best Film not in the English Language 
from BAFTA, and it was nominated for the Best Film on Golden Globes in the 
following year. 
 
Along with their successes in festivals was the films‘ box-office overseas. 
According to statistics published in the Movie World, in the United States alone 
Farewell My Concubine made more than five million US dollars. This success is quite 
close to the sum total of Zhang Yimou‘s red trilogy films176 in the U.S. To Live also 
made more than two million US dollars from the American box-office, which is much 
higher than some of Zhang‘s subsequent films (in America), such as Not One Less 
(1999), The Road Home (2000), and Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles (2005). By 
contrast, the Blue Kite only made 0.36 million in the U.S., which was probably a 
result of the depressing sentiment of the narrative and its lack of film promotion. 
                                                        
174  In 1993, Farewell My Concubine shared the Golden Palm Award with Jane Campion‘s The Piano, a New 
Zealand film. 
175  The film represented Hong Kong at the Oscar. Farewell My Concubine was made through co-operation 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong, but the main investor (HK Tomson) is actually controlled by Taiwan. 
So the film is a model of filmic cooperation between the Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
176  The trilogy includes Red Sorghum (1989), Ju Dou (1990), and Raise the Red Lantern (1992). 
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Nevertheless, its achievement in the U.S. box-office is still better than some other 
famous Chinese speaking films, such as Ang Lee‘s Pushing Hands (1992), Wong Kar 
Wai‘s Happy Together (1997), Fallen Angels (1995), and Days of Being Wild (1990) 
(Tang 27-9). In addition, Zhang Xudong recalled that ―when the film [Blue Kite] made 
its way to the 1994 New York Film Festival, it became a hot ticket and received rave 
reviews nationwide‖ (Zhang Xudong Trauma 34). It was not easy for three artistic 
films to achieve such a brilliant success in the overseas market fifteen years ago, when 
a Chinese film still lacked universal attention
177
 in a world dominated by Hollywood. 
 
6.1.2. The Silent Treatment 
 
However, such an international reputation is quite different from the way the 
films have been treated in China. The silent treatment by the Chinese official 
administration forms a striking contrast with the foreign rave notices. 
 
Presumably because the film content includes a certain far left political history 
of China, the Blue Kite has been unable to pass the local censorship since its editing 
was completed in 1992. Soon afterward the film was sent to the Tokyo International 
Film Festival by its Japanese investor without the permission of the Chinese Film 
Bureau, and won the highest award there as a ―Japanese movie‖ in 1993, which led 
the issue becoming so acute that the Chinese film delegation stormed off from the 
                                                        
177  It is commonly known that a large scale commercial (and cultural) export of Chinese language films started 
from Ang Lee‘s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) that won an Oscar for the Best Foreign Language 
Film in 2001. See Huang Shixian (55); or Zhu Ying (53). 
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festival. This left the Blue Kite as a nasty incident that brought shame to 
Sino-Japanese relations. In consequence, the film has never been premiered in China 
up until today. Its director, Tian, was punished as well with the full rigor of the local 
film bureau. He was prohibited from directing films for the next ten years. The Blue 
Kite was his one and only film in the 1990s. 
 
One year later, in 1994, To Live faced a similar adversity. Because of its absurd 
and satiric description, it has been given a durable silent treatment in the Chinese 
official film market. Nowadays, Chinese audiences can only watch the two films on 
pirated disks or illegal Internet connections rather than in cinemas. Even so, these 
films are still well-known in China,
178
 though it is hard to support this fact with any 
official statistics.
179
 The reason these films are of universal concern among the people 
depends on at least four factors, one of which is the celebrity appeal of both the fifth 
generation directors and film stars. Second, they profit from being admired at 
overseas film festivals. Third, that also benefit from new media technologies that 
break through the official block in cinemas; the overflow disks/Internet is becoming a 
typical postmodern subversion against a controlling force of the mainstream discourse 
(by the government, or say the elite culture). Finally, the silent treatment along with a 
                                                        
178  An informal comment from the Internet is that cinemas in the mainland of China may never receive any copy 
of To Live, but all over the cities there are many Chinese families that possibly treasure their copy (pirate 
DVD). Xiaoxie Huang (2000) Baidu – Chinese film column – To Live, http://baike.baidu.com/view/3408.htm 
Last access: 19 Dec. 2007 
179  China started to build its own box-office statistical system gradually only from 1994, so the results of the 
statistics are not very reliable. On the other hand, with the large-scale prevalence of the Internet and DVDs in 
the 1990s, the official box-office seems not high enough to reflect the real size of the audience for each film in 
China. See the article ―Why is it hard to count the Chinese film box-office?‖ Southern Network – 
Entertainment Edition, 2001-12-24, http://www.southcn.com/ENT/yulefirst/200112240368.htm Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010 
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political taboo has the opposite effect from its original intention and causes more 
curiosity in the masses to explore the ‗forbidden‘ films. Beyond those extrinsic factors 
above, an ideological connotation from its nostalgic narratives could probably be an 
important reason that will be discussed later on. 
 
Compared with the two films above, the distribution for Farewell My 
Concubine seems a little smoother. Although it was stopped from premiering 
domestically at first, it was permitted a public showing
180
 among a small circle in 
China after it won the Golden Palm from Cannes. But there is a precondition that any 
advertisements and promotions for its distribution are not allowed in the local market, 
nor can the film be sent to any national and local film festivals.
181
 Therefore it is still 
criticized overseas as a typical ‗forbidden‘ film in China. In his article ―Banned in 
China‖, James Mudge mentions: 
 
[T]he 1993 Farewell My Concubine was initially banned in its home 
country despite winning the prestigious Palme d'Or at Cannes, mainly 
for its tackling of homosexuality and its depiction of the country's 
tumultuous modern history. Following its hailing around the world as a 
masterpiece, the film was grudgingly released, albeit in cut form.
 182
 
 
However, this discussion is not going to focus on any individual film texts but 
                                                        
180  The Chinese film industry had a lack of ability in its box-office statistics at that time, so there is no accurate 
data from the official box-office for Farewell My Concubine in domestic market. One estimates about 9 
million Yuan (RMB), the other says 20 million Yuan, and the latest data from the ―Domestic box-office ranking 
list ‖ in Mtime is 40 million Yuan. But the list does not mention whether its data was of the time (1993) or is 
for an accumulated box-office today. http://www.mtime.com/group/yeying/discussion/418181/ Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010 
181  Please refer to a news report ―Farewell My Concubine Has Eventually Broken the Ban, It Makes A Stir in 
Shanghai Without Promotion‖, in Cheng Bao, 28th July, 1993. 
182  James Mudge (2008) Banned in China, online: http://www.yesasia.com/us/yumcha/banned-in-china.html Last 
access: 15 May 2009 
Chapter Six 
 188 
on a common situation (a cold reception by the authorities) that the three films face 
jointly. There are reasons to believe it is the integral nostalgic connotation of a whole 
in the early 1990s that must be involved in conflict with the mainstream (official) 
ideology. In any case, a clash between films and government will normally reflect on 
its censorship first. It seems necessary to give a brief introduction to that. 
 
6.1.3. Censorship or Promotion? 
 
In the Oxford Dictionary, the word ‗censorship‘ is defined as follows: an 
authorized act or policy of censoring books, films, plays, letters etc and a proper act to 
remove parts which are considered indecent, offensive, politically unacceptable or 
(esp. in war) a threat to security.
183
 That is to say, when certain modifications or a cut 
form cannot completely avoid the above troubles, works will be kept away from the 
public, or at least separated from the mainstream field of vision.  
 
The executing agency of film censorship in China is called the ―State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television‖ (SARFT) 184 . What should be 
mentioned is that China is not the one and only country in the world that takes 
advantage of film censorship. Many other countries have set up similar administration 
                                                        
183  Oxford Advanced Learner's English-Chinese Dictionary (2004), the third edition, p255. 
184  Literally 国家广播电影电视总局. Chinese Film Bureau (电影管理局) is a subordinate body of SARFT. As 
for what the bureau is responsible for, please refer to its official website: 
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2008/08/07/20070909004206220673.html  
Chapter Six 
 189 
sections, such as the British Board of Film Censors
185
, the Japanese Administration 
Commission of Motion Picture Code of Ethics
186
, and the Office of Film & Literature 
Classification, New Zealand
187
. However, as James Mudge pointed in his latest article, 
it has become an indisputable fact that it is censorship in China that gets most 
attention from overseas: 
 
Of course, China is by no means the only country in the world to 
prohibit certain films made within its own borders, though again in this 
case the productions in question tend to attract a lot more interest, often 
being seized upon by the international media, or being trumpeted at 
festivals as causes.
188
 
 
In other words, censorship in China has almost become an attraction point 
receiving global attention constantly. What is more, it may directly tempt the overseas 
box-office. The illustration below is a film poster for the Blue Kite when it was 
released in North America, on which it is capitalized in black and red, ―THE FILM 
THAT IS BANNED IN CHINA‖. It is so eye-catching that the poster can become a 
good example of how significant censorship is for its foreign box-office. 
 
                                                        
185  Later, it changed the name to the British Board of Film Classification, BBFC. 
186  えいりんかんりいいんかい, 日本映画伦理规程委员会 
187  The Office of Film & Literature Classification is the Government body responsible for classifying publications 
that may need to be restricted or banned in New Zealand. 
188  James Mudge (2008) Banned in China. 
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Figure 8. A Poster Advertising the Blue Kite Overseas 
 
It can be argued here that one is more likely to read the capitalized words as a 
highly-coloured promotion implying a certain false allure of the mysterious China. 
For a foreigner, this temptation comes not only from the geopolitical differences of 
Chinese culture and society, but also from the mystique of its socialistic ideology, as if 
an unspeakable national secret could be uncovered immediately by buying a film 
ticket. But for those who have ever watched the Blue Kite, the so-called secret 
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covered by the film censorship is just a fictional nostalgic story. 
 
In today‘s global culture, censorship embodies some postmodern elements. For 
one thing, through its censorship, a Chinese ideological taboo has attracted universal 
concern all over the world, and gains a potential commercial value gradually. Thus 
censorship, originally as a media control device, has more and more been transformed 
into an integral element in global culture. A process of such taboo consumption then 
partly fragments the controlling force of the will to power of both the government and 
an elite consciousness. For another, beyond nostalgic appearance (a difference of time) 
and exotic diversity (a difference of space), censorship (a difference of ideology and 
politics) becomes the third, independent symbol and a tempting spectacle in a 
nostalgic culture representing China. As an object of post-modernity, censorship 
seems to have deviated from the significance of its origin, and has been exploited by 
some subsequent Chinese films on their overseas promotion. It then turns into a 
marketing ploy with the purpose of creating temptation, a sign empty of the signified. 
In the last two decades, many Chinese films, such as Zhang Yuan‘s East Palace West 
Palace (or called Behind the Forbidden City, 1996), Jiang Wen‘s Devils on the 
Doorstep (2000), Wang Xiaoshuai‘s Beijing Bicycle (2001), Lou Ye‘s Suzhou River 
(2000), were all sent to international festivals right after editing in an underground 
way without passing censorship. Then they were accused of that by the local 
government
189
 but succeeded in overseas markets. This strategy continued when Lou 
                                                        
189  ―Showing out of line in Cannes, Lou Ye will be prohibited from a five-year career‖, Shenzhen Evening Paper 
18 May 2006. 
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Ye sent his Summer Palace (2006) to Cannes. As I would like to propose, hidden in 
the process is that avoiding censorship seems sometimes not to be a passive 
alternative but an active and positive strategy, even an activator for overseas 
promotion. Films may not be banned (or isolated from the local cinemas) at first, but 
filmmakers or distributors wittingly rub the censors (or the authority) up the wrong 
way in order to promote fame and gain. Whatever the facts may be, Chinese film 
censorship and other executive resistance as a tempting postmodern cultural symbol 
cannot be neglected.  
 
Returning to the content of those films, one may wonder what exactly a 
Chinese censor (or the authority) intends to hide, which leads to such a long-range 
concern from overseas? 
 
The purposes of censorship are various. In the light of the Chinese film 
bureau‘s statute190, there are roughly three rules as follows. First, similarly to film 
censorship (or film classification) in other countries, the film bureau needs to shield a 
whole film or remove parts which are considered nude, nasty, bloody, violent, or 
immoral. For instance, Lost in Beijing (Pingguo, Li Yu, 2007) is banned in China for 
its overdone nudity and a plot concerning extramarital affairs.
191
 
 
                                                        
190  See ―the Film Administrative Byelaw‖《电影管理条例》Chapter 3: ―Film Censorship‖, in the Decree of State 
Council (PRC) No. 342. 《国务院令第 342 号》
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/02/16/20070913144431120333.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
191  See ―Notification of the Punishment on Lost in Beijing by SARFT‖, 4th January, 2008 
http://www.gov.cn/zfjg/content_850139.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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Second, the bureau and its censorship are also responsible for protecting the 
national film industry from overseas competition. An unlimited importing of foreign 
films would probably hit national filmmaking and its market. Thus, in terms of those 
foreign releases, ―the simple truth is that many are withheld, rather than actually 
banned. This is generally for economic purposes, in an attempt to boost local 
production and to ensure that screens are not overwhelmed with overseas films‖.192 
However such protectionism makes the words, ―censor‖ or ―banned‖, more confusing. 
As some of the ―banned‖ films mentioned above are actually involved with foreign 
investment, these cooperative products could then be reasonably considered ―foreign‖ 
films. The Blue Kite might be called a ―Japanese‖ film and East Palace West Palace 
might be seen as a ―French‖ film. So sometimes the Chinese authorities may just 
withhold their import permission with the excuse that those ―foreign‖ films are not 
under consideration. Therefore technically speaking, these films are ignored (excluded) 
by the Chinese market rather than banned or censored. But if the nationality of an 
investor can easily change the country of a film, why do the nationalities of directors, 
actors, stories, filming locations not do the same? These ―foreign‖ films are set in 
China, shot in China, and their directors and actors are Chinese as well, so there are 
adequate reasons to call them Chinese films. Then why must ―protectionism‖ isolate a 
Chinese film from its local market? For this reason, the point is that it is equivalent to 
being ―censored‖ or ―banned‖ if the Chinese film bureau ―ignores‖ the existence of a 
successful Chinese film from international festivals or markets. In a broad sense, 
                                                        
192  James Mudge (2008) 
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censorship is the same as protectionism in this context. They can both be understood 
as interchangeable administrative resistance. 
 
Third, apart from ethical censorship and protectionism, political content 
unsurprisingly becomes a crucial point of the Chinese film censorship and is 
considered to be the most important factor that attracts foreign attention: 
 
[O]ne of the main causes for films being banned, and probably the 
cause which attracts the most attention is political content. Certainly, 
some kind of social criticism, negative portrayal of the government or 
revisionism – either based on current or historical events – is usually 
enough to result in a film being refused release, and often also results 
in those involved being censored in some capacity, with directors 
frequently being banned along with their works.
193
  
 
In conclusion, in contrast with the three rules mentioned above, the three 
nostalgic films seem not to offend against the first rule. The Blue Kite and To Live do 
not contain any nude, nasty or immoral issues at all. As for Farewell My Concubine, 
though a homosexual plot is implied, it is without explicit expression. When the film 
was shown in China, such a plot was not removed or amended overmuch. It is obvious 
that gayness was not the main misgiving focused on by the censor. In addition, the 
domestic film industry benefiting from a national protectionism seems wrong to reject 
those nostalgic films (directed, played, set, and shot in China). After all they are not a 
threat to local filmmaking, whereas the films could help the export of culture. In this 
case, the main reasons for their prohibition or restriction should be related to their 
political content and the source of investment. These factors closely concern its 
                                                        
193  James Mudge (2008) 
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nostalgic readership. 
 
6.1.4. The Target Audience of the First Nostalgic Wave 
 
At the end of Chapter 4, the three films (Farewell My Concubine, the Blue 
Kite, and To Live) have been classified as the first nostalgic wave in contemporary 
China. If we see the three films as a whole in considering a holistic nostalgic tendency 
of the wave, the discussion above has proved that it is in their overall character that 
the films happened to coincide in their wide recognition in the West but in exclusion 
(or restriction) in China. This naturally leads the discussion to the following doubt. As 
far as the Chinese nostalgic wave is concerned, what on earth is the target audience of 
the films? In other words, who were those films shot for in the early 1990s? 
 
6.1.4.1. Cultural Revolution, a Political Content and a Forbidden Cultural Region 
 
In an article on his reminiscences of the 1980s, Mou Sen sums up the Chinese 
cultural atmosphere of that time in this way, ―Retrospectively, in the year of 1988, an 
artistic atmosphere in Beijing was all one can desire‖ (60).194 Guo Jian also assesses 
the 80s of China as a ―relatively gentle/moderate political climate‖195, and his 
                                                        
194 Mou Sen (牟森) is a famous theatrical director of China since the late 1980s. 
195  Guo Jian (2006) ―A Cultural Ghost in Contemporary Left-wing Cultural Theories‖, 21st Century, 2006-2. 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplem/essay/0601014.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010; Guo (郭建) is a 
Professor in the University of Wisconsin Madison. 
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argument is that as a focal point of scar literature
196
 the topic of the Cultural 
Revolution had met a comparatively open, tolerant and broad-minded discourse 
environment, and the film industry was no exception. Xie Jin‘s Legend of Tianyun 
Mountain (1980) and Hibiscus Town (1986) are typical films that mainly reflect social 
scars in the anti-rightist movement (1957)
197
 and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
There is no evidence available that the two films were thwarted by the censorship. 
The former won the Golden Rooster Award in 1981, the latter won the best film in 
both the Hundred Flowers Film Festival and the Golden Rooster Film Festival
198
 
organized by Chinese officialdom. So there is enough evidence to prove how tolerant 
the atmosphere was in the 1980s towards its past political content. In this case, one 
would have said that political nostalgia set in the 1950s or 60s had never failed to 
become popular in the domestic market of the 1990s. 
 
However, the practical situation runs in the opposite direction and the official 
position suddenly changed in the late 1980s. No one could overlook the political 
disturbance of 1989 (allegedly the Tiananmen Square Protests). The position of the 
Government towards the ―Cultural Revolution‖ (as being a subject matter in the 
                                                        
196  Scar literature is a genre of Chinese literature which emerged in the late 1970s, soon after the death of Mao 
Zedong, portraying the sufferings of cadres and intellectuals during the tragic experiences of the Cultural 
Revolution and the rule of the Gang of Four. 
197  The Anti-Rightist Movement of China in the 1950s and early 1960s consisted of a series of campaigns to purge 
alleged "rightists" within the Communist Party of China (CCP) and abroad. The definition of ―rightists‖ was 
not always consistent. But in general it referred to those intellectuals who appeared to favour capitalism and 
class divisions and against collectivization. The first wave of attacks began immediately following the end of 
the Hundred Flowers movement in July 1957. By the end of the year, 300,000 people had been labelled as 
rightists. Most of the accused were intellectuals. The penalties included informal criticism, and re-education 
through labour in countryside. Online information from: 
http://www.experiencefestival.com/anti-rightist_movement Last access: 27 Jan. 2009 
198  The Hundred Flowers and Golden Rooster are the most prestigious awards in film given in Mainland China 
(held by the Government). 
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mainstream culture) completely altered around the disturbance. According to Guo, ―a 
loud shot of 1989 marked the end of a political defrosting
199‖, from then on ―the 
Cultural Revolution‖ becomes a ―forbidden region‖ of discourse in Mainland 
China.
200
 But it was the Cultural Revolution (and other political anti-rightist 
movements in the 50s and 60s) that became a main motif of the first nostalgic wave in 
the early 1990s. Thus the main reason that the three nostalgic films were restricted or 
excluded in that time seems hard to separate from the (above-mentioned) changing 
attitude of the Government. The early discussion has concluded that such political 
contents are probably one of the main reasons for their domestic failure. But the 
question is: What significance does the Cultural Revolution contain, which made the 
films so sensitive that they become no longer tolerated by the Government and its 
mainstream ideology? To answer this question, Guo makes a pointed comment. He 
stressed the significance of retrospective criticism of the Cultural Revolution:  
 
Just because the Cultural Revolution was in opposition to democracy 
and freedom, and it was an extreme era of tyranny, so a rethinking and 
criticizing of Culture Revolution is always in accord with voiced 
opinion of advocating democracy and liberty and of challenging a 
totalitarianism of the contemporary authorities. Therefore, an official 
attitude towards the Cultural Revolution is the best barometer of 
today‘s consistency of democracy.201  
 
In such a strained political situation of the early 90s, the fifth generation 
directors (Chen, Tian, and Zhang) unanimously focused on the retrospection of the 
                                                        
199  A political defrosting means an unprecedented open-minded atmosphere met by Chinese artistic creation from 
the end of Cultural Revolution to the late 1980s. 
200  See Guo Jian (2006) 
201  “正因为文革时代是一个反民主、反自由、极权统治登峰造极的时代，对文革的批判反思在中国特定的
历史环境中和社会条件下总是和倡导自由民主、挑战当局的威权主义、呼吁政治改革有同一性。官方对
文革的态度实际上最能从侧面反映文革批判与自由民主的一致性”。Ibid. 
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Cultural Revolution. That reflects a voice for the hope of freedom, but in the 
meantime it inevitably contradicts what the Government wants – to maintain social 
stability. In consequence it is a foregone conclusion that a political content of 
nostalgia was excluded from domestic markets.  
 
Here, the purpose of referring to the exclusion is not to emphasize how 
incompatible the first nostalgic wave was with a mainstream ideology of the time, but 
it leads the argument to the question at the beginning of for whom the nostalgic films 
were shot? The Chinese situation of the 1990s cannot return to what it was before 
1989, the condition of being free from confinement (or certain political control). The 
schemes and preparations for making the nostalgia films had started after the 
Tiananmen Square Protests. It seems impossible that their producers and directors did 
not foresee that political nostalgia would have difficulty being released in China. Nor 
were they guilty of a lack of notice of the tightened atmosphere. But why did the fifth 
generation directors collectively pay attention to the political nostalgia, and were 
willing to be ―cannon fodder‖ for the local censorship? If a film that is directed, set, 
and shot in China cannot be released in its motherland, then what significance does 
the first wave embody? Thus there is cause for speculation, that to some extent the 
three nostalgic films were presumably not customized or targeted towards natives of 
China and its market. Even from the beginning of the filmmaking scheme, the 
filmmakers had already thought more about their foreign audience and overseas 
markets, which can be proved from their sources of investment. 
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6.1.4.2. Becoming Involved with External Investment 
 
In fact, Farewell My Concubine, the Blue Kite, and To Live have connections 
with external investors. By ―filmmaking co-operation‖ it is understood that a film is 
(fully or partly) invested in by investors from overseas (or Hong Kong and Taiwan), 
but is shot in China with performers and facilities from local film studios. Now that 
external investments were involved, it seemed to be a common sense that film 
productions certainly would consider their return on investment. Perhaps the first 
nostalgic wave, to a great extent, had made a great attempt to humour Western 
markets and foreign festivals. 
 
Farewell My Concubine is a co-operation between the Beijing Film Studio and 
Tomson (Hong Kong) Group, while actually the film has only two producers, Tang 
Junnian and Xu Feng, who are the Chief Executive Officers of Tomson. So it can be 
gathered that Tomson‘s ratio of investment must be the greatest part of the film. Later 
on, it was Xu who provided the financial contribution and led the chief creators of the 
film to Cannes. It shows how film investors had began to predominate in overseas 
promotions and foreign releasing. The couple are not from Hong Kong, they are 
actually film investors in Taiwan and Xu established Tomson Film Ltd. in Taiwan 
1984, and tried to make films with Mainland China in the late 1980s. However, with 
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the hindrance of prohibition
202
 in filmmaking on both sides of the Straits, Xu decided 
to let Tomson go on the Board of Hong Kong in order that it (on behalf of Hong Kong) 
may smoothly participate in film co-operation with Mainland China.  
 
Furthermore, it is presumed that Tomson‘s ambition was never limited to the 
film markets of Hong Kong and Taiwan from the very beginning of investing in 
Farewell My Concubine. Two reasons can be proved. One of which is that in the early 
1990s the Taiwan authorities did not only block the film co-operation, but also strictly 
censored/restricted in its local cinemas films produced by the mainland. For instance, 
when a film had a majority of chief creators from Mainland China, it had to be banned 
in Taiwan. This prohibition was still in force when Farewell My Concubine came back 
with the best award from Cannes, which resulted in the film not being premiered at 
the time in Taiwan. But later the issue aroused controversy around the island. Many 
local legislators thought it was an irony that an internationally awarded film invested 
in by Taiwan could not be shown to the Taiwanese. As a result, the authorities 
changed the law and allowed co-operated films that won awards in the five main 
international film festivals to be released in Taiwan. This adjustment helped To Live to 
be shown in Taiwan smoothly in 1995 (W. Sun 66-72). In addition, as far as the Hong 
Kong film market was concerned, it was so small that the Hong Kong film industry 
itself (party) relied on the Taiwan market at that time. If a film is to be potentially 
banned in Mainland China and Taiwan, a market in Hong Kong is apparently not 
                                                        
202  At that time, the Taiwan authorities forbade local investors to co-produce films with mainland China. 
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adequate for cost-recovering.
203
 Therefore, Farewell My Concubine was not mainly 
shot for audiences in Hong Kong and Taiwan so the only target left was the foreign 
markets. Second, according to a published interview with Chen Kaige, the interviewer 
(Li Erwei) recalled:  
 
Kaige had ever mentioned that, before the post production was finished, 
a jury‘s chairman in the Berlin International Film Festival had 
contacted Xu Feng and Chen, and invited Farewell My Concubine to 
the competition for the ‗Golden Bear‘ award on February, 1993. Chen 
was quite sure that his film would win the award so long as he 
participated. However he refused the invitation from Berlin, as the only 
objective of Xu and himself was a Golden Palm (at Cannes). This was 
because in the whole of the Eastern countries, only Shohei Imamura (a 
Japanese director) had won the Golden Palm before and no Chinese 
had ever won the award.
204
  
 
Though this is from an individual‘s memory, it is noticeable that Chinese 
filmmakers of the time made a fetish of foreign reputations of their films. Chen (as a 
cultural elite) and Xu (as an investor and producer) made no secret of their 
expectations that Chinese films would become famous all over the world. However, 
an argument would be that such a patriotic passion does disguise their ambitions to 
access the Western markets and so far as its purposes are concerned, foreign film 
festivals and the overseas markets do not clash with each other at all. Overseas 
markets, as a vital target of Farewell My Concubine, were not just a hearsay guess. 
For that matter, Adam Lam argues that ―fulfilling the Western audience‘s expectations 
and making every effort to gain a high rate of investment return, become the most 
                                                        
203  In fact, the box-office of Farewell My Concubine in Hong Kong is about 15 million HK dollars, but the 
filmmaking cost reaches up to more than 30 million. 
204 Li Erwei (2004) Farewell My Concubine in Cannes, the Whole Story, International Online, 2004-3-22, 
http://gb.cri.cn/41/2004/03/19/602@102822.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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important factor that the film needs to seek‖ (2005, 100). 
 
To some extent, that fifth generation directors are going to the West, shows 
that the Chinese film-makers (as cultural elites) are gradually walking down an altar 
of high art and attempting to accommodate their artistic pursuits to a globalized and 
secularized market. The process itself may persuade one to believe that Chinese films 
of the 1990s had probably surpassed the domestic cultural products‘ market and taken 
the lead in an integration into cultural globalization. That not only indicates a 
postmodern transition from national elite arts to a global and popular culture, but also 
proves that overseas markets are able to become a key factor of the contemporary 
Chinese nostalgia and a main point of the discussion. 
 
By the same reasoning, the investment conditions of To Live and the Blue Kite 
were quite similar to Farewell My Concubine. To Live (1994) was co-operated on by 
Era International (Hong Kong) and Beijing Film Studio. The CEO of Era International, 
Qiu Fusheng, like Feng Xu, comes from Taiwan. Actually, it was not the first time that 
Zhang Yimou participated in a co-operated film. As early as 1989, his Ju Dou was 
completed by investment from Japan. After that, Zhang‘s Raise the Red Lantern (1991) 
was invested in by Era International as well. When talking about the external 
investors and readerships of the two films, Adam Lam argued that,  
 
although Zhang Yimou has more than once stressed that his films were 
made primarily for Chinese audiences, the fact that both Ju Dou and 
Raise the Red Lantern were fully overseas funded forced Zhang and 
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the films to have as much a focus on the international market as on the 
domestic, or even more (2005, 125). 
 
By this token, a few years later when To Live was sent to the West, its target 
market would not have changed too much. 
 
The funds for the Blue Kite came from Hong Kong and Japan. It has been 
mentioned above that one of the obvious reasons for the film to be banned (in China) 
was that it was sent by its Japanese investor to the Tokyo Film Festival for 
competition on behalf of Japan. This is recalled by Tian Zhuangzhuang afterwards in 
his reminiscences on making the Blue Kite: 
 
There was an investment company from Japan planning a film 
co-operation with China and looking for a local director. They had 
supported Zhang Yimou for his Ju Dou, so they asked what kind of 
film I would like to make… I told them I intended to shoot a courtyard 
(in Beijing) where I spent my childhood with so many stories. Then 
they asked what exactly the story is. I said it‘s about a kite. There was 
an uncle from the neighborhood when I was young. He always took us 
to fly kites on the roofs every autumn. The Japanese company was 
quite interested in the story… at that time (the early 1990s) Uncle 
Chen Huangmei was the chief of the Chinese Film Bureau, and he 
lived in the same yard with my family for many years. He reminded 
me that I‘d better not set a film within the first seventeen years of P. R. 
China (1949-1966). I knew that was a fact, and I understood his 
warning was to take good care of me. But the problem was that, the 
―seventeen years‖ had become a load on my mind. Why cannot I talk 
about it? [...] My heart was full of so many past events and paradoxes. 
When growing up you would see that those past experiences had 
extensive connections to the ―Cultural Revolution‖. Their merits and 
demerits would never be made clear. But one‘s course of growth, 
interpersonal relations, and one‘s destinies have solid content and will 
have eventual results.
205
 
                                                        
205  Sun Xiantao and Li Duojue (ed.) (2006) A Century of the Chinese Cinema, Part II, Beijing: Chinese 
Broadcasting Publishing House. Or online: http://book.sina.com.cn/nzt/ent/cnmovie100years/100.shtml Last 
access: 4 Oct. 2010 
Chapter Six 
 204 
 
This memoir foregrounds three points. One is that foreign funds had 
participated in the nostalgic film plan from its very beginning. Second, as same as 
Guo Jian mentioned previously, the Chinese officials do indeed bear a grudge against 
the past (radical) period of 1950s and 60s China.
206
 This can be conjectured between 
the lines of the chief‘s reminder to Tian. Third, as an average person, Tian is 
fascinated by and infused with rich sentiments over his own past as well as a Chinese 
past, so it even becomes an impulse and responsibility in his mind to represent a 
nostalgia. Here I am not inclined to emphasize subtle hints and relations between 
political movements reflected through the first nostalgic wave and the contemporary 
Chinese authorities with its censorship, but as a fact it does seem undeniable. When 
an ordinary Chinese (no matter whether a director or an audience) is interested in 
his/her nostalgic sentiments, the Chinese political situation and its ideological 
atmosphere yet seem reluctant to accommodate them with such nostalgic images and 
political retrospection. Accordingly, alluding to certain political movements and the 
Cultural Revolution almost became a taboo of Chinese cinema in the 1990s. 
Comparatively speaking, overseas investment and its market, as it turns out, may have 
provided appropriate narrative opportunities and nostalgic germinations outside of 
China, to let the Chinese film-makers carry out their impulses. It certainly grounded 
Chinese nostalgic cinema well as an oriental visual commodity in a global market  
 
 
                                                        
206  This has been explained by Guo Jian in the previous discussion, see 6.1.4. 
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6.2. Chinese Nostalgia, a Global Illusion 
6.2.1. The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Sixties of the World 
 
In the latter half of the 1960s, radical riots swept almost the whole world. 
From the Chinese Cultural Revolution, to the American counterculture movements
207
; 
from 1968 in France
208
 and Prague
209
 to the liberation rush in the Third World
210
; 
from the British Angry Young Men
211
 to the Beat Generation
212
 of the United States, 
perhaps it was only this period in history that implemented a globalized radical 
ideology. Various radical protests and liberation movements formed eddies of 
                                                        
207  The counterculture of the 1960s refers to a cultural protest movement that developed in the United States and 
Western Europe between 1960 and 1973 as a reaction against the political conservatism and perceived social 
repression. It was characterized by anti-war and counter-mainstream cultures, life styles, and their values 
among young people. It also contained all of the protests in American society, regarding the Vietnam war, race 
relations, sexual mores, women‘s rights, traditional modes of authority, experimentation with psychedelic 
drugs and an interpretation of the American Dream based predominantly on consumerism etc. Those cultural 
waves like pop music, sexual liberation, and hippies were also included. See Theodore Roszak (1969/1995) 
The making of a counter culture : reflections on the technocratic society and its youthful opposition, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. In the book, Roszak found a fundamental consensus for the movements: 
counterculture is to protest against all of the industrialized phenomena based on science and technology. 
208  May 1968 refers to the period the events occurred in France; it is regarded as the largest general strike that ever 
stopped the economy of an advanced industrial country. It was caused by a far-left student movement in Paris, 
which can be seen as a typical event of Western youth in the late 1960s. See ―The Beginning of an Era‖ 
translated by Ken Knabb, in Internationale Situationniste No. 12 (September 1969). 
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/si/beginning.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
209  The Prague Spring was a period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia. It began on 5 January 1968 and 
continued until 21 August when the Warsaw Pact allies invaded the country to halt the reforms. Ben Fowkes 
(2000) Eastern Europe 1945–1969: From Stalinism to Stagnation, Longman 
210  It means those national liberation movements happened in Asia, Latin America, and Africa of the 1960s and 
70s, when many Third World countries freed themselves from imperialist colonial rule and joined the United 
Nations. It marked an unexpected rise in the Third World, and proved that the movements had reached a 
crescendo at that period. 
211  The Angry Young Men was a group of mostly working and middle class British playwrights and novelists who 
became prominent in the 1950s. It is thought to be derived from the autobiography of Leslie Paul, founder of 
the Woodcraft Folk, whose Angry Young Man was published in 1951. The label was later applied by British 
newspapers to describe young British writers who were characterized by disillusionment with traditional 
English society. It also refers to a British film genre of the 1960s, featuring working class heroes and left-wing 
themes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angry_Young_Men Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
212  The Beat Generation is a term used to describe a group of American writers in the 1950s, and the cultural 
phenomena that they wrote about and inspired (later sometimes called ―beatniks‖). Central elements of ―Beat‖ 
culture include a rejection of mainstream American values, experimentation with drugs and alternate forms of 
sexuality, and an interest in Eastern spirituality. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beat_Generation Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010. Here in the discussion, the purpose of quoting ―Angry Young Man‖ and ―Beat Generation‖ is to 
emphasize their influences and reflections upon Western young people of the time and their radical/rebel stance 
against the mainstream. 
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anti-culture tides. Political posters, irony discourses, great quotations, alternative 
music, new lifestyles, poetry, and radical dramas and movies were all greatly 
developed in the Sixties. 
 
It is not an individual subjective assumption to combine an ideological history 
of China, in the 1960s with the corresponding period of radical burst in the West and 
the whole background of the global culture. Inspired by the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, Fredric Jameson had termed the period of the Sixties an international era 
of ―culture revolution‖ (Unconscious 95-8). Guo Jian also mentioned that ―the Sixties 
indicate a termination of modernism and a rising of postmodernism‖, and he repeated 
Jameson‘s word as follows: 
 
An interaction between liberation and domination was the main 
developing progress of the Sixties. Jameson then combined the 
Chinese radical practice together with the Third World‘s 
anti-imperialist/anti-colonialist movement, the protests against 
industrialization in the West, counter-culture movements of the U.S., 
student movements of the Western young, shock waves against 
modernism and its social system by the mass culture and certain 
peripheral ideologies, and a fragmentation of the linguistic system that 
freed itself from a myth of signifier and signified. All of these can be 
called a liberation phenomenon. Furthermore, within these Western 
movements of anti-system, anti-culture, and anti-war, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution still provided a model of political culture. Because 
it is not only a political movement, but also a systematic and 
theoretical transformation of culture and a whole ideology of the 
society, which had a profound significance around the world. (Jameson 
60s 178-209) 
 
By this token, ―the Cultural Revolution of China was not just a part of the world 
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structure, but was the epitome of that‖ (60s 180).213 Setting aside the linear logic in 
economic development and political form, China did not lag behind the West at least 
in its radical (far-left) movements of the Sixties. Jameson is full of compliments for 
the active role China had played in the global culture of the time: the Cultural 
Revolution was a collective re-education of the oppressed nations and all of the 
proletariat that lacked revolutionary consciousness; as a strategy the Cultural 
Revolution aimed at breaking the docile and obedient habits of the exploited classes: 
―It evoked the emergence of a genuine mass democracy from the breakup of the older 
feudal and village structures‖ (60s 208). Thus according to Jameson, the practice of 
Cultural Revolution by Mao Zedong, or so-called Maoism, is the most abundant of the 
great ideas and ideologies of the Sixties. As an uncompleted Chinese social practice it 
is ―unparalleled‖ in world history,214 where a ―freshness of a whole new object world 
produced by human beings in some new control over their collective destiny; the 
signal event, above all, of a collectivity which has become a new subject of history 
and which, after the long subjection of feudalism and imperialism, again speaks in its 
own voice‖ (Jameson Postmodernism 29). 
 
In addition, Arif Dirlik
215
 also integrates the Sixties of China into a 
postmodern process of the whole world and uses a strikingly attractive expression, 
                                                        
213  As Jameson argued, ―Indeed, politically, the first world 60s owed much to third-worldism in terms of political 
and cultural models, as in a symbolic Maoism.‖ (60s 180) 
214  Jameson (1984) ―Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism‖, New Left Review 146 
(July-August 1984): p53-92. Cited in Guo (2006). 
215  Born in Turkey, 1940, Dirlik is a historian best known for his works about 20th century Chinese history. He 
was a member of the History faculty at Duke University (from 1971-2000). In 2001 he moved to the 
University of Oregon. 
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―the two cultural revolutions in the perspective of global capitalism‖ (Two 4-15). This 
first makes the West clearly a cultural object (or cultural others) from the concern of 
Chinese political movements. He pointed that, since the 1960s, the world has 
germinated two cultural revolutions, one a cultural revolution of capitalism, which 
Jameson called cultural phenomena leading to late capitalism, which changed the 
culture into commodities and remade them with infinite and desirable plasticity, 
namely the alleged ―postmodern‖ culture; simultaneously, there was the other cultural 
revolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China (Dirlik Globalization 
241-70).
216
 The difference in the two mappings of revolution is that the former sees 
cultural production and consumption as a consequence of a revolution;
217
 whereas for 
the latter, a cultural revolution in China was not a result or goal, but means to an 
end.
218
 In other words, ―culture‖ was regarded as a weapon in the revolutionary 
struggle and radical rebellion, in order that the crowd may participate in the revolution 
through cultural movements to counteract any bureaucracy, power, and autocracy 
brought by social structures. If the commodity culture and technological innovation 
are cast aside, and one only focuses on the ideological struggle spread over the world 
of the Sixties, it is undoubtedly the case that the Chinese Cultural Revolution indeed 
coordinated its efforts from the global trend of counter cultures at that time. Even to 
                                                        
216  Moreover, Dirlik extends the period of the Cultural Revolution from what the authority terms ―ten years‖ 
(1966-76) to what he believes is ―twenty years‖ (1957-76). His definition of the twenty years is in accord with 
the historical period that the first nostalgic wave focused on. 
217  As Dirlik mentioned, scientific technology makes capitalism successful in its cultural revolution. Its core 
substance consists in playing a role of creator of ideas, media, information, images and so on, rather than a 
goods producer (commodities still need to be produced, but they are made by the Third World regions, whereas 
the developed world serves as a brains trust of the earth). In an ideological level, the postmodern culture of 
capitalism is producing the culture itself, rather than achieving other aims through culture. See Arif Dirlik 
(1996). 
218  Guo (2006). 
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some extent, the Cultural Revolution did promote left/radical movements among 
nations. 
 
The promotions can be substantiated from two films made in France. One is 
Jean-Luc Godard‘s La Chinoise in 1967, telling of five college students in Paris who 
set up a radical Maoist group and participated in a far-left revolution. The film is full 
of advocating of the Cultural Revolution. Those political appearances from China: the 
Little Red books, quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, shortwave radio broadcasts 
from Beijing, and resentment of the French Communist Party, revisionism of the 
Soviet Union and imperialism of the United States, are seen everywhere in the film. 
The other one is Les Chinois à Paris, 1974, by Jean Yanne. It is an imaginary tale of 
Paris being occupied pacifically by many Red Guards from China. In addition, 
another film, The Society of the Spectacle (Guy Debord, 1973), may also be involved 
as it directly represents Maoism and the French riot 1968. No matter what the 
purposes and political stands of these films are, their existence proves the far-reaching 
influence of the Cultural Revolution on the West of the day. A book, A Rebellious 
Generation: Western Student Movements of the 1960s, by Shen Han and Huang 
Fengzhu, also reflects the enlightenment of China towards Western countries: ―Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, all of the Third World‘s national liberation movements, 
communist revolutions, and anti-imperialist waves, were followed by a left-wing 
backlash in the West, and in return impacted on developed and capitalist countries. 
The student movement of the Sixties was an echo and feedback of the Third World. 
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The Rebellious Generation (of the West) was inspired by such models, consequently 
Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh became the revolutionary idols of the 
1960s‖ (Shen and Huang 383). 
 
From today‘s perspective, though the world‘s cultural situation is daily 
engulfed in a capitalized globalization, there are still reasons to believe that the Sixties, 
that surging forward era of radicalism, dropped seeds in the hearts of some of the 
Western audience. Nostalgic narratives about the Cultural Revolution from China 
perhaps changed into a certain catalyst of Western nostalgia, to remind Western 
audiences of their memorable, radical youth. At least in their forms, the Cultural 
Revolution in China has similarities in some respects with contemporary radical 
movements of Europe and America. Both ―May 1968‖ in France and the American 
counterculture movements were all involved with large-scale mass participation. Their 
disorderly demonstrations, political catchphrases, slogans, students and industrial 
strikes, and burning vehicles and other radical actions against social order and 
oppressions, are quite similar to what the Red Guards did in all kinds of Chinese 
nostalgia. That leaves good opportunities for bricolage, appropriation, and 
combination in a postmodern pastiche that makes a god of past appearances. Through 
the confusing illusions, the Chinese visual past of the Sixties has perhaps become a 
part of Western nostalgic imagination. 
 
Moreover, the Cultural Revolution in China seems much more realistic, 
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practical, and complete than the movements in the West. Chinese nostalgia and its 
film productions have probably made up for a radical, violent or utopian dream of the 
Westerner. To some extent, Western movements of the Sixties were idealistic 
daydreams lacking a long-term and real-life practice. It has a close bearing on the 
social context of the day. Capitalistic social unrest in common sense is largely based 
on, and caused by, social crises (such as economic crises, natural calamities, or 
increasing unemployment). For example, fascism coming into power in Germany and 
Italy and militarism in Japan of the 1920s and 30s were directly influenced by the 
depression during the late 1920s and the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake. However, the 
Western radical trends of thought in the 1960s happened in a period of economic 
boom in the developed world. The United States was in its twenty years of golden 
times since the 1950s. Its average rate of economic increase (per year) reached 3.7%, 
and Europe‘s was even more at 5.5%. Their unemployment rates were at a low level, 
that of the Europe was only around 1.5%. Therefore, the advocates and the main 
forces of the radical movements in the Western societies of the period were not mainly 
from the working class or the upper class, but those young students that came from 
the middle and lower middle classes.  
 
This social background may lead to three results (weaknesses). One of these is 
that the participants and their identities and the social constitution of the movements 
were quite narrow and lacked support from the main economic actors of the society 
(such as the proletariat or the government). Second, the movements of the Sixties 
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were short of unified or concordant purposes and slogans, all kinds of protests – 
against war, government, race, gender discrimination, industrialization, tertiary 
education system, imperialism, and colonialism and so on – were in great confusion. 
Young participants were quite confused with their ambitions of struggle. There was no 
profound revolutionary principle. Third, the two points mentioned above meant the 
radical movement could only shake the social orders on the surface temporarily, but it 
was incapable of freeing the people from them. As a result, it was on the wane from 
the beginning of the 1970s. Perhaps, ―liberation‖ for the youth of the West was just a 
transient utopian illusion. 
 
Whereas China had paid a ten-year social practice
219
 for such a radical dream. 
That meant China did have adequate time and space to break away from the frame of 
theoretical reference, from hollow slogans and the utopian dream, and to create 
various authentic life experiences in its left-wing cultural context. As far as its 
implementation is concerned, the ten-year radical practices are much more real, 
comprehensively affected, and cruel than the Western flash in the pan. Compared to 
those surface formalities of strikes, parades, hippies, and burning vehicles in the 
Western movements, the Cultural Revolution provided more opportunities for 
everyone living within it to deeply realize what influence a revolution brought to 
one‘s destiny. No matter whether it is Cheng Dieyi (Bean), Fu Gui, Tie Tou and his 
mother, Chinese nostalgic narratives can always describe a radical context by going 
                                                        
219  It means the Cultural Revolution in China, from 1966-1976. Even though as Dirlik argued, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution had started in 1956 and carried on for twenty years. 
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deep into a ―real life‖ story of the protagonists, rather than just a superficial bricolage 
of the radical signs. This is what Western nostalgia (in the radical respect) finds hard 
to reach. The Cultural Revolution, as a typical symbol of the radical Sixties, is not 
only similar to the Western movements that may arouse nostalgic sentiments in the 
West, but also transcends the left-wing illusions of the Westerners, which (with a real 
practical history of China) contribute to continue their radical delusions about certain 
Occidental peoples. 
 
In the beginning of Les Chinois à Paris, the French president goes abroad for 
political asylum. The citizens of Paris voluntarily accept the leadership of communist 
China. The whole city is full of Red Guards and the People‘s Liberation Army. This 
scene may more or less show a burning desire of the West that the results of the 
Cultural Revolution may be applied immediately to a Western reality. Although the 
end of the film stands on the side of criticizing the communist revolution, the plot of 
the film itself proves the whole Western world of the day was devoid of a radical 
cultural practice, while as early as the 1960s, China had possibly become a focus in 
the West and a model that Western revolutions followed. Nevertheless, when the 
world entered the period of the 1990s, left-wing political practice had rung down the 
curtain in China, a sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
made it impossible for those leftists and radicals (in the West) to find a real mirror 
image reflecting a lasting utopia in their minds. Then nostalgia became the only 
consolation of the radical past. Since the 1990s, Chinese nostalgia, as certain 
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postmodern visual signs and consumer goods, entered into Western cinemas. On the 
one hand, it is a late call-and-response to what Dirlik alleged are ―the two cultural 
revolutions in the perspective of global capitalism‖; on the other hand, through the 
utopian imaginations on the flat screen, it brings ideological recall to the Westerners 
of the halfway radical movements in their hearts. For some of the Western audience, 
such allure of the past is not just from an exotic spectacle, but also from the West 
itself, its own nostalgic excitement at the Sixties. 
 
6.2.2. Maoism or Orientalism? – China, the Supposed Eastern ―Empire‖ 
 
As time goes by, the younger generation of the late Sixties will have grown 
into the backbone of Western society by the 1990s, but this does not predicate that a 
radical trend of thought (from the younger generation) can gradually dominate the 
mainstream position of the contemporary Western audience. In fact, the democratic 
political standpoint that has been generally received in the modern West has been 
widely divergent from its radical slogans of the Sixties. As far as the process of the 
radical decline in the 70s was concerned, on the one hand it is as a result of an 
amelioration and compromise by the governments (or the Western mainstream) on a 
series of issues of race, gender, war, social welfare, colonialism and so on. A crusade 
for civil rights for black people and fairer treatment of minorities had received a wide 
range of sympathy; the troops of the United States had gradually pulled out from 
Vietnam; gender discrimination and homosexual issues had seemingly begun to be 
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resolved… On the other hand, the main body of the radicals (those young and 
rebellious counterculture groups) had gradually moved to maturity. By the mid 1970s, 
the early baby boom generation (after the World War II) had reached the age of 30, 
and in their marriages had begun to shoulder more family and social responsibilities, 
which urged them to dissociate from the radical struggles. Additionally and most 
importantly, as Jameson argued, in the economic debates, oil in short supply and ―the 
worldwide economic crisis‖ in the 70s, meant that ―the great explosions of the 60s 
have led to powerful restorations of the social order and a renewal of the repressive 
power of the various state apparatuses‖ (60s 207-8). All of these arguments suggest 
that a contemporary Western democracy is completely different from what it was in 
the Sixties. A left-wing illusion has receded into the background since the 1970s and 
disappeared rapidly in the 80s. The capitalist world has returned to extremely rational 
politics, which to some extent can be considered the beginning of neo-conservatism. 
Perhaps, today‘s Western audience is used to looking at a communist and radical 
movement (or history) through its conservative, right-wing stances and a linear logic 
of democratic development in the West. As a result, the Stalin era of the Soviet Union 
and the Mao era of China can be put together and seen by the West as typical models 
of extreme left political power and violent centralization. 
 
Such a stereotyped image of communist countries by the West, can be found in 
a joint intersection, with Edward Wadie Said‘s orientalism, China. According to Said, 
the term ―orientalism‖ describes a Western tradition, both academic and artistic, of 
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hostile and deprecatory views of the East (Orientalism 203-5). It is an extreme 
position on understanding: the system of perception and discourse, of the East, 
constructed by a Western thinking model. Since the controversial book, Orientalism, 
was published in 1978, the way to describe a Western perspective towards the East by 
orientalism, has usually contained (or implied) a negative or one-side view. That 
emphasizes an imperialist and colonialist attitude by the West on reading and 
interpreting the Eastern world, to the extent that the West sometimes portrays a 
stereotyped prejudice against the East and its culture. In such a discourse system of 
orientalism, the East is placed under a logic of Western culture, in other words, the 
East becomes objected ―others‖ for being criticized, distorted, studied, described, and 
created. The operating strategy of the discourse is a binary and oppositional system: in 
the view of orientalism, the East is always lagged, primitive, rude, absurd, mysterious, 
and strange, and imbued with inhumanity, violence, threat, and horror; whereas the 
West is democratic, rational, enlightened, progressive, civilized. 
 
Though Said seldom chose the Far East as his talking point, nor might he 
comprehend the full historical situation of Eastern Asia, yet it seems undeniable that 
Chinese nostalgia films, when facing the Western audience, may still have certain 
intentions or motives, through their narrative strategy, to cater for an orientalism of 
the West. Namely, they portray the Chinese radical era (its 50s and 60s) as an old 
eastern empire without rationality, order or democracy, but full of bloodiness, unrest 
and political witch-hunts. 
Chapter Six 
 217 
 
Such a tendency can be proved through the film narratives. In the latter half of 
Farewell My Concubine, the political investigation of Duan Xiaolou (Stone), public 
criticism and struggles against Duan, Cheng Dieyi (Bean), and Juxian, and the 
subsequent suicides of Cheng and Juxian, all lead the political tragedy to a rebuke of 
the whole radical era. Blue Kite is full of plots of political fatality. Lin Shaolong, 
Tietou‘s father, dies of the ―reformation through labour‖ 220  in the anti-rightist 
movement of the late 1950s; Tietou‘s stepfather, the cadre of the communist party,  
violently struggles at home with the Red Guards at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution, and when he is unconscious from the struggle they still carry him away 
on stretchers for a public criticism; Madam Lan, Tietou‘s landlord, becomes the object 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and is deprived of her rights to eat steamed buns, 
just because she owns property; Tietou‘s eldest uncle is originally a technician in the 
air force of the Kuomintang, but after the liberation (the founding of the PRC in 1949) 
he cannot gain acceptance by the communist party. Later on, his blindness is then 
compared to his life of falling into darkness. Seemingly everyone‘s destinies in the 
film have a shadow cast over them by radical movements, which is in accord with its 
dim colour-tone.
221
  
 
To Live does not, as the other two films, represent the radical past with sharp 
                                                        
220  Literally ―Laogai‖ 劳改 or 劳动改造. During the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese prisons contained large numbers 
of people who were considered to be too critical of the government or ―counter-revolutionary‖. Prisons were 
organized like factories (called laogai camps) in rural areas for work without pay. 
221  The dull blue may be seen as a ―depressed‖ colour in Blue Kite. 
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criticism, though it still tells of the tragedies of Chun Sheng and the director of the 
street indirectly in the Cultural Revolution. However the film stresses a certain 
position towards orientalism with absurd contingencies in the plot. Fu Gui is 
originally of the landlord class. Due to his unrestrained gambling, he plays away all 
his house property on the eve of the liberation. Soon afterwards, the loss in return 
makes him beat an execution by shooting in the Chinese land reform
222
. Later, his son 
and daughter successively die of absurd tragedies, but the plot by changing does 
abandon the prejudiced frame of orientalism towards a radical past of China. During 
the Great Leap Forward
223
, people (all over the country) work on the street in steel 
production all night, which means Youqing (Fu Gui‘s son) does not sleep at night. 
When he dozes off under a wall at school in the afternoon of the next day, he is killed 
by a car driven by the chief of the district who is going to inspect steel production in 
the school. Obviously the film intends to impute the accidental death to the rash 
advance of the Chinese movement. Fengxia, Fu Gui‘s daughter, is about to give birth 
during the Cultural Revolution. But the hospital has been occupied by a group of 
young students from medical school and all the skilled doctors have been locked in 
prison. As a result, Fengxia cannot get effective treatment and dies from a massive 
haemorrhage. Both of the tragedies of Fu Gui‘s family have indirect connections with 
                                                        
222  The Communist Party of China launched a land reform from 1946 to the early 1950s. It won the party millions 
of supporters among the poor and middle peasantry. The land and other property of landlords were 
expropriated and redistributed so that each household in a rural village would have a comparable holding. By 
the time land reform was completed, at least a million landlords and members of their families had been 
publicly executed or beaten to death by enraged peasants. See Stephen R. Shalom (24). 
223  The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which aimed to use China's 
vast population to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy by peasant farmers into a 
modern communist society through the process of agriculturalization and industrialization. Mao forecast that 
within 15 years of the start of the Great Leap, China‘s steel production would surpass that of the UK. However 
in the end, it led to a widespread famine that resulted in millions of deaths. 
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the social and political contexts. The film in its own ironic fashion implies an attack 
on the far left radical era. 
 
It is unknown whether the directors of the first nostalgic wave intentionally 
catered for the tastes of the Western audience by showing complaints about the 
ideological (or political) differences of China. But it cannot be denied that these films 
and its narrative do have something indeed that is consonant with orientalist positions 
of some of the investors and audiences overseas. Those visual narratives have 
intuitively intensified a bloody-cruel, brutal, uncivilized and irrational Eastern illusion 
in the minds of the Western audience. They may contain certain negative biases 
towards the East. When talking about American prejudices against Islam, Said has 
said, 
 
So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight 
overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as 
either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the 
human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered the 
awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the 
Arab world. What we have instead is a series of crude, essentialized 
caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make 
that world vulnerable to military aggression.
 224
 
 
In a similar way, borrowing the tone of Said above, a Chinese past can be told 
in such ―biased‖ words below, when its nostalgia films cater to a Western orientalism, 
 
So far as the Western world seems to be concerned, it is only a slight 
overstatement to say that socialist China and its people are essentially 
seen as radical trouble makers and an impulsive gang of red guards 
                                                        
224  Edward W. Said (1980) ―Islam Through Western Eyes‖, The Nation, 1980-4-26, or The Nation Online at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/19800426/19800426said Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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who have their minds stuffed with Maoist dogma. Very little of the 
detail, the country‘s basic condition or state, the passion of Chinese life 
has entered the awareness of even those Western audiences of the 90s 
who were interested in the socialist history of China. What we have 
instead is a cruel, despotic, violent, and excessively simplified Maoist 
empire presented in such a way as to make Chinese civilians miserable 
in front of the mob rule. 
 
In consequence, the misery of the radical affairs in the Chinese cinema 
exemplifies the typical nostalgic style of the political past in China. It reconfirms the 
Western prejudice in the one-party state of China and Soviet Union. In the start 
sequence of the Blue Kite, Tietou recalled that, ―as Stalin passed away (in 1953), my 
parents‘ wedding day was postponed unconditionally for ten days‖. The film intends 
to relate the social background of China and the Soviet Union together and implies a 
strong impact of a ―great man politics‖ (or despotism) on ordinary life. Combined 
with the argument in the beginning of this section, – that some people get used to 
taking a linear logic of democratic development for granted in the West – such a 
monologue from Tietou may further their extreme views on the despotism of socialist 
histories in the minds of the Western audience. At least some of them could possibly 
have a linear logic on a development track of government systems (from primitive 
society through slave society, feudal/monarchic form, and constitutional monarchy, to 
a democratic republic). In those forms, it seems difficult to avoid assuming, or 
supposing, according to the Western concept that a left-radical government combined 
with a personality cult (such as Stalin in Soviet Union and Mao in China) is a phase of 
dictatorial monarchy or empire before entering into democracy. Simultaneously, 
Western audiences may automatically find (or be supplied) with certain tragic 
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elements from Eastern nostalgia to prove their own superiority in democratic politics. 
On the other hand, as an important part of the Far East, Chinese radical history in such 
an Eastern narrative of tragedy is probably involved in the frame of orientalism, as 
proof of its uncivilized stereotype. Here orientalism generates certain connotations of 
the West, which helps call to mind past sufferings and think over the good times 
today. 
 
In the light of the above discussion, there seems enough evidence to believe 
that the first nostalgic wave of Chinese cinema in the 1990s had experienced a 
metamorphosis and changed into an exotic nostalgia spectacle for the West, where the 
Western audience recalled its own course of social evolution history by the ―others‖ (a 
past of China). In the process, a Chinese past is not just as simple as a product of 
postmodernity. It is possible to surpass a Chinese reality and become a historical 
novel of global culture. 
 
6.2.3. Fawning or Seduction? 
 
The purpose of borrowing ―orientalism‖ in this discussion, does not consist of 
criticizing the biases of the West, but indicates its stress on the issue reflected from the 
Chinese cinema itself. Actually, Said‘s orientalism (especially, its discussed context) 
does not completely coincide with the historical situation of China. One should be 
dialectically cautious in thinking of China in the debate on orientalism. Historically 
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speaking, most regions of China have never become Western colonies as thoroughly 
as Egypt or India. The attitudes of the Western world to Arabic Islam and China were 
totally different too in the period of the 1950s to 70s. For the sake of petroleum in the 
Cold War, the Middle East was stirred up in the long drawn-out wars; while when the 
Korean War finished in 1953, the Western countries adopted a twenty-year economic 
blockade and cultural isolation towards China. As a result, China temporarily left the 
Western field of view. For most Westerners, the 1950s to the 1970s in China had an 
inscrutable face, which led to China and its socialist history becoming an extremely 
alluring spectacle in the contemporary West. Such a deficient knowledge of China 
caused by the shortage of international communication prompts me to read 
orientalism from another standpoint. That is, orientalism does not only contain 
criticism of Western prejudices, but it may also provide hints on the Eastern issues 
themselves, especially their own fawning intentions towards the West. 
 
This idea may be in accord with Christopher Alan Bayly‘s opinion. He argues, 
―even at the height of the imperial era, European power in the East was never absolute, 
and remained heavily dependent on local collaborators‖ (Bayly 143). A cultural 
discussion on Chinese nostalgia films may probably become a typical instance of 
exploring such a ―local collaborator‖. 
 
The argument then would be, so far as the first nostalgic wave of the early 90s 
is concerned, the most important is not how and what the Westerners regard China as, 
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but how the Chinese filmmakers interpret its past to the West. There are a number of 
intentions of humoring, fawning, even actively seductive in the issue. Through the 
ages, the Eastern people always regard the developed world in the West as a centric 
subject, and put themselves on an objective margin lacking the right of speech, but 
neglecting their own seductions and fatal strategies
225
 when they become objects 
being watched by others. The real power should be held by the objects being watched. 
If this is your fate, it is not how people watch you, but how would you like to show 
yourself in front of others. This is what Baudrillard emphasized time after time. Those 
nostalgic films from China, conspicuous in overseas markets, then make such a 
seduction of accelerated reproduction prominent. 
 
This discussion is inclined to regard the nostalgic seduction as individual 
fawning behavior by the Chinese directors. Because, no matter what the West wants to 
see, those violent tragedies and other narrative strategies reflected in Chinese cinema 
are all the directors want to show to the West. It could be proved by orientalism that 
some of the Westerners have a biased stereotype of Chinese radical ―autocracy‖; 
however it does not mean that a prejudice or investors from the West could directly 
control the expression and seduction of a Chinese film itself. In such a process, 
Chinese filmmakers cannot avoid their responsibility and suspicions of collaboration. 
 
Such a fawning attitude seems unavoidable in contemporary China, and is 
                                                        
225  As for the interpretations on seduction and fatal strategies, please refer to the discussions at the end of Chapter 
5. Or see Baudrillard (Seduction 85-129); and Baudrillard Fatal Strategies; or Baudrillard (Selected Writings 
183-99). 
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perhaps the only way out. That could be supported by some inklings of views from 
other Chinese scholars. 
 
 ―Post studies‖226 in China are a paradox, as they expand on the Cultural 
Revolution and its cultural criticism. When talking about the Chinese literature of the 
New period
227
, Zhang Yiwu re-emphasized that, since the 1980s, Chinese literature 
and arts (including many critical works of China‘s radical past based on the 
background of the Cultural Revolution and other movements in the 50s and 60s) do 
generally have a strong intention of ―learning form the West‖ that can be termed 
―modernization‖ or ―westernization‖. These works always try to represent a ―China‖ 
that is based on individualism in myth and a great narrative of the ―individual‖ as well 
as their life blighted by tragedy, and the way the nation is time-lagged in culture. 
These works display that, ―the (Chinese) intellectual indulged in an enlightened 
discourse of the 1980s have unconditionally surrendered to and enthusiastically been 
infatuated with Western modernity‖ (Zhang Yiwu 34).228 Before the expansion of the 
West-worship in China, Zhang Xudong shows an attitude of having no alternative as 
well: ―at least nowadays we (China) could not construct a completely self-directed 
identity of value orientation, and we are understanding our own life, world, and 
everyday phenomena in a frame of interpretation of ‗others‘ (the West)‖ (Zhang 
                                                        
226  Post studies means those cultural criticisms expanded from Western postmodernism and post-colonialism to a 
context of China. See Jian Guo (2006). 
227  The New period means Deng Xiaoping‘s reform and opening-up since the late 1970s. It is a subsequent period 
of the Cultural Revolution. 
228  “80 年代在启蒙话语中沉溺的（中国）知识份子对西方话语无条件的臣属和对於（西方）‘现代性’的
狂热迷恋”。 
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Xudong Interview).
229
 Guo Jian also points out, in the debates of postmodernism and 
post-colonialism, the Western enlightenment and its modern discourse have gradually 
formed a cultural hegemony (or predominance) in the last two centuries. ―the 
self-identity of those non-Western nations finds it hard to overstep a Western model of 
interpretation. For instance, the Chinese in their recollection and criticism of the 
Cultural Revolution must not free themselves from a shadow of ‗orientalism‘.‖ In this 
case, one of the key roles of the ―post studies‖ in China is to ―ruthlessly deconstruct 
such a critical recollection, in order to differentiate those cultural codes that the West 
saddled on China.‖ (Guo Resisting 343-76) However conversely, such a process itself 
of ―deconstruction‖ (by token of post-structuralism, postmodernism, or the field of 
cultural studies) must not succeed in escaping from borrowing, reproducing, and 
imitating Western opinions. It is a dilemma when the postmodern criticism in China 
faces westernization. 
 
As for the Chinese nostalgic films, Chen Xiaoming had criticized the Blue Kite: 
it was quite late, until 1994, that Tian still emphasized that such a subject of ―political 
persecution and fear‖ was same as what had been prevalent in the late 1970s, ‗scar 
literature‘.‖ As a result, it (the film) was just ―a well-conceived reproduction of the 
‗China image‘ in the Western cultural imaginary‖. (Mysterious 132)230 In other words, 
it criticizes certain fawning inclinations towards the West in contemporary ―national‖ 
                                                        
229  “至少现在我们（中国）无法获得完全自主的一种价值认同，我们还在别人（西方）的解释框架里寻找
资源来理解我们自己的生活世界和日常现象”。 
230  Or cited from Chen by Guo Jian (Ghost).“都到 1994 年了”，田壮壮还在“强调 70 年代末期‘伤痕文学’
所表现的政治迫害和恐惧这样的主题”，其结果不过是“复制了西方文化想象中的‘中国形象’”。 
Chapter Six 
 226 
nostalgia, and such a point is suitable for Farewell My Concubine and To Live as well. 
 
But Chen‘s argument is only right in one part and his criticism does not 
indicate a solution. So far, we may realize that actually there was no feasible way of 
avoiding the Western impact at all, for those writers or filmmakers of that time. Since 
the Chinese Opening-up in the 1980s, as Zhang Yiwu asserts, the new minds of the 
generation of intellectuals and elites in China became flooded with Western thoughts, 
and immersed in fanaticism and infatuation for Western modernity (34). Such a 
radical enthusiasm by China reached a climax in the late 1980s, but was suddenly 
suppressed at home and ceased abruptly. In a short time, this situation may possibly 
and conversely have influenced Chinese film production to (temporarily) change their 
target-market to beyond the sea, going abroad to seek Western reviews, attention, 
consumption, recognition, consolation, patronage, and asylum.
231
 It is only the West 
that can truly understand those Chinese intellectuals who have been widely baptized 
in a Western discourse. So it is not a collective impulse or self-exile at all. The 
spiritual matrix of the Chinese intellectuals in the 80s might originally have existed in 
the West but when such liberalism of modernity does continue domestically after 1989, 
it is an inevitable and necessary choice to return to its matrix. It explains why in the 
early 1990s Chinese cinema must approach Western markets through its nostalgic 
scar. 
                                                        
231  Similarly as Zhang Xudong mentioned, the ―epic exposes‖ in the Blue Kite is ―an ongoing effort to transport 
the symbolic capital of a local new wave to the international network of review, consumption, recognition, and 
patronage…In this way, the post-Tiananmen transformation of new wave Chinese cinema stands as an allegory 
of the rapid incorporation of the Chinese national economy with the capitalist world system.‖ see Zhang 
(2008). 
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If this can be seen as a destiny, its predestination in Chen‘s argument may have 
positive significance. Some Chinese intellectuals of the early 1990s could rapidly get 
rid of the Western discourse and its spiritual shadow. Then they were unavoidable and 
they had no alternative but to get intimate with the West spiritually. If they thoroughly 
abandoned the Western discourse, they would have developed aphasia and become 
lost in silence. To be extreme, to become immersed in Western discourse was the 
destiny of Chinese literature and arts in the 1980s and early 90s as well as its fatal 
problem. For Jean Baudrillard, being fatal means to be predestined or inevitable, and 
disastrous or deadly (Baudrillard Selected 183-99; Baudrillard Fatal, qtd. in Lam 
2005, 74). His fatal strategies may exceed those negative arguments by the Chinese 
critics above and regard Chinese nostalgia as having certain positive effects through 
its post-modernity. But through its borrowing from Western discourse, its imitation of 
socialist ―despotism‖ and the stereotyped orientalism, and its active seduction and 
fawning actions,  Chinese nostalgia, with its fatal strategies (both deadly and 
fatefully), becomes a sitting duck (or a cultural target) of postmodern criticism in 
China, in order to make those Chinese cultural codes imposed by the West betray 
themselves. Thus, seduction and fawning actions are no different in essence. Now that 
there is no way to avoid Western discourse, it might as well accelerate its reproduction 
of discourse so that a ―hyper-real‖ nostalgia could draw more attention to make its 
prejudice prominent and let people realize the untouchable authenticity of the past. 
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As was expected, such a fatal strategy implemented by the seduction of 
self-fawning certainly will suffer much criticism from nationalists and lead to a self 
dying out. Since the 1990s, criticisms of the filmmakers‘ making up to the West, 
trading of traditional culture, and their turning traitor for personal gain have never 
ceased in critical circles. After all, their parochial nationalism is only superficial. It 
just embodies a national pretence of their own. As Adam Lam pointed out, the fatal 
seduction is ―a challenge to the lasting Chinese national pride, a survival seeking by 
self-destruction, and a truth seeking by self-falsehood.‖ The false ―tradition‖ in its 
nostalgic cinema on the one hand becomes hyper-real signs and a substitute for the 
real Chinese traditional culture fading out; on the other hand it uncovers the ―pretence 
of its nationality‖ (Lam 2005, 74-5). If Chinese nostalgia had been not based on the 
radical motif of political movements, not catered for the West, not sacrificed itself, it 
might have not aroused criticism over the dominance of Western discourse on Chinese 
arts, nor could it have awoken the Chinese national consciousness of post-colonialist 
culture. It is just the cinematic self-sacrifice that made the first nostalgic wave start off 
upon the road to what Jian Guo called a deconstruction of ―post‖ studies. Therefore 
the globalized nostalgic illusions exported from China seem definitely illustrative of 
the postmodern culture and its post-colonial criticism. 
 
6.3. A National Scar and Domestic Nostalgia 
6.3.1. Distortion and Trauma  
 
We seek to link our personal past with collective memory and public 
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history [...] People are so eager to be part of „history‟ that they falsely 
„remember‟ their responses to, or even having been present at, some 
momentous event. 
 (Lowenthal 197)                                        
 
The above-mentioned words by Lowenthal may be a reminder that Chinese 
nostalgia towards its past Cultural Revolution is likely to be a kind of false fulling of 
historical temptation. Such a forgery then displays what he called ―distortion‖ (200). 
 
Undoubtedly, although the first nostalgic wave in China was distorted from the 
real past realities of the 1950s and 60s, the distortion does not only result from those 
radical motifs catering for the Western orientalist complex, where personal destinies 
are completely immersed in political discourse and ideological struggle, and 
individual fate is mainly decided/substituted by a stereotyped political fatality of 
China in the Western mind.  Also and  most importantly, the essence of the 
distortion consists in that the destinies of the film protagonists all fall into tragic 
despair in the radical movements, which is perhaps geared to, or compatible with the 
humanistic spirit and value orientation of the West, in order that political tragedy 
becomes the most predominant model of nostalgic narrative in that period. As Zhang 
Xudong argues, national ―trauma becomes the rule‖ (Trauma 37). 
 
However, as far as the ―trauma‖ is concerned, when it was becoming closer to 
the Western taste in Chinese stories, it was gradually moving far away from the real 
tone of a radical China in the past. Similarly to other movements of the Sixties in the 
world, the Cultural Revolution in China did take on its own positive role. That is to 
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fight against bureaucracy, social power, the exploitation of proletarianism, 
imperialism, hegemony, and colonialism… those zeitgeist and realities closely linked 
with the past of China are not represented by the first nostalgic wave at all. 
 
The substitute (in the representation) is that, those nostalgic films have all 
chosen certain characters and identities, which seem capable of arousing sympathetic 
sadness and compassion in the West, as their protagonists. Cheng Dieyi (Bean) fits 
into a traditional mould of a high-art performer as well as an unacceptable view of 
love (but gayness is becoming a commonplace in the West). Duan Xiaolou (Stone) 
with his role ―the Conqueror‖ on the opera stage expresses a sense of arrogance and 
despotism that seems close to the characteristics of those Western Empires in his 
identity of invader and colonialist in the past; however such a ―Conqueror‖ is 
violently counterattacked and suppressed by the far left Red Guards in the film. 
Juxian‘s previous identity as a prostitute seems more acceptable to the West where 
people may (in somewhere) legally trade their bodies out as commodities. Fu Gui is 
originally of the landlord class which is enough to arouse compassion in the West with 
their private ownership of land, and his children‘s deaths are obviously related to the 
socialist movements. Tie Tou‘s father, uncle, and step father are all victims in the 
movements too. His elder uncle‘s girlfriend suffers obscenity and retaliation from the 
revolutionary authorities. No matter how hard his landlord may try, she cannot change 
her family‘s class status and avoid class conflict. All of these protagonists and their 
tragedies may easily arouse Western sympathy with its contemporary humanistic 
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spirit. 
 
While what has been distorted in those films consists of those identities of the 
protagonists in the nostalgia they seem incapable of representing the zeitgeist of the 
past China. The spiritual subject and the main part of social life in 1950s and 60s 
China should be made up of the majority of its population, its workers, farmers, city 
residents, the red-blooded youth, or even the thousands of Red Guards… But why has 
the majority of the masses been silenced in such an ideologically coloured nostalgic 
narrative and been given minor roles or voiceless, political, and symbolic appearances 
in the films? Why has the absolute minority who were being dragged on to platforms 
in the 1960s (as in the old picture
232
 below) taken the place of the majority of the 
public (who were brandishing banners, shouting slogans, and supporting the 
revolution around platforms) and become the absolute majority of protagonists (and 
the main body of its narrative) in the nostalgia of the early 1990s? 
 
                                                        
232  The illustrations shows two leaders being violently criticized on a truck in Shenyang, northeast China, 1967. 
http://hhhh.hhh.hh.h.blog.163.com/blog/static/127216373200981995128287/ Last access: 25 Jun. 2010 
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Figure 9. A Struggle Meeting in the Cultural Revolution, Northeast China 
 
Even today, the nostalgic narrative in contemporary Chinese cinema still lacks 
positive regard for the zeitgeist of the masses and the little which has been represented 
today, may not be the real truth of the past. Zhang Xudong observes the Blue Kite that 
the film‘s narration of political movements is unlike that which most people had ever 
experienced in China, but just aims to reach a taste consensus on scar narrative 
(Trauma 37). In other words, the trauma of the Sixties may not belong to the majority 
of the Chinese people but to the minority who were criticized. In this case, the 
discussion cannot exclude the possibility that the contemporary Chinese nostalgic 
cinema has probably had a vicious circle of binary opposition between the radical 
―left‖ and the conservative ―right‖. When a radical, political, revolutionary, and left 
voiced opinion has been suppressed since 1989, an economic reform and its 
capitalized proposition (what Maoism was dead set against, the far-right and capitalist 
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statements in the 50s to 70s) have begun to predominate in the Chinese culture of the 
90s, including its nostalgic trends. Such a corrective inclination against the radical left 
is called, by Dirlik, a political climate turning to the right and a today‘s overcorrection 
constantly brings shame on the Cultural Revolution (Two 9-14). 
 
On the other hand, the rigorous exclusion and censorship in the domestic 
market show that the nostalgic wave does have differences (or distortions) from the 
mainstream ideology of the Chinese authorities. 
 
In a review of the Blue Kite, Xudong Zhang emphasized the appeal in the film 
of a great celebrity for the domestic audience. Lǚ Liping (as Shujuan, Tie Tou‘s 
mother), Pu Cunxin (Shaolong, Tie Tou‘s father) and Li Xuejian (Tie Tou‘s uncle) are 
all influential stars in the 1990s‘ China. From this, Zhang thinks the film originally 
was intended to be shot for its domestic market, especially the bourgeois audience in 
large and medium-sized cities of China (Trauma 34). This argument could be 
applicable to Farewell My Concubine and To Live as well. Leslie Cheung (as Bean) is 
not only a star with charisma in Hong Kong and Taiwan but also has wide influence 
on the Chinese mainland; Zhang Fengyi (Stone) and Gong Li (Ju Xian) are also in the 
first-line of film stars of that time in China; Ge You (Fu Gui) (together with Lü 
Liping) is a household star since the TV series, Stories from the Editorial Office, a hit 
in China in the 1990s.  
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Thus the celebrity‘s appeal in the first nostalgic wave provides reasons for an 
argument as follows. The casting probably hints that the films did not completely give 
up on the Chinese mainstream market at first, and the filmmakers underestimated the 
suddenly ironfisted attitude of the censorship on the theme of political nostalgia in 
China. In fact, the government‘s attitudes to political nostalgia and the Scar literature 
do not have consistency, but rather there is a sudden shift after 1989. 
 
This shift reflects the way that contemporary Chinese society has been 
transformed towards certain right-wing and conservative cultural trends. The ―scar‖ is 
perhaps not a natural or objective result of the ―left‖ (radical) period (the 1950s-1976) 
of China, but a stereotyped verdict made by the post-revolutionary age
233
 for its 
historical predecessor.
234
 Zhang Xudong also pointed out that ―the birth of trauma 
itself is a cultural event of the post-revolutionary age‖ (Trauma 31). In other words, 
―scar‖ is just a subjective cultural definition imposed on a past. Furthermore, to 
extend the view from Dirlik, regarding the Scar literature of the 1980s and what he 
called today‘s overcorrected shame over the Cultural Revolution, then conversely, we 
may realize the scar itself can be understood as a far-right extreme cultural trend with 
the inclination to criticize the left radical past of the 50s and 60s. This argument can 
be supported by a number of ―scar‖ literary and artistic works, including those 
popular (and mainstream) films of trauma, such as Xie Jin‘s Legend of Tianyun 
                                                        
233  The ―post-revolutionary age‖ indicates contemporary China since the late 1970s (the end of Cultural 
Revolution). 
234  This argument will be extended in Chapter 8, where nostalgia is seen as historical bleach today. 
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Mountain (1980) and Hibiscus Town (1986) and Huang Shuqin‘s Woman Demon 
Human (1987). It illustrates that the mainstream ideology of the 1980s maintained a 
positive and encouraging attitude to the extreme scar literature. Nevertheless, such an 
attitude has obviously had a subtle transformation since the early 1990s. Both the 
domestic market and local film festivals remain almost silent on the nostalgic wave. 
Farewell My Concubine is prohibited from sales promotion, and even to this day the 
other two films are still banned from public release. Such an outcome in the 1990s is 
quite different from Hibiscus Town in the 1980s when it was well received by the 
public of China. It shows the Chinese authorities may probably resort to a strategy of 
conservative moderation towards the scar literature and the extreme right criticism. 
China, in its economic and high-speed development period (especially the 1990s), 
may not want to lean to any radical or extreme side in politics, in case the golden 
opportunity for its economy is delayed. This deduction dovetails nicely with Deng 
Xiaoping‘s tour speech in the southern inspection235 in 1992, when he expressed his 
intention that China should concentrate its strength on economic development and 
lighten the political struggle. Herein, we may presume, through the government‘s 
attitudes toward its nostalgic cinema, that since the early 1990s the contemporary 
Chinese mainstream ideology has changed into a relatively conservative and moderate 
mode of prevailing culture ignoring radicalism or extreme struggles. Undeniably, with 
                                                        
235  South Tour Speeches are a series of speeches delivered by the late leader Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of 
China‘s reform and opening-up, during his inspection tour of southern Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and 
Shanghai in early 1992. Targeted at domestic misgivings and confusion among some scholars and even 
officials about the country‘s reform and development, Deng put forward some new viewpoints on a series of 
crucial issues, such as the core of Marxism, the essence of socialism, market economy, and how to emancipate 
and develop productivity. The significant speeches outlined an unequivocal path for the country‘s further 
reform and opening-up and have greatly driven its political, economic, and social development. Please see the 
official compilation of his speech at, http://www.oklink.net/lszl/dangdai/dxp01.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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the dominance of the official will, contemporary mass culture in China approaches 
conservative trends of postmodernity. As Zhang Xudong said, ―if there is such a thing 
called Chinese postmodernism, then what it takes to be over is not the age of 
modernity, but the age of revolution and radicalism‖ (Trauma 30-1). I agree with 
Zhang‘s opinion and recognize that beyond an economic modernity, Chinese society 
has reached certain postmodernity in its culture. 
 
6.3.2. A Nostalgic Sense of China 
 
Though much evidence and argument in the above discussion show that the 
first nostalgic wave of the early 1990s seems much more intended to satisfy the West, 
it cannot be forgotten that the films have a nostalgic attraction for the Chinese 
audience. Apart from those nostalgic symbols and flat appearances, the deep hurt of 
the past days makes people treasure those wonderful memories all the more. So the 
political trauma reflected from the wave does not conflict with the nostalgic 
connotation of its humanistic care. What it has diffused is the dialectically aesthetical 
allure, which according to Zhang Xudong, consists in ―the paradoxical beauty…in the 
duality of images as the bearer of both traumatic witness and nostalgic 
rememberance‖ (Trauma 40). Political history was full of national trauma, just 
because of that, kindness and friendship between people become even more desirable 
and memorable. It is the power of tragedy. Juxian‘s great sympathy for Bean 
(Farewell My Concubine); the love between Shujuan and Guodong (the Blue Kite); 
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the great suffering when Fu Gui loses his children and his later forgiveness of 
Qiusheng (To Live)… all of these true feelings and sacred fire could probably arouse a 
sympathetic response in the Chinese audience to their nostalgic past. Compared to the 
increasing capitalization and modernization of contemporary China, today‘s 
interpersonal relations blinded by greed may be refined and released through nostalgic 
memories of the 1950s and 60s. Therefore, no matter where the film investment 
comes from, no matter whether the fifth generation directors have become completely 
Westernization, no matter how big its box office will be and how charming Chinese 
nostalgia would be for Western reminiscences, and no matter if the wave has 
separated from a national film category, those nostalgic films still retain countless ties 
and relations with Chinese society, its historical recollection, and the nostalgic 
feelings of the Chinese people. 
 
Therefore, the exclusion and the censorship that the first wave met in its 
domestic market, cannot be explained that the political nostalgia is out of joint with 
the Chinese audience and the contemporary reality, and the disjunction can only be 
read as a governmental compulsion. Since the 1990s the authorities have hidden the 
past trauma and tended to evade and restrain a reconstruction of political history from 
the public. However the ideological past of the 50s and 60s is indeed a part of the 
memories of the common people. Recollections become brilliant because of the happy 
experiences of the past; similarly they should not be written off because of the 
historical pains. The prohibition, limitation, or exclusion of nostalgic films from its 
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local cinemas has in reverse explained why such a scar continues in contemporary 
China. Perhaps, the real trauma of a historical mistake has changed into regret that 
today‘s mainstream opinions (dominated by the government) seem unable to (or dare 
not) face up to a piece of history. So far as this transformed trauma is concerned 
Zhang argues, 
 
What is truly traumatic, then, is not so much the horrors to be re-lived 
visually as the moment of discovery and shock when one finally comes 
up with a narrative, a picture of the past from a distance. It is in this 
distance that the past, in the form of memory, suddenly becomes 
morally and ideologically unbearable. (Trauma 31) 
 
Nevertheless, what really find the past unbearable are not the films themselves, 
nor the contemporary Chinese masses. There is a sequence in the Blue Kite, when Tie 
Tou‘s eldest uncle (Shusheng, a former Kuomintang insurrectionist) is working in a 
dim hangar of the socialist air force (in the 1950s), the slide door of the hangar is 
suddenly opened and a sunbeam penetrates the dark workshop and shines on his head. 
The glare is so dazzling that he looks quite insignificant, tiny, and frail in the huge 
hangar. His eyes cannot resist the sunlight, and his hand goes up in the air trying to 
cover the overwhelming brightness. On the one hand, this scene hints at his later 
blindness; and on the other hand it is perhaps a trope of people‘s trembling and 
helplessness in the face of radical politics. But furthermore, to a deeper level, if the 
blazing light could be seen as a fearless retrospection of historical politics by the Fifth 
Generation directors into the ideologically ―forbidden‖ China, then obviously Tian 
Zhuangzhuang in his Blue Kite pre-installs an allegory for the domestic failure of the 
first nostalgic wave, where the hand stretching up into the air is just the same as film 
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censorship concealing the public from the past, and it continues hovering and 
enveloping the sight of the public. 
 
By this token, the first nostalgic wave, as a typical retrospection of the fifth 
generation directors, directly expresses their radical criticism of a political past of 
China that forms a sharp contrast with the censorship of the authorities. Being 
censored without a pass, nostalgic films cannot get full attention from domestic 
audiences, which is totally unfavorable for the development of nostalgic culture in 
China. In consequence, it naturally leads the Chinese cinema and its nostalgic 
narratives to a postmodern conservatism. There are only three roads left for the 
eclectics and their compromise, they may either ignore the past; or take either a 
peripherization to weaken the political narratives and to reinvent a nostalgic story in a 
pure everyday life; or as a representation of the mainstream ideology, develop a set of 
moderate right-wing discourses and to continue bringing shame on the radical politics 
of the past. 
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Chapter Seven 
Silence and Revival 
 
It has been discussed in the last chapter that the first nostalgic wave of the 
early 1990s found it hard to break through the blockade of governmental censorship. 
Neither the frontal (positive) reconstruction and criticism of political history in the 
Blue Kite and Farewell My Concubine nor the black humour based on a reinvention of 
historical and political appearances in To Live had complete freedom in the domestic 
cinemas. It seems undeniable that the nostalgic narrative largely based on a radical 
past of the 1950s or 60s had become taboo in the contemporary Chinese cinema, 
especially from the mid 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first Century. As far as 
the practical situation is concerned, after the first wave disappeared, there was no 
nostalgic film released in China with the motif of looking back at a political discourse. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, the creation of nostalgic filmmaking lapsed into silence. 
However such a consequence cannot be completely attributed to administrative 
censorship or political inhibition; it is probably a result of multiple causes, including 
economic development, political barriers, and interactive cultural phenomena. China 
has experienced rapid economic growth since the 1990s, and most of the population 
were probably not prepared to accept nostalgia as the postmodern consumption in that 
period. But in the middle of the first decade of the new century, especially around 
2005 and for a few years afterwards, there was a sudden outbreak of a nostalgic 
creative rush in the Chinese cinema, with such films as Peakcock (Kongque, Gu 
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Changwei, 2005), Shanghai Dreams (Qing hong, Wang Xiaoshuai, 2005), Sunflower 
(Zhang Yang, 2005), Dam Street (Hong yan, Li Yu, 2005), Peach Blossom (Taohua 
canlan, Fu Huayang, 2005), The Road (Fangxiang zhilǚ, Zhang Jiarui, 2006), Summer 
Palace (Yi he yuan, Lou Ye, 2006), Xin Jie Kou (Xue Cun, 2006), The Sun Also Rises 
(Taiyang zhaochang shengqi, Jiang Wen, 2007), Teeth of Love (Aiqing de yachi, 
Zhuang Yuxin, 2007), Sailfish (Qi yu, Jin Yimeng, 2008), A Tale of Two Donkeys (Zou 
zhe qiao, Li Dawei, 2008), and The University Entrance Exam 1977 (Jiang Haiyang, 
2009)…236 Most of these nostalgic films are set in the social background of the 1970s 
and 1980s, and their directors are much younger than the fifth generation. Moreover, 
more importantly, most of these films received success and great attention in both the 
international festivals and domestic box-offices, which may allow one to realize that a 
real nostalgic era for China (rather than for the West) has come, termed in this thesis, 
the second nostalgic wave of the contemporary Chinese cinema. If one stands on the 
second nostalgic wave and looks back to the first wave ten years ago, then 
comparatively speaking one can see that the first wave of borrowing both foreign 
investment and Chinese stories has largely satisfied the Westerner‘s nostalgic 
demands and curiosity; while the second wave with its developed consumer 
consciousness and postmodern cultural atmosphere has given more attention to suiting 
(or catering to) the nostalgic consumer psychology of the Chinese audience. An 
increased consumer consciousness in the Chinese masses towards nostalgia illustrates 
that contemporary Chinese society at least in its cultural debates has already had 
                                                        
236  And from their spiritual connotation of the past, Gimme Kudos (―qiuqiu ni biao yang wo‖, Huang Jianxin, 
2005), Unfinished Girl (―di san ge ren‖, Cheng Er, 2007), and 24 City (Jia Zhangke, 2009) can be read as 
certain nostalgia related films as well. 
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certain postmodern symptoms of the visual consumption. All of these issues are 
discussed in the last two chapters (Chapters 7-8). 
 
The focus of Chapter 7 is not the narrative connotations of the second 
nostalgic wave but a transition process of the contemporary social culture of China 
between the two waves and its postmodern strategy of keeping silent. In this sense, an 
absence of nostalgia in China and its post-modernity do relate to its social and cultural 
reality. 
 
7.1.  The Darkest Time Is Near the Dawn – Silence of the Fifth Generation 
Directors 
 
The silence was a massive reply through withdrawal, that the silence 
was a strategy… they [the masses] nullify meaning. And this is truly a 
power… Basically they absorb all systems and they refract them in 
emptiness. 
 (Baudrillard, qtd. in Gane Interview 87-8) 
 
For whatever reason
237
, such as an after-effect following the censorship and 
                                                        
237  There are many reasons that may explain why the first nostalgic wave is excluded or limited in China. One of 
them would be that the Chinese authorities are quite sensitive and worried about the negative influence of its 
extreme criticism on and connotation for the social stability.  
It may perhaps be a punishment for the filmmakers‘ intentional stunt in the process of applying domestic 
release. This is called politicized film releasing, namely to avoid the domestic official examination and 
approval after a film is completed, it is directly sent overseas without authorization, so that a stunt of ―political 
asylum‖ can be created and attract foreign attention; see Adam Lam (2005, 148-50 & 158). In the 
contemporary Chinese cinema, examples of punishment caused by the politicized release are frequent. The 
lighter will be refused a domestic permit for public release; a serious matter will lead to a restriction on its 
filmmaker making films in the future. For instance, because of the Blue Kite Tian Zhuangzhuang was banned 
from being a director for the last years of the 1990s; the sixth generation director Zhang Yuan was banned from 
making films in domestic film studios for six years since his Beijing Bastards (1993) got out of line in release; 
Lou Ye is banned for five years from directing in China since his Summer Palace was excluded by the local 
authorities in 2006. The producers of Summer Palace (2006) declared that the film had been sent to the local 
film bureau for censorship and modified several times according to suggestions from the bureau before it was 
sent to overseas film festivals, however the film bureau asserts that they never received any application for 
censorship of the film and the film story (which includes the background of the Tiananmen Square protests of 
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limitation of the first nostalgic wave, it is beyond dispute that the fifth generation 
directors have seldom referred to (or focused on) the radical past of politics (the 
background of the 1950s and 60s) in their filmmaking.  
 
After Farewell My Concubine, Chen Kaige‘s Temptress Moon (Feng yue, 1996) 
is a story of the beginning of the Republic of China (the 1920s); and his The Emperor 
and the Assassin (Jingke ci qin, 1998) traces back to the period of the Warring States 
two thousand years ago; later Together (He ni zai yi qi, 2002), The Promise (Wuji, 
2005), and Forever Enthralled (Mei lan fang, 2008) never even mentioned the radical 
past of Communist China. 
 
Following To Live, Zhang Yimou made Shanghai Triad (Yao a yao yao dao 
wai po qiao, 1995). It is set in the 1930s and shows the only flourishing scene of the 
modern history of Shanghai. If it is compared with the Chinese economic take-off in 
the 1990s, Shanghai‘s prosperous past is indeed capable of arousing certain nostalgic 
sentiments in the contemporary Chinese masses. But sixty years later, as far as today‘s 
mainstream audience is concerned, such a nostalgic imagination has been more 
sublimated into a retrospection of a past sense of economic honor, and it seems too 
antiquated to achieve a visual reconstruction in the collective memories of the mass 
culture today. Afterwards, Zhang‘s Keep Cool (You hua haohao shuo, 1997), Not One 
                                                                                                                                                               
1989) is largely different from its censored script before shooting. In this paradoxical case, it is presumed that 
the politicized release process is probably either the filmmaker‘s stunt or a governmental salvo for prohibition 
or exclusion. The real reason for the censorship may be a mystery forever. 
Another possible reason is that the fawning behavior (towards the West) and its distortions emphasized in the 
last chapter led to strong dislike and hatred in the Chinese national patriotic discourse. 
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Less (Yi ge dou bu neng shao, 1999), Happy Time (Xingfu shiguang, 2000), Hero 
(Ying xiong, 2002), House of Flying Daggers (Shi mian maifu, 2004), Riding Alone 
for Thousands of Miles (Qianli zou dan qi, 2005), Curse of the Golden Flower (Man 
cheng jin dai huang jin jia, 2006) are all set in either contemporary realities or are 
ancient costume narratives. They do not reflect concern with the public‘s familiar 
memories of the period between the 1950s and 80s.
238
 
 
In consequence of the Blue Kite, Tian Zhuangzhuang was banned from his 
career as a film director. As a result, he did not direct any other film for the whole of 
the 1990s. In the new century, his Springtime in a Small Town (Xiaocheng zhi chun, 
2002) was a remake of the classic 1948 film of the same title (directed by Fei Mu), 
one of the most important masterpieces in the history of the Chinese cinema. The 
action of remaking a film itself does probably contain a sense of nostalgia or pastiche. 
But within such a process of imitation, what the new film recalls and rebuilds, is 
actually the original filmmaking features and its classic screenplay, rather than what 
Jameson emphasized, a postmodern reconstruction of the past social style and its 
whole period of mass culture.
239
 Even though Tian‘s remake could be read as a 
retrospective of a real life experience of the past in the 1940s (before the socialist 
People‘s Republic of China was founded), it has still distanced itself from a past sense 
                                                        
238  The Road Home (1999) directed by Zhang Yimou is a particular case in the discussion here. The film indirectly 
touches on the Anti-Rightist Movement in the late 1950s, but it is just mentioned casually and lacks related 
narration and political background. Thus it shows a political peripherization in the contemporary Chinese 
nostalgic cinema, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
239  As Jameson said, the ―nostalgia film‖ ―consists merely of films about the past and about specific generational 
moments of that past‖. Alternatively, it may ―not reinvent and picture of the past in its lived totality; rather, by 
reinventing the feel and shape of characteristic art objects of an older period (the serials), it seeks to reawaken 
a sense of the past associated with those objects.‖ (Jameson Consumer 113) 
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of the radical politics reflected in his early work, the Blue Kite. In addition, other main 
fifth generation directors, such as Huang Jianxin, Zhang Junzhao, Wu Ziniu, Zhang 
Jianya and so on, have not positively refered the radical period of the 50s and 60s in 
their works since the mid 1990s. 
 
Although the situation mentioned above seems inadequate to prove that, after 
the first nostalgic wave, the fifth generation directors (in their creative subjectivity) 
made a conscious effort to avoid (or not to touch) the radical period of socialist China; 
yet to be objective, one cannot deny that their narrative concerns have indeed 
involved a long-term silence on the radical past. Even if this is not a subjective taboo, 
it cannot be read as a fact by accident either. Nostalgic films are not as dispensable as 
a commercial genre and reflect the collective memories of the contemporary public. 
The main three influential fifth generation directors made three earthshaking nostalgic 
films within a short period between 1992 and 1994, so why did the whole film 
industry collectively fall into silence about its stirring past in the ten years after 
(1995-2000)? Is there any intention in the ―occasional‖ silence? 
 
What the ―intention‖ means is not any personal taste or inclination towards a 
total disregard for the past. The individual silence on political nostalgia probably 
derives from the government, rather than being purely voluntary. Wang Keping‘s early 
sculpture (woodcarving) Silence (Chenmo, 1979) was a typical example of such taboo 
(Koppel-Yang 120). It depicts a man‘s head, with one eye covered and whose mouth 
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is sealed, an agonizing image of a man who cannot see and speak freely. This work 
dates precisely from the tension surrounding the opening-up of China. As Wenweipo 
(―Wenhuibao‖, Hong Kong) remarks ―that sculpture shows the suppressed thought 
and expression of the people in the Cultural Revolution‖.240 However, when the same 
sculpture was exhibited in Pompidou Art Centre (Paris, France) ten years later 
(immediately after Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989), there was obviously a slight 
change in its political connotation. If its first successful exhibition in Beijing 1979 
testified that a past extreme had been remedied, then the latter one (overseas) 
probably indicates that China had run to another extreme, which led to silence again 
in the 1990s. This thesis does not focus on the blocking actions of the government, but 
pay attention to a collective anoesis (passive intension) of the circle of Chinese 
filmmaking in the face of such curfew. 
 
 
Figure 10. Silence 
                                                        
240  Wenweipo, Hong Kong, 7th Dec, 2008. 
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Here the discussion would emphasize, what Baudrillard set his mind on, 
―silence‖ and its functions in postmodern fragmentation241 towards politics, social 
power, and dominant discourse:  
 
They [those who keep silent] exercise a passive and opaque 
sovereignty; they say nothing, but subtly, perhaps like animals in their 
brute indifference, they neutralize the whole political scene and 
discourse.
 
(Fatal 94) 
 
As Baudrillard said, silence means certain objective power, for the power itself 
does not need the people who keep silent to take up any subjective attitudes or give a 
swift reply. What they do is, in the same way as those animals which lack the faculty 
of thinking, to continue their silence. As the mainstream film-creative group of the 
1990s in China, the fifth generation directors and their collective silence present a 
kind of position of paying no attention to their past era. Their stance predicates a 
neutralization of ―powerful discourse‖, a dominant esthetics formed and shaped by the 
censorship. If a cinematic element can be read as a reflection of its time and society, 
then the collective absence (silence) of nostalgia may lead to a reflection as well, a 
sort of fragmenting discourse that turns into a passive conservatism. 
 
Such a conservative silence is in accord with the general atmosphere of the 
whole social/cultural development of the 1990s. It has been discussed in the last 
chapter that a public debate about the ideological/political issues of Chinese society 
                                                        
241  Here ―fragmentation‖ means to resolve the culture hegemony of power politics. 
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has been restrained since 1989, and trauma related literary criticism has been 
restricted too.
242
 Relatively speaking, it seems impossible that the censorship and 
exclusion suffered by the first nostalgic wave have no relation to the above mentioned 
situation. Actually, the moderately tightened policy of film censorship on the radical 
past and political theme proves from a different angle that such a restrained policy has 
spread in contemporary Chinese culture. Banning the Blue Kite and To Live from 
being publicly shown and the draconian punishment of Tian Zhuangzhuang can be 
read (to some extent) as an attitude consistent with the get-tough policy that the 
authorities adopted in Tiananmen in 1989. The government neither wants to see any 
extreme political movement disturbing the progress of economic reform and 
opening-up, nor to let the contemporary cinema have close relations with ideological 
criticism of the past. Consequently, as for those Chinese filmmakers of the 1990s, it is 
better to choose to keep silent than be the second ―Tian‖ in the face of governmental 
censorship. In other words, they chose a collective absence from the concerns of the 
nostalgic film narrative, in order that the silence may give prominence to the 
dominant/powerful discourse and its absolutism and mighty logic, through which 
people may clearly realize that there is a firm grasp of power. And some of them may 
have participated in the effort to neutralize and balance the potency of power and its 
efficacy of discourse. Taken in this sense, a collective silence by the mainstream 
filmmakers is a reflection upon the cultural conservatism and postmodern 
fragmentation. 
                                                        
242  Guo Jian (2006) online. 
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7.2.  The Nostalgic Concern and Political Silence of the Post-fifth Generation 
Directors 
 
Also to be mentioned, beyond the fifth generation directors, there is still 
sporadic nostalgia reflected in the maiden films of other newborn directors at the same 
time as (or a bit later than) the first nostalgic wave. This mainly refers to Jiang Wen‘s 
In the Heat of the Sun (Yangguang canlan de rizi, 1995). Other films, like Dirt (Toufa 
luanle, Guan Hu, 1994) and The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, Lu Xuechang, 
1997), though they cannot be totally regarded as nostalgia, still contain certain traces 
of retrospection of the past. The three films were made simultaneously with the first 
nostalgic wave, but they should not be confused with each other for at least the three 
reasons below. 
 
First of all, the three films seldom deal with subjects of ideological or political 
nostalgia. This can be supported by two pieces of evidence as follows. On the one 
hand, as far as their narratives are concerned, the films seem to neglect to represent 
(reconstruct) the political appearances or recollect the radical politics of the past. In 
the Heat of the Sun tells of a group of teenage boys living in Beijing in the Seventies. 
The whole film has nothing to do with the radical politics of China. More than 90% of 
Dirt is a narrative of sentimental entanglements of a few young people in the 1990s. 
Only in its beginning sequence are there a few shots that look back to the childhood of 
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the protagonists in Beijing, the mid 1970s, when the scene shows a couple of boys 
(around 7 years old) ―apprehending‖ a little girl (a bit younger than them) and playing 
together in an alley. The adults passing by do not realize their play at all. One of the 
boys speaks to the girl, ―Hurry! Own up!‖, which is followed by a medium shot 
framing the three children in the film. Each of the boys holds one of her arms behind 
her back.
243
 The little girl tries to break loose from the ―jet position‖ and says: ―Let 
go of me! I‘m Ye Tong [her name], I‘m not a spy!‖ Obviously, the scene implies a 
naive imitation of the radical behavior of the Red Guards in the Sixties. But it only 
sketches a background of the protagonists‘ childhood and has no apparent intention244 
of letting the political behavior relate to the realistic theme of the film. On the other 
hand, as far as the period of the nostalgic background in the films is concerned, it is 
totally not what the first wave has intensively focused on. The first wave typifies 
nostalgic concern about the 1950s and 60s. However, In the Heat of the Sun is mainly 
set in the summer, 1975. The black and white newsreel quoted in Dirt was shot in 
1976 at Premier Zhou‘s funeral. At the beginning of The Making of Steel, Zhou Qing 
(a teenage boy), experiences the Tangshan Earthquake (which occurred in July, 1976), 
and meets Fu Shaoying (a senior class girl in his school) in an earthquake shelter-tent 
in Beijing. When the film plays its first 15 minutes, it hints at the smashing of ―the 
gang of four‖ (October, 1976) that indicates the end of the Cultural Revolution. This 
historical background means that the nostalgic era framed by the films is not of the 
                                                        
243  In China it is called ―jet position‖ (喷气式), usually used in critical gatherings of the Cultural Revolution. 
People that were publically criticized were usually seized by two Red Guards behind them with their heads 
dropped and arms held up in a tight grip, like a jet aircraft. 
244  The whole film does not relate to any political connotations.  
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high-tide period of radical politics any more, but is set on the verge of the radical 
ending
245
. Such a historical setting not only leads a political representation to an 
absent condition in their nostalgic narrative, but also evades the possibility of directly 
facing the radical past. Thus, no matter whether they are in film narrative or a 
time-setting, the films do imply a silent strategy for political nostalgia. 
 
Secondly, the silence does not completely mean that the post-fifth generation 
directors have always intended to avoid the political past of the 50s and 60s. Their age 
is probably an insuperable factor as Jiang Wen (born in 1963), Lu Xuechang (1964), 
and Guan Hu (1968) seem quite different from those of the fifth generation. In the 
light of the directors‘ classification in the history of Chinese cinema, Lu and Guan can 
be identified as typical directors of the sixth generation
246
. However, Jiang‘s cinematic 
experience seems more sophisticated, as in the early days of the 1980s he was 
originally trained as a professional actor in the Central Drama Academy. Then 
fortunately he acted in the leading roles in Xie Jin‘s Hibiscus Town (1986) and Zhang 
Yimou‘s Red Sorghum (1989) and soon became famous. Although, as an actor Jiang 
has teamed up with many fifth generation directors (such as Zhang Yimou and Tian 
Zhuangzhuang
247
), he in no way can be categorized as one of the fifth directors. 
                                                        
245  It refers to the verge of the end of the Cultural Revolution and the eve of the reform and opening-up of PRC. 
246  In its narrow sense, the ―sixth generation‖ directors refer to a group of youth who entranced the directing 
department of Beijing Film Academy around the late 1980s and began to direct films in the 1990s. As one of 
its directors, Lou Ye, said, the Sixth Generation may be only a label, its definition open-ended because of the 
lack of a commonly shared manifesto or school of thought. Sixth Generation directors have their distinct 
individual tastes and their films all look different. http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/ 
China-SIXTH-GENERATION.html Also, the definition of the Sixth Generation, as Adam Lam mentioned, is 
still ―a question yet to be answered. Critics generally define the sixth-generation directors as those who grew 
up after the Cultural Revolution, so it is a very loose term.‖ See Lam (2005, 152-3). 
247  For instance, Li Lianying, the Imperial Eunuch (Tian, 1991). 
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However, as Jiang also lacks any professional background of film directing, he is 
seldom regarded as a sixth generation director in academic circles. This is the reason 
why Jiang, Lu and Guan are called by joint names in the discussion of ―post-fifth 
generation directors‖.248 As for the age of Jiang, his childhood seems closer to the 
sixth generation group. The reason that he may exceed the sixth generation and take 
the lead directing his own films is largely because he became a film star at a very 
young age, before 25. Therefore he could accumulate more advantages from 
filmmaking than his peers. Both Jiang and Lu were born before the Cultural 
Revolution, but there is still more than a ten-year age gap between them and Chen 
Kaige (born in 1952), Zhang Yimou (1951), and Tian Zhuangzhuang (1952). When 
China and its radical politics were experiencing a climactic period (around 1967 and 
1968), perhaps Jiang and Lu had not yet established a clear memory of their childhood. 
It is impossible for them to have personal feelings about the Red Guards and the 
violently critical gatherings that the fifth generation had experienced. So radical 
movements are probably not remembered with deep sentiment by the young directors 
at all, as in the radical moment of 1968, Guan Hu was just born. When his Dirt was 
completely finished in 1994, he was only 26. Thus as can be seen, the age distance 
may have become a barrier for those young directors to become involved in the 
political nostalgia. 
 
                                                        
248  Similarly to Jiang, some other directors today also interpose their positions between the fifth and the sixth 
generation, such as Gu Changwei, Hou Yong, and Lü Le. All of them are classmates of Zhang Yimou and 
graduated from Beijing Film Academy in 1982. They are younger than the fifth generation directors but much 
older than the sixth. In the early days of their careers, they worked with the fifth directors as photographers; 
and in recent years, they have created their own directed films. In this case, these directors can be also seen as 
post-fifth generation directors. 
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Thirdly, compared with the first nostalgic wave, In the Heat of the Sun, Dirt, 
and The Making of Steel have not been strictly censored or banned by the domestic 
film bureau. All of them have received a film permit for public release from the 
authorities and were successfully distributed in the domestic market. In the Heat of 
the Sun not only won awards from the Venice and Taiwan film festivals, but also 
became the one of only four local films that made a profit in the Chinese box office, 
1995 (Lam 2005, 185). Dirt, and The Making of Steel received their governmental 
permits in 1994 and 1997.
249
 The public release of those films in the domestic market 
shows that they are not restricted or excluded by the mainstream ideology (the 
government) any more. This is probably evidence that proves that the Chinese 
nostalgic film has gradually managed to come out from the domestic shade of the first 
nostalgic wave. Moreover, it provides a reference function for the new nostalgic mode 
for sometime in the future when the second nostalgic wave could smoothly avoid 
difficulties (in censorship). In fact, ten years later the second wave, no matter what the 
age structure of its directors is, with its nostalgic motif and narrative setting, and its 
historical background, seems in accord more or less with the mode of In the Heat of 
the Sun. The new kind of nostalgia is in a silent position (or possesses conservative 
and avoidable strategies) regarding left-wing or radical themes and pushes the second 
nostalgic wave into a peripheral state. That will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                        
249  Also mentionable, The Making of Steel was finished as early as 1995, but due to the investigation of censorship 
it was modified and delayed for two years. Eventually the film received its permit in 1997. 
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7.3. The Nineties’ Social Background with Its Nostalgic Sense Faded Out 
 
However, nostalgic creation reached hard times in the second half of the 
nineties. Nostalgic cinema in China had been stagnating for about ten years until the 
second nostalgic wave suddenly came into being around 2005. Perhaps the deadlock 
may reflect some new tendency in Chinese social and cultural development (or 
changes) of the nineties. These social conditions are likely to be relevant to the fading 
consciousness of the mass nostalgia. 
 
Compared to the 1980s, there seemed to be a much more limited belief in the 
1990s. In his latest public speech, Gan Yang concludes that the ideological and 
cultural differences between the eighties and the nineties of China were as follows: 
―the nineties is relatively simple, just one word can conclude its motif, ‗economy‘; 
whereas the eighties seems quite complex and diversified… various liberal minded 
thoughts sprang up, and they were not merely dominated by an economic logic‖ (Gan 
Rich). To some extent, this opinion seems to correspond with the historical situation 
of the Chinese nostalgic cinema. The first nostalgic wave happened in the early 
nineties, and its ideological thoughts on society, politics, and history may presumably 
go along with the spiritual status of the eighties to look to open-minded liberation and 
freedom. And it tries to culturally communicate (or get into accord) with the West 
through the ―export‖ of its nostalgic narrative. To some extent, we can see the catering 
for Western market as a practice of the ―narrowed‖ belief in economic reward 
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overseas. Therefore, the discussion has emphasized the fawning position that the first 
wave took towards a Western or late capitalist consumer culture in the last chapter. 
 
However, domestically speaking, a great divide formed in China, after 1989 
when those radically coloured and open-minded ideological propositions were 
suppressed strenuously. Also in the world, the simultaneously drastic changes in 
Eastern Europe (in late 1989) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1991) may 
probably have placed great pressure on Chinese socialist politics. China (especially its 
authorities) may have hoped for the withdrawal of the eyes of the mass culture from 
the conflicting ideologies to keep its social stability. In this case, accompanied by 
Deng Xiaoping‘s south inspection tour in 1992 and the deepening economic reform, 
China of the nineties (from the governmental origin of force to the whole social 
climate) mostly turned its direction towards economic construction. China gradually 
accelerated its freedom from the old trouble of a planned economy and came into a 
new phase of sustained and rapid development of the market economy.
250
 
Consequently it led to a rapid expansion of the bourgeoisie and the urban culture (Qiu 
Expansion), which probably prepared the ground for a Chinese climate of large-scale 
consumer culture in the future (Xie Ronghua 65). In this sense, the nineties could be 
regarded as a crucial accumulating phase for a cultural logic of Chinese 
post-modernity. Furthermore the nineties of China were also an important stage in 
                                                        
250  Within the thirteen years between 1989 to 2001, China‘s average growth rate of GDP (gross domestic product) 
per annum reached more than 9.3%; but the same rate in the whole world in the nineties was merely 2.5%. See 
Xinhuanet 2002-11-5. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/05/content_618871.htm Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010 
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China‘s slipping the leash of the planned economy and trending towards the market. 
In that period a number of state-owned enterprises declared bankruptcy and their 
capital was regrouped, which led to large numbers of people losing jobs and their 
indemnification of social welfare. This to some extent may have forced the masses to 
change their attention from politics into improving their individual economic 
positions. ‖Make money and live better days‖ became a dominant theme all over the 
nation. As far as the dreariness of political issues is concerned, the government of the 
time perhaps implied certain purposes through economic improvements, which were 
to bury the past, forget the misery, and look ahead in everything
251
, an out and out 
propitiatory strategy of the social culture. Effectively speaking, in the nineties of 
Chinese society, the levels of the economy, life style, and value orientation were all 
gradually integrating with (or keeping abreast with) Western social formation and its 
physical modernity. Looking into the future, it seemed possible for China in such a 
time of transformation to cast the past aside and to neglect its ideological trauma for a 
while, so that it could whole-heartedly long for and enjoy a daily improved material 
lifestyle. 
 
The above-mentioned social symptoms were also embodied in the national 
film industry of the nineties. On the one hand, Chinese film output in the period 
dramatically reduced and its box office sank into atrophy as well
252
; on the other hand 
                                                        
251  ―ahead‖ (前) is a homophone of the word ―money‖ (钱) in Chinese language. 
252  The annual film output of mainland China decreased from more than 100 films in the eighties to less than 40 
films in 1998; the audience in domestic cinemas in 1979 reached 27.9 billion persons or times, while the 
average cost of movie tickets were up to 15 Yuan (RMB) in 1998 but the gross box office of that year in China 
was merely 2 billion Yuan. On such a basis, the annual person-time of film watching in the late nineties was no 
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television became the dominant audiovisual entertainment in China
253
, TV plays and 
entertainment programmes began their explosion
254
. As for the film market, domestic 
cinemas started to import foreign commercial movies (especially Hollywood 
block-buster movies) systematically from 1995, and during the late nineties the 
Chinese box office was mostly dominated by those visual spectacles from Hollywood 
and Feng Xiaogang‘s comedy movies for greeting the new year.255 All of these 
phenomena prove (at least to some extent) that the Chinese masses did have an 
obvious propensity to consume everyday visual productions in the late Nineties: that 
                                                                                                                                                               
more than 1/200 of what it was in 1979. See Yin Hong, ―Chinese Films in the 1990s‖ 
http://www.tecn.cn/data/23371.html (last updated in 2009-4-30) and the web data ―An Overlook on the 
Chinese National Film Industry‖, http://www.mianfeilunwen.com/Yishu/Dianying/19534.html Last access: 4 
Oct. 2010 
253  The Chinese ownership of TV sets in 1965 was 0.1 per thousand people, but in Japan it was 285 in the 
corresponding period; while the number in China had risen to 156 in 1990 and 293 in 2000, which means its 
TV set ownership increased nearly 3000 times within 35 years (1965-2000). 1987 was the first time that 
China‘s TV set output exceeded Japan‘s and reached 1.934 million. From then on, China became the biggest 
country producing TV sets. By the end of 2007, the gross ownership of TVs in China was more than 0.4 billion. 
Hu Angang and Zhang Xiaoqun (2004) Analysis of rising popularization of China‟ s media based on actual 
evidences, News and Communication Studies, 2004-4, p5. And the web data, ―The Developing Route of 
Chinese TV Set Production‖, http://www.csmpte.com.cn/window/060516TVlishi.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
254  Since 1990 CCTV (China Central Television, the mainstream TV studio of the time) has started to broadcast a 
large-scale entertainment programme ―Super Variety Show‖ (Zongyi daguan) at prime time each weekend, the 
show is high in the ratings (18%,an audience of more than 0.2 billion per week); from the mid 1990s regional 
satellite channels become popular all over the nation. Provincial entertainment programmes spread through the 
country, for example ―Kuai le Da ben ying‖ from Hunan province won success quickly. As for the aspect of TV 
plays, since the first indoor TV serial ―Ke Wang‖ (Lu Xiaowei) came out in 1990, many other TV serials like 
The Story of an Editorial Office (Zheng Xiaolong, 1992), A Native of Beijing in New York (Zheng, 1993), Guo 
Ba Yin (Zhao Baogang, 1993) have continually appeared in the TV ratings. The narrative contents of these 
mainstream TV plays were inclined to focus on the contemporary realities and modern loves of the Chinese 
society rather than nostalgia. Other series from outside of mainland China, such as costume plays Xiang Shuai 
Chuanqi (Fan Xiuming, 1995), Xi Shuo Qianlong (Fan, 1991), Xin Bai Niang Zi Chuanqi (Xia Zuhui & He Qi, 
1993); Qiong Yao‘s serial TV plays Qingqing He Bian Cao (Shen Yi, 1991), Huan Zhu Gege (Sun Shupei, 
1997); the remakes of Jin Yong‘s Kung-Fu (martial arts) serials; and the American sitcom Growing Pains 
(broadcasted in China between 1990-1994) and so on, endlessly expanded the entertaining space of the 
Chinese mass culture. Television became a main and dominant mass media in the Nineties of China. Its 
tendency as a pastime in visual culture, and the inclination for entertainment have been obvious. 
Comparatively speaking, those political pasts, scars, trauma, and criticism (towards the 1950s-70s) had almost 
faded out from the mainstream visual arts of the Nineties in China. This is quite in accord with the situation 
after the censored first nostalgic wave, especially its consequent silence. 
255  Beginning from Dream Factory (1997), Feng successively directed many popular movies like Be There or Be 
Square (1998), Sorry Baby (1999), A Sigh (2000), Big Shot's Funeral (2001)… these films played an absolute 
leading role in the domestic market, and they even surpassed the greatest Hollywood block busters in the 
Chinese box office of the time, while all of these Feng‘s movies lack nostalgic concerns. Please refer to Yin 
Hong, ―Chinese Films in the 1990s‖, http://www.tecn.cn/data/23371.html Last access: 23 July 2009. In 
addition, a latest article from Xinhua News Agency argues that the Chinese film market from 1995 to 2002 was 
nearly the world of (or occupied by) Hollywood. See Xiao Chunfei, Xu Xiaoqing and Zhang Jiansong (2009) 
Wenhui Daily, 2009-6-15. 
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people or the mainstream interests/concerns at that time generally stressed what the 
television reflected – the realities, everyday life, entertainment,  contemporary issues, 
and what Jameson so-called the superficial culture (Postmodernism 17-25) – rather 
than some of films full of profundities, symbols, and criticisms of the previous, 
politics, and trauma. Chinese visual culture of the late nineties preferred a modern 
prospect rather than her own scarred past and traditions; it was keen on comedy and 
humour
256
 rather than political trauma and ideological tragedies. It was probably a 
phase in that it was temporarily deprived of memories, traditions, and the past. From 
today‘s perspective, it has become hard to tell whether it was the government that 
intentionally covered its past (and offset its public memories) through the economic 
success and modernized prospects; or the mainstream audience themselves who had 
not realized their past had a nostalgic value of consumer culture yet; or the Chinese 
cultural condition of the nineties was still distanced from a postmodern nostalgia. But 
at least a symptom cannot be denied: the mass consciousness regarding nostalgia 
represents a certain estrangement or even silence. 
 
7.4. An Accumulation of Power 
 
Chapter 7.1 suggested that silence may be power. Here the discussion would 
argue that silence also means an accumulation of power. From a linear viewpoint, 
                                                        
256  People may think that comedy and humour could probably lead to criticism, irony and satire on the social 
situation of the time. This perhaps shows that the mainstream media (and its audiences) would rather criticize 
today‘s social issues than focus on its political past; or conversely that the authorities (government) would 
rather compromise on the current criticism of today than let people recall their scarred experiences of the past. 
Therefore a connotation of the silence towards the past is very prominent through it. 
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there is a ten-year distance between the end of the first nostalgic wave in the mid- 
nineties and the eve of the second nostalgic wave around 2005. While an evaluation of 
the significance of the silent decade should not be as simple as only using a negative 
word like ―ignorance‖ or ―silence‖; it should have a more positive effect on its future 
development. Perhaps it could be regarded as a phase of saving up strength to start out 
again. 
 
Adam Lam briefly summarized the period (the 1990s) as follows, ―what China 
had experienced in the period was a social developing process that simultaneously 
combined with both industrialization and post-industrialization. It was a 
transformation period of historical economy and social system‖ (Lam 2005, 156). In 
other words, that was a key stage for China to evolve its social culture from a 
traditional economic mode into a post-traditional, or a modernized (and 
post-modernized) status. Then China of the nineties obviously made certain 
preparations for its future cultural development in the twenty-first Century.  
 
As far as nostalgia is concerned, the preparation was presented as a certain 
distance of cultural space or the march of time. Nostalgia is not as simple as memory 
recall. It is not really nostalgia to recollect what happened last week today. The 
emotional germination of nostalgia needs a relatively long temporal distance and a 
qualitative change of cultural conditions between circumstances of reality and of its 
past. Just as in the United States of the fifties relative to its eighties, the social 
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circumstances – including the political situation, economic condition, life style, family 
status, and various other cultural phenomena – have completely changed.257 
 
As for China, though it started its reform and opening-up from the 1970s, its 
mass culture in the following decades still needed a long-term accumulation of 
quantitative changes to break out of its tradition
258
 and to grow and adapt to a brand 
new modern life. Properly speaking the transformation process from the quantitative 
to the qualitative mainly happened in the nineties of the last century. Economic 
development not only leads to an increase in social wealth, it may also mean a 
transformation of systematic, spiritual, and cultural conditions. The transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy led to collapse of the socialist welfare system 
built in Mao‘s era. Egalitarianism was replaced by distribution according to one‘s 
performance, which could force the contemporary masses to give up those unrealistic 
communist convictions, then think of how to take advantage of reform, market and 
capital to trade a better standard of living in return. That is to say, the whole spiritual 
status of the Chinese public has changed fundamentally from a certain utopian fantasy 
to material desires.
259
 Such a production of desire may probably lead contemporary 
China to a further distance from the Mao era and to become closer to the global 
                                                        
257  North America, within the period of the 1950s to 80s, had experienced the Golden Age, the Cold War, the 
Vietnam War, counter-cultural movements, the oil crisis, the third industrial revolution, and its baby boom 
generation have gradually dominated the social mainstreams.  American life and its social formation have 
changed much from the fifties. 
258  Here the word ―tradition‖ includes backward economic traditions, cultural traditions, and radical or left-wing 
ideological traditions. 
259 Even to associate the Chinese social economy since the nineties with the basic concept of ―capitalism‖ is not a 
horrendous opinion in academic circles any more. For instance, Sheldon H. Lu mentioned that China ―pursues 
capitalist economic practices in the era of globalization‖ … and ―quasi-capitalist China in the 1990s‖… (130, 
148). 
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(especially the Western) capital
260
, markets
261
, and its consumer culture. Therefore a 
feasible speculation could perhaps be made that no matter what the economy, social 
culture, or the mental status of its population was, China before the nineties was 
totally different from what it is today. This is really what nostalgia needs to develop, a 
feeling of cultural and historical distance. The reason to stress the necessity of 
distance is that one could not imagine or create too many (postmodern) nostalgic 
emotions in a non-industrialized traditional China before the nineties (for example, 
China in the 1980s) or the other (quite similar) old and conventional China (like that 
of the 1950s).
262
 
 
However after the nineties, when contemporary culture entered into a new 
(twenty-first) century, China experienced its greatest modern and economic 
                                                        
260 Since the nineties China has become the biggest country introducing foreign capital in the world. By the end of 
2003, the gross foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has exceeded 500 billion U.S. Dollars, accounting for 
40% of the annual GDP of the year. The extent of taking advantage of foreign investment is apparently higher 
than the developed countries. It shows China has roundly opened its capital market and its economy has 
gradually moved into the global economic system. See ―A Report on the Exploitation of Foreign Investment‖, 
by National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2004), 
http://www.fsa.gov.cn/web_db/sdzg2005/internet/infoweb/DQWFB/qwfb35-01.htm Last access: 21 July 2009 
261 The Chinese total export-import volume was 165.5 billion U.S. Dollars in 1992, and it increased to 474.3 
billion in 2000; its gross national product per capita rose from 226 U.S. Dollars in 1978 to 420 Dollars of 1992, 
and with a steep rise from 945 Dollars in 2000 to 3266 in 2008. It took China 15 years to develop its GDP per 
capita from 200 Dollars to 1000 Dollars, but only 4 years from 1000 to 2000, and no more than two years from 
2000 to 3000. The data reflects the rapid growing economy, its market vitality, and the increased consuming 
capacity of the Chinese masses. See ―China‘s GDP Per Capita has Exceeded 3000 US$, the Interim of 
Becoming A Consumer Society‖, by Xinhua News Agency, 2008-3-24, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-03/24/content_7848957.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
262  There are examples of films in the 1980s (like My Memories of Old Beijing) that contain such a homesick 
feeling towards the 1920s, and it still depends on time and distance to create nostalgia. While other films in the 
80s such as Hibiscus Town and Woman-Demon-Human (Huang Shuqin, 1987), represent only a distance of a 
political transformation (from the Cultural Revolution to the reform and opening-up) and an ideological change 
(from left-wing radicalism to a pluralistic liberalism of the Eighties), rather than the life and cultural difference 
from its postmodern and visual superficiality. By this token, the first nostalgic wave in the early 1990s is 
basically the inheritance from the Eighties. What seems different is the readership (it has been discussed before 
that the first wave is to a large extent shot for the West). If there is a certain postmodern sense reflected from 
the first wave, it probably consists of the political/ideological difference in the appearances and the 
perspectives between the West (or the daily Westernized China) and the radical China of its past; rather than 
what the second nostalgic wave largely depends on in the new century: a great change in the social culture and 
economy. That will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
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transformation for a long time, with its traditions and past rapidly vanishing. 
Compared to the old times, perhaps it has accumulated adequate distances. ―The 
Chinese public who have been used to living in the market economy may need to wait 
up for a while and stop to have a rest.‖263 And recall the aftertaste of their past, no 
matter whether it was good or bad, brilliant or unbearable. It may also mean that 
China in its modern development of literature and arts has bordered on a stylistic 
exhaustion, or at least a lack of popular feedback from the public.
264
 Thus at this 
moment, taking advantage of cultural appearances and rebuilding a public memory as 
visual commodities, may perhaps save the desperate situation of the cinema. 
Accordingly at all events, various signals indicate that nostalgia suddenly became 
prevalent and popular in China around 2005, when Liu Yangdong published collective 
and nostalgic memoirs about his childhood in the 1960s and 70s in Beijing. In the 
preface, he writes, 
 
Because the manners and morals of the time change rapidly, nostalgia 
has been upgraded into a life style. When the book was half written, a 
TV station [in China] released an Internet survey of public opinion. 
The result shows, that in the table of the top ten most popular living 
styles, nostalgia comes first. This is also a reminder that those old 
memories, past events, former happenings, and those crusted odds and 
ends, which seemed flat and uninteresting before, are becoming more 
and more important, profoundly, flavored, attractive, and significant. 
(Yangdong Liu 1)
265
 
                                                        
263  See ―The Accelerated Era of Nostalgia‖, China Youth Newspaper, 2008-7-18, the culture edition. 
264  As John Hill mentioned, those high arts and culture, full of modernity and stuck-up individual styles, may 
probably be jammed in the deep freeze in the postmodern era. (Hill 99) This situation is similar to the 
embarrassed failure the Chinese cinema met in its domestic box office of the late 1990s. It can perhaps be read 
as a distance problem between a modern style (a high art in cinema) and the popular culture. 
265  “因为世道变得快，怀旧已升格为一种生活方式。这本书写到一半的时候，（中国）有家电视台公布了
一项网上民意调查，它显示，在十大时尚生活方式的排名榜上，怀旧列在了头一位。这也意味着，当年
那些陈芝麻烂谷子的事情，那些鸡零狗碎的事情，那些淡而无味的事情，正在变得越来越有分量，越来
越有滋味，越来越有意思和有意义了。” 
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Just then, the second nostalgic wave of the Chinese cinema burst out. 
 
7.5. Cultural Replacement and the Production of (Postmodern) Nostalgia 
 
The social transition experienced by China since the recent decades not only 
involves an economic transformation from the traditional to modern or post-modern 
society, but also predicates a change, from a production economy dominated by the 
planning system for the purpose of satisfying primary material demands, to a 
consumer economy based on measureless consumer desires. This changing process is 
an important foundation from which a contemporary issue of Chinese culture can be 
deduced or compared with the Western idea of a ―consumer society‖. That should start 
from the understanding of an accelerated ―replacement‖.  
 
This section is attempt to explore the way China‘s consumer culture produces 
a new (second) nostalgic wave of its own. 
 
7.5.1. Self-replacement, Waste, and Washing Out 
 
What is called here ―replacement‖, is to be precise, more like ―recycling‖. 
However it is not associated with a scarcity of commodities in a common sense or any 
kind of saving for the purpose of environmental protection in everyday life (such as 
the increasingly popularized charges for shopping bags in supermarkets), but refers to 
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the self-replacement, elimination and discarding in the mass domain of  
contemporary culture. 
 
Such replacement derives from an inner source of cultural guidance in human 
beings. As Baudrillard mentioned, ―everyone who does not wish to fall behind, be left 
on the shelf or lose their professional standing must update their knowledge, their 
expertise‖. This kind of renewal has increasingly become something unavoidable, 
―the cycle of fashion‖ in consumer society, where ―everyone must be ‗with-it‘ and 
people must ‗recycle themselves‘ – their clothes, their belongings, their cars – on a 
yearly, monthly or seasonal basis‖. If they refuse to do so, ―they are not true citizens 
of the consumer society‖. Today what we have is ―not a rational process of the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge, but a non-rational social process of 
consumption‖ (Baudrillard Consumer 100). Just as all living matter needs a process of 
metabolism, without reason, this introdues a re-discovery and re-explanation of 
natural qualities of our own. 
 
But beyond the built-in impulse of human beings, consumer society is 
applying itself to transfer such self-replacement into certain waste, disuse and 
discarding of the mass culture. In the meantime, human beings try to free themselves 
from the emotional stress and anxiety associated with confronting universal moral 
commandments towards waste, and turn it into a positive need. After all, ―all societies 
have always wasted, squandered, expended and consumed beyond what is strictly 
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necessary‖. Only when it is ―in the consumption of a surplus, of a superfluity‖, can 
individuals or a society ―feel not merely that they exist‖, but that they are living their 
lives. Then there must be a positive connection between profusion and waste in a 
consumer society. Profusion means a surplus beyond basic existing satisfaction, while 
―all production and expenditure beyond the needs of strict survival can be termed 
waste‖ (Baudrillard Consumer 42-5).266 
 
When ―waste‖ becomes certain necessary needs, it (the term) then can be 
regarded as ―disuse‖ and ―discardment‖. Consumer society improves such a 
fundamental and direct system of discardment in an economic process of the everyday, 
where ―wasteful consumption has become a daily obligation‖, a ―forced and 
unconscious institution‖, and a ―cool participation in the constraints of the economic 
order‖ (Baudrillard Consumer 47). This means in a consumer society, from the very 
beginning a product is not only created for its use value and durability, but for its 
death, its obsolescence, and to be disused. In other words, discarding (or waste) 
becomes part of the social production and has been added, at very beginning, to final 
destiny of the product. A consumer society places much stress on consuming the 
―produce‖ or producing the ―consumption‖ through wasting and discarding, so as to 
promote a never ending cycle of production and consumption. 
 
                                                        
266  This point also raises a question between real needs and false needs. We go through life very conscious of what 
we need, or is there any system that continues fostering what we think we need? Are people, in consumer 
society, spending time, money and effort chasing after things that they do not really need? Replacement and 
obsolescence are thus good excuses for renewing our needs endlessly. 
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Nowadays, waste is largely based on ―technological ‗sabotage‘ or organized 
obsolescence under the cover of fashion‖. Its only purpose is not to promote but to 
wipe out the use value of objects, to detract from their time (or life) value by 
―subordinating them to their fashion value‖ and to accelerate their replacement. 
(Baudrillard Consumer 46) 
 
―Organized obsolescence‖ tends to be closely related to the nostalgia of 
contemporary culture. In the following discussion, nostalgia becomes a vivid 
symbolic scene of time and space. Through the retrospection of its past space, and in 
the countercurrent of the trend, it tries to build a value of past time. But underneath, 
nostalgia helps consumer culture (and post-industrial society) corroborate the fact that 
time is, time was, and time is past. 
 
7.5.2. A Byproduct of the Obsolescence – The Production of Nostalgia 
 
When such compulsive and organized obsolescence/elimination becomes an 
economic driving force, the discussion will naturally lead to an understanding or an 
explanation of today‘s increasingly overflowing nostalgic culture developed by 
Lowenthal. An eliminating acceleration (or an accelerated obsolescence) seems to be 
the author of this sedition of nostalgia under such a condition of violent consumption. 
 
―The transience of artifacts of all kinds – houses, clothes, books, furniture, 
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crockery – transforms our surroundings no less than outright destruction‖. According 
to Lowenthal, all the objects around are here today and gone tomorrow, and ―rapidly 
become useless and die out‖. In an old society where use value was still dominant, 
and ―materials were expensive and labour cheap, many things were made to last, often 
handed down from generation to generation‖. But today, replacement seems much 
easier than repair: 
 
Who now protects fabric with dust covers? How many turn cuffs and 
collars or darn socks? Manufacturing makes it cheaper to buy whole 
new aggregates than to furnish old structures with new parts. Because 
profits depend on high turnover, old goods become obsolete even when 
still serviceable. […] Most things lasted a lot longer than now […] 
Entire categories of objects rapidly become useless and die out. 
(Lowenthal 398) 
 
Those daily products, the everyday environment, their appearances… and 
everything in the consumer society – under the veil of fashion (which is producing 
―waste‖) or on the false pretences of self-replacement – are rapidly being washed out. 
In this sense, nostalgia can be better understood in the accelerated obsolescence of the 
postmodern: The more the past is destroyed or left behind, the stronger the urge to 
preserve and restore. (Lowenthal 399) 
 
This is the connection between the obsolescence of a post-industrial culture 
and the bursts of nostalgia. In other words, it is not our subjective minds that instill a 
consciousness that we have entered the postmodern age and unintentionally pay more 
attention to some past appearances; but the consumer society and its production 
features that promote (or force) people today into a system of obsolescence and 
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compel them to separate from a past of their own. Therefore, people‘s historical 
feelings about a few hundred years ago seem quite different from the nostalgic 
feelings of the past thirty or forty years: the former perhaps concentrates more on 
understanding the past, but the latter is preoccupied with the present tense,
267
 namely 
an alienation between a past and the reality.  
 
Here one may emphasize the word ―more‖ used by Lowenthal. ―More‖ does 
not just mean a quantitative increase, as if people today would have more past 
memories than the people before in sheer quantity. ―More‖ here indicates a certain 
concept of pace or speed in time and space. That is to say, what the people today have 
experienced, the individual vicissitudes and environmental changes in their lives, 
seem much greater than those of the ancients. In a consumer society, the alienation of 
time has been accelerated and proliferated more than that of space. The original 
meaning of nostalgia based on a distance of space has been replaced by an inability 
for time to return. The postmodern is based on such an eternal present where people 
can do nothing but mourn for their yesterday. For measuring the past, ―more‖ can be 
probably juxtaposed with ―fast‖: the more the past is destroyed, the faster the past is 
left behind, the stronger the urge to preserve and restore. This can best explain why 
nostalgia comes regularly, but especially floods consumer society today. In fact, 
contemporary China has shown a great dependence on its nostalgia in the huge social 
revolutions as well. For instance, what has appeared nowadays, an accelerated 
                                                        
267  As Lowenthal said, ―nostalgia is memory with the pain removed, the pain is today‖ (8). 
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obsolescence of the social spectacle. 
 
7.5.3. An Obsolescence of the Social Spectacle 
 
An accelerated supersession in everyday spectacles is closely connected to the 
commodification of time as well. The experience and observation of human beings 
interms of ―time‖ usually derive from their direct spatial experiences. People always 
ask themselves in every life: what the past looked like, rather than what is a past time. 
The quickly changing spectacle of social life makes people realize there is a lapse of 
space related to a symbolic passage of time. The most powerful nostalgic feeling in 
film is not driven purely by excitement at diachronic alienation, but perhaps some 
indefinable sadness, loss, and regret. To reconstruct past spatial symbols on the screen 
one must simultaneously realize the loss of that space is beyond retrieval in the 
present reality. The feeling of modernism, with its linear time consciousness breaking 
through tradition, quickly isolates the past, not veer off in another direction, moving 
straight into the future, seems ineffective on nostalgia. According to Jameson, 
―modernism is temporal and postmodernism spatial‖ (Geopolitical 153). Nostalgia 
today apparently runs counter to an extension of certain linear time, but acts more on 
rebuilding a past space, and leads to a fragmentation of time. 
 
Such disorder of time should have provided a common perspective from the 
accelerated obsolescence and the rapid development of the recent thirty years in China 
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gives just the opportunity for social space. The two photos below of a courtyard 
dwelling from an alley in Xicheng district, Beijing, were shot by the writer in winter 
2001. On the right side of the first photo, there is an aluminum chimney stretching out 
under the low eaves which was a typical range exhaust system for domestic stoves 
(burning honeycomb briquet) in old Beijing. There is also a wooden birdcage hanging 
under the chimney, which provides a source of imagination to the owner of the house 
who saunters along the alley every morning with the lovely bird together, a vivid 
description of the local culture and traditional atmosphere. The lower-left of the 
second photo shows an outdoor hut for showering in the same courtyard. There is seen 
indistinctly an icon of Mona Lisa on the wooden, shabby door of the hut, but actually 
it is only a title page of a back copy of a calendar, which is similar to what Walter 
Benjamin or Andy Warhol emphasized in the industrialized reproduction of arts, an 
accidental appearance in the present popular culture. The Chinese destination of high 
art from the West – becoming a dilapidated fig-leaf in a shower room – is increasingly 
discarded in the same way as it is in the West. However, the actual influence of 
Western modernization has gradually changed from the illusion of Mona Lisa to the 
certain reality of contemporary China and has been represented by the other part of 
the photo, where the eaves become a clear-cut watershed and powerlessly bear the 
oppressive feeling of the outer-space of the yard: the pressure of a nearly completed 
skyscraper
268
 towards the traditional everyday life. To express the threatening action 
of the modernization on the traditional spectacle in terms of ―strangulation‖, ―invade‖ 
                                                        
268  It is actually a headquarters block of a foreign bank in Beijing. 
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and ―occupy‖ seems not undue at all. In fact, the age-old eaves and the shower room 
(shown in the photos) combined with the archaic courtyard and the whole alley had 
been demolished before 2006 without trace. The old and traditional architecture in 
Beijing had been formed at least 700 years before, when the Mongolian ruler Kublai 
Khan established his Chinese dynasty at Beijing. But now the obsolete courtyard with 
its seven hundred-year history cannot long evade its doom, being gradually melted 
into the modern city spectacle, and changed into a part of a car park and public green 
space near the modern bank building on the West Second Ring road (the chief 
business street) of Beijing. 
 
 
Figure 11. A Birdcage and Modern Times 
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Figure 12. Mona Lisa in Beijing 
 
Modernity is inclined to erase those dated and broken traditions from one‘s 
eyes, but nostalgic films tend to include contrasts. The dilapidated downtown streets 
in old Anyang in Peacock and Sichuan in Dam Street, the low ceilings of the past staff 
dormitories and the gloomy workshops of third-line factories in Shanghai Dream, the 
barely furnished university campuses in the pioneering period of the 1980s in Summer 
Palace, the loading and unloading station of the planned economy in old Wuhan in 
Peach Blossom, and the traditional courtyard of Beijing in Sunflower, through all 
these obsolete spectacles (the past visual symbols), nostalgia is trying to construct 
distant recollections of time by the rebuilding of space. In films today, these symbols 
have turned the time values into cultural commodities. Nostalgia is attempting to free 
itself from the linear sense of modernity which usually loves the new and loathes the 
old. Instead of that, it goes upstream, against the current, and recycles the timeworn 
ideas in combination with today‘s disordered visual (spatial) culture of the 
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postmodern. However, the nostalgic spectacle, by taking the space and visual culture, 
gives a definition of a ―past‖ which makes people assure themselves that an earlier 
space-time has belonged to a time long gone. Only then may it rapidly break apart 
from a psychological past, so as to push the yesterday (or a history) to become an 
absolute otherness, and eventually in the present tense, it isolates itself from (or 
ignores) its own conscious subjective aspect of emotion. 
 
7.5.4. Nostalgia in China: An Obvious Deduction 
 
If a consumer society, as Baudrillard said, has catalyzed a cultural system of 
certain accelerated obsolescence, and the system as Lowenthal said, has quickened the 
self-elimination of social symbols so that people have rapidly left behind a sense of a 
past and in return intensified their desire to recall it with nostalgia, then such an 
agenda is not merely similar in context to China‘s development of the last thirty years. 
It should be said that the nostalgic culture and its cinema in China have generally 
tallied with the (consumer) cultural conditions outlined above. 
 
Those symbols of everyday life, mentioned by Lowenthal seem equally 
transient in China. His descriptions of Western cultural obsolescence can easily apply 
to a similar cultural reality of contemporary China as well. The dress, bicycles, 
furniture, streets, and the whole urban landscape of the Chinese people in the 1980s 
are totally different from China today. Little boys do not feel ashamed any longer 
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because of receiving used clothes from their elder sisters; people in China do not see 
clothes as their heirlooms and hand them down from one generation to another. They 
will not ride their old Feige, Yongjiu and Fenghuang
269
 in the streets; antiquated 
furniture and the stagnant vista of the local cities in the past age of public ownership 
have all vanished with little trace. The accelerated obsolescence of all the everyday 
spectacles has increasingly shown that China‘s mass culture is moving into a cycle of 
fashion and consumption. Without constant consumerism and elimination, how have 
the life appearances brought about such tremendous changes? The cultural and 
fashionable transmutation is in return proving a consumer society is on the rise in 
China. 
 
The accelerated cultural replacement has also been represented by images in 
film from the second nostalgic wave. Xin Jie Kou (Xue Cun, 2006) reminds us that 
tape recorded advertisement for ―Yanwu‖ was known to every household in China 
from television in the 1980s; while today, the brand combined with its outdated 
product has collapsed without being noticed in the flood of various price wars a long 
time ago.
270
 Peacock (2005), set in a small city of northern China in the late 1970s, 
relates a family‘s past life experiences where the elder brother, the sister and the 
younger brother sit together around a table with their parents in a shabby and open 
corridor of a dormitory building, create homemade coal balls in autumn, or deposit 
                                                        
269  They are outdated brands of bicycle made in China. 
270  Since 1982, Yanwu recorders had become a pillar product of the Radio Factory of Jiangsu. They had occupied 
the first place in the market share for over eight years. But after the 90s, the factory did not catch up with the 
world development trend in digital productions and was bankrupt in 1996. 
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fresh tomato slices in glass bottles for the winter. But nowadays all these previous 
household lifestyles are gone forever, as a result of changes in family structure (the 
one child policy), the modern heated buildings, and the increase in vegetable 
greenhouse technologies. Also the public earthquake shelter-tent (set in 1976) in 
Sunflower (2005) seems quite strange to the young generation today. Its romantic love 
story set on the ice surface of Houhai
271
 in the 80s reflects many happy memories of 
the contemporary audience, but in recent years a warm winter resulting from 
greenhouse gases has made the ice surface of the lake often unsafe. Furthermore the 
market economy makes the lake cease to be an innocent breath of romance and turns 
it into a red-light district full of pubs and bars. The flared trousers and slick disco 
moves reflected from Shanghai Dream (2005) went out years ago and have been 
replaced by the present fashions (such as Hip-Hop). The immature (university) 
campus love of the 80s is shown in Summer Palace (2006) as certain utopian 
nostalgia. Zhou Wei and Yu Hong, hand in hand, roamed the lakefront glorying in the 
sunset. College students get together in the evening talking about democracy, freedom 
and the West. All of these show a cultural temperament which is romantic, modern 
and plain (naive) for the new generation of Chinese intellectuals of the 80s. But now 
Zhou Wei‘s sports suit with the traditionally made double white lines has already been 
discarded by contemporary college students who mainly yearn for Adidas and Nike, 
and the past single-minded pursuit of freedom and democracy in the 80s has been 
swallowed up by the sound of hysteria all night from college halls playing CS and 
                                                        
271  Shichahai is an historic scenic area consisting of three lakes in the north of central Beijing. Houhai is one of 
the lakes. 
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Warcraft.
272
 
 
Today‘s nostalgic reinvention of past life in the 70s and 80s may perhaps 
astonish every Chinese audience with brevity of their own past, and trigger their 
unprecedented interest. This interest may not only derive from an infatuation about 
the past, but focus more on the present isolation and alienation from the past, and the 
huge changes which mean a rapid supersession of the contemporary everyday. 
 
7.5.5. Political Supersession or Consumption Supersession? – The Different 
Production of Nostalgia in the Two Waves 
 
Nostalgia plays a promotional action in a consumer society. If Baudrillard is 
right that the accelerated supersession of consumer culture is based on ―sabotage or 
organized obsolescence under cover of fashion‖ (Baudrillard Consumer 46) and for 
the purpose of eliminating the use – and time – value of commodities to quicken the 
replacement, then nostalgia obviously sides with consumption (consumer society) and 
fosters its growth. The instinct for memory-based nostalgia of human beings is just 
like a rubbish museum that changes abandoned cultural garbage with its use – or time 
– value lost into something memorable and recycles it into circulation.273 So within 
the circle, nostalgic culture accomplishes a shift in tense from the present to a past, 
                                                        
272  CS, Counter-Strike, and Warcraft are both popular internet games in the campus culture of China. 
273  Such a cultural circulation, apparently, is quite in accord with the postmodern parody (or imitation) after the 
present cultural exhaustions, but the motive of rubbish recycling seems more positive as one of the postmodern 
cultural reactions. 
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like a public oath of naming, by which people are convinced that the culture of 
yesterday is now all ancient history. In other words, it is not just a consumer society 
that produces nostalgia, but nostalgia is also creating a time consumption of the public. 
This is one of the important factors leading to the flood of nostalgia in consumer 
society. 
 
But the accelerated obsolescence of consumer society is not the absolute 
requirement for Chinese cinema to produce nostalgia. Undoubtedly the domestic 
economy and the local consumer culture in China had crucial influences on the rise of 
the second nostalgic wave; however this point does not apply to the first wave. In fact, 
the causes of the two waves differ considerably. In the former discussion (in Chapter 
6), it has been argued that the creation of the first nostalgic wave had more connection 
with China‘s political (ideological) changes, fawning positions in regard to foreign 
novelty-hunting and the childhood experiences of the fifth generation directors. 
Nevertheless, the first nostalgic wave seemed quite limited in its connection with the 
local factors in the economy. At least from its macro performance (for instance, the 
above-mentioned macroeconomic improvement), it was still showing few signs of a 
qualitative change in China‘s social conditions in the early 90s from those of the 60s 
or 70s. The real economic take-off of China should be counted from the mid nineties. 
Thus there is a distant connection between the nostalgic sense of the first wave and an 
economic (or consuming) supersession. 
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As things stand now, many nostalgic symbols have been remade from the first 
wave, such as the repeated signs of the Sixties: the Red Guards, radical slogans, and 
the scenes of people being violently criticized and denounced. These cannot be read 
as an economic obsolescence or self-replacement in a consumption sense, but rather 
tend to satisfy the overseas interests in an exotic distance through the imitation of 
obsolete ideology and past (radical) politics. People, such as Jameson, may still call 
the first wave an ―imaginary museum‖, full of past memories, dead styles, masks and 
voices (Jameson Consumer 115); and assert that they themselves are consuming 
certain past representations and spectacles. However such consuming behavior in the 
early 1990s (based on ideological supersession or geopolitical difference) does not 
equate to the economic renovation of domestic consumer culture (mainly reflected 
from the second wave) in twenty-first Century China. 
 
The first nostalgic wave was largely constructed on certain breaking points of 
ideological history, such as the turn and change from stratocracy (the Republic of 
China, 1912-1949) to a socialist politics (the left-leaning period, 1950-1976), and to 
Deng‘s era to set things right (the late 1970s and 1980s). Ideological representations 
dominate its nostalgic reinvention. Farewell My Concubine contains a fifty-year long 
history from the 1920s, and many of its appearances derive from political variations 
through wars, regime, or political strategies, including the Second Sino-Japanese war 
(1937-45), the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China 
(1946-49), the founding of socialist China (1949), the Anti-Rightist Campaign (since 
Chapter Seven 
 279 
1956), and the Cultural Revolution (since 1966). Most of the nostalgic representations 
of the first wave – the Japanese army uniform of the 1930s, those regimentals of 
Kuomintang officers in the 1940s, the Chinese tunic suit, and the emerald green 
uniform of the Red Guards in the late 60s – were not eliminated as a result of a 
profusion or supersession in consumer society at all. In the same way as the fatal 
embarrassment that happens to Cheng Dieyi (Farewell My Concubine), when his 
traditional costume for the Beijing opera does a not satisfy the new (socialist) 
situation of the 1950s, it implies a certain compulsory replacement of cultural 
representation by political changes rather than a consumption supersession. 
 
However the second nostalgic wave is not inclined to contain such lengthy and 
far-flung history as Farewell My Concubine and To Live did in their narratives. Nearly 
all of the stories in the second wave take place after the Great Tangshan Earthquake 
(1976). Peacock is a piece of the ephemeral past from 1977-1984; Shanghai Dream 
happens in the early 1980s; Xin Jie Kou is set in the mid 1980s; the nostalgic section 
of Summer Palace focuses on the late 1980s; and Sunflower, The Teeth of Love and 
Dam Street all start their stories from the late 1970s; even The Road and Sailfish set 
their nostalgia in the 1960s, still narrated as a point of the past rather than a long 
historical clue. Generally, the second wave has kept itself away from the politically 
sophisticated period of Chinese history (1920s-1960s). The late 1970s and 1980s were 
a relatively stable period for economic development, which probably makes its 
nostalgia present much purer supersession in consumer culture. 
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The difference and distance of the nostalgic representations between the two 
waves consist in a transformation from a politically compulsory obsolescence (for 
instance, the radical Cultural Revolution with its compelling intentions) to a 
self-replacement of a mass cultural system, such as a postmodern consumer society 
with its accelerated elimination of the past. Consequently to some extent, the alleged 
two cultural revolutions of the contemporary world by Dirlik, the great Cultural 
Revolution of China and the postmodern cultural revolution of the late capitalism 
(Two 4-15), have acted in concert with each other through a process of nostalgic 
representation in the Chinese cinema. The transition from the first to the second wave 
testifies that the domestic cultural consumption of the twenty-first Century in China 
has greatly improved over what it was in the early 1990s. Its social function 
(significance) has transformed from presenting political scars and satisfying exotic 
novelty-hunting, to a postmodern nostalgia increasingly penetrated and dominated by 
a local and public consumer culture of China. 
 
7.5.6. A Disappeared History – To Read a Postmodern Nostalgia in Spectacle 
 
A dramatic change in economic development naturally leads to a 
transformation of cultural conditions. The shift from economic consumption to 
consumer culture seems unstoppable. If a constant self-supersession makes China 
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achieve a consumer society in the economic category, the spectacle
274
 is filling the 
space of consumer culture. 
 
Spectacle, as John Frow put it, is derived more ―in part from the increasing 
integration of ‗cultural‘ process and ‗cultural‘ goods into the system of production‖ 
(Frow 6). That, of course, is closely related to the development of the productive 
forces, because according to Guy Debord, when the accumulation of capital (or 
economic abundance) develops to certain extent, the primary logic of production will 
change into a spectacle and its portrait (34). This frees mass culture from the 
limitation on technological innovation and pushes it to certain visual and virtual levels 
of an inauthentic transition. Just as Roberto Finelli alleges, 
 
In the postmodernist era, things — mass-consumed commodities — 
become more and more sheer occasions for capital‘s realization and 
less and less the means for satisfying the natural and cultural needs of 
human beings. Things progressively become less authentic and lose 
their use qualities; they turn into superficial, rapidly seductive, and 
consumable commodities.  
(qtd. in Frow 6) 
 
Deriving from its superficiality and seductive quanlities, an extreme viewpoint 
from Debord thinks that such a visualized commodity has gradually been instilled in 
and dominated social life: the modern world ―presents itself as an immense 
accumulation of spectacles. All that was once directly lived has become mere 
                                                        
274  John Frow introduces the term as follows, ―the ‗present age‘ is defined in more precise terms as a set of social 
relations of production, and the ‗sign‘, ‗copy‘ and so on reappear as the category of the ‗spectacle‘: the 
fetishized form of the commodity in a system of representation which is in part to be understood as the system 
of the mass media, including advertising and design; in part more specifically as the social force of television 
(which can often be directly substituted for the word ‗spectacle‘); but at times more generally as the visual, or 
the forms taken by the gaze within a consumer-capitalist society‖. (Frow 5) 
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representation‖… reality becomes ―a pseudo-world apart‖ (Debord 1-2). Therefore, as 
a foundation of the commercialized illusion and ―its most general form‖ (Debord 47), 
spectacle has completed its colonial reforms on a modern society (Debord 42). 
 
For Frow, Debord‘s argument that spectacle has increasingly shifted into a 
commodity culture has opened many postmodern topics for discussion later, such as 
superficiality and the in-depth, the hyper-real world, a spatialization of time, and its 
domination of the everyday abstraction. (Frow 7) 
 
One must however stress the ambiguous relationship between spectacular 
effects and nostalgia, which largely determines the special role nostalgia plays in 
consumer culture, where a presentational, visual, and filmic commodity has 
increasingly become a part of the spectacular culture of the postmodern. The sudden 
burst of nostalgic presentations in the Chinese film industry since 2005 may 
conversely testify to the large-scale spread of the past spectacle in a commodity 
culture of the mainland. Nevertheless, this has also shown a dilemma as to how to 
present the relation between spectacle and nostalgia. 
 
Outwardly, the flooded images of nostalgia return the audience to their 
thoughts of the past, and build a bridge between presenting reality and history. 
Through a reconstruction of past spectacles, contemporary people may achieve the 
consumption of a certain past tense. That is of much cultural consequence in a linear 
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time deconstruction. As Pam Cook put it, ―Nostalgia plays on the gap between 
representations of the past and actual past events, and the desire to overcome that gap 
and recover what has been lost‖ (4). Here a nostalgic spectacle has been described as 
a visual form used to break through (or annihilate) the distance of time and promote 
their communication. 
 
However, this thesis has repeatedly emphasized that the consumption of the 
spectacle‘s appearances has actually severed its relationship with historical verity, as a 
postmodern spectacle has tended to be a simulacrum without deep realities any 
more.
275
 A social culture dominated by the spectacle will directly lead to a paralysis 
of history and memory. According to Debord, a spectacle should be explained as ―the 
reigning social organization of a paralysed history, of a paralysed memory, of an 
abandonment of any history founded in historical time‖ (Debord 158). Furthermore he 
said, ―the first priority in the spectacle‘s domination is to obliterate all knowledge of 
history‖… and impose upon us ―a world without memory‖ (qtd. in Frow 7). If his 
point is accepted, it runs counter to the understanding of nostalgia by Cook. 
 
If a spectacle can still become effective in postmodern culture, it seems 
necessary to adjust the explanation of nostalgia. In fact, a postmodern nostalgia 
usually indulges, waives, dispels, and releases a historical past, rather than redeeming 
or retrieving it. In a flat, superficial and depthless culture of spectacle, Susan Stewart 
                                                        
275  As Baudrillard quoted from Ecclesiastes, ―The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth--it is the truth 
which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true.‖ (Select Writing 169) 
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points out, ―that a surface is projected so that a profundity can be lost‖ (qtd. in Frow 
8). In other words, the ―past‖ images reflected from a screen do not have much effect 
on communicating, stimulating, and resurrecting a history, but intend to cover and 
replace the profound depth. Consequently a past profundity melted irreversibly in an 
accelerative process under the spectacle of cinematic nostalgia. ―Many accounts of 
modernity view the world retrospectively, in sadness; a fortiori, many accounts of 
postmodernity mourn a loss of history and of memory‖ (Frow 7). The implication is 
probably that the latter and its mourning have no intention of redeeming but to give 
away all the past. 
 
Thus, the understanding of nostalgia by Pam Cook may be modified in a 
postmodern context as follows: nostalgia is not playing on, but appearing in the gap 
between representations of the past and actual past events, and the desire is not to 
overcome but to distance that gap and not to retrieve but to reconfirm what has been 
lost. Then a dated image affirms the elapse of yesterday, rapidly separates it from 
people‘s consciousness of their real space, and eventually enables the 
commodification of time. 
 
The second nostalgic wave is laden with just such a responsibility. Nowadays 
spectacles make yesterday‘s memory become history and objects of mourning and are 
freely consumed. A condition of forgetfulness has accorded well with the needs of the 
rapid social reform (and economic development) in China since the 1980s. Compared 
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with the first nostalgic wave, the second one is not indulging in the sadness of past, 
and its narrative seems relatively light, easy and pleasant. Its recollections about past 
youth and lost love have replaced those radical and political conflicts. Even though 
some of the loves (as they are in Shanghai Dream, Sunflower, The Teeth of Love, and 
Peacock) turn sour quickly and seem not sweet enough, there is no sinister political 
fate such as that which Bean, Shujuan and Fugui meet in the first wave. The execution 
by shooting in Shanghai Dream, Yuhong‘s abortion in Sunflower, He Xuesong‘s 
drowning in The Teeth of Love, and the sister‘s despair over her first love in Peacock 
are not played up (as ―radical‖ trauma) in the visual sense on the screen. Nostalgia 
obscures the pain and scrapes off its scar in one‘s memory. Neither does it provide 
love with any perfect ending, nor has it left any possible chance to reconnect the past 
with today. The past has already passed and no longer has a connection to the present. 
This is not a rethinking or a reassessment of history at all, but a firm chopping off 
(amputation). Such a determined attitude then may force people to turn back to the 
eternal present. 
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Chapter Eight 
A Real Nostalgia for China 
 
8.1. The Families That Are Broken 
 
The traditional China according to Zhao Shu, a sociologist, is much based on 
the concept of family as a basic element of the society. Zhao also argues that China 
forms a relatively steady social system with the core idea of filial piety within each 
family. (6) This implies the importance of maintaining a stable family for Chinese 
society as well. A family is not only a main determinant of each member‘s happiness 
but also indicates the basic status of each society and era.  
 
The discussion of this chapter starts with an analysis of the second nostalgic 
wave from its interpretation of ―family‖ in cinema. The point is that broken families 
in nostalgic films lead directly to a conjunction between nostalgic appearances and a 
mass (postmodern) consumer culture of China. 
 
Both of the nostalgic waves in Chinese cinema history stress their dramatic 
conflicts through the reflection of broken families. By way of contrast their mode and 
conditions of representing the ―break‖ are different. Moreover, there is a basic 
difference (between the two waves) in the expression of the relationship between the 
family and the outer world (namely the society). 
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Whether it is Farewell My Concubine, the Blue Kite, or To Live, the narration 
of the first wave is always centred on a unique subject, which is the way the families 
are devoured by the external world. With no exception, Juxian (Farewell My 
Concubine), Shujuan (Blue Kite), Fu Gui (To Live), all regard a complete family as a 
prerequisite for happiness. That is consistent with the social aim of traditional 
China.
276
 However beyond their families, radical politics and its social atmosphere 
play a negative role and overhang the nostalgic narration as the greatest villain of the 
piece. It is the immediate cause of Juxian‘s suicide, Shujuan loses her three husbands 
one after another, and Fu Gui loses his son and daughter. In other words, the miseries 
of those families are caused by outside factors in politics. The nostalgic appearances 
and their reconstructions of the first wave are totally shrouded in the depthless 
political haze, such as the Red Guards, red flags, the Maoist propaganda team, 
Dazibao (big-character posters), and critical gatherings. The domestic harmony and 
the wicked political setting are formed or shaped as a crucial binary opposition in the 
dramatic conflict in the films, which seems overwhelmingly favorable for 
constructing and intensifying a stereotyped oppositional conflict in some of the minds 
of the Western audience, between a weak image (a traditional and broken family) and 
a radically mighty social status. At the end of the last chapter, the discussion argued 
that these kinds of stereotyped political images cannot present the entire content of the 
                                                        
276  For the relationship between family and society in China, please refer to (Li Guimei 30-3). The article pointed 
out that the (special and unique) social and historical conditions have always made the Chinese family deeply 
combine and integrate with the geographical relationship of kin. To attach importance to the family-oriented 
conception does have the positive significance of maintaining family stability and social harmony. To 
understand the conventional culture of China, one must read the Chinese family. 
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culture and lives of the Chinese masses in the 1950s and 60s. It is probably the 
fawning position of the first wave towards the West, and in the meantime it can be 
seen as a distortion of the radical past. In the view of orientalism, the essence of their 
intentions consists in that, through the stereotyped political elements, the export 
nostalgia may emphasize the negative effect of the social status and the tragedy of the 
social life. To a large extent, the first nostalgic wave seems to lack concern with the 
cultural reality of the local masses, but it intentionally stresses a kind of domestic pain 
in the past memories. 
 
A past pain is a kind of nostalgia too, which has been overwhelmingly 
represented in the first wave of films exported. Lowenthal has said that Western 
people today love nostalgia and firmly believe that what is old is necessarily good, 
and they hope that nostalgia may help to remove them from their real predicaments 
and to escape into a past dream (4-8). But what the nostalgia in China represents is 
perhaps quite the reverse. People hope that the pain from their memories will not 
trouble them any longer, so the ―pain‖ in their nostalgic setting is not only to relive 
the thrilling past but also to assure them that those past disasters are out of reach today. 
Therefore the ―fearsome‖ past ―is by no means universally rejected‖ in a nostalgic 
sense (403), and one is none the less glad to recall one‘s early days of trauma. ―Yi ku 
si tian‖, or calling to mind past sufferings and thinking over the good times, is a 
proverb all over China.
277
 
                                                        
277  Literally 忆苦思甜. The sufferings experienced by the Chinese public from the 1950s to the 60s are unique 
and are difficult for Westerners to understand. Lowenthal cited a case to describe what in the past disappointed 
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But in the second nostalgic wave, the domestic pains gradually moved away 
from the binary conflicts of the radical politics and changed into emotional reflections 
on cultural and social changes between the Mao era and Deng Xiaoping‘s reform and 
opening-up (around the late 1970s and early 1980s). If the first nostalgic wave seems 
inclined to cater for (or satisfy) a Western stereotyped consumption of the radical, 
oriental imagination, then the second nostalgic wave perhaps leans towards giving 
more attention to the consumer mentality of the local/mass nostalgic culture in China. 
 
Differently from the first wave, the nostalgic films of the second wave choose 
a sort of ―implosion‖ (internal contradictions) to represent the broken family 
(domestic) in most cases. In other words, this kind of breakdown of families does not 
derive directly from the external persecution of political movements, but it results 
from the autonomous internal contradictions and represents the family members‘ 
resistance to the concept of a traditional family itself from inside to outside. 
 
Shanghai Dreams (Wang Xiaoshuai, 2005) is set in the early Eighties. The 
protagonist, Qinghong is an adolescent high school girl. She has followed her parents 
and migrated from Shanghai to Guizhou Province (one of the most undeveloped 
                                                                                                                                                               
people in the West. It was in 1981 when a Western man walked through the hippie encampment at 
Stonehenge‘s solstice rites and it felt ―like stepping back in time… I have returned to the Sixties… and it 
stinks‖ (Lowenthal 28). While I would argue that the cultural style of hippies just embodies the freedom of the 
Western public in the Sixties to freely choose their own life styles; however in China, the Sixties were 
completely smothered by Maoist politics, people had no alternative at all. For the Westerners, the Sixties is 
probably a radical coat, and one may choose whether he/she would like to put it on or to take it off; but for the 
Chinese public, the Sixties are no form of escapism for any one. Maybe they seem not happy but still deserve 
thought and recall. 
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places in China) to implement the Third-line Construction
278
. But many years later, 
with the beginning of the Chinese reform and opening-up, many parents of the 
Third-line hoped that their children could study well and be admitted to a university 
so that the families could return and improve their lives in the big cities. Such a 
homeward urge proves that from then on the political pressures on individual families 
have become flexible and gradually fade out, so people are increasingly having 
freedom of choice to reside where they want to. This means an external (political) 
atmosphere is no longer the most important factor that directly forms the dramatic 
conflicts in nostalgic narratives, but just an actual storytelling background. The real 
main conflict of the film consists in the contradictions between its family members, 
the parents and their daughter. It is Qinghong who is beset with puppy love and 
deviates again and again from the homeward plan of her parents.
279
  
 
Sunflower (Zhang Yang, 2005) tells the story of a boy (Xiangyang) and his 
course of growth in Beijing. From his childhood Xiangyang loses the freedom he 
enjoys (playing with other boys) and is forced by his father to learn art and drawing. 
When he grows up, his parents want him to be a student in art college, but he fails his 
entrance exam and falls in love with a girl. His father then compels him to prepare for 
                                                        
278  The ―Third-line Construction‖ was regarded as a major decision of the Chinese industrial system and national 
defence construction from the 1950s to the 70s. As a preparation for war and to guarantee logistics support in 
the interior areas (or third-line) in the event of war, the Chinese leadership decided to build new factories in the 
southwestern regions, mainly Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. For this very reason, a huge number of 
technicians and skilled workers were transferred from big cities like Shanghai, Harbin and Shenyang to 
southwest China that seemed far away from the potential front line in the Cold War. 
279  Though potentially speaking, the film takes advantage of Qinghong‘s story to hint at a criticism of the Chinese 
authorities that stripped her parents (and many other Third-line workers like them) of their own lost youth, the 
motif of the nostalgic story has already wandered away off into an ideological theme and focused on its 
realistic legacy of the past. 
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the next exam and prevents his love by taking his girl friend for an abortion. 
Xiangyang is filled with a desire to break through the family barrier and look for his 
freedom. 
 
Peacock (Gu Changwei, 2005), The film is divided into, ―sister‖, ―elder 
brother‖, and ―younger brother‖, the three parts (of the family) to be narrated. They 
(the parts) interrelate with each other but still seem independent. This narrative 
strategy itself may imply a divisive effect. The sister wants to trade her future with her 
bloom (her love and body), but her dreams have been shattered over and over again; 
because he is slightly mentally deficient, the elder brother is spoiled all the time by 
the parents, which leads to his sister and brother‘s envy; the younger brother does not 
like to live in his brother‘s shadow of bearing the cap and bells, while he fails to 
overcome the inauthenticity of his own existence and eventually chooses to escape. 
 
Dam Street (Li Yu, 2005) tries to break through a family ethic in an extreme 
way. A ten year old boy Xiaoyong falls in love with a twenty-six year old woman 
Xiaoyun without the knowledge that she is his biological mother and he is her son. All 
of these films represent the inside explosion/contradiction within the concept of 
family. The impact of the collapsed idea of family then embodies (to some extent) the 
process of a social transformation in China from its traditional consciousness of 
family to a modern (postmodern or post-family) society that upholds individual 
freedom. 
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Figure 1. Xiaoyun and Xiaoyong in Dam Street 
 
Completely different ideas of a broken family are shown in the two nostalgic 
waves. The first wave tends to impute most responsibilities to the political 
environment and regards radical politics as the immediate cause of the domestic 
sufferings. However the second wave does not blindly blame the contradictions on 
society and politics, but takes advantage of the discontent of the young individuals 
with their families and pushes them to change society. Through the process of being in 
society, the new nostalgic wave uses more space to show the connections between 
individuals and the social realities, which can be read as direct evidence proving that 
the visual culture (nostalgic films) in China has gradually left its stereotyped political 
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factors behind
280
 and paid more active attention to the realities of its own mass 
culture. Only in this way (by breaking through the restrictions of the family) can 
Chinese nostalgia make its films break certain stereotyped styles and represent a 
reconstruction of the entire social climate of the past. If we say that the family 
sufferings reflected from the first wave accomplish the task of pastiche towards a 
radical climate of Chinese politics; then the broken family with its inside explosion is 
likely to lead the narrative emphasis towards the whole climate of the social culture. 
The retrospection of the mass culture and the representation of the vivid life 
experience of the past have directly connected the Chinese cinema with its 
domestic/indigenous (rather than foreign/Western) postmodern nostalgic (and mass 
consumer) cultures. 
 
Here in the second wave, the main dramatic conflict of the nostalgic narration 
has changed from a contradiction between family and the external ideology (political 
context) into a conflict between individual freedom and traditional family cohesion. 
Those external social factors no longer play a negative role full of political intrigues, 
but they are transformed into certain temptations (of the reformed new China) that 
entice the young family members into fighting against the old families and step into a 
brand new society. The relationship between individuals and society is no longer 
similar to what orientalism embodies, to seek an extreme conflict between the 
                                                        
280  Some of films in the second nostalgic wave (such as Shanghai Dream with its the Third-line issue) still exploit 
the family contradictions to hint at some of the historical (or even political) legacies, so that they form a 
historical or social criticism in potential. But this kind of connotation seems neither apparent nor immediate. It 
could be seen as a peripherization of the critical strategy, which will be mentioned later in the chapter. 
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innocent weak and the ruthless politics. But it relives all kinds of wonderful memories 
and life experiences of the masses, from the ―underground party‖ attended by 
Qinghong (Shanghai Dream) to the romantic ice-skating encounter of Xiangyang and 
Yuhong (Sunflower)… All of these are beautiful memories of the Chinese masses 
beyond the political sufferings. For Fredric Jameson, they not only mean a pile of 
freely-chosen parts of a nostalgic museum, but perhaps indicate the sort of mass 
consumer products that belong indeed to the Chinese audience of their own. As far as 
their nostalgic time is concerned, the main historical period that the second wave 
focuses on is no longer the Fifties and Sixties, full of political symbols, but the late 
Seventies and Eighties that seem peaceful in politics but gradually cause restlessness 
in people‘s mind with the various new ethos of reform. 
 
8.2. Reflections on the Transitional Society 
 
Diachronically, it seems undeniable that nostalgic films would refer to certain 
reflections on the historical transitions of society as they change through time. Owing 
to the different historical stages that the two waves are separately focusing on, their 
modes of describing the transitional stages are not quite similar. 
 
8.2.1. Political Transitions of the First Nostalgic Wave 
 
What the first wave pays close attention to is the period between the 1940s to 
Chapter Eight 
 295 
the 1960s when the People‘s Republic of China was newly founded. That is the 
dramatically evolutionary phase of the political and social systems in China, where 
the undeveloped, semi-feudal and semi-colonial country had suddenly changed into a 
socialist state. It is mainly through the appearances of those political symbols at that 
time that the first wave embodies the situation of social transitions.  
 
For example, Farewell My Concubine develops its transitional background 
through representing the scenes in which the Communist forces (the PLA) enter 
Beiping (old name of Beijing) without a fight in January 1949. On a vernal morning 
the communist soldiers, smiling and shouldering their rifles, march in procession. 
There are jumbo portraits of Lenin and Mao raised by the troops, and the sides of 
streets are full of hailing crowds, singing and dancing. Xiaosi
281
 also shouts and 
jumps for joy with the crowds, cheerfully receiving the new socialist era in his name. 
The warm sunshine floods the opera theatre. Bean gives a performance for the 
Communist soldiers and there is a shower of applause afterwards. In return, the 
soldiers sitting in seats also sing their war song with their heads held high. The 
orderly singing from the seats is so loud that it apparently dominates the atmosphere 
of the theatre and constrains the delicate Peking opera. One may realize from the 
scene that even though the whole theatre is immersed in a victorious atmosphere, the 
victory, the applause, and the performing stage do not belong to Bean and his 
traditional opera. Here the film pre-sets a foreshadowing of the potential tragedies of 
                                                        
281  Xiaosi is a young man adopted by Cheng Dieyi (Bean) at an early age who follows Bean as an apprentice in 
the Peking opera performance. Later in the Cultural Revolution, it is Xiaosi who becomes a Red Guard and 
leads Bean, Stone and Juxian to be violently criticized. 
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the story. 
 
While beyond the military force, critical gatherings become a crucial political 
symbol of the transition as well. They clearly indicate the profound changes in the 
social system that had taken place in the country around the early Fifties. Master Yuan 
(Yuan Siye, played by Ge You) in Farewell My Concubine could always keep his 
social identity as a member of the upper class in both the period of Japanese 
occupation (1937-1945) and the Republican era (1911-1937 and 1945-1949). 
However, after 1949 when the communist system commenced, he is unavoidably 
called to account by socialism, as a reactionary. Soon after Yuan is sentenced to death. 
His destiny seems quite similar to that of Long Er in To Live, which tries to combine a 
historical scene (of criticizing rally) together with the situation of Chinese land 
reform
282
 of the time. That reflects a profound transition of the ownership of 
productive means (from private to public land ownership) by the newborn communist 
authorities in the early 1950s. Because he owns land and property, Long Er is 
classified as part of the landlord class and then publicly executed by shooting. The 
crack of the shot marks the beginning of a new era. But what seems ironic is that the 
first wave avoids giving those radical scenes a reasonable explanation. For instance, 
Farewell My Concubine does not suggest that Yuan has ever committed any 
crime-ridden error, and what the audience hears at the criticizing rally are just those 
                                                        
282  China has been through a series of land reforms. Here in the film it refers to the thorough land reform launched 
by the Communist Party of China from 1946 to 1952, around the period of the foundation of the People‘s 
Republic of China. It won the party millions of supporters among the poor and middle peasantry. The land and 
other property of landlords were expropriated and redistributed so that each household in a rural village would 
have a comparable holding. By the time land reform was completed, at least a million landlords and members 
of their families had been publicly executed or beaten to death. See Stephen R. Shalom (24). 
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inane accusations, such as ―reactionary theatergoer‖ or ―has to be executed to assuage 
the people‘s anger‖. Again, Long Er‘s death penalty does not result from any 
particular offence or crime caused by his property, but because he refuses to give his 
estate to the socialist authorities and burns his own house down which blocks the 
socialist land reform. From the Western standpoint, these reasons seem completely 
preposterous and may perhaps easily arouse Western sympathies. In a Western 
audience‘s eyes, there are only violent killings without providing logical reasons. This 
probably caters for a stereotyped prejudice of barbarous cruelty in the discourse of 
orientalism. Similarly, in the Blue Kite, the story does not give any reason why Tie 
Tou‘s own father is classified as a rightist after he returns from his toilet and why his 
stepfather must be carried away on a stretcher for public criticism when he has been 
stunned by the Red Guard. All in all, the political nostalgia of the first wave has 
over-simplified those historical campaigns in vague presentation. 
 
8.2.2. Cultural Transitions of the Second Nostalgic Wave 
 
The second nostalgic wave however relies rarely on political appearances as 
its transitional indices. This is largely because what the new wave mainly focuses on 
is not the same historical background/era that the first wave is concerned with, but a 
relatively new historical stage, the late 1970s to 80s. Since then China has gradually 
moved towards the path of market, capital, and economic development, and been 
away from the radical life of political struggle. Through the social transition, the 
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infiltrating ideas of the market economy and popular culture may practically surpass 
the political settings in the everyday life of the public (especially the youth of that 
time) and become the prominent feature in their memories. 
 
Accordingly, the second nostalgic wave rids itself of the dull symbols of 
politics, and focuses on taking advantage of popular singing and dancing – certain 
vivid symbols of culture – to embody the reconstruction of the society and its 
transitional spirit. That has met with general acceptance by the films of the second 
wave. 
 
The first film to be discussed is Peacock. The story is set in the period around 
the late 70s and early 80s. In the sexual excitement of his adolescence, the younger 
brother draws some naked sketches at school, which are soon uncovered by his father 
and this offends the son‘s amour propre. His adolescent overreaction results in his 
dropping-out and travelling to distant parts without trace. Then in the latter half of the 
film, the narrative time line develops into the transitional period of the early 1980s. 
The changing process (from the planned economy to the economic reform and 
opening-up) is embodied in the return of the younger brother in the film: a few years 
later, he gets back to his parents from the South. By this time, he has changed into a 
loafer living with an older woman and her son, but the change reflected in the film is 
not limited to this. The name of his partner is Zhang Lina and she is a street singer. 
The film tries to use her singing scene in an outdoor dance place to represent the 
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changing climate of the whole society. The scene is made up only of a long take. At 
the beginning, there is a close shot with Lina standing behind the microphone and 
presenting her speech of welcome to the audience, ―Ladies and gentlemen, welcome 
to our open-air dance of Eden. I‘m going to sing a song…‖ What she performs is a 
traditional Henan Zhuizi
283
, Gua Wang Ba. With her singing continuing, the close shot 
is gradually and steadily zoomed out to a long shot. From the movement of the lens, 
the shot shows a series of dissonant collages between traditional and modern, Eastern 
and Western cultures. The dance held on the street has a totally Westernized name, 
―Eden‖; but what is performed is a quite traditional, nationalized and localized opera. 
The performer, Lina, with a folding fan in her hand, makes as if to present the 
traditional ballad in its original taste and flavour; but what she wears is a formal 
Western style evening dress and possesses a kind of sexual allure. Originally, the 
incidental music for the opera should be played by Zhuiqin, a traditional Chinese 
string instrument; but with the extension of the zoom lens (all the instruments on the 
stage are gradually shown in the long shot), what the audience has watched and heard 
from the film scene is a hybrid music combination of Western drums, electronic organ, 
and the traditional string instrument. When the long take zooms out toward its end, 
one may realize that the stage where she is singing is not a well equipped dance hall at 
all, but a pop and open air gathering, in which the local Chinese are woodenly doing 
their dance in a Western style (ballroom dancing) that had come into vogue not long 
before in China. What they are accompanied by is a bricolage of Western instruments 
                                                        
283  Henan Zhuizi (河南坠子), a traditional local opera and ballad, singing to the accompaniment of the zhuiqin (a 
Chinese stringed instrument), popular in Henan Province. 
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and oriental opera. Thus the cultural transition of that time has been vividly conveyed 
by the dramatic hit and the exaggerated use of the oriental tradition and the popular 
culture from the West, or perhaps it can be read as an (postmodern) intertextuality of 
the depthlessness of both Chinese and Western cultures. 
 
Almost the same long take and mise-en-scene appear in Dam Street as well. 
The story is set in a small city of Sichuan province, in the early 1980s. Xiaoyun, a 
sixteen year old school girl, becomes pregnant by her classmate and later gives birth 
to a baby boy. Xiaoyun is told that the baby has died at birth, but behind her back her 
child is privately adopted by his paternal aunt (an obstetrician). Then the film‘s time 
line jumps to ten years later, when the baby has grown up into a school boy. With that, 
similarly to Peacock, Dam Street also takes advantage of singing and dancing in a 
sequence (of a long take) to accomplish the narrative transition, from the 1980s to the 
early 1990s. At the beginning of the shot, there is a close-up of Xiaoyun‘s face. She is 
singing a traditional Sichuan opera and has already had her face painted with thick 
make-up with the theatrical costume paraphernalia on her head. This explains that her 
identity has changed from a school girl into a Hua Dan
284
 in a theatrical troupe of 
Sichuan.  
                                                        
284 Dan (旦) is the general name for female roles in Chinese opera, often referring to leading roles. Hua Dan (花旦) 
is a kind of Dan, and its actresses often play lively, vivacious young female characters. 
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Figure 14a. Dam Street and Its Long Take Sequence 
 
Then the camera slowly tracks out into a medium (close) shot in which 
Xiaoyun‘s costume and the traditional opera scenery behind her are gradually shown 
in focus, so that the film audience may realize that she is performing on an opera stage. 
Suddenly there comes a series of noisy voice-overs from the opera audience in the 
film. They seem over satiated with the traditional opera and require Xiaoyun to 
change her performance into pop songs. The camera does not turn back to her 
audience, but still keeps on Xiaoyun‘s medium shot. She stops her performance and 
abuses them with a word in whisper, then has to cater for their tastes and starts to sing 
a popular song, Just Like Your Tenderness (Qiasi nide wenrou)
285
 by Cai Qin. The 
camera is continuously tracked out to a panorama with some modern instruments 
(guitars and an electronic organ) emerging on the stage, even more there are two 
dancing girls standing on both sides of Xiaoyun with their shoulders and waists 
naked.  
                                                        
285  《恰似你的温柔》(1979) 蔡琴。 
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Figure 14b. Dam Street and Its Long Take Sequence 
 
Such an appropriation of both the traditional art (Sichuan opera) and the 
vulgarized pop culture together conveys certain postmodern implications, similar to 
that which Charles Jencks originally argued in postmodern architecture and Lyotard‘s 
comments on eclecticism (Jencks 14-9; Lyotard Explained 8). It is not too much to say 
that traditional culture in China is increasingly engulfed by pop culture, and it is 
reflecting a fact that the tradition as a high art is faced with an awkward predicament 
in the contemporary Chinese mass market. There is a fading border and a compulsory 
eclecticism between the Chinese tradition and modern times, and the high art. Jencks 
defines postmodernism in terms of the concept of bricolage, involving ―the 
combination of modern techniques with something else (usually traditional buildings) 
in order to communicate with the public‖ (14). I would argue that for contemporary 
China the postmodern situation seems the converse. It is not the modern avant-courier 
that fuses itself in the ―traditional‖ public, but the Chinese traditions that have to be 
mixed together with some modern, post-traditional, Western, and popular ingredients 
to please the ―modernized‖ public today. However, the bricolage or the eclecticism is 
just the temporary and surface phenomena, the real implication is that it is a dying 
tradition that is increasingly being replaced and swallowed by the popular culture. 
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Figure 15. Pop Dance on Traditional Stage 
 
Later when Xiaoyong (Xiaoyun‘s son) goes to the theatre for her performance, 
the traditional opera stage emerges in the film again. This time Xiaoyun simply 
changes her opera costume into a model of a showgirl with a modern miniskirt. What 
she sings is a pop song Don‟t Pick the Wildflowers on the Roadside (Lubian de yehua 
ni buyao cai)
286
, by Deng Lijun (a household singer from Taiwan) from the early 80s. 
Those traditional cultures (like Sichuan opera or Henan Zhuizi) have been discarded 
on the opera stage today and have lost their existing space. As a high art, they have 
been increasingly shelved and forgotten by the contemporary mass culture. In this 
process, a rough idea of the foreign (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) cultural 
influences – which may be considered as cultural colonialism or post-colonialism – on 
China can be reflected through the nostalgia. Instead of those outdated radical politics, 
certain new cultural representations, such as electronic organ, guitar, Western drums, 
sexual dancing dresses, the colourful stage-lighting, the ―Eden‖, pop music, and 
ballroom dancing, have become the most crucial indicators of transitional times. 
 
                                                        
286  《路边的野花不要采》邓丽君 
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Shanghai Dream also describes a green purity of calf love in the new era (the 
early 80s) with the benefit of dancing sequences. At the beginning of the Chinese 
reform, the popular dancing saloon (as something new introduced from the West) had 
not yet been accepted by the Chinese mainstream. Influenced by the remaining social 
conduct of the former radical politics, people of the time (especially in some remote 
areas) still regarded the modern Westernized singing and dancing styles as bourgeois 
(or capitalist) dirt. But the young generation in China rapidly lost patience with their 
inability to withstand the popular allure and were ready to make trouble. That is the 
origin of ―underground‖ dance. In the film Qinghong and Xiaozhen (two high school 
girls), behind their parents‘ backs, take part in an underground dance held by a group 
of youths at a nearby factory building. The temporary dance hall seems quite dull with 
dim lights. All the girls stand on the periphery of the dance floor with their heads 
hanging in shame. The young fellows stand in the centre of the dance place in pairs 
and are dancing Western ballroom dancing ungracefully. The reserve between the 
sexes is not broken until Lüjun appears in the hall. He is the most handsome boy in 
the party. He instantly places his eyes on Xiaozhen and decides to seduce her with his 
special solo dance.  
 
Figure 16. Dancing in Shanghai Dream 
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The dance music in the cassette radio is changed into ―Gotta Go Home‖287. All 
the boys stop to surround Lü Jun. He takes off his coat and shows up his attractive 
appearance: exaggerated sunglasses, checkered shirt in a light colour, wasp-waisted 
flared trousers, and a pair of polished shoes… simply a Chinese Elvis Presley. He 
goes out on the floor towards Xiaozhen on the other side with his disco dancing steps, 
like an adult rooster performing a courtship rite. His giddy steps with sexual cues 
easily work to capture her heart. Xiaozhen lets herself be seduced on to the floor. The 
whole sequence lightens up the long stifled youthfulness of the Chinese public on the 
eve of new times. In the face of the new life of reform, Chinese people start to 
accumulate passions in their hearts. Here there are no guitars or Western drums nor 
any eclectic effects (between the tradition and Western cultures) reflected in the film, 
but one may feel the signs of the times through Xiaozhen‘s excitement that seems 
hardly to be restrained.  
 
If Shanghai Dream shows that the Chinese early 1980s still retained some 
reservations about the exotic popular culture in the remote town of Guizhou; by the 
late Eighties of Summer Palace (Lou Ye, 2006) the intellectuals of a great metropolis 
like Beijing have already thrown themselves into the completely modern, Westernized 
and popular culture. Yu Hong and Zhou Wei are lovers in college. The location of 
their first meeting is set in a pub. Formerly such places of Westernized entertainment 
as pub or bar had not existed in a planned economy (before the 1980s) at all. But from 
                                                        
287  The song is also called ―El Lute‖, a double A-side single by the German band ―Boney M‖ in 1979. 
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the second half of the Eighties, they became an important gathering place for educated 
youth in Beijing. While a group of young people (including Yu Hong and Zhou Wei) 
are walking into a pub, a reproduced version of Can‟t Take My Eyes off You by Andy 
Williams (1967) rings out from the scene immediately (as background music). 
Accompanied by the old song, the film arranges a set of sequences imitating the 
culture in the pub of the late Eighties in Beijing: a college girl sitting in the pub is 
reading aloud the modern poem To the Night by Haizi
288
; a few individuals sit 
together around the table and talk about how to protect workers, peasants and 
intellectuals; a young fellow sings a campus song
289
 to his guitar. Without grief or 
restraint, they are in the dim and red lights, and all the people of the pub are immersed 
in a reformed atmosphere of romantic and free excitement. It does of course include 
Yu and Zhou‘s love. Another song then rings out, Paul Evans‘s Seven Little Girls 
(Sitting in the Back Seat) from the dance floor. From this great hit released in North 
America in 1959 it seems not hard to associate the golden age of the U.S. with the 
relaxed cultural climate in Beijing on the eve of ―1989‖. The young couple (Yu and 
Zhou) stands facing and staring at each other in the wonderful singing from the West, 
then they lean together and freely twist their bodies in the dancing crowd of the floor. 
Along with Evans‘s song, they immerse their love and their yearning towards the 
future in the belated admiration for Western culture.
290
 Then one may rediscover how 
                                                        
288  Haizi (1964-1989) modern poet in contemporary China. 
289  Campus songs here refer to a music genre that originated in Taiwan around the 1970s. It combines a folk music 
style and a rhythmic breath of youth in colleges. Campus songs from Taiwan had a profound effect on the pop 
culture of the Mainland of China in the 1980s. http://baike.baidu.com/view/959815.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 
2010 
290  Such a nostalgic scene is roughly in accord with Zhang Yiwu‘s argument (cited in Chapter 6) that the new 
minds of the generation of intellectuals and elites in China 1980s became flooded with Western thoughts, and 
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the epochal characters in the Chinese social elites of the Eighties (with their position 
of leaning towards the West) had developed their process of modernization. 
 
While the process is represented in a nostalgic way, it may perhaps have 
certain postmodern and post-colonial effects of introspective examination. The 
beautiful things that are past (but sentimentally left in one‘s memory) always sweep 
people off their feet; however it is related to a realistic pain today by nostalgia. As far 
as postmodern introspection is concerned, the pain comes from waking up to the 
exhaustions of the Western modernity and an unavoidable return to certain eclecticism 
(namely, getting back to the conflicts and the appropriations between the origins of 
the modern and the tradition). On the other hand, as far as the post-colonial reflections 
are concerned, what the pain from the nostalgia has produced is a potential vigilance 
(criticism) over a series of cultural changes in the Westernization, materialization, and 
modernization of China. 
 
As for its postmodernity, generally speaking the second nostalgic wave (like 
the four singing and dancing examples shown above) is full of enthusiasm for 
reflecting the contemporary Chinese social evolution of a modernization through its 
cultural appearances; if this transitional progress can be seen as part of Chinese 
modernity, then the process of imitating and self-reflecting a past modernization by a 
large number of nostalgic films may probably imply a cultural symptom of 
                                                                                                                                                               
immersed in fanaticism and infatuation with Western modernity. See Zhang Yiwu (34-41). 
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post-modernity. It is by no means an accidental reflection from individual cinema, but 
a collectively retrospective trend towards the modernized transition. After 
experiencing the spiritual worship of communism (from the 50s to the mid 70s of 
China) and the materialized worship of the Western capitalism, perhaps all the 
advanced civilizations and prevalent styles from the modern world have been admired, 
imitated and exhausted in China today; and when any exotic innovation seems no 
longer fresh in the twenty-first Century, the Chinese modernity is likely to be on the 
point of drying up with nothing to follow. The people there (in the new century) need 
to stop to gather breath and get back to their traditions and past memories by which 
they can find the driving source of the future development in China. Therefore, if 
there is something called a Chinese post-modernity, it first should be a fusing 
(combining) process in which the extreme modernization and the blind Westernization 
may return to its self-directed tradition and history. Only in this way can the Chinese 
nostalgic/postmodern connotations be coordinated with the ―postmodernism‖ outlined 
by Jencks and Lyotard: namely an eclecticism and the cultural return from what is 
modern to the traditional. In this writing, a certain architectural sense of the times may 
reflect and support Jencks‘s perspective. For instance the ―West Railway Station‖ 
(completed in 1996 in Beijing) simultaneously upholds the Bauhaus style
291
 and 
reintegrates some historical elements of a traditional China (like the stately gate 
towers on the top of the building). It proves that an eclectic trend has already 
germinated in the contemporary architecture of China, but it is ten years later (around 
                                                        
291  One of the most influential currents in modernist architecture. 
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2005) that a similar cultural return has been largely embodied in today‘s nostalgia. 
 
Figure 17. The West Railway Station, Beijing 
 
As for its post-colonial connotations, in the same way as the puppy-love of Yu 
and Zhou, one could not help feeling puzzled. How long could the honeymoon last 
between China and the West? Why must a Chinese nostalgic past memory be radiant 
with and full of Westernized modern colours? Could it be that the second nostalgic 
wave is a Chinese epic exposing an ongoing effort of the Western culture to permeate 
the traditional/modern China? If such a hypothesis can be realized, then for the 
Chinese audience of the new century and as time goes on, they may probably create a 
new awareness of such an exotic penetrating power in culture. Taken in this sense, 
nostalgia as certain post-colonial criticism (or in national/cultural self-defence) is 
trying to arouse people from their modern dreams to rebuild a traditional heritage of 
their own. 
 
In any case, the second nostalgic wave has seldom become involved in those 
intuitional appearances of politics. Instead of the radical/ideological changes, it 
emphasizes a whole climate of social and cultural transition. But conversely, what 
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does the lack of politics
292
 mean? 
 
8.3. Evasive Strategies and the Marginalization 
 
This ain‟t no truth or dare,  
They‟ll kick you, then they beat you, 
Then they‟ll tell you it‟s fair. 
So, beat it… 
 (Michael Jackson, “Beat It” in Thriller, 1982) 
 
This discussion is not going to pay attention to racial prejudice. But the words 
of Michael‘s song seem helpful to stress a conservative and evasive strategy in the 
broad range of cultural sense. In fact there is no comparability at all between the 
repressed feelings of the racism in America and a restricted nostalgic filmmaking in 
China. However, in the face of suppression the countermeasures by the Chinese 
cinema are likely to be in accordance with what Jackson suggested, ―beat it‖. 
 
The avoidance of the local censorship is an unavoidable consequence under 
compulsion. Since the 1990s the governmental attitude to political nostalgia in the 
Chinese cinema has tightened up. This point has been discussed in Chapter 6 (about 
the local film censorship) and in the beginning of Chapter 7 (about the punishment 
received due to politicalized film releases) in detail, so it is not repeated here. There 
are examples of the uncompromising posture by the governmental censorship in both 
of the two nostalgic waves, such as Blue Kite and Summer Palace, which have left 
                                                        
292  Here I do not mean that there are no political connotations reflected from the second wave at all. Actually those 
social/cultural transitions in the films (especially Shanghai Dream) may still arouse much political imagination. 
However most of them are not directly reflected by the imitated political appearances that seem obviously 
inadequate in the second wave in comparison with the first one. 
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deep impressions (and painful lessons) on the Chinese cinema history of censorship. 
Their absence (exclusion) from the domestic box-office and the punitive sanction
293
 
suffered by the directors (Tian Zhuangzhuang and Lou Ye) have all cast a shadow 
over the Chinese nostalgic filmmaking since the 1990s. In this case, Chinese nostalgia 
must adopt evasive strategies in peripherization if it is to attract great attention in local 
cinemas. 
 
It has been mentioned in Chapter 7 that between the two nostalgic waves 
(1995-2004, especially the late 1990s) the whole film industry of China had sunk to a 
low ebb, but there were still sporadic films released with a nostalgic sense in that 
period, such as In the Heat of the Sun, Road Home (1999), and The Making of Steel 
(1997). These films, no matter what their nostalgic characteristics, quantity, and 
release dates are, seem hard to classify in either of the waves. However to various 
degrees, they have all learnt the lessons of the domestic failure of the first wave and 
adopted all kinds of evasive strategies, which provide referential experiences for the 
large-scale outburst of the second wave later in 2005. This part of the discussion will 
be first based on these films of the late nineties and will then combine some details of 
the second wave in order to discuss and summarize some of the features in the 
transitional nostalgia of marginalization. 
 
                                                        
293  From the very beginning of Chapter 7, the discussion has argued that the politicalized release process of the 
two films is probably an excuse for a governmental salvo on censorship. In fact the exclusion of the films from 
their domestic market is perhaps largely related to the political contents reflected in the Blue Kite (for its 
concerns with the anti-rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution) and the Summer Palace (with its 
implications for the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989). As a result, the directing careers of Tian and Lou 
were prohibited for eight and five long years respectively. 
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8.3.1. The Marginalized Narrative 
 
On the issue of marginalization, In the Heat of the Sun (1994) shows 
similarities to An Orphan Joins the Army (1992).
294
 The earlier discussion (at the end 
of Chapter 3) has discussed the postmodern connotations and significance of the 
conservative, evasive, and marginalized strategies in the Chinese cinema of the 
Nineties (with the example of An Orphan Joins the Army). As a result it has argued 
that there is a big difference in domestic box-office between An Orphan Joins the 
Army and the Blue Kite. The former has been successfully released in the domestic 
market; but the latter is still frozen out by local censorship today. The reason for the 
difference seems complicated, but it is undeniable that certain marginalized elements 
have probably played an important role in the domestic success of the former. 
Subsequent to the failure of the Blue Kite, another nostalgic film, In the Heat of the 
Sun, was then a hit in the local cinemas (Lam 2000, 328).
295
 The film perhaps can be 
read as a successful adjustment towards marginalization after the first nostalgic wave. 
Therefore, In the Heat of the Sun may probably be comparable to An Orphan Joins 
the Army in such a ―margin‖ debate. 
 
An evasive tactic is at first represented in the narrative genre and its story-line. 
                                                        
294  In Chapter 4 the discussion had made a clear distinction between the postmodernist parody in An Orphan Joins 
the Army and the postmodern pastiche in nostalgic films. This has actually ruled out the possibility of An 
Orphan Joins the Army being regarded as a typical nostalgic film. But from its crucial postmodern origin in the 
Chinese cinema (and with general elements of postmodern conservatism), its marginalized strategies are 
equally of directive significance to a nostalgic debate here in this discussion. 
295  Adam Lam had even mentioned that the film was quite successful in its domestic box-office in 1995. 
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Differently from the narrative style of the Blue Kite‘s historical melodrama, In the 
Heat of the Sun goes back to a juvenile genre similar to An Orphan Joins the Army. 
Although the Blue Kite tells its story through Tie Tou‘s memory of his childhood, the 
main characters in the film consist of his mother and her three lovers that form three 
stretches of tragedies in politics. However In the Heat of the Sun develops its story 
totally through a teenage boy (Ma Xiaojun), The plots, of his participating in a gang 
of youths and fighting with other group of boys, and his being infatuated with a young 
woman (Milan) and the sex fantasy with her, have all lost in touch with any direct 
political climate of the radical time. Instead of the political symbols, the everyday 
appearances from a genre-painting of Ma‘s childhood fill the nostalgic film. This 
implies the film with its focus on children‘s interesting and muddled puberties has (at 
least on the surface) gained its potential effect of estranging itself from a realistic 
background of politics in the 1970s. 
 
Next, it also shows evasiveness over the narrative time (time background) 
selection. Contrary to the Blue Kite that directly faces the peak time of Chinese radical 
politics (1957-1968), An Orphan Joins the Army sets its story background on the eve 
of the Communist Party in power (before 1949) and In the Heat of the Sun chooses its 
narrative in the mid 1970s when the radical situation has gradually levelled off. By the 
mid 1970s, the Cultural Revolution was drawing to an end. Those so-called ―rightists 
and reactionaries‖ had been already overthrown and transferred to a lower level (the 
countryside) for reformation through labour, thus the political struggles in the main 
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cities were not as sharp as they were in the late Sixties. Such a period setting has 
probably made the dramatic conflicts of nostalgia sheer away from the summit of 
left-leaning politics, and obviously in consequence (the distanced narrative from 
politics) it seems hard to arouse censorship displeasure. By this token, although the 
production period of In the Heat of the Sun (1994) is contemporaneous with the first 
nostalgic wave (1992-1994), its narrative strategy on time-setting seems much closer 
to the second nostalgic wave ten years later, or perhaps better, the time-background of 
the film is more inherited and carried forward by the second wave, as will be 
discussed later in this section. 
 
Also mentionable, beyond the avoidance of politics, is that a crucial feature of 
the narration from In the Heat of the Sun is its deconstruction of heroism or a grand 
narrative. The teenage protagonist, Ma is similar to Sanmao (the orphan) and other 
ordinary children of the same age, who are usually full of day dreams of becoming a 
hero in order to feed their vanity or attract attention from girls. For instance, Ma 
always shows off that he has an older ―girlfriend‖ (Milan) in front of his fellows; and 
in the presence of Milan, Ma climbs up a tall chimney to display his courage; even 
later for Milan, he does not hesitate to rough up with his friends. Finally, Ma 
unexpectedly confesses (to the film audience) that the film story-line is a complete 
invention by himself.
296
 It is perhaps a postmodern self-reflex or to remind the 
                                                        
296  A monologue by Ma:“Haha… Don‘t believe this! I‘m never brave enough to do this (fighting). I continue 
swearing that I don‘t lie any more. But the stronger the desire I have to tell the truth, the stronger the 
interference I meet. I sadly find that I can reproduce no reality at all. My memory is always changed by my 
emotion, and then it ridicules me, betrays me, and even makes my mind jumbled. I can‘t tell truth from fiction. 
I now believe that the first meeting between Milan and me was fictional. In fact, I never met her on a road. In 
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audiences that a film is actually a fiction, which is helpful to let them realize the fact 
that they are immersed in a nostalgic illusion of heroism, and it is this that covers and 
obliterates the real memories of the individuals of the mass. That sense then sets off 
an absence (or deletion) of the individual memories which have been wrapped in the 
collective consciousness of a nostalgic culture.
297
 
 
Therefore, the main point of this section is that a marginalization of Chinese 
nostalgia is not just an evasion or self-surrender, it also contains an implied criticism 
of centred, grand, meta-, and all powerful narratives. The film with its self-reflexivity 
(or self-fragmentation) towards heroic narrative has actually placed a protagonist (a 
―hero‖ of a great narrative) into a marginalized situation. Then I would argue that to 
make one realize the existence of a marginal position will have a similar 
deconstructive effect on a centred narrative. So if In the Heat of the Sun draws one‘s 
attention to the lack/absence of individual memories (covered by the heroic illusions) 
in the past, it would probably be read as certain criticism and deconstruction of a 
(communal or collective) nostalgic culture constructed by the contemporary cultural 
sense of the mainstream. 
                                                                                                                                                               
that afternoon, it was Liu who introduced her to us, that was our first meeting. I was not familiar with Milan at 
all. We have never been familiar with each other. God! Is she the girl that I‘ve seen in the picture? Why does 
Yu suddenly disappear from my story? Or perhaps, they‘re the same person? I dare not think more about that.‖ 
297  In my thesis for the Master‘s degree (2005), I have mentioned that the first shot of the film (In the Heat of the 
Sun) ―is a big statue of chairman Mao Zedong, the leader of the movement. Then the camera pans down from 
the top of the statue to a pavement where a group of ‗red little guards‘ are dancing the ‗revolutionary dance‘, 
which drops a hint that the Chinese people were ‗enjoying‘ their life under the communistic sunshine… As Ma 
Xiaojun, said (monologue) at the beginning of the film: ―about that era, I can only remember that it was so 
brilliant and so bright, looked like sunshine, that it made me feel dark…‖ The word ‗dark‘ here seems to 
express an unconscious or insensible condition. It reflects that the Chinese people tended to lack 
self-consciousness, for in that period, political ideology had dominated everything, they could do nothing 
except follow it like sheep. Thus, through the disharmony between the nostalgia and the boy‘s experience, the 
film tries to shake and subvert the central position of the mainstream ideology in the spectators‘ mind, and help 
people retrieve their lost egos.‖ (Shen Jiang 28-9). 
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8.3.2. The Space-Time Marginalization 
 
As far as nostalgic films (such as a contemporary visual production) are 
concerned, perhaps one of the best ways to filter out political entanglements is to 
avoid them in the spatial appearance. By this token, it seems unwise (as in Farewell 
My Concubine and the Blue Kite) to set a nostalgic narrative in a great metropolis and 
political centre like Beijing, since it is obviously not hard to arouse political 
recollections behind those radical symbols which may be what the governmental 
censorship is reluctant to see. Therefore it is to be expected that the two films will be 
limited (or excluded) in their domestic release. Consequently after the first nostalgic 
wave the Chinese filmmakers constantly attempt to vary the space setting of their 
nostalgic narratives, so as to avoid political sensitivity. 
 
A typical example of such avoidance is Road Home completed by Zhang 
Yimou in 1999. The film is set on the eve of the Expanded Anti-Rightist Movement 
(1957) which is similar to the time-background in the Blue Kite when Lin Shaolong 
(Tie Tou‘s own father) is purged as a ―rightist‖. In other words, Road Home did not 
adopt any evasive tactic to keep away from the radical period of its time setting. 
However it seems to be impossible to define the film as political nostalgia, as it has 
not provided any opportunity for showing political symbols/appearances in its 
space-background at all. This is read as a spatial marginalization in the discussion 
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here. The film (Road Home) tells the story of Luo Changyu, a graduate college 
student from the city, who comes to a rural area in the north of China as a grade 
teacher and then falls in love with a local girl, Zhaodi (by Zhang Ziyi). The filming 
was located in a grassland in Fengning, Chengde (Hebei province), a piece of steppe 
with rustic peace and far away from the metropolis and the political climate. The 
whole visual background of the film consists of beautiful scenery including a birch 
forest, the glow of sunset, and the country lane with loess foundation, which pervades 
the film with a poetic romance. If it were not for the second half of the plot in which 
Luo is arrested and taken away from the village (as a rightist), causing painful 
thoughts in Zhaodi, one would find it hard to perceive a political climate within the 
beauty of nature. Here the brief tragedy of politics shoots across the narrative like a 
meteor, but it suddenly forms a sharp contrast with a natural space and leaves the 
audiences with an open reverie of their own. This kind of geographically distanced 
space-setting may perhaps come very close to the ideas of Bertolt Brecht on 
―defamiliarisation‖ (sometimes translated ―alienation effect‖). That involves, as 
Brecht wrote, ―stripping the event of its self-evident, familiar, obvious quality and 
creating a sense of astonishment and curiosity about them‖, in order to force the 
audience to see the common things in an unfamiliar or strange way and to enhance 
perception of the familiar (Brooker 191). By this principle, film authors can not only 
evade restriction of the government censorship on special space and time (such as a 
Chinese urban area in its radical past), but also deliver their true intensions to the 
audience. Accordingly, it makes the evasive strategy more positive. 
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Compared to the first nostalgic wave, which usually directly portrays the 
political sufferings and shows off the groans of pain of the protagonists, Road Home 
leaves room (and thinking space) for the viewers. A silence (avoidance) of the past 
pain and the visualized suffering may perhaps make an alternative wisdom prominent: 
on the one hand, at least in its visual/spatial presentations, the film (with its absence of 
radical space) shakes off a critical comment on – what has long been criticized by 
Chinese scholars
298
 – the Chinese cinema with an extremely political and orientalist 
spectacle and with its Westernized fawning position; on the other hand, the lack of 
political elements (on their visual/spatial debate) has greatly eased the anxiety over 
the governmental censorship, which forms a positive/successful mode for the 
domestic release of the later nostalgic films. 
 
In 2005 when the second nostalgic wave burst out, spatial marginalization had 
become a narrative strategy in common use. Many filmmakers of the wave attempted 
to remove their story background from the big cities and to focus their lens on rural 
areas. Shanghai Dream (2005) sets its shooting location in Guizhou province that 
seems close to area of the personal boyhood of its director, Wang Xiaoshuai. No more 
than two months after his birth in 1966, Wang was expelled with his parents from 
Shanghai to the remote Guizhou for the Third-line Construction. He stayed there in 
Guiyang (the provincial capital) for 13 years, until the late 70s (the end of the Cultural 
Revolution) when most of the Shanghai workers (who supported the remote factory in 
                                                        
298  Please refer to Chapter 6, the end of the former discussion in section 6.2.3. 
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Guiyang) were impatient to get back home and return to the metropolis, and this is 
where the film title ―Shanghai Dream‖ is derived. Although no scene is set in 
Shanghai, the film still spiritually represents a centripetal desire of those Third-line 
workers to return from the remote area to the central cities. Perhaps the absence of 
urban space made it easier for the film to pass the entanglement of political censorship. 
However an element of satire is that the difficult process of getting back home (in the 
nostalgia) leads the criticism to a political history and its leftover problem: by whom 
and why were a large number of skilled workers transferred from cities to those 
remote factories in the radical period of politics? Who did forget them away in the 
distance when the international military threat was gradually on the ebb in the 
1980s?
299
 To represent a nostalgia in such a forgotten distance, may again make the 
marginalization full of critical implications. 
 
Not all of the nostalgic films are related to their filmmakers‘ personal 
experiences in the debate of filmic space. Li Yu is from Shandong province, but her 
Dam Street is set in a solitary county in Sichuan; Gu Changwei is a Xi‘an native (in 
Shaanxi), but his Peacock is a story about Anyang, a small city in Henan province; 
Zhang Jiarui was born in Sichuan, but he shot The Road in the frontier county of 
Luoping, Yunnan province. Perhaps, these space settings could be read as certain 
intentional evasions by the directors. The practical use of marginalized space helps the 
                                                        
299  Since the late 1970s, with the normalization of the Sino-US relations (1979), and the adjusted relations with 
the Soviet Union and Vietnam (the mid 1980s), China has entered a period of rapid economic development and 
peace. In consequence, its requirement for military products had linearly decreased and the whole Third-line 
Construction was at a standstill. Even some workers in the state-owned factories were not all well provided for. 
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nostalgic films (of the new wave) to evade the uproar of the flourishing cities and 
their past sense of politics smoothly. It then leads the historical/nostalgic concerns into 
a recollection of life activity, which means Chinese nostalgia in the twenty-first 
century has gradually faded out from the political reflections and an orientalist 
submissive position, and turned back to reflect a national, domestic, and popular 
interest of nostalgic culture. Conversely, it may prove that a domestic cultural climate 
has probably formed a land fit for a popular nostalgia of the local public. 
 
On the other hand, following In the Heat of the Sun, most of the Chinese 
nostalgic films (after the first wave) continue a ―marginalized‖ strategy on their 
narrative time-setting as well, to avoid showing the peak period of radical politics in 
the Sixties. It has been mentioned in the early discussion (Chapter 7) that In the Heat 
of the Sun (1994) and The Making of Steel (1997) are both set in the mid 1970s. It 
seems that in Chinese nostalgia now, their time-background-setting has actually 
become a typical model (an infallible law) followed by the second nostalgic wave 
around and after 2005. Except for The Road (2006) that sets its narrative background 
in 1960s Yunnan,
300
 all other films in the second wave are set no earlier than the mid 
1970s. In the very beginning of Sunflower (2005) the story (similar to The Making of 
Steel) starts from the Tangshan Earthquake (1976);
301
 also some nostalgic narratives 
such as The Sun Also Rises (2007), Peacock (2005), Peach Blossom (Taohua canlan) 
                                                        
300  As a result of space marginalization (Yunnan is quite distant from the political centre of China), The Road does 
not refer to any visualized radical scar or political violence. So the film is still different from the first nostalgic 
wave, though its time setting (the 60s) seems in accordance with it. 
301  It is a nostalgia marked by natural history rather than a political event like the Cultural Revolution. 
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(2005), and Teeth of Love (2007), are set in the late 1970s; while some others, such as 
Shanghai Dreams (2005), Dam Street (2005), Xin Jie Kou (Xue Cun, 2006), and 
Summer Palace (2006) all begin their stories from the 1980s. 
 
Therefore, an obvious difference between the two waves can be clearly read 
from their time-background-setting. The first wave mainly focuses on the historical 
period of the 1940s to the 1960s; while the second wave places particular emphasis on 
the 1970s to 80s. As far as the latter is concerned, it is perhaps not an accidental 
coincidence that so many nostalgic films (in such a short period, 2005-2007) are 
simultaneously crazy about such a specially appointed era in the past (the late 70s and 
80s). There must be some logical reasons and apart from the time-setting avoidance of 
the radical period, the age structures of the directors and their audiences may also be 
an influence. 
 
With regard to the age of the directors, the fifth generation such as Chen, 
Zhang and Tian) were generally born fifteen years earlier than most of the post-fifth 
generation directors of the second wave.
302
 Their childhood backgrounds have made 
the personal experiences of the two groups of directors different. New generation 
directors whose childhood memories are of the 1970s find it impossible to set the 
radical politics of the 1950s or 1960s as a main theme of their own works. 
                                                        
302  Chapter 7 has mentioned that Zhang Yimou, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and Chen Kaige were born in 1951 or 1952; 
but most of the directors who were involved in the second nostalgic wave were generally born in the late 60s or 
70s, such as Wang Xiaoshuai (1966), Zhang Yang (1967), Li Yu (1973), Fu Huayang (1964), Lou Ye (1965), 
Zhuang Yuxin (1972). Their age difference from the fifth generation is from 15 to 20 years. 
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The other objective factor consists of the dynamic change in the age structure 
of the mainstream audience. One should not expect that the mainstream viewing taste 
of the early 1990s regarding nostalgic films would always remain the same for the 
young generation of the twenty-first Century. What the latter had experienced and 
would like to view retrospectively in cinemas may not be the same as that of their 
elders. As time goes by, more and more younger audiences will replace their parents, 
brothers and sisters in dominating the film market. Though they still have a special 
interest in the experiences of their elders, they are likely to be hungry for recollections 
of their own past. Shunting the nostalgic background into a later period may probably 
reflect the changing interest of the Chinese audience in their past. This then naturally 
leads to the discussion below. 
 
8.3.3. Nostalgia, A Dynamic Fusion of Horizons 
 
Like a flash in the pan, an ephemeral destiny for nostalgia seems unavoidable. 
Lowenthal said, 
 
The past we depend on to make sense of the present is, however, 
mostly recent; it stems mainly from our own few years of experience. 
The further back in time, the fewer the traces that survive, the more 
they have altered, and the less they anchor us to contemporary reality.
 
 
(40) 
 
Therefore in the process of time (and the change in the mainstream audience 
from one generation to another), a nostalgic background reflected in (by contrast with) 
Chapter Eight 
 323 
real life today may continue a forward movement to a later period of the past. Just as 
the mainstream audiences in the 1970s made their thoughts fly to the Thirties 
(Chinatown); the 1980s to the Fifties (Back to the Future); the audiences of the 1990s 
would like to focus their attention on the remakes of the Sixties and Seventies 
(Forrest Gump)… And conversely, as time goes by a ―remote‖ past with its memories 
will gradually fade out from the visual field of contemporary mass culture. 
 
This may lead to the deduction that the term ―nostalgia‖ for films would 
probably disappear in the march of time. It should be a dynamic variable closely 
related to the constant changes of contemporary culture. It is not nostalgia that seems, 
as musical, horror or science fiction films, to be a fixed and regular genre. A pastiche 
of the past social background of the Thirties could be called ―nostalgia‖ in the 
audience‘s eyes in the 1970s; but when contemporary culture has entered a new period 
– the twenty-first century – in its history, the social background of the Thirties would 
have perhaps gone beyond the memory span of the mainstream audience today. It then 
turns into a stereotyped historical play that has gradually lost the involvement of 
today‘s audience‘s personal memories. Nowadays, even the most regular reader in 
Britain seems unlikely to regard a Victorian (1837-1901) story as nostalgia in 
contemporary culture. People today may still have an interest in the era, but it is 
stylistic or historic, rather than nostalgic. Most of the nostalgic products will (or have) 
experience(d) such a turn of the wheel (or a twist of fate) in a few decades after their 
creation. By this process, nostalgia is practising and implementing what Gadamer 
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called ―Fusion of Horizons‖303, a truth criterion that edifies the (uncertainty of) 
postmodern hermeneutic. An understanding of history should be combined with the 
current condition of the person who reads the past; a current understanding cannot 
restore the original state, nor can it completely decide the future.
304
 Time is fleeting, a 
present truth of the past only exists in its current condition, in the same way as 
nostalgia that flies by like a flash in the pan. 
 
However it cannot be denied that people‘s interest in nostalgia could slightly 
exceed their own age bracket. A young man born in the 1980s may become interested 
in an early cultural background (say the 70s or 60s). In an academic article discussing 
masquerade culture in New Zealand, Christina Stachurski found that some of the 
youth today in their twenty-first celebrations  like to choose costumes in a parody of 
old icons of the 1980s. This is because, though they were still children in the 80s, their 
early consciousness of adulthood in the process of growing up was largely marked by, 
constructed and gained from observing their elders as adults (98). Thus they prefer to 
reconfirm their own adulthood through the adult images of the past rather than what 
their own life looks like today. Through their childhood people perhaps never relax 
their imitation of their brothers, parents, and teachers for a moment. These elders 
(with their everyday lifestyle) would be a living example to children before they grew 
up. Nostalgia, to a large extent, is based on people‘s infatuation with and their 
                                                        
303  It argues that anyone who tries to interpret or understand a past, must take his/her bias (their own field of 
views), using current conditions and trends as a point of departure, to fuse together with the original text of the 
past. (Hans Georg Gadamer 262-9). 
304  As far as the current condition of the interpreter is concerned, a past interpretation is a prejudice; and for the 
future, the current one is perhaps biased as well. 
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admiration for older generations. So the readership of nostalgia does not by any 
means belong to only a certain age level; but extends to several generations from the 
old, the middle-aged, to the young. Different people of assorted ages would perhaps 
have different views and attitudes about the same nostalgic theme, but simultaneously 
they all consume the same era and its nostalgic symbols. Here the writer of the thesis 
finds it impossible to escape from his own age limit, or to provide a completely 
objective appraisal of the two nostalgic waves of the Chinese cinema. Maybe a few 
decades later when the coming generations try to understand their ―history‖, will those 
―nostalgic‖ films combined with the thesis merely become an unappreciated reference 
or a small bias in their fusion of horizons. 
 
8.4. An Invisible Hand, the Nostalgic Reinvention by Governmental Leitmotiv 
Consciousness
305
 – Control and Resistance 
 
Since the reform and opening-up, China has been widely inspired by Adam 
Smith and has paid attention to what he stressed, the social influence from certain 
natural forces or natural inclination. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao has mentioned that 
he often read Adam Smith‘s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and understands the two 
invisible hands as market (law of value) and morality.
306
 In fact, the thirty-year 
economic reform in China (since the late 1970s) is more or less based on belief in 
                                                        
305  It refers to a mainstream consciousness promoted by the Chinese government through films recognized as 
leitmotiv nostalgia. 
306  “我最近常读亚当斯密的《道德情操论》，他实际上讲过两只看不见的手，一只是讲市场，一只是讲道
德”。See Wen, ―Invisible Hands‖, Oriental Review, http://pinglun.eastday.com/p/20090630/u1a4469584.html 
Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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such a natural force. However here in this discussion, the metaphorical expression of 
―an invisible hand‖, is aimed at the reinvention of nostalgic consciousness in the 
Chinese cinema. If to regard a macro-filmic regulation and control (through Chinese 
film censorship) as a visible hand, then what it has been forced to form – like the 
above-mentioned, a marginalized, de-politicalized or unfamiliarized expression of 
nostalgia – will probably change into an invisible hand that has reshaped and distorted 
the past knowledge and the nostalgic understanding of the public. 
 
8.4.1. The Everyday Normalization of Nostalgia 
 
The marginalization of Chinese nostalgic films (since the mid 1990s) has 
largely resulted from the tightened restrictions by the authorities through their 
censorship, and it seems not hard to transfer this into a controlling force over culture. 
For this point, a supporting argument comes from Xu Bi. He alleges ―in China today, 
the memories of violence, terror, and evil in the Cultural Revolution are still getting 
repressed.‖307 While the so-called ―repression‖ must have a definite direction, it 
needs always to dodge some things and to advocate others. This is where the 
argument of the section lies: the contemporary Chinese cultural spectacle is inclined 
to change/normalize those radical memories of the Cultural Revolution into an 
everyday past. Through the process, a mainstream ideology (a governmental intention 
of the historical reinvention) has undoubtedly been reinforced, and its everyday 
                                                        
307  Xu Bi (2006) ―Today‘s cultural relics and the mass culture of nostalgia on the Cultural Revolution‖, Artistic 
Criticism of China, 2006-10. http://www.zgyspp.com/art/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=3084 Last access: 17 Feb. 
2008. 
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reconstruction in nostalgia has replaced the cruelty and reality of a real past gradually. 
According to Xu,  
 
[W]hile the government exerts its influence to forbid the political 
criticism on the Cultural Revolution, it simultaneously allows those 
cultural relics
308
 from the radical period to be freely traded in its 
market; in order that, with the benefit of the (antique or sudo-antigue) 
market, the centralized authorities can eliminate the political and 
ideological connotations of those radical relics, and change them into 
the pure money-valued relics and cultural collection. 
(Xu 2006) 
 
The same applies to contemporary nostalgic films as well, when the point 
extends to the discussion of the cinematic debate. That is to say, while the will of the 
authorities goes to great lengths to restrain a radical criticism within the society, it 
perhaps has a mind to simultaneously connive at (or even foster) a representation of 
the old, radical relics, appearances, and its images in those marginalized and trimmed 
nostalgic films without (political) criticism. In consequence, a popular nostalgia and 
its consumer culture in spectacles may turn to help the mainstream (governmental) 
power eliminate political and ideological connotations and remnants from a radical 
history and its memories, so that they may change into a series of everyday life 
appearances of a past without pain. Nowadays, the everyday (normalized) nostalgia 
has increasingly become a pure consumer-valued historical spectacle with only 
esthetic force and national traditions in form. Nostalgia in the contemporary popular 
culture of China (at least on its surface) is gradually effacing its despotic, radical, and 
left-leaning imprints from a symbolic representation of its past, and ―making them 
                                                        
308  Like a large number of badges with Chairman Mao‘s image on them, as well as radical costume, revolutionary 
pictures, porcelain, stamps, and little red books… 
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whitened and glorified, and incorporating them into a harmless memory of the 
Cultural Revolution‖ (Xu 2006). 
 
As Jack D. Douglas emphasized, people in society are always unavoidably lost 
in a certain ―natural stance‖ of the ―everyday‖, 
 
The natural stance is that supposedly taken by men in everyday life, 
though whether or not they in fact take this stance is certainly an 
empirical question. It is the stance in which the everyday world is 
taken for granted as it is experienced in everyday life. It is that stance 
taken by the individual within the stream of everyday life. It is a stance 
that does not raise serious and persistent questions concerning the 
nature of the everyday experience but, instead, takes that experience as 
a fact. (Douglas 14)
309
 
 
Moreover, Baudrillard deepens the criticism of the ―natural stance‖ and argues 
that those everyday symbols (such as the superficial images or consuming 
appearances) have become a daily obligation that is similar to the action of taxes 
payment, a normally intangible dictate with certain coercive effect, to naturally 
(unconsciously) melt and foster people‘s standpoint on certain economical, cultural, or 
ideological participation (Consumer 47). Thereby it embodies an 
obsessive-compulsive repression. Furthermore when such a compelling stance blends 
with nostalgia (a visualized illusion of the ―past‖ everyday life), history in its 
everyday memories is then provided with what is called an anaesthetic effect by 
Debord,
310
 arguing that through the everyday spectacle of nostalgia, the (nostalgic) 
                                                        
309  This criticism of the natural stance is quite in accord with the understanding of postmodernism by Linda 
Hutcheon: ―those entities that we unthinkingly experience as ‗natural‘ are in fact ‗cultural‘, made by us, not 
given to us.‖ (Politics 2) 
310  Debord, Society of Spectacle (30). ―The spectacle is a permanent opium war designed to force people to equate 
goods with commodities and…‖ 
Chapter Eight 
 329 
films have increasingly purified and anaesthetized those negative factors of politics, 
criticism, and trauma from the contemporary impressions (consciousness) of history 
in public memories. Before the audience, there is only past life, past childhood, past 
love, past goodliness, and past peace left without pain, scar, and blame
311
. Roughly 
speaking, most of the films in the second nostalgic wave do have such a whitening 
effect on the everyday. All that remains of the nostalgic tense and everyday 
representations is an empty shell, and although there are various modern love stories, 
those true colours of a real history no longer obtain outside the remade appearances. 
 
Nostalgia of the ―everyday‖ is like an invisible hand. With its natural stance 
and the compulsive effects, it controls the stereotyped impressions of today‘s public 
towards history. As Lowenthal said, ―the past as we know it is partly a product of the 
present; we continually reshape memory, rewrite history, refashion relics‖… and ―the 
most compelling motive for altering the past is to change the present‖ (26-7). As a 
cultural remake of history, nostalgia seems overwhelmingly favorable for helping a 
nation move away from its trauma and heal the past wounds, in order to create a 
different ―good old time‖ for the present. This is a positive role. 
 
However, its negative role consists in its compulsive forgetfulness of certain 
                                                        
311  Here the argument of the ―painlessness‖ only follows the extreme point from Xu. However eclectically 
speaking, now that the everyday past remake could help the authorities cleanse its political spots (so that 
nostalgia can continue to exist in its mainstream culture today); then conversely, it seems unavoidable that such 
an existence of nostalgia can be also exploited by the filmmakers for implied (political) criticisms. As in 
Shanghai Dream, a critical sense of the past issue (the Third-line Constructions) had been aroused by the film 
in the viewer‘s mind, though its intuitional appearances of the remote everyday do not matter to the political 
blame at all. Thus a double-edged sword has come again, between the whitewashing of everyday and its 
implicit criticism. Their correlative dependence embodies a conservative and eclectic strategy in a 
contemporary (postmodern) nostalgia between the will of the government and a (counter-) cultural criticism. 
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history. This argument can be supported by two points from Lowenthal. One of these 
is the transition from political scar to domestic pain. As Lowenthal argues, ―memory‖ 
in nostalgic culture ―converts public events into idiosyncratic personal experiences,‖ 
and ―political history has become an annexe to family history‖ (195). This is a 
predominant characteristic of the second nostalgic wave. At the beginning of this 
chapter, it has been mentioned that the two nostalgic waves adopt different ways of 
representing the ―family broken‖. Political factors in the first wave are represented as 
the primary cause that breaks a family harmony, while in the second wave, nostalgic 
narrative has gradually freed itself from the political threat and upgraded the domestic 
contradiction caused by the confusion of time (the new social changes since the 
reform of the late 70s) as the chief dramatic conflict (and it put those political factors 
into a subordinate, or even an absent, position). Such narrative making seems 
propitious for what the mainstream nostalgia advocates, a harmless memory of history. 
That is to let the audiences focus on domestic (family) contradictions with rapt 
attention, in order that the everyday memories (of the past household affairs) may 
weaken the (negative) historical impress of the politics in the public‘s minds. The 
trauma and scars then tend to sink into oblivion. 
 
The other way is to cover up individual memories with a general and 
collective nostalgia. According to Lowenthal, ―we need other people‘s memories both 
to confirm our own and to give them endurance‖… ―memories are continually 
supplemented by those of others.‖ Those individual events in our personal minds are 
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―less certainly, less easily evoked‖. So in the process of ―knitting our own 
discontinuous recollections into narratives‖, it seems people may ―revise‖ their 
personal ―components to fit the collectively remembered past‖, and gradually ―cease 
to distinguish between them‖ (196). As a matter of fact, the process of its own has to 
some extent obliterated abundant individual experiences of the past that were 
contained behind the public historical appearances. On its merits, a nostalgic narrative 
in public cinemas does integrate the signified(s) of its remade past images into a 
unitary and exclusive memory of the masses. As a result, nostalgic films stand the 
mainstream ideology in good stead to influence people‘s perspectives on the past. 
Again, this equals a compulsive forgetfulness of the individual recollections. 
 
To conclude, with the radical period having increasingly passed away, more 
and more people have no longer had firsthand experiences of the Cultural Revolution. 
As Xu points out, nowadays the attitudes of the public towards the past period have 
become much more complicated than in the 1980s when the radical politics were 
immediately over. Actually the contemporary Chinese nostalgic culture is analogous 
with the situation that West Germany had met in the late 80s over its trend of thought 
on the ―trivialization‖ of the Nazis.312 That is, some of the German citizens of the 
time were reluctant to live under the shadow of an incriminatory atmosphere of 
Nazism; while some others would stake a claim that the historical lessons of bloody 
cruelty should be engraved on the nation‘s memory. On this issue, Habermas had 
                                                        
312  Xu (2006) 
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argued that a negative effect of history and its bloodiness should not fade from one‘s 
memory with the passage of time; on the problem of the public history making, 
everyone must envisage it in their own person first, for none of us is able to sit on the 
sidelines with the identity of nonparticipation (230-7).
313
 If one thinks of his 
argument as a reference point, then one may realize that the nostalgic ―everyday‖ of 
the Chinese contemporary culture today has gone to an extreme. 
 
8.4.2 Xie Jin Model 
 
One may develop a comparison between the political whitewashing (of the 
second wave) and the so-called ―Xie Jin model‖ (of the 80s). The third generation 
director, Xie‘s Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1980) and Hibiscus Town (1986) are 
regarded as typical ―scar films‖ relating the period of the 1950s to 70s.314 In the light 
of certain clues to the structuralist approach to myth (such as the theories from Claude 
Levi-Strauss or Vladimir Propp
315
 who proposed that there are universal laws by 
which various arbitrary myths and narrative contents seem to have similar orders or 
structures), Zhu Dake, a film critic in Shanghai, reduced the narrative structures of 
Xiejin‘s films in the 80s to the ―Xie Jin model‖ and began to criticize his narrative law 
                                                        
313  In the famous ―Historians‘ Quarrel‖, Habermas attacks the revisionist German historians who have been trying 
to trivialize and ―normalize‖ the history of the Nazi period, and in the debate he defends the need for a realistic 
and discriminating approach to the Nazi period and its legacy. 
314  Li Jie and Zhang Enhua. ―Red Legacies in China‖, in China Heritage Quarterly. No.22, June 2010. 
315  Levi-Strauss and Propp were mentioned by Zhu Dake, a Chinese critic, in his criticism of ―Xie Jin model‖ in 
1986. This thesis will not make an intensive study of structuralism. For further concern about structuralist 
theory, please refer to Claude Levi-Strauss (1963) Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke 
Grundfest Schoepf, New York: Basic Books. And Levi-Strauss (1978) Myth and Meaning, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. And Vladimir Propp (1984) Theory and History of Folklore. Ed. Anatoly Liberman. University 
of Minnesota Press. 
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in 1986. This approach is quite similar to the structural study of the Western films by 
Will Wright in the 1970s
316
. According to Zhu‘s conclusion, Xie‘s film-narration of 
the 80s always follows the norms of the structure below: 
 
1. The protagonists of these films usually live in a background of a radical 
politics. 
2. Morality and justice are always on the side of the protagonists, but they 
are persecuted by the political setting. 
3. The miserable experiences of the protagonists seem easily to arouse 
sympathy from the audience. 
4. Radical politics turns into a principal factor of tragedy and pushes the 
protagonists to a tragic high. 
5. At the end, with the changes in the social (political) climate, the justice 
of the protagonists is upheld. 
 
Based on the above model, Zhu argues that Xie‘s films, on the one hand, are in 
accord with the process of the medieval Christian mission in Europe, taking advantage 
of the tragedy of the moral in order to stimulate tears and the box-office. ―Its 
outmoded esthetics (to see the enthusiasm arousing as its paramount object)‖ has 
obviously ―denied a modernistic and rational science‖, and returned to a traditional 
and outdated filmic Confucianism
317
. On the other hand, the model is quite similar to 
the classic narrative structure of the Hollywood (the weak – in a precarious situation – 
meets a hero – salvation), and it is fostering a popular, or Hollywood mode of viewing 
taste in the Chinese masses with ―the stance of cultural colonialism‖.318 From today‘s 
                                                        
316  For example, Wright reduces the narrative structure of the classical plot of the Western heroism to sixteen 
unvarying functions in his Six Guns and Society, A Structural Study of the Western, University of California 
Press, (Wright 40-9). However, Wright points out a different emphasis between his filmic study and those of 
Levi-Strauss: ―Levi-Strauss wants to discover the meaning of a myth in order to exhibit its mental structure, 
while I want to exhibit the structure of a myth in order to discover its social meaning.‖ (17). Zhu Dake in his 
criticism of Xie Jin model may perhaps approach to the Wright‘s stress rather than Levi-Strauss. 
317  Here what Zhu called ―Confucianism‖ means a moralized filmic intention that serves for the governing class. 
318  For the idea of Xie Jin Model, please refer to Zhu Dake (1986) ―The Defect of Xie Jin Model‖, Wenhui Bao, 
1986-7-18。 
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perspective, one may feel that Zhu‘s argument had perhaps had a jaundiced mind in 
the 80s. Even nowadays, the whole film industry of China has made an inexorable 
march of progress in its globalization, commercialization, and popularization; also in 
the meantime, the contemporary Chinese (or even global) cinematic esthetics 
apparently does not much surpass the popular culture in its range of enthusiasm 
aroused. Thus, it is clear that Zhu‘s point (combined with his Xie Jin model) could 
only be seen as an avant-courier criticism by the Chinese intellectuals (elites) of the 
80s who urged that literature and art discard tradition and advance into modernity, but 
simultaneously he deviated from a social reality of the mass culture. 
 
However, the structuralist mode of thought reflected from Xie‘s films led the 
discussion to a deeper level. As Chen Xihe argued, the Xie Jin model also contains a 
story-plot accompanied by a sexual theme (202). The villains of his films who are 
usually power holders in  radical politics (like Wu Yao and Li Guoxiang) always 
harbour a grudge against the protagonists (like Luo Qun, Hu Yuyin, and Qin Shutian) 
just because the love-life of the villain cannot be satisfied (or he is sex-starved). 
Consequently with the opportunity from radical movements the villain always 
discriminates against those kindhearted protagonists which lead to their miserable 
experiences. In a similar way, Adam Lam regards the clue as ―sexual politics‖ in Xie‘s 
films (Lam 2005, 31-8). They generally have two endings, either the villain is 
punished by his/her sexual plotting (for example, the breakup of the marriage between 
Chapter Eight 
 335 
Song Wei and Wu Yao
319
), or there is a happy ending in which both the protagonist 
and the villain get a rose without a thorn
320
. Some people may argue that the mode of 
putting such sexual politics as the first cause of the narrative tragedy has actually 
shifted the historical responsibility of the radical politics on to the ―individual‘s‖ sex 
impulse or sexual envy, which would be regarded as a general flaw in the natural 
quality of human beings. In this way, many critics of the Xie Jin model proposed that, 
as cited by Lam, Xie‘s films have in fact reproduced and served the traditional 
Chinese Confucian ideology; and they ―accused Xie of using political settings but 
lacking a critical view, favouring the authorities instead‖ and ―this aligned Xie with 
Confucian conservatism.‖ (Lam 2005, 37)321 
 
By this token, like the remake of the everyday past in the second nostalgic 
wave where those political blots are covered or whitewashed through past 
trivialization, the Xie Jin model also plays an active role in masking the radical past 
and consolidating (affirming) the contemporary political control. On the other hand, 
the model may still contain a critical inclination. Instead of the political 
animadversion, can sexual politics be read as ―sex‖ satire with conservative sagacity? 
                                                        
319  In Legend of Tianyun Mountain, Wu Yao plays the role of the villain, he breaks the love relation between his 
rival Luo Qun and a beautiful girl Song Wei in the Anti-rightists movements (late 1950s), then lets Song 
become his wife. Twenty years later, when the Cultural Revolution finished, Wu still thwarts the righting of a 
wrong for Luo. At the end of the story, Song eventually leaves Wu for Luo by a force of justice. 
320  In Hibiscus Town, Li Guoxiang, a female radical leader, is jealous of Hu Yuyin, a beautiful woman in the town. 
Li successively breaks Hu‘s business, executes her husband on a charge of being a ―counter-revolutionary‖, 
and sends her later lover (Qin Shutian) to a distant exile. After the Cultural Revolution, Qin is set free. On his 
way home he meets Li by chance on a ferry and is told that she is getting married, which hints that the villain‘s 
sexual desire is going to be released without jealousy. For more details of the two films, please refer to Lam 
(2005, 31-6). 
321  “谢晋的电影仅仅是利用政治运动做故事背景，缺乏对运动本身的质疑，实质上是在维护当权者，体现
了中国传统的儒家保皇思想”。 
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Imputing all of the political impulses to libido and its emotional urge does not only 
mean a profane criticism against the past Mao era and its conception of history, but it 
may simultaneously imply a certain tinge of irony and sarcasm towards all of the 
political rulings, past and present. One may ask after seeing Xie‘s films, if mistakes of 
the past politics mostly resulted from personal urges of the libido, can the rulers, 
leaders of the authorities today completely overcome the drive of sexual politics? 
When such a doubt comes into being in the viewers‘ minds, it may also become an 
obscure, absurd, and self-contradictory sword with its double edges, good or evil, in 
postmodernity: in accord with the marginalized inclination of the second wave, they 
(both the wave and the model) all live in the present and comply with the taste of the 
power holder, cater to its pleasure and become a political shield or pretext; but they 
conversely target the political authorities for criticism on the sly. By way of contrast 
the model was twenty years earlier than the wave; and their materials by which the 
swords are made are different as well: one is of sex, the other the trivialized past of 
the everyday. 
 
8.4.3. The ―Peaceable‖ Right 
 
Following Habermas, if we see a nostalgic everyday as one extreme of a 
two-pole structure, which tends to trivialize (cover or whitewash) a left-leaning, 
radical history, then the recent expansion of the second wave has gone to the other 
extreme, namely that to which the heading points: the peaceable right that is inclined 
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to interpret history in a right-leaning way. 
 
Although the term ―right‖ was originally coined during the French Revolution 
and referred to those supporters of the institution of the monarchy, it is now primarily 
used throughout the world to refer to tradition-related conservatives, reactionaries, or 
other groups that have views supporting capitalism the free market and so on (Bobbio 
and Cameron 9-37). However the term used within the thesis is mostly based on the 
special use of the ―Right‖ in China, where left and right are not fixed positions and 
they largely depend on what side a viewer is on. From the proletarian view of 
Marxism, Mao and his radical period of socialism may be seen as the left, while those 
who advocate capitalism and preservation of the capitalist system can be regarded as 
the right. However, practically speaking, as far as the contemporary era of China 
(since Deng Xiaoping‘s reform and opening-up from the late 1970s) is concerned, the 
definition of left or right seems uncertain. As its market economy takes advantage of 
capital accumulation, its position seems to be more to the right in the economic debate, 
while it can still be on the left as China retains a political system of socialism. 
Furthermore it can be divided into left-leaning and the right-leaning within a left 
position, as the understanding of the reality differs.
322
 When understanding of the 
social reality is forward-looking, it is left-leaning (like the radical China that was 
eager for quick success and instant revolution); conversely when one‘s evaluation is 
limited to a practical situation of society, it seems conservative, reserved, and it may 
                                                        
322  http://baike.baidu.com/view/483.htm Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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be read as right-leaning (as the Chinese reform that blindly indulges itself with market 
benefits and the expansion of capital value, but lacks social morality and equity).
323
 
Both of the leanings are under the mask of the left. By this token, even the 
mainstream social stand of China today is not of the complete right as some of its 
positions may still be right-leaning ones of the left. 
 
In this case, it may be argued that there is no absolute standard for the right, 
which is quite unfixed. But there should be a direction of the ―right‖ in the discussion 
of the thesis. Compared with the strong points of the radical (or far-left) politics, the 
right side of the social culture may consist in an overcorrected discourse reflected 
from the contemporary nostalgia. 
 
At the end of Chapter 6 I have argued, within a frame of the postmodern 
conservatism (or in the situation of a contemporary mainstream discourse where a 
criticism of the far left seems unacceptable), that Chinese nostalgic narratives may 
only have three options (roads) in front of them. They may either ignore the past 
(keep silence); or take either a peripherization to weaken the political narratives and to 
reinvent a nostalgic story in a pure everyday life; or as a representation of the 
mainstream ideology, develop a set of moderate right-leaning discourses and to 
continue bringing shame on the radical politics of the past. The first two roads have 
been mentioned separately in Chapter 7 and in the above discussions of this chapter. 
                                                        
323  Criticized by Zhang Hongliang (2009) ―the rightist in China‖, 2009-7-22. 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/200907/95306.html Last access: 4 Oct. 2010 
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So this part will discuss the last road combined with some examples of the latest 
nostalgic films, The University Entrance Exam 1977 (Jiang Haiyang, 2009), Sailfish 
(Qi yu, Jin Yimeng, 2008), and A Tale of Two Donkeys (Zou zhe qiao, Li Dawei, 
2008). 
 
Before discussing the films‘ details, a fact should be stressed. The release 
dates
324
 of these films were actually quite close to either the sixties‘ national 
anniversary of PRC (1
st
 October 1949 - 2009) or the 29
th
 Summer Olympics held in 
Beijing not long before (August 2008). In this case, to be in concert with these great 
events, the Chinese film bureau may have already examined, approved and put those 
films on record a few years earlier when their filmmakers were still in the process of 
preparing the shooting plans, in order that the films‘ release would not negatively 
influence the cultural climate of the events. In other words, the authorities and the 
administrative powers may perhaps have initiated a potential interference or even a 
domination over screenwriting and film creation in various ways, such as ordering 
directors to revise or delete some parts of the screenplay, or to defer screen 
examinations or film censorship so that they cannot be publicly released on time. By 
this token, if some films (such as those mentioned above) have successfully and 
precisely been released in the domestic market on the eve of the great events, they 
may not only have been agreed on and approved by the authorities, but also (to some 
extent) represent/embody a governmental will of power instilled in the mainstream 
                                                        
324  The University Entrance Exam 1977 was first released in March 2009; Sailfish was in June 2008; and A Tale of 
Two Donkeys in May 2009. 
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stand of history. On the other hand, through the guidance of governmental 
investments in filmmaking, the Chinese film authority also prepared and dominated a 
great number of film productions that are called ―greeting films‖ for the national 
anniversary and the Olympics. There is sufficient evidence from the media showing 
that both The University Entrance Exam 1977 and Sailfish are part of such a greeting 
category.
325
 Thus these authorized ―greeting‖ nostalgia (films) were perhaps more 
intended to cater for, reflect, express, or even represent a governmental cultural will 
for the social elites of China. With certain peaceable or moderate discourses of the 
right-leaning stands, the films may attempt to deny, bring shame on, and rebuild a 
radical (and far-left) past of China.  
 
After these films, the Chinese cinemas premiered about forty national 
anniversary greeting films thick and fast between August and October 2009, such as 
The Founding of a Republic (Jianguo daye, Han Sanping and Huang Jianxin) and The 
Message (Fengsheng, Chen Guofu and Gao Qunshu). Those films in various ways 
remold many important historical events of the past century in China, and some of 
them may be probably brought into the discussion of nostalgia. However, because the 
release dates of those films are so close to the present (when the thesis is being written) 
there is a lull before the feedback from the box-office, the industry, the academic 
circles and the audiences. In this case, the writer cannot yet provide a fixed comment 
                                                        
325  See web data, ―Entrence Examination 1977, the First Gift Film for the Sixtyth National Anniversary‖, 
http://www.jxwmw.cn/news/system/2009/03/13/010116369.shtml Last access: 4 Oct. 2010; and ―Sailfish 
Declares Its Views on Shanghai International Film Festival‖, 
http://bbs.bar.sina.com.cn/thread.php?tid=2151310272&bid=230 Last access: 24 July 2009 
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on whether the nostalgic tide in 2009 could be seen as a new wave of the mass culture, 
or just a flash lasting briefly during the anniversary. 
 
The University Entrance Exam 1977 is one film that may best embody the 
leitmotiv intentions of the elite culture in contemporary China. The film was directed 
by Jiang Haiyang.
326
 It is set in 1977 when the Cultural Revolution had just ended 
and China‘s university entrance system was reconverted for the first time, and the 
examinations were completely abolished. The substitution was to enrol new students 
by recommendations from leading CCP
327
 members‘ groups at all levels such as 
factories, rural communities, People‘s Liberation Army and so on. So most college 
students of that time were revolutionary activists with ―red‖ political (or family) 
backgrounds. Conversely those who had been politically criticized in the radical 
period (and their family members that came into the picture) and those ―rusticated 
youth from urban areas‖328 found it hard to enter a university. However with the 
continual development of the reform, from 1977, university entrance exams were 
reinstated, inspiring the majority of rusticated youth to attempt to return to the cities, 
which, later on, was regarded as a major turning point for the contemporary 
                                                        
326  Jiang Haiyang, graduated from Beijing Film Academy in 1982, a classmate of Chen Kaige and Tian 
Zhuangzhuang. 
327  CCP commonly refers to Chinese Communist Party. 
328  The Rusticated Youth of China,or Zhiqing (知青) is a term used in China to refer to a young person who had 
received a high level of education, especially those who, beginning in the 1950s until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, willingly or under coercion, left the urban areas and were rusticated to rural areas to assume 
peasant lives. The vast majority of those who went had received elementary to high school education. It is 
estimated that there were a total of between 12 and 18 million rusticated youth, throughout the 1950s to the end 
of the 1970s. Please refer to 
http://www.bing.com/reference/semhtml/The_Rusticated_Youth_of_China?mkt=zh-CN Last access: 24 July 
2010 
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intelligentsia in China. From today‘s perspective, those students passing the exam and 
enrolling into universities in the late 1970s and early 1980s are now over fifty years 
old. They are the main body of the new generation intellectuals since the reform and 
are widely active in government, higher education, scientific research, legal 
departments, culture and arts, and all kinds of key and leading posts of the 
contemporary society. In other words, such graduates are today‘s backbone of China 
and the important component part of the leading brains (the elite class) in the country. 
 
The story is set in a remote village of the late 1970s. Some of the educated 
youth from big cities have been sent (rusticated) to a communal farm for quite a few 
years. When they suddenly read the news that the government is about to reinstate the 
entrance exam system, everyone seems ready to try. The only dramatic conflict of the 
film comes from a radical cadre, Laochi, the head of the revolution committee in the 
farm and without whose official seal and permission no one shall enter for the exam. 
The film neither goes to an extreme of whitewashing the every day, nor does it try to 
fade out from politics. Instead, it directly sets the radical leader against the 
right-leaning youth. The reason to read the latter as of a ―right‖ stand is because these 
young people are the sons and daughters of those ―old-line counter-revolutionists‖ or 
―Rightists‖. Even without these negative titles, most of the intellectuals (like the 
educated youth in the film) were scornfully called the ―stinking ninth category‖329, 
                                                        
329  The “stinking ninth category‖ (or the ―stinking old ninth‖ 臭老九) is a Chinese dysphemism for intellectuals 
used in the Cultural Revolution. In the view of the far-left, intellectuals were usually set behind the other eight 
counter-revolutionists of the ―Nine Black Categories‖, which include landlords, rich farmers, 
anti-revolutionaries, bad influences, right-wingers, traitors, spies, capitalist roaders. See Xinhua Dictionary, 
Commercial Press, 1996 edition, p121. 
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and had suffered from the left radical politics in general. 
 
Therefore, the film narrative obviously contains a subjective attitude and a 
specialized stand by the contemporary intellectual class, who may excessively tend 
towards an overcorrected historical conception and intentionally stress the repression 
of the radical politics. Even though such an attitude cannot be generally regarded as 
an absolute rightist concept, it at least includes an intensified criticism against the 
colours of the left. However, such a political conflict ends peaceably. Humane justice 
eventually affects the ―brutal‖ radical. At the end of the film Laochi drives the youth 
to the exam in a tractor. The right-leaning discourse in the film tones down its 
oppositional conflict against the radical past and reflects an eclectic mind. This kind 
of peaceable ending is not like those grievous pains and tragedies left from the end of 
the first nostalgic wave. Instead, it is a type of triumph over past difficulties. In this 
sense, political tensions have gradually eased. The historical victims are freed as a 
result of the reform, and the radicals receive public acceptance. The happy ending 
seems propitious to social harmony and means that past trauma has gradually healed. 
It is as if its nostalgia becomes a peaceable mouthpiece of the leitmotiv ideology 
instilled by the elite authorities. 
 
A similar ideology is represented by Sailfish (Jin Yimeng
330
, 2008) as well. It 
is generally regarded as a greeting film for the synchronous summer Olympics in 
                                                        
330  Jin Yimeng, born in 1970, Harbin, China. A Chinese female director educated in the U. S. with a Master‘s 
degree in film production. 
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Beijing. However the film traces back to the radical period to reflect the hardship of 
Chinese athletes in the past, which again largely relates to far-left politics. The story is 
set in the 1960s about two boys (Yue and Gao, both around twelve) who are in 
training for competitive swimming in a city sports school. Each time Yue takes the 
first prize at matches, Gao is second. Soon afterwards, at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution Yue‘s father dies of a heart attack in a political struggle and Yue is forced 
to move to a rural area without even a swimming pool. But he does not give up 
swimming and meets a girl, Bai who loves swimming as well. Eight years later, Yue 
(in his twenties) gets back to the sports school with Bai enrolled as well. At that time 
Gao‘s father has become the leader of the city‘s revolution committee. In the selection 
trials for the district, Gao is still defeated by his mate Yue, but Gao‘s father swings his 
weight to let Gao replace Yue in being selected to the national team. Simultaneously 
Gao manages to seize Bai‘s love from Yue. Here the film returns to the old wine of the 
Xie Jin model of the 1980s and tries to produce a negative impression of the radicals 
(leftists) who are usually depicted as greedy, rascally, incompetent and shady.. It is not 
surprising that Sailfish was smoothly released on the domestic market during the 
course of the Olympics. Perhaps with a joyful memory of the Olympic Games, the 
bad pain of the radical past can be reconfirmed through nostalgia. Similarly the film 
repeats the happy ending represented in The University Entrance Exam 1977 and Xie 
Jin‘s Legend of Tianyun Mountain. It devotes itself to removing the scar. When the 
Cultural Revolution is over, Gao‘s father is divested of all authority and Yue 
eventually receives bumper harvests from both his career and his love. If so, such 
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nostalgia still remains on the right-leaning side and is tinted with subjective sarcasm 
about the radicals. This, if not a completely extreme attitude, is at least a peaceable 
―Right‖. 
 
Concerning the eclecticism of such an oppositional narrative structure, ―right‖ 
nostalgia is obviously suspected of bringing shame on a ―left‖ past. However, it is not 
the only way to disparage it. The other way is to humourize the past appearances of 
the radical politics, which seems intensified by A Tale of Two Donkeys (2009) and The 
Road (2006). 
 
A Tale of Two Donkeys, directed by Li Dawei
331
, is set in the mid 1970s and is 
a story of an educated young man, Ma Jie who was sent to work (rusticated) at a rural 
production team. Ma was originally a do-nothing lounger or trifler from an urban area. 
He likes reciting Ostrovsky‘s revolutionary sayings332 all day in a village lane. But in 
fact, Ma only takes advantage of such quotations to confess his love to Caifeng, a 
village girl. In the second half of the movie, Ma puts his badge (with Mao‘s image on 
it) awarded by the production team on Caifeng‘s chest so as to please her. With the 
excuse ―You‘ve got the badge on skew-whiff‖ he then adjusts it by touching her left 
breast. In this case, a strong sense of political honor has been degraded to an absurd 
rite of heavy petting. In The Road, when Laocui and Chunfen go into their bridal 
                                                        
331  Li Dawei, graduated in 1993 from the department of photography, Beijing Film Academy. 
332  ―Man‘s dearest possession is life. It is given to him but once, and he must live it so as to feel no torturing 
regrets for wasted years, never know the burning shame of a mean and petty past; so live that, dying he might 
say: all my life, all my strength were given to the finest cause in all the world – the fight for the Liberation of 
Mankind.‖ Nikolai Alexeevich Ostrovsky (271). 
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chamber, the intense sexual drive and love making movements make the whole 
furniture around the bed tremble. This then leads to a white statue of Chairman Mao 
on the bedside table being shaken off, in which a radical appearance with its rational 
spirit is covered, replaced, and redefined by an emotional libido and fades out from 
the contemporary mainstream discourse. 
 
Figure 18. A Badge with the Statue of Mao 
Either the revolutionary quotation or Mao‘s image can be read as a nostalgic 
appearance of the radical discourse in the past. Through the series of gut reactions, the 
original connotations of the signified (with its lofty ideals) behind the remake of the 
past signifier have disappeared without trace. Thus it is again a conservative criticism 
or a moderate irony towards the past left.  
 
8.4.4. Nostalgic Films by Way of Counter-culture 
 
If a nostalgic everyday (trivialization) could be called a purified history for the 
present, and a moderate criticism could be regarded as sort of subjective prejudice (on 
the part of the right) against the radical past, then both of them are probably suspected 
of distorting representations of the old days. This naturally leads to the question: are 
there any other film narratives existing in the contemporary cinema that attempt to 
adjust, revise, break through, or contradict such a whitewashed representation of the 
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past, which can be criticized for distortion? 
 
This section is trying to break away from a superficial debate on nostalgia and 
to find some other texts from the contemporary cinema, such as Unfinished Girl 
(Cheng Er
333
, 2007), 24 City (Jia Zhangke, 2008), and Gimme Kudos (Huang Jianxin, 
2005), in the hope of contrasting them with the one-sided (unilateral) lack of the 
second nostalgic wave and its depthless past remake. 
 
Properly speaking, the three films above are not really nostalgic films, since 
their narrative time-lines are set in the present. However, I would call them a ―realistic 
nostalgia‖ or ―spiritual nostalgia‖, because their modern stories all contain and imply 
certain retrospections of the past, of past revenge, past resplendence, and past spiritual 
life. As a result, by comparison, real life is not as happy as people imagine. One may 
even realize that nostalgia cannot screen the audiences from real life forever. 
 
Unfinished Girl tells a story about a young woman who is mentally ill and 
tries to uncover the unspeakable and amazing revelations of her brother-in-law‘s past 
experience, which leads him to confide his emotionally depressed monologue of the 
heart. The story is set in the present age. He Wei is an insurance salesperson and he 
loves his wife (Xiao Feng) beyond measure. Feng has a younger sister, Xiao Ke, who 
suffers from a brain tumour. Wei is very attentive to Ke and does almost everything 
                                                        
333  Cheng Er, graduated from the department of film directing, Beijing Film Academy, 1999. 
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for her. However it so happens that Ke finds from an old photo that her brother-in-law 
(Wei) has kept his childhood experience secret from his family. Accordingly she 
compels Wei to confess the truth by binding him to a chair with rope. It turns out that 
as a Little Red Guard, Wei killed Feng‘s parents with his own hands when he was 
around thirteen. Later on a sense of class hatred forced him to marry Feng, which 
places him in a position of conflict today: 
 
[He Wei:] You wonder why I killed your parents. […] How should I 
explain this to you? This is the power of hatred. I did hate your family, 
very much. You had a big house, with a yard and flowers, and a big 
iron gate. Your father wore his watch all day. Your mother liked being 
dressed up and wearing bed gowns. That night your gate was smashed 
up and I just passed by, so I walked in. All the flowers in the yard were 
destroyed by us early in the afternoon when we beat them and made 
them go down on their knees on broken glass. Suddenly I wanted to 
see what they looked like at night. Your father perhaps recognized me. 
He saw I was in a sweat, then asked if I want a drink, as if the 
afternoon incident had never happened. I was so angry. Your mother 
was asleep, peaceful and serene. And she was unexpectedly wearing 
that gown. I thrust my knife at her without hesitation, and added a 
thrust for each of them before leaving. 
 
Such recollection of the past is only represented at the end of the film by Wei‘s 
monologue. The three minute soliloquy, though it seems marginal (compared with the 
90 minute length), has become the most important part of the film. And what is more, 
a monologue has replaced those visual retrospections of nostalgia with the actor‘s 
lines. It then either evades or counteracts the predominance of the nostalgic intentions 
by the mainstream ideology through the visual media, and leads a conflict and hatred 
of the past to the scare and pain today.  
 
[He Wei:] At the same time I‘m also scared. I dread the night with its 
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nightmares. I feel shame at my behavior. For some time, I have even 
felt it would be good if I could be found guilty by the public for my 
offence. At least I would not be in a state of anxiety anymore. 
 
While such ―pain‖ of the present age is perhaps not all from a sense of guilt 
for a past radical behavior, but results as much from a spiritual loss of the past ideal 
twisted by a reformed (or to some extent, materialized) social climate at present. 
 
[He Wei:] Feng has changed me. It‘s true. Our life is quiet and peaceful. 
She has revised my mind. […] I flung myself at her. […] I‘m not going 
to repent of or do penance for it, but I just feel kindness is good. I fell 
in love with what I hated before. Understand? Every night when I‘m 
lying in bed, I want to talk to myself, the previous me when I was 
young. Your sister and I have a happy life. I am changed, changed into 
vulgarized trivialization. Now I love all of these, and I‘m reluctant to 
leave the vulgarization. 
 
Feng is He Wei‘s wife. Here, she may be understood metaphorically as an 
avatar of a happy marriage and the contemporary trivialized happy life. She has 
changed He Wei, as similar as those countless radical revolutionaries have been 
reclaimed by the Chinese reform and the colourful niceness of material realities since 
the late 1970s. They change into blankness, sloth, and cowardice as a result of an 
abundance of material possessions. At the end of the film, He Wei is no longer 
anxious, but his monologue has transferred the anxiety to thousands of audience that 
had come across the radical past. Those former Red Guards and Little Red Guards, 
who had ever firmly supported the leftist Maoism, could not help searching their souls 
today and asking themselves how their past revolutionary ideas have entangled with 
the contemporary reality. 
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Talking about the leading roles of the first nostalgic wave, Chapter 6 
mentioned, ―even today, the nostalgic narrative in contemporary Chinese cinema still 
lacks positive regard for the Zeitgeist of the masses‖. On the contrary, Unfinished Girl 
does not evade such a long forgotten theme; as a protagonist of the film, He Wei does 
represent millions of radical crowd and reflect their spiritual trauma by the reversal of 
the times. Such a retrospection does not rely on any past appearance, public history, or 
sensitive words like ―Cultural Revolution‖ or ―radicalism‖, but consists in a short and 
brief monologue. In this process, a historical past is not represented by any 
stereotyped visual impressions (as those good old days in normal nostalgia) or by any 
narrative prejudices misled by will power of the government, but is left open to every 
audience. 
 
24 City extends a past pain today as well. The film tells about the rise and fall 
of Chengdu Engine Works. Following Mao‘s wish to develop the Third-line 
Construction, the original Shenyang Aero-engine Works (in northeast China) with its 
3000 staff was relocated to Chengdu, Sichuan province (southwest) in 1958. Nearly 
fifty years later, the old defence industry enterprise was on the verge of bankruptcy in 
2005. In consequence, the main site of the factory (originally located in the city centre 
of Chengdu) was auctioned off to a real estate developer at the knock-down price of 
2.14 billion RMB. It now has been constructed into a new commercial housing estate, 
named the ―24 City‖. The film is not like Shanghai Dream with so many historical 
(superficial) images about a third-line factory. Instead, it turns its lens to the present 
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and focuses on the various living behaviours of its workers today. Some of them are 
getting old, and they have devoted the entirety of their life to the factory; some are 
about fifty years of age and in their prime, but have experienced being laid-off and 
penury through the process of reform; while some others are still young and full of 
vigor, they take over duties from their parents and try to realize their ambitions in the 
enterprise transformation… In the face of history and its relics, people with personal 
experiences do have different feelings and longings of their own. 24 City spurns any 
sense or inclinations of nostalgic aesthetics with superficial disguises, past appetites, 
visual consumption, and an unreal ―everyday‖ of the past. It returns to a real present 
and lets people tell their past story with the purpose of reconstructing a history 
through cinematic interviews. 
 
Gimme Kudos, literally means ―beg your praise‖ and is a contemporary story. 
One day a construction worker, Yang Hongqi, comes to the office of a newspaper. He 
wants the editors to publish a commendatory letter to praise him, for he has rescued a 
college girl from a rape. Such a request sounds ridiculous to Gu Guoge, a journalist of 
the newspaper, since the materialized reality of contemporary China had long ago 
broken away from the shackles of propaganda in spiritual commendation. As the 
investigation goes further, Gu finds that Yang‘s requirement is not for his own sake 
but for some facts he wishes to hide. In a cabin in the countryside, Gu meets Yang‘s 
father. The old man is lying on a sickbed and not long for the world. However, his 
spirit rises at the journalist‘s arrival. The old man gladly guides him around his past 
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reflected glory. It turns out that the room is full of medals and certificates of merit that 
were awarded to him for his former achievements. Yang‘s father hopes his son can 
also get a commendation to extend his spirit before he dies but things do not turn out 
as he wishes. At the end of the film, the praise is eventually published by the 
newspaper, but the old man has already passed away. In front of Gu who brings the 
newspaper Yang just said, ―I don‘t need it any more‖. Here Yang‘s word potentially 
separates the ―praise‖ (certain past spiritual discourse) from the present reality and 
brands it with an outdated name. Conversely it in return reflects the reality – if 
contemporary China no longer needs good people, good deeds and positive 
commendations, then, except for desires, is there any other spirit left in the 
materialized communism? – that in this sense can be called a ―spiritual nostalgia‖. 
 
All of the three films contain a counter-cultural sense in comparison with a 
general nostalgia. They are set in the contemporary reality, in other words these films 
have been in defiance of representing nostalgic appearances, and have not intended to 
cover any particularity of history through the nostalgic everyday. However the films 
conversely tend to highlight the influence of the past on a contemporary society and 
its individuals, to show a real (present) reality as a result of history. Their narratives 
have neither paid close attention to the criticized trauma of the past which left the 
―right‖ with a feeling of deep hurt nor responded to radical politics with illiberal 
attitudes. They trained their camera lens on the ordinary people – the Red Guards, the 
working-class and the revolutionary crowd who went through the whole journey of 
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the radical period – to explore the spiritual pulse and living status of those people 
today. He Wei (in Unfinished Girl) looks very healthy, but inside he is smouldering 
with revenge, crime and dread. He acknowledges that his ideal is consistently being 
encroached upon by the real world and becoming commonplace. The laid-off workers 
in 24 City have quietly faced their individual destiny in the face of the factory‘s rise 
and fall. Yang‘s father (in Gimme Kudos) has lived all his life in the spiritual kudos of 
―serve the people‖334, but his son must beg for praise in the materialized present. It 
has proved that film art has the power to combine (integrate) the public experiences 
together with a social history, by which a personal rough and tumble of the masses 
will never be written off from history. 
 
To perceive the present as a result of history is a totally different way of 
thinking, from the ―nostalgic everyday‖ or ―peaceable right‖ that usually remake a 
history from certain limitations or biases of some preoccupied past appearances. 
Comparatively speaking, focusing on a result of history (or the present) seems much 
more open than a remade nostalgic stereotype (by the past flatness), and it leaves the 
understanding of a past to each of the individuals with independent thinking. 
Furthermore this provides a reminder of the shortage of nostalgia that, under the 
circumstance of consumer society, the superficial visualization is not the only way to 
reconstruct a history. If to see a superficial nostalgia as a secluded beautification of 
past, then a spiritual nostalgia (in the three films above) can indeed convey the pain to 
                                                        
334  ―为人民服务‖ one of the most influential quotations by Mao, which often recurred on all kinds of certificates 
of commendation in the radical past of China. 
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the common people today. 
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 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has discussed a general thread of nostalgic representation in 
contemporary Chinese cinema since 1993. Two filmmaking periods of local 
nostalgia are divided through discussion. The first phase, namely the first nostalgic 
wave, is the early 1990s. It is a retrospection of the radical past of China‘s modern 
history by the fifth generation directors. In general, the so-called first wave can be 
also called certain political nostalgia. Chinese ―politics‖ in nostalgia are not the 
authors‘ personal interests, but the cultural climate in the 1990s. However, such a 
trend was derived more from overseas. This can be testified by the films‘ exclusion 
from the domestic box-office and their passionate foreign audience and investors. 
Owing to strict censorship in Chinese cinema at that time, we may definitely assume 
that the first wave indeed was only pseudo-nostalgia for Chinese audiences. Those 
presentational reconstructions of the past by visual signs have, on the one hand, 
made a distorted history stand out through postmodern culture; and on the other hand, 
satisfied a global illusion and foreign aesthetic demand for radical narrative and 
orientalism. In a sense, those films invested in overseas may be seen as nostalgic 
extension from a Western perspective. The true (contemporary) nostalgia that 
belongs to the Chinese public did not appear until 2005 onwards, and can be called 
the second phase of local nostalgia. Only then, have the years of economic 
development in China accumulated and prepared adequate (postmodern) consumer 
elements and cultural references for its mainland audience, local market, and artists. 
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The emergence of the second nostalgic wave proves a local potential for ―past‖ 
cultural consumption. It also predicates that contemporary China has entered into a 
visual-appearance featured, postmodern consumer society. 
 
When David Ray Griffin introduced postmodern theories to China in 1995, 
he was so enthusiastic about such a wonderful hope: 
 
Our original intention consists in learning, from the study of those 
lessons of Western mistakes, whether China can avoid destructive 
effects brought by modernization. If so, China has been effectively 
―post-modernized‖. (13)335 
 
Unfortunately, the actual circumstances reflected from nostalgia films of the 
recent twenty years of China are quite contrary. China may not necessarily 
implement a post-modernity by avoiding Western detours. Instead, either it places 
itself in a fawning position, actively caters for a Western taste of nostalgia, and 
gradually distorts its own past; or it follows the old Western road and strides forward 
to a consumer society by economic modernization. It is then inevitably trapped in the 
onrush of consumption in a postmodern spectacle. This is why China‘s cultural 
studies can more and more clearly find their grounds of argument in contemporary 
Western cultural theories. As far as Chinese nostalgia is concerned, it is not purely 
derived from the West. However, the discussion proves that nostalgia film in China 
has come close to what Jameson called postmodern elements. That not only indicates 
that China‘s nostalgic culture has increasingly been engulfed in the globalization, but 
                                                        
335  “我们的出发点是：中国可以通过了解西方世界所做的错事，避免现代化所带来的破坏性影响。这样
做的话，中国实际上是‘后现代化’了。” 
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also hints at a postmodern trend of its whole society. If postmodernism in China is 
showing game playing between elite domination and mass culture, then a nostalgic 
post-modernity may equally take on a double-edged effect. Through the 
reconstruction of past visual signs, it fluctuates between a whitening function and a 
subverting position. In brief, past appearances in nostalgia are reflecting assorted 
standpoints of the contemporary social culture of people. Thus, nostalgia does not 
just predicate historical concerns, but it provides reliable clues for understanding 
contemporary culture.
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 Filmography 
 
24 City (Ershisi cheng ji, Jia Zhangke, 2008,) 《24 城记》 
 
A Brighter Summer Day (Edward Yang, 1991) 《牯岭街少年杀人事件》 
 
A Tale of Two Donkeys (Zou zhe qiao, Li Dawei, 2008) 《走着瞧》 
 
A.V. (Ho-Cheung Pang, 2005) 《青春梦工厂》 
 
American Graffiti (Lucas, 1973)  
 
An Orphan Joins the Army (Sanmao congjun ji, Zhang Jianya, 1993) 《三毛从军记》 
 
Back to The Future trilogy, The (1985/1989/1990)  
 
Beijing Bastards (Beijing zazhong, Zhang Yuan, 1993) 《北京杂种》 
 
Beijing Bicycle (Shiqi sui de danche, Wang Xiaoshuai, 2001)《十七岁的单车》 
 
Blue Kite (Lan fengzheng, Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993) 《蓝风筝》 
 
Blue Velvet (David Lynch, 1986)  
 
Cape No. 7 (Te-Sheng Wei, 2008) 《海角七号》 
 
Chinatown (Polanski, 1974)  
 
Crazy Stone (Fengkuang de shitou, Ning Hao, 2006) 《疯狂的石头》 
 
Curse of the Golden Flower (Man cheng jin dai huangjinjia, Zhang Yimou, 2006)  
《满城尽带黄金甲》 
 
Da Jue Zhan trilogy (Da jue zhan, Wei Lian etc, 1990) 《大决战》 
 
Dam Street (Hong yan, Li Yu, 2005) 《红颜》 
 
Days of Being Wild (Kar Wai Wong, 1990) 《阿飞正传》 
 
Devils on the Doorstep (Guizi laile, Jiang Wen, 2000) 《鬼子来了》 
 
Dirt (Toufa luanle, Guan Hu, 1994) 《头发乱了》 
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Dream Factory (Jiafang yifang, Feng Xiaogang, 1997) 《甲方乙方》 
 
East Palace West Palace (Donggong xigong, Zhang Yuan, 1996) 《东宫西宫》 
 
Fallen Angels (Kar Wai Wong, 1995) 《堕落天使》 
 
Farewell My Concubine (Bawang bieji, Chen Kaige, 1993) 《霸王别姬》 
 
Forever Enthralled (Mei lan fang, Chen Kaige, 2008) 《梅兰芳》 
 
Forrest Gump (R. Zemeckis, 1994)  
 
Gimme Kudos (Qiuqiu ni biaoyang wo, Huang Jianxin, 2005) 《求求你表扬我》 
 
Gladiator (Ridley Scott, 2000)  
 
Happy Together (Kar Wai Wong, 1997) 《春光乍泄》 
 
Hero (Yingxiong, Zhang Yimou, 2002) 《英雄》 
 
Hibiscus Town (Furong zhen, Xie Jin, 1986) 《芙蓉镇》 
 
House of Flying Daggers (Shi mian mai fu, Zhang Yimou, 2004) 《十面埋伏》 
 
If You Are the One (Fei cheng wu rao, Feng Xiaogang, 2008) 《非诚勿扰》 
 
In the Heat of the Sun (Yangguang canlan de rizi, Jiang Wen, 1994) 《阳光灿烂的日
子》 
 
Indiana Jones series, The (Steven Spielberg, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1992, and 2008)  
 
Jean de Florette (Claude Berri, 1985)  
 
Ju Dou (Zhang Yimou, 1989) 《菊豆》 
 
Keep Cool (You hua hao hao shuo, Zhang Yimou, 1997) 《有话好好说》 
 
La Chinoise (Jean-Luc Godard, 1967) 《中国姑娘》 
 
Laborer‟s Love (Laogong zhi aiqing, 1922) 《掷果缘/劳工之爱情》 
 
Legend of Tianyun Mountain (Tianyunshan chuanqi, Xie Jin, 1980) 《天云山传奇》 
 
Les Chinois à Paris (Jean Yanne, 1974)  
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Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels (Guy Ritchie, 1998)  
 
Lost in Beijing (Pingguo, Li Yu, 2007) 《苹果》 
 
Mr. Wang‟s Burning Desires (Wangxiansheng zhi yuhuo fenshen, Zhang Jianya, 1994) 
《王先生之欲火焚身》 
 
My Memories of Old Beijing (Chengnan jiushi, Wu Yigong, 1982) 《城南旧事》 
 
Not One Less (Yige dou buneng shao, Zhang Yimou, 1999) 《一个都不能少》 
 
Once Upon a Time in America (Sergio Leone, 1984)  
 
Patton (Franklin J. Schaffner, 1970)  
 
Peacock (Kongque, Gu Changwei, 2005) 《孔雀》 
 
Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994)  
 
Pushing Hands (Ang Lee, 1992) 《推手》 
 
Raise the Red Lantern (Da hong denglong gaogao gua, Zhang Yimou, 1991) 《大红
灯笼高高挂》 
 
Red Sorghum (Hong gao liang, Zhang Yimou, 1987) 《红高粱》 
 
Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles (Qianli zou danqi, Zhang Yimou, 2005) 《千里
走单骑》 
 
Sailfish (Qi yu, Jin Yimeng, 2008) 《旗鱼》 
 
Set Off (Jiri qicheng, Liu Jiang, 2008) 《即日起程》 
 
Shanghai Dream (Qing hong, Wang Xiaoshuai, 2005) 《青红》 
 
Shanghai Triad (Yao a yao yao dao wai po qiao, Zhang Yimou, 1995) 《摇啊摇摇到
外婆桥》 
 
Snatch (Guy Ritchie, 2000)  
 
Sparkling Red Star (Shanshan de hongxing, Li Ang and Li Jun, 1974) 《闪闪的红
星》 
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Springtime in a Small Town (Xiao cheng zhi chun, Fei Mu, 1948) 《小城之春》 
 
Springtime in a Small Town (Xiao cheng zhi chun, Tian Zhuangzhuang, 2002) 《小城
之春》 
 
Summer Palace (Yi he yuan, Lou Ye, 2006) 《颐和园》 
 
Sunflower (Xiang ri kui, Zhang Yang, 2005) 《向日葵》 
 
Suzhou River (Su zhou he, Lou Ye, 2000) 《苏州河》 
 
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhiqu weihushan, Xie Tieli, 1970) 《智取威虎
山》 
 
Peach Blossom (Tao hua can lan, Fu Huayang, 2005) 《桃花灿烂》 
 
Teeth of Love (Aiqing de yachi, Zhuang Yuxin, 2007) 《爱情的牙齿》 
 
Temptress Moon (Feng yue, Chen Kaige, 1996) 《风月》 
 
The Battleship Potemkin (Sergei Eisenstein, 1925)  
 
The Birth of New China (Kai guo da dian, Li Qiankuan and Xiao Guiyun, 1989) 《开
国大典》 
 
The Black Cannon Incident (Hei pao shijian, Huang Jianxin, 1985) 《黑炮事件》 
 
The Conformist (Bertolucci, 1969)  
 
The Emperor and the Assassin (Jing ke ci qin, Chen Kaige, 1998) 《荆轲刺秦》 
 
The Forest Ranger (Tian gou, Qi Jian, 2006) 《天狗》 
 
The Founding of a Republic (Jian guo da ye, Han Sanping and Huang Jianxin, 2009) 
《建国大业》 
 
The Godfather: Part II (Francis Ford Coppola, 1974)  
 
The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, Lu Xuechang, 1997) 《长大成人》 
 
The Message (Fengsheng, Chen Guofu and Gao Qunshu, 2009) 《风声》 
 
The Promise (Wuji, Chen Kaige, 2005) 《无极》 
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The Road (Fangxiang zhilu, Zhang Jiarui, 2006) 《芳香之旅》 
 
The Road Home (Wode fuqin muqin, Zhang Yimou, 2000) 《我的父亲母亲》 
 
The Society of the Spectacle (Guy Debord, 1973)  
 
The Story of Liu Bao (Liu bao de gu shi, Wang Ping, 1957) 《柳堡的故事》 
 
The Sun Also Rises (Taiyang zhaochang shengqi, Jiang Wen, 2007) 《太阳照常升
起》 
 
The Tunnel Warfare (Di dao zhan, Ren Xudong, 1966) 《地道战》 
 
The University Entrance Exam 1977 (Gao kao 1977, Jiang Haiyang, 2009) 《高考
1977》 
 
Tiananmen (Ye Daying, 2009) 《天安门》 
 
To Live (Huo zhe, Zhang Yimou, 1994) 《活着》 
 
Together (He ni zaiyiqi, Chen Kaige, 2002) 《和你在一起》 
 
Troy (Wolfgang Petersen, 2004)  
 
Unfinished Girl (Di san ge ren, Cheng Er, 2007) 《第三个人》 
 
Unknown Pleasures (Ren xiaoyao, Jia Zhangke, 2002) 《任逍遥》 
 
Where Have All the Flowers Gone ( Nashi huakai, Gao Xiaosong, 2002) 《那时花
开》 
 
Woman Demon Human (Ren gui qing, Huang Shuqin1987) 《人鬼情》 
 
Xiao Wu (Zhangke Jia, 1998) 《小武》 
 
Xin Jie Kou (Xue Cun, 2006) 《新街口》 
 
Yellow Earth (Huang tudi, Chen Kaige, 1985) 《黄土地》 
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